REIMAGINING THE NATION-STATE:

LANGUAGE, EDUCATION AND MINORITY RIGHTS

Stephen Andrew May

A thesis submitted to the University of Bristol in accordance with the requirements of the degree of PhD in the Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Sociology.

December, 1997

Abstract

This account explores the sociological and political legitimacy of minority group rights within modern nation-states, particularly with regard to language and education. While sociological in focus, it draws in addition upon political theory, sociolinguistics, education, history and law in order to explore fully the issues which pertain to such rights, their mobilisation, and the potential consequences for the present and future organisation of nation-states.

In so doing, debates on ethnicity, its social construction, and its validity as a form of social identification and political mobilisation are highlighted. Parallel discussions on nationalism and national identity are also explored. In both instances, the position adopted is that ethnic and national identities are to some extent constructed phenomena but that they are also *material* forms of life which, for many, continue to constitute significant forms of individual and collective identity. Liberal-communitarian debates in political theory are also explored with regard to the exclusion of cultural membership from the theory and practice of liberal-democracies, leading to the cultural and linguistic disenfranchisement of minorities within modern nation-states. The links between language and identity, and the role of mass education in reinforcing a common language and culture, are given particular attention here, both with regard to the historical construction of modern nation-states and their contemporary political consequences for minority groups.

Various case examples are discussed throughout, including Ireland, France, the USA, and Québec. However, the case of Wales is explored at length, particularly with regard to its historic and contemporary nationalisms, its ongoing debates around language and national identity, and its recent development of a nascent Welsh/English bilingual state framework. As part of this extended case study, new empirical research is conducted on language attitudes to Welsh, and to bilingualism. The data highlight that while the development of state bilingual policy in Wales has considerable support at a general level, specific aspects of such policy, and the minority rights which attach to them, remain more contested. This is particularly so when bilingual policy developments are seen to impinge on the notion of individual rights. Nonetheless, Wales can be said to provide an instructive model of how nation-states may be reorganised, or reimagined, to accommodate a greater recognition of minority language and education rights. This process involves imbuing political democracy, as currently constructed, with a greater recognition and accommodation of ethnocultural and ethnolinguistic democracy for minority groups.

TO JANET

Acknowledgements

Research (like life) never quite goes according to plan. I had originally intended this to be a comparative analysis of Wales and New Zealand, the latter being my own country. However, my increasing interest in Wales, and the increasing size of the project, have led me in what follows to concentrate almost exclusively on the Welsh case study. For the many in Wales who have assisted me to gain a better picture of what is currently going on there, I am most grateful. In particular, I would like to thank the following for their invaluable assistance: Colin Baker, Gwenan Williams, Siwan Richards, Len Jones, Bill Raybould, Janet Pritchard, Cen Williams, and Zac Davies. Diolch yn fawr iawn am eich cymorth.

I would also like to thank my friends and colleagues (the two are often hard to distinguish) here in the Sociology Department at Bristol. In particular, to Steve Fenton who combined his head of department and supervisory roles with great skill and panache and who, even more importantly, got me through the final days still (relatively) intact. To John Carter, Jackie West, Will Guy, Kieran Flanagan, Tom Osborne, Gail Hebson, Ruth Levitas and Rohit Barot for their interest and encouragement along the way. And to Jackie Bee, Elaine Escott and Sue Durbin for their unstinting administrative support.

Many thanks also to Nancy West, Mari Day, Ruth Kelso, Gwerfyl Jones, and Berwyn Prys Jones for their assistance in variously coding, transcribing and translating aspects of the empirical data. I would also like to acknowledge with gratitude the funding support provided for this research as a result of a New Zealand Postgraduate Scholarship, an ORS Award, a Michael Hiatt Baker Award from the University of Bristol, and a Tripp Travelling Scholarship from Christs' College.

And finally, to my family. To Ella, whose recent arrival in this world has made me realise that there is far more to life than just academia (and that there are more profitable and enjoyable reasons for losing sleep!). But most of all, to Janet -- not only for making this all possible, but also for making it all worthwhile.

Declaration

I declare that this thesis is my own work and that the views expressed here are my own and not those of the University of Bristol.



Stephen May

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF TABLES

The Lost

We are the lost people.
Tracing us by our language
you will not arrive where we are
which is nowhere. The wind
blows through our castles; the chair
of poetry is without a tenant.
We are exiles within
our own country; we eat our bread
at a pre-empted table. 'Show us',
we supplicate, 'the way home',
and they laughing hiss at us:
'But you are home. Come in
and endure it.' Will nobody
explain what it is like
to be born lost? We have our signposts
but they are in another tongue.
If we follow our conscience
it leads us nowhere but to gaol.
The ground moves under our feet;
our one attitude is vertigo.
'And a little child' the Book tells us
'shall lead them.' But this one
has a linguistic club
in his hand with which, old as we are,
he trounces and bludgeons us senseless.

(R.S. Thomas, 1995: 14)

INTRODUCTION

> To be truly modern we are told, one must belong to a nation, better still to a nation-state. (C. Williams, 1994: 1)

We live today, as we have now for some centuries, in the era of the nation-state. The nation-state remains the bedrock of the political world order, exercising internal political and legal jurisdiction over its citizens, and claiming external rights to sovereignty and self-government in the present inter-state system. But the nation-state is also under increasing pressure -- both from above and below. From above, the inexorable rise of globalisation, along with the burgeoning influence of multi-national companies and supra-national political organisations, have required modern nation-states to re-evaluate the limits of their own political and economic sovereignty. From below, minority groups are increasingly exerting the right either to form their own nation-states -- as seen in various secessionist and irredentist movements around the world -- or for greater representation within *existing* nation-state structures. It is this last development, and its implications for the social, cultural and political organisation of nation-states, which are the principal focus of this account.

There are obvious advantages to the nation-state which help to explain its ongoing ascendancy. It liberates individuals from the tyranny of narrow communities, guarantees their personal autonomy, equality, and common citizenship, and provides the basis for a collectively shared way of life (Parekh, 1995a). Or at least it does so in theory. As such, it is often viewed as the apogee of modernity and progress -- representing in clear political terms the triumph of universalism over particularism.

But the nation-state also excludes as much as it includes -- most notably, via its central requirement that all its citizens adopt a common language and culture for use in the civic realm. The imposition of a uniform national language and culture, and the ideology underlying it, may be described as the 'philosophical matrix of the nation-state' (see Chapters 2 & 3). However, minorities are increasingly beginning to question and contest the principles and effects of this matrix, the latter as a result of the long historical proscription of minority languages and cultures that has usually attended it. In the process, the public discourse on national identity, its parameters, and its constituent elements, are opened up for debate. In short, the nation-state is being asked, even forced, to *reimagine* itself along more plural and inclusive lines.

As I will argue, nation-states must attend to these debates, and the questions and consequences that ensue from them, if they are to continue as the major basis of social and political organisation in the next century. They must do so for two reasons. If minority demands for greater representation and inclusion within the nation-state are not met they may lead, in turn, to secessionist pressures and the potential fragmentation of the nation-state. Given the likely consequences of such fragmentation, and the hardening of ethnic and national boundaries which normally ensues, we should avoid this wherever we can. The spectres of the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda are sufficient reasons alone for doing so. However, there is also a positive dimension to this. If nation-states are reimagined in more plural and inclusive ways, there is greater potential for the recognition of not only political democracy but *ethnocultural* and *ethnolinguistic* democracy as well. Thus, far from undermining democratic principles -- a common assumption among liberal commentators, as we will see -- the accommodation of minority rights may well *extend* them.

Before proceeding further, a few caveats are in order. It should be stated from the outset that I am committed both to the extension of minority rights and, concomitantly, to a greater recognition of cultural and linguistic plurality within modern nation-states. On this basis, some critics might suggest that my argument is a 'moralistic' one rather than a form of 'disinterested' academic enquiry (see, for example, Edwards, 1985: 144). I do not accept this critique nor the distinction on which it is based. *All* positions that are taken on ethnicity and nationalism -- academic or otherwise -- involve a moral dimension, reflecting the particular values and ideologies of their exponents. Ideology is not the sole preserve of nationalists or minority 'ethnic

spokespersons', although it is often painted as such. Seen in this light, the equation of academic disinterestedness with scepticism towards, and/or criticism of ethnicity and nationalism may be seen for what it is -- an ideological move in the politics of ethnicity, nothing more. Indeed, as I will argue, such a move often acts to reinforce the hegemony of dominant ethnic groups within nation-states.

Second, and more broadly, this position is consonant with debates in critical theory on the *situatedness* of any academic inquiry. As I have argued elsewhere (May, 1994, 1998a), all research is value-laden and, as such, a researcher *must* begin from a theoretical position of some description, whether this is articulated or not in the ensuing study. Accordingly, it is better to state one's position at the start than to cloak it in the guise of apparent neutrality. Not only that, critical social research, of which the following forms a part, is not content with the interpretive concern of 'describing' a social setting 'as it really is', since this assumes an objective, 'common sense' reality where none exists. Rather, this 'reality' should be viewed as a social and cultural *construction*, linked to wider power relations, which privileges some, and disadvantages other participants. The discourses of ethnicity, nationalism and minority rights are prime sites where such power relations are articulated and outworked.

On a more technical note, since much of what follows is also concerned with the particular roles and functions of minority languages within modern nation-states, and the questions of their status, use and value, I have deliberately chosen not to follow the usual publishing procedure of italicising non-English words and phrases. This is not to imply their subsumption within English. Rather, it aims to act as a visual metaphor for a central tenet of my account -- that the *normalisation* of minority languages within the public domain is a legitimate and defensible sociological and political activity.

Overview

I begin in Chapter 1 by highlighting the pejorative perception of ethnicity -- and, by extension, minority ethnic groups -- apparent in much academic and political discourse. This is primarily a result, I suggest, of the unfavourable juxtaposition of ethnicity with the nation-state -- the one associated with primitivism and particularism, the other associated with modernity and

universalism. From this, I proceed to explore in detail the various academic debates on ethnicity and, in particular, the broad polarisation between 'primordial' and 'situational' perspectives which marks the field. The former ascribes to ethnicity an enduring, intrinsic character that is associated with, and determined by particular objective cultural characteristics -- the 'cultural stuff' of ethnicity such as language, ancestry and history. The latter rejects this position as essentialist and argues instead for the social and political constructedness of ethnicity, its fluidity and malleability, and its instrumental mobilisation to particular political ends.

It is clear from these debates that a situational account of ethnicity has, and is seen to have far greater veracity than primordialism -- a conclusion with which I broadly concur. However, my own position is that the primordial/situational dichotomy is in the end unhelpful and unnecessary and that one can, and should, combine elements of the two. Thus, ethnicity needs to be viewed as *both* constructed and contingent, *and* as a social, political and cultural form of life -- a Durkheimian social fact, in effect. Adopting this position allows for a more adequate exploration of the constitutive elements of ethnicity, the varied forms of its political expression and mobilisation, and their complex interconnections. To this end, I employ Bourdieu's (1977, 1990a, 1990b, 1991) notion of 'habitus' and Anthony Smith's (1981, 1986, 1991, 1995) concept of 'ethnie' as a useful means by which to theorise this position.

I take much the same stance in Chapter 2 which examines parallel debates on nationalism and the construction (and constructedness) of nation-states. Here, I am inclined to broadly agree with modernist accounts of nationalism which point to the formation of nation-states as a specific product of eighteenth and nineteenth century nationalisms and the related processes of industrialisation and modernisation. Conversely, the claims of many nationalists -- that nations have always existed in one form or another, and that (like ethnicity) they are determined by certain cultural characteristics, are clearly untenable. However, I suggest again that a middle position may be a more helpful way forward here since the principal disadvantage of a modernist perspective is its failure to account adequately for the *ongoing* influence of ethnicity and nationalism in the modern world. After all, if modernism has now largely been achieved, and the nation-state is its apogee, so too should ethnic and national movements have atrophied. And yet this is clearly not the case.

This central weakness of modernist accounts here is attributable to the valorisation of the 'legal-political' dimensions of the nation-state over the 'cultural-historical' -- that is, the perception of the nation-state as principally a political rather than an ethnocultural community (when in fact it is both). This in turn arises from the modernist concern to disavow *any* link between ethnicity and nationalism. However, such a position conflates the nation and the state. In so doing, it fails to explore adequately the differential power relations that underlie the representation of the language and culture of the dominant ethnie *as that* of the *civic* culture of the nation-state. The result is the marginalisation of a range of sociological minorities within modern nation-states whose languages and cultures are consigned to the private sphere.

The claims of minorities are explored further in Chapter 3 in relation to political theory, particularly with regard to the various arguments surrounding the merits of individual and group-differentiated rights. This debate has largely been polarised around, on the one hand, the tenets of orthodox liberalism and, on the other hand, the claims of communitarianism. Much of the debate, as perhaps one might expect, favours the former over the latter. Individual rights, which are associated with citizenship and the apparent neutrality of the civic realm, are valorised for their universalism, their protection of fundamental liberal freedoms, and their strict impartiality. Group-differentiated rights are viewed far more sceptically, often hostily by liberal commentators. They are most often associated with particularism and the potential illiberality that may result -- some would argue, *always* results -- when one apportions rights differently between groups.

My own position, following Iris Young (1993) and Will Kymlicka (1995a), is that group-differentiated rights are defensible as long as they retain within them the protection of individual liberties. Of course, combining the two is not always easy. Nonetheless, I argue that such an alternative is necessary because the present articulation of individual rights within political liberalism implicitly, and at times explicitly, supports the hegemony of the dominant ethnie within nation-states. In developing an argument for group-differentiated rights, I also distinguish here between the rights that might be attributable to national, ethnic, and other social/cultural minorities. While I argue that all such groups should have greater representation within the civic realm of the nation-state, only national minorities can claim the right to *formal* representation, given their status as historical ethnies. By way of example, I discuss the current positioning of

indigenous minorities (who may be equated with national minorities) within nation-states, and in relation to international law.

Chapters 4 and 5 examine the various debates outlined thus far with particular reference to language. Chapter 4 explores the relationship between particular languages and the ethnic and national identities with which they are (or have been) associated. In line with my previous discussions on ethnicity and nationalism, I argue here that language is not a *necessary* marker of such identities, as can be clearly seen in the growing prevalence of 'minority language shift' (Fishman, 1991). The loss of Irish and its replacement by English in Ireland, provides an example here which I discuss at some length. However, I also critique the view that language is *peripheral* to identity and the related implication that minority language shift is an inevitable, voluntary and beneficial process for minority groups. Rather than being about 'modernisation', as it is often constructed, this process is more often about differential power relations than anything else. Bourdieu's (1982, 1991) notions of 'cultural capital', 'linguistic capital', 'symbolic violence' and 'misrecognition' provide an explanatory framework for this discussion -- particularly with regard to the differential apportionment of status and value between dominant and minority languages. The ascendancy of the former is principally achieved, I suggest, by their legitimation and institutionalisation within nation-states. I illustrate this via a discussion of the development of French as the national language of France, and in relation to English as the current lingua franca, or world language.

Chapter 5 explores the links between education and minority language policy. Since education plays a key role within modern nation-states it *can* be used effectively to promote a minority language. That said, it is also acknowledged that education cannot *by itself* effect language change, or reverse language shift. Various approaches to minority language policy are examined here, ranging from the complete disavowal of minority languages to their formal inclusion within all significant institutional and language domains of the nation-state. The specific debates surrounding minority language education, and the controversies which ensue from them, are highlighted by an extended discussion of the English Only movement in the USA and by a briefer examination of Québec's French language laws.

Chapters 6-8 examine the case of Wales, and in particular the development of Welsh bilingual policy, as an example of the key issues outlined in preceding chapters. Chapter 6 explores the contested debates surrounding Welsh national identity both within the wider British state and within Wales itself. The prominence of cultural nationalism and the complex dialectic between the Welsh language and Welsh identity are highlighted here. Chapter 7 discusses recent developments in Wales which have led to the nascent development of a bilingual state, and the close interrelationship between language and education policies that underpins it. Chapter 8 provides an empirical analysis of attitudes to such developments via a language attitude survey of 494 teacher trainees in Wales. Drawing on the tenets of language attitude research, the analysis combines both quantitative and qualitative dimensions in order to explore attitudes to minority language policy in Wales, and the views associated with them. The data highlight a tension between, on the one hand, strong support for such policies at a general level and, on the other, ongoing controversy and contest with regard to the implications of more specific aspects of such policy. The latter, I suggest, is to a large extent attributable to the tensions that continue to surround debates about individual and group-differentiated rights with regard to minority languages and cultures.

The concluding chapter reiterates my position that minority language rights are both sociologically and politically defensible and argues that the nation-state be *reimagined* to accommodate greater cultural and linguistic diversity. While continuing to uphold the importance of citizenship and individual rights, it is my contention that a greater accommodation of minority languages and cultures within the nation-state provides a more just representation of the (at times differing) interests of all its citizens. More pragmatically, such accommodation may become a political necessity, given the growing discontent with existing nation-state structures evident among minorities today. In short, nation-states may well be living increasingly on borrowed time. This account suggests a means by which they might extend it.

Chapter 1

EXPLORING ETHNICITY

This chapter will explore the various debates surrounding ethnicity, particularly as these have come to be expressed within the primordial/situational distinction. However, before doing so, I want to chart briefly the long-held pejorative perception of ethnicity in much academic and popular commentary. This predominantly negative view of ethnicity in both discourses, I suggest, arises from its unfavourable juxtaposition with the nation-state. For example, it is almost de rigeur now in academic discourse to view ethnicity as socially and politically constructed; an essentially anti-modern and regressive phenomenon that is mobilised instrumentally by particular groups to achieve certain (self-interested) political ends. Concomitantly, the 'cultural stuff' of ethnicity -- that is, the particular ancestry, culture, language and/or religion of the group(s) in question -- is regarded as largely fictive. As we will see, many academic commentators view ethnicity as simply a convenient construction of an ethnic group's *supposed* distinctiveness that is employed *retrospectively* to engender 'ethnic solidarity' as a basis for social and political action.

Popular commentary reflects a similarly sceptical bias towards ethnicity, albeit of a somewhat different kind. Fuelled by lurid media reports of the immolation attending yet another 'ethnic conflict', the wider public locate in ethnicity the principal cause of many of today's social and political problems. Places like Rwanda, Burundi, Sri Lanka, Northern Ireland, and the former Yugoslavia -- to name just a few contemporary examples -- suggest starkly the destructive and unproductive nature of ethnicity and ethnic mobilisation. Indeed, since the end of the Cold War, these 'ethnic conflicts', as they have come to be known, have been ascribed as the most common

source of political violence in the world (Gurr, 1993). Such developments are closely related, in turn, to the proliferation of a variety of 'ethnonational movements' -- movements based on ethnic affiliation which aim to establish a national state of their own and which may, but do not always, resort to violence to achieve their ends. The Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka, the separatist ETA movement (Euskadi ta Alkartasuna) in the Basque Country, the Parti Québécois in the Canadian province of Québec, Plaid Cymru (the Welsh Nationalist party) in Wales, and Republicans in Northern Ireland can all be cited as examples here. In addition, there are minority groups who, while not necessarily wanting to establish a state of their own, want greater recognition and representation within existing nation-states and agitate, sometimes violently, to this end. Most notable here, perhaps, are indigenous people groups such as the Māori of New Zealand, the Koori (Aboriginal peoples) of Australia, Sámi (Lapps), Inuit (Eskimos) and Native Americans.

Suffice it to say, that while these various developments present us with qualitatively different examples of ethnic minority affiliation and mobilisation,[1] they are all widely held to be negative phenomena. This is so *even when* such groups may be seen to have legitimate and supportable claims, as I will proceed to argue. In the following section, I want to outline how this negative perception of ethnicity has come to hold such sway, focusing in particular on the historical development of academic discourse in this area.

The denunciation of ethnicity

This widespread dismissal of the legitimacy and value of ethnicity as a form of social and political identification has been juxtaposed historically against the valorisation of *national* identity and the modern nation-state from which it springs. Nation-states are something to which we can legitimately give our allegiance it seems, but ethnic groups are not. Nation-states are embracing and cohesive whereas ethnic groups are exclusive and divisive. Nation-states represent modernity while ethnic groups simply represent a harping, misinformed and misguided nostalgia. Or so the story goes. Moreover, it is a story long told and with an impressive academic pedigree. In the nineteenth century, for example, the British liberal John Stuart Mill argued in *Representative Government*: 'Free institutions are next to impossible in a country made up of different nationalities. Among a people without fellow-feeling, especially if they read and speak different

languages, the united public opinion, necessary to the working of representative government, cannot exist' (1972: 361). Mill proceeds to elaborate on why he deems alternative ethnic affiliations to be so counter-productive to the political organisation of the nation-state. In so doing, he invokes a clear cultural hierarchy between different groups, arguing that smaller nationalities -- the equivalent of 'ethnic minorities' in modern political parlance -- should be assimilated into the nation-state *via* its 'national' culture; that is, the culture of the dominant (national) group:

> Experience proves it is possible for one nationality to merge and be absorbed in another: and when it was originally an inferior and more backward portion of the human race the absorption is greatly to its advantage. Nobody can suppose that it is not beneficial to a Breton, or a Basque of French Navarre, to be brought into the current of the ideas and feelings of a highly civilised and cultivated people -- to be a member of the French nationality, admitted on equal terms to all the privileges of French citizenship ... than to sulk on his own rocks, *the half-savage relic of past times*, revolving in his own mental orbit, *without participation or interest in the general movement of the world*. The same remark applies to the Welshman or the Scottish Highlander as members of the British nation [sic].[2] (1972: 395; my emphases)

Likewise, the French nationalist and historian, Michelet -- a near contemporary of Mill -- was to conclude of the French Revolution that: 'this sacrifice of the diverse interior nationalities to the great nationality which comprises them undoubtedly strengthened the latter.... It was at the moment when France *suppressed* within herself the divergent French countries that she proclaimed her high and original revelations' (1946: 286; my emphasis).[3] In this view then, an homogenous national identity -- reflected in the culture of the dominant national group and established by the processes of political nationalism -- should supersede and subsume alternative ethnic and/or national identities. As we shall see in Chapter 3, many modern liberals continue to hold to this position. However, the merits of the dominant group's culture tend to be emphasised less overtly in contemporary commentary (although the cultural hierarchy underpinning such assumptions remains). Rather, the argument is couched on the basis of defending two ostensibly key liberal democratic principles -- universal political citizenship, and the recognition of individual (as opposed to collective) rights. These two principles are seen as sufficient in themselves to repudiate the claims of other ethnic groups for greater social recognition in the public or civic realm of the nation-state (the private realm is seen as less problematic), and for associated political

recognition/representation (see, for example, Glazer & Moynihan, 1975; Porter, 1975; Gellner, 1983; Schlesinger, 1992; Hughes, 1993). But more on this later.[4]

As for Marxist commentary on the legitimacy of ethnicity as a basis for social and political mobilisation, Marx and Engels were themselves to adopt a remarkably similar position to their contemporary liberal commentators. In discussing the position of ethnic minorities, Marx and Engels drew on Hegel's distinction between nation and state -- equating the 'nation' directly with the modern nation-state and 'nationality' with ethnic groups, or ethno-cultural communities, which lacked a state of their own (Nimni, 1995). On this basis, Engels could observe:

> There is no country in Europe which does not have in some corner or other one or several fragments of peoples, the remnants of a former population that was suppressed and held in bondage by the nation [nation-state] which later became the main vehicle for historical development. These relics of nations [ethnic groups], mercilessly trampled down by the passage of history, as Hegel expressed it, *this ethnic trash* always become fanatical standard bearers of counter-revolution and remain so until their complete extirpation or loss of their national character, just as their whole existence in general is itself a protest against a great historical revolution. Such in Scotland are the Gaels.... Such in France are the Bretons.... Such in Spain are the Basques... (Marx & Engels, 1976a: 234-235; my emphasis)

The position of Marx and Engels vis-à-vis ethnic minorities arises from their somewhat contradictory views on nationalism. On the one hand, Marx and Engels argued, as one might expect, that the working classes were the motor of history. In *The Communist Manifesto*, Marx observes: 'The working men have no country ... National differences and antagonisms between peoples are daily more and more vanishing' (Marx & Engels, 1976b: 65). On the other hand, Marx and Engels also endorsed the nationalist causes of 'historic' nations where these were seen to facilitate and expedite the proletarian revolution. Thus Marx observes, again in *The Communist Manifesto*, that the struggle of the proletariat with the bourgeoisie is 'at first a national struggle' and that 'the proletariat of each country must, of course, first of all settle matters with its own bourgeoisie' (1976b: 60). In neither instance, however, were the claims of 'non-historic' nations or 'historyless peoples' (Geschichtslosen Völker) recognised -- that is, ethnic and/or national groups which lacked the 'historical vitality' to consolidate a national state of their own. As Nimni concludes in his lucid discussion of this question, 'Marx and Engels were, to put it mildly, impatient with and intolerant of ethnic minorities' (1995: 68; see also Guibernau,

1996: 13-21). In this regard, they were, like their liberal contemporaries, Mill and Michelet, very much a product of their times. Indeed, Hobsbawm (1990) argues that it is 'sheer anachronism' to criticise them for holding such views since they were shared by nearly all nineteenth century political theorists on both the right and the left.

And yet, having said this, Hobsbawm's views are not too dissimilar to his nineteenth century counterparts. Hobsbawm, for example, contrasts a positive unifying nineteenth century nationalism -- modelled on the French Revolution and located in the political formation of nation-states -- with a negative and divisive twentieth century variant, largely centred on ethno-cultural and linguistic differences (ethnonationalisms, in effect). This is clearly comparable with the distinction drawn by Marx and Engels between 'historic' and 'non-historic' nations, and the transitory and regressive nature attributed to the latter. Other Marxist commentators have been less sceptical about the legitimacy of ethnicity and ethnic mobilisation. Nonetheless, their analyses of ethnicity are predicated principally on the pre-eminent influence of capitalism and on the subsequent subsumption of ethnic and national relations within class relations (see, for example, Hechter, 1975; Wallerstein, 1979, 1983, 1991; Nairn, 1981; Hroch, 1985; Balibar, 1991).[5]

The rehabilitation of ethnicity?

More recently, postmodernists have developed what might be seen as a counter-argument to this broadly articulated modernist position on ethnicity. Postmodernists argue that the rise of globalisation[6] -- the next stage of the modernisation process -- has significantly undermined previous forms of identification and political mobilisation. In this view, modern nation-states are finding it more difficult to impose a uniform national identity in the increasingly global economy and culture of today's world. Consequently, a new decentred and 'hybridized' politics of identit*ies* is emerging (Harvey, 1989; Jamieson, 1991; Hall 1992a, 1992b; Robertson, 1992; Bhabha, 1994; Featherstone, 1991, 1995). In the place of the previous certainties of nationhood and national identity, local, ethnic and gender identities have now become the principal sites of postmodern politics. As Stuart Hall observes, the result is the simultaneous rise of new 'global' *and* new 'local' identities and the consequent proliferation of supra- and sub-national identities:

> Increasingly, the political landscapes of the modern world are fractured ... by competing and dislocating identifications.... National identities remain strong, especially with respect to such things as legal and citizenship rights, but local, regional, and community identities have become more significant. Above the level of the national culture, 'global' identifications begin to displace, and sometimes override, national ones. (1992a: 280, 302)

Post-modern analyses thus provide a space for the re-emergence of ethnicity as a valid social and political form of identification and mobilisation. However, ethnicity in this context faces some stiff competition. The fragmented, dispersed and decentred individual of the postmodern world is supposedly able to choose from a bewildering range of identity styles and forms of political mobilisation, and ethnicity, it seems, is just one of them. As I will argue in this chapter, this position significantly understates the key role that ethnicity often assumes in the processes of identity formation and social and political mobilisation. Relatedly, postmodernists may also have underestimated the salience and resilience of 'national cultures' in which liberal and Marxist commentators have historically placed such store. Michael Billig cogently argues, for example, that national allegiances cannot simply be exchanged like 'last year's clothes'. As he proceeds to observe:

> There is a sense of 'as if' in some versions of the postmodern thesis. It is as if the nation-state has already withered away; as if people's national commitments have been flattened to the level of consumer choice; as if millions of children in the world's most powerful nation [the USA] do not daily salute one, and only one, style of flag; as if, at this moment around the globe, vast armies are not practising their battle manoeuvres beneath national colours. (1995: 139; see also Miller, 1995; Smith, 1995a)

And so we come to a point where -- despite both consistent negative attribution, and confident predictions of its imminent demise, for over two centuries now -- ethnicity continues to persist and prosper in the modern world. Many contemporary liberals are confounded and dismayed by the resilience of ethnic ties, and the increasing advocacy of ethnic minority rights, within contemporary nation-states. Marxist commentators are similarly bemused by the emergent and ongoing claims of ethnonational movements in post-industrialist societies; a feature which the achievements of modernisation (and class-based politics) should have rendered obsolete. Likewise, postmodernists, while they rightly highlight the contingent and multiple aspects of identity formation, cannot explain adequately why ethnicity (and nationality) should so often 'trump' the competition. The salience of ethnicity may well vary from context to context and, as

we shall see, its inter-relationship with nationalism and national identity, and with other forms of social relations and social identity, may be complex, overlapping and at times contradictory. Nonetheless, ethnicity cannot be as easily discounted as we have been led to believe. Moreover, the rejection of ethnicity as a valid form of social and political action is in itself problematic. As I will proceed to argue in this account, if ethnicity has survived and prospered -- despite, it seems, insuperable odds -- this suggests that it has at least *some* basis in social reality. Ethnicity cannot *simply* be a convenient and largely fictive construction, although such elements are clearly apparent within it. The 'cultural stuff' of ethnicity -- ancestry, language, and culture -- *does matter* to a significant amount of people. Likewise, ethnicity has meaning not only at the level of social and political *mobilisation* but also as a principal form of individual and collective social *identity*. In short, and whether we like it or not, ethnicity continues to have a special claim on the individual and collective allegiances of many people in the world today and we need to understand why this should still be so.

Ethnicity and modernity

So what exactly is ethnicity and what are the key sociological questions which surround it? Before examining these questions in detail, I want to flag a central theme which should already be apparent from my discussion thus far and which pervades much of what will follow -- that is, ethnicity's complex and ambiguous relationship to modernity. There is a dualistic tension in much of the academic debate about ethnicity which posits 'ethnic groups', ironically, as at once both a modernist creation -- defined socially and politically by their *partial* incorporation into the modern nation-state -- and as essentially *anti-modern*. The former is signalled by the usual collocation of 'ethnic' and 'minority'. Indeed, most of the discourse concerning ethnicity still tends to concern itself primarily with subnational units, or minorities of some kind or another (Chapman *et al.* 1989). The latter is suggested by the unflattering comparison of ethnic (minority) groups as atavistic and regressive in contrast to the modernity of the nation-state; a position that is particularly evident in nineteenth century academic commentary, as we have seen, but is not exclusive to it. Thus, while these ethnic minority groups may argue that their apparently distinct ethnicity pre-dates their (incomplete) incorporation within the modern nation-state, ethnicity is generally viewed here as a *construction* of modernity -- a by-product, in effect, of the political,

cultural and ideational processes of nation-state formation -- rather than an antecedent to it. Yet, at the same time, ethnic claims for social and political recognition are rejected on the basis that they fail to reach or reflect appropriate standards of modernity! As I will argue in Chapter 2, both these assertions are problematic and have much to do with the primacy ascribed to political nationalism(s), and to its institutional embodiment in the modern 'nation-state', over the last two centuries. At this stage, however, it is enough to point out that this central dualism can be traced through much of the academic (as well as social and political) commentary on ethnicity.

Terminology

Not only that, it is also evident in the very terminology used, and the various attempts over the years to define both 'ethnicity' and 'ethnic group'. The first use of the term 'ethnicity' was attributed by Glazer & Moynihan (1975) to the American sociologist David Riesman in 1953, although other commentators suggest an earlier genesis in the 1940s (Sollors, 1989; Fishman, 1989a, 1997). Despite its apparent recency, however, ethnicity actually derives from the Greek word 'ethnos', meaning people or tribe. The equivalent term for ethnos in English -- 'ethnic' -- was used from the mid-fourteenth century to the mid-nineteenth century to describe someone as heathen or pagan (Williams, 1976).[7] This etymological association was subsequently to fit well with the pejorative construction of ethnic groups in relation to the nation-state. The related collocation of 'ethnic' and 'minority' is also reflective of this positioning since it assumes that majority groups are somehow not 'ethnic'; that they simply represent modernity, or the modern (civilised) way of life. However, as I will proceed to argue in this account *all* groups -- both minority and majority ones -- incorporate an ethnic dimension and the failure of the latter to recognise or acknowledge this has more to do with differential power relations between groups than with anything else.

Subsequent discussions of the term ethnicity in the social sciences continue to reflect these ambiguities and tensions. Isajiw (1980), for example, found in a review of 65 studies of ethnicity, that 52 gave *no* explicit definition of the concept. If a particular view of ethnicity was assumed in these studies, it tended by de facto to accord with the 'cultural stuff' of ethnicity -- ancestry language, and culture. This position is reflected in its broadest terms by Glazer & Moynihan's

much cited assertion that ethnicity is 'the character or quality of an ethnic group' (1975: 1). More recently, however, a view of ethnicity as *subjective* and *situational* has come to the fore; a position which has much to do with Barth's (1969) elaboration of ethnic *boundaries* and which is characterised by Eriksen's counter description of ethnicity as 'essentially an aspect of relationship, not a property of a group' (1993: 12).

These seemingly contradictory aspects of ethnicity are encapsulated within Max Weber's definition of the associated term 'ethnic group'. Weber argues that ethnic groups are 'those human groups that entertain a subjective belief in their common descent because of similarities of physical type or of customs or of both, or because of memories of colonisation and migration' (1961: 389). This definition highlights how ancestral, cultural, and at times racialised traits are commonly associated with particular ethnic groups, both by members of the groups themselves and by others.[8] However, along with these traits, Weber also specifically emphasises the subjective nature of ethnic group membership. For Weber, objective characteristics such as language and particular cultural practices do not in themselves constitute an ethnic group, they simply facilitate that group's formation. Rather, he stresses that it is the political community which engenders such sentiments of likeness, although ethnic bonds, once created, contribute in an ongoing way to the solidarity of the group (Guibernau, 1996).

Polarities and their like

Weber's formulation effectively highlights the countervailing dimensions of ethnicity, although he does not necessarily resolve them fully. However, this at least remains a better formulation than much subsequent academic commentary on ethnicity which, as with many debates in the social sciences, has tended towards a dichotomous approach. Accordingly, such analysis has largely been framed within and by the following kinds of polarities. Is ethnicity a pre-modern or a modern phenomenon? Is it an intrinsic attribute of human identity or a social construction that is mobilised to achieve certain political ends? Can it be defined by particular objective cultural attributes or is it subjectively maintained by shifting relational boundaries which allow groups to distinguish themselves one from another? Does it only apply to minority groups or does it encompass majority groups as well? Is ethnicity primarily material or symbolic, political or

cultural, voluntary or involuntary, individual or collective? These dichotomies overlap in many instances and may be summarised as follows:

Ethnicity as:

- primordial or situational
- intrinsic or instrumental
- content or boundaries
- objective or subjective
- category or group
- involuntary or voluntary
- individual or collective
- material or symbolic
- minority or majority

In the remainder of this chapter, I aim to critically evaluate these debates on ethnicity and the various oppositions to which they give rise. In so doing, I will frame my analysis within the bifurcated approach that has been largely characteristic of these discussions until now -- working, in particular, within the broad distinction commonly drawn between *primordial* and *situational* accounts of ethnicity. However, this should *not* be seen as endorsement of this practice. I adopt it here simply as a useful heuristic device in order to compare and contrast the various positions adopted in these debates. My own argument is that such an approach is unhelpful. Adopting an oppositional stance, though a favourite pastime of social scientists, inevitably results in a partial view of the phenomena analysed. Self evident as it may seem, the only sensible way forward is to endorse a middle ground -- combining, where appropriate, salient elements of traditionally bifurcated positions. As such, after presenting an overview of the relevant debates, I will conclude the chapter by arguing that Bourdieu's concept of 'habitus' and Anthony Smith's notion of 'ethnie', in combination, provide us with the means of developing a more integrative -- and, in the end, more adequate -- account of ethnicity. Such an account will also help to explain not only the continuing influence of ethnicity in the modern world but also its complex interconnections with nationalism and national identity, the subject of the next chapter. However,

in saying this, it should also be borne in mind that distinguishing ethnicity from nationalism and national identity is inevitably a somewhat arbitrary exercise, given their numerous interconnections. Accordingly, both this and the next chapter will demonstrate some degree of overlap in their thematic concerns.

Ethnicity as primordial

One of the key reasons proffered for the enduring nature of ethnicity in the modern world is that it constitutes a primary aspect of human nature and human relations. This stance, which is broadly termed 'primordialism', is actually represented by a range of positions (Smith, 1995a). The extreme version, elaborated in the 'organic' nationalism of the eighteenth century 'German Romantics', Herder, Humboldt and Fichte, posits ethnic -- and, by extension, national -- identity as natural and immutable. Human beings are viewed, by nature, as belonging to fixed ethnic communities which are, in turn, defined by the constitutive elements of 'language, blood and soil' (see also Chapter 2). A second stream of primordialism is represented by the socio-biology of van den Berghe (1979) who argues that ethnic groups are 'natural' because they are extensions of biological kin groups, selected on the grounds of genetic evolution. The third, and most plausible stream, is associated most prominently with Geertz (1963, 1973), Isaacs (1975), and Shils (1957, 1980). Geertz for example, in a much cited passage, develops Shils (1957) argument that the political actions of ethnic groups are often attributable, in the first instance, to primordial attachments. These primordial ties are regarded as a fundamental basis for collective action because they are rooted in our earliest socialisation, in kinship, and in the wider ties and solidarities built on and around kinship. As Geertz outlines:

> By a primordial attachment is meant one that stems from the 'givens' of existence, or more precisely ... the *assumed* givens of social existence: immediate contiguity and live connection mainly, but beyond them the givenness that stems from being born into a particular ... community, speaking a particular language ... and following particular social practices. These congruities of blood, speech, custom and so on, are seen to have an ineffable, and at times overpowering, coerciveness in and of themselves. One is bound to one's kinsman, one's neighbour ... as the result not merely of personal affection, tactical necessity, common interest or incurred moral obligation, but at least in great part by virtue of some unaccountable absolute import attributed to the very tie itself. (1973: 259; my emphasis)

On this basis, Geertz's provides us with an explanation of why primordial attachments often trump what he describes as 'civil sentiments' -- those sentiments and allegiances which arise from civic participation in the modern nation-state. This has been construed in much subsequent academic commentary as an endorsement of a primordial view of ethnicity, although it is not entirely clear whether this was actually Geertz's intention (see Fenton, 1998).[9] However, if we accept that Geertz's argument is representative of this position, we may note that he is not arguing that ethnic ties or affiliations *are* primordial in any real sense -- hence, his deliberate qualification regarding 'the assumed givens of social existence'. Rather, he is arguing that people *perceive* these ties as primordial and thus as pre-eminent over other affiliative ties. Such a position then does not necessarily entail that ethnic groups are fixed and static, although ethnic groups are still equated in this conception with certain cultural characteristics -- the 'congruities of blood, speech, custom and so on'.

Notwithstanding the more flexible accounts of Geertz *et al.*, the primordialist position has been widely dismissed by modernist theorists of ethnicity and nationalism (see, for example, Eller & Coughlan, 1993). A number of key objections have been raised in this regard. First, modernist critics argue that while cultural attributes are often associated with ethnic distinctiveness, they do not constitute a *sufficient* explanation for ethnicity. To attempt to equate the two, in fact, amounts to cultural determinism. Nor does an emphasis on cultural characteristics explain adequately why some cultural attributes -- language, for example -- may be salient markers of ethnic identity in some instances but not in others. In effect, cultural differences do not always correspond to ethnic ones. As Robert Thornton argues, an understanding of culture must thus involve more than 'simply a knowledge of differences, but rather an understanding of *how* and *why* differences in language, thought ... and behaviours have come about' (1988: 25; my emphases). Second, and relatedly, cultural forms thus require an *historical* examination; as indeed do all aspects of ethnic group formation (Mare, 1993). This is not something which a primordialist account can adequately provide. By situating the search for ethnicity within 'the assumed givens of social existence', the primordialist position conveniently explains both everything and nothing. It lacks, in effect, explanatory power and predictive value and is, at best, an ex post facto argument (Rothschild, 1981; Stack, 1986). As John Stack elaborates, the primordial approach 'fails to explain why ethnicity disappears [as an organising social category]

during one historical period and reintensifies in another' (1986: 2). Third, and most tellingly perhaps, primordial accounts also underplay the multiplicity of social groups to which individuals may belong and the role of individual choice in selecting between and within them.

Situational ethnicity

This emphasis on individual choice is reflected in the alternative endorsement of a *situational* view of ethnicity, a view outlined in Barth's influential (1969) *Ethnic Groups and Boundaries* (see also Moerman, 1965, 1974). Barth's central insight is that ethnicity is *not* an immutable bundle of cultural traits which can be enumerated in order to determine differences between ethnic groups (Jenkins, 1994). Indeed, the 'cultural stuff' of the group is not even a key consideration for Barth. Rather, ethnic groups are situationally defined in relationship to their social interactions with other groups, and the boundaries established and maintained between them as a result of these interactions. As Barth asserts:

> ethnic categories provide an organisational vessel that may be given varying amounts and forms of content in different socio-cultural systems.... The critical focus of investigation from this point of view becomes the ethnic boundary that defines the group, not the cultural stuff that it encloses. (1969: 14-15)

For Barth, ethnicity is about social relationships rather than specific cultural properties. Cultural attributes are not significant in themselves since any one of a range of cultural properties could be used to fill the 'organisational vessel' of a particular ethnicity. This may well explain the diversity of cultural diacritica employed by ethnic groups in the world today to distinguish themselves from others. Instead, it is their *perceived* usefulness in maintaining ethnic boundaries which is central. Cultural attributes only become significant as markers of ethnic identity when a group deems them to be *necessary*, or socially effective, for such purposes. Thus, particular cultural attributes may vary in salience, may be constructed or reconstructed, and may even be discarded by an ethnic group, depending on the particular socio-historical circumstances of their interactions with other groups, and the need to maintain effectively the boundaries between them. It is these ethnic boundaries which determine in the end who is and who is not a member of a particular ethnic group, as well as designating which ethnic categories are available for individual identification at any given time and place (Nagel, 1994).

Barth's emphasis on the relational, processual and negotiated aspects of ethnicity (Eriksen, 1993) also presupposes that the formation of ethnic identity is largely shaped by the group itself. This will be in response to those on the other side of the ethnic boundary, and to changing circumstances, certainly. Likewise, the success of ethnic ascription will depend to a large extent on the reciprocity of other parties in recognising and accepting the distinctions involved. Nonetheless, ethnicity is seen by Barth as a product of *intra*-group processes of negotiation rather than the *direct* result of outside forces. In short, an ethnic group is ultimately defined by its own members. As Barth clearly states, it 'makes no difference how dissimilar members may be in their overt behaviour -- if they say they are A, in contrast to another category B ... they declare their allegiance to the shared culture of A's' (1969: 15).

Ethnicity as subjective

In adopting this position, Barth's account can be said to be a subjectivist one. It emphasises the role of individual agents, rather than social structure, as the primary force in the construction of ethnic identities. As such, it has been criticised for underplaying (or even ignoring) the social and cultural constraints facing actors in their ethnic choices (Worsley, 1984; Wallman, 1986; J. O'Brien, 1986; Fardon, 1987). As these critics argue, ethnogenesis, or the creation of new ethnicities, does not just happen. Identities are not -- indeed, *cannot* -- be freely chosen and to suggest otherwise is to adopt an ahistorical approach which reduces life to the level of 'a market, or cafeteria' (Worsley, 1984: 246).

While this criticism is a valid one, the answer probably lies somewhere in between both positions. As Eriksen astutely observes, 'ethnic identities are neither ascribed nor achieved: they are both. They are wedged between situational selection and imperatives imposed from without' (1993: 57). Joane Nagel likewise suggests that ethnic identity:

> is the result of a dialectical process involving internal and external opinions and processes, as well as the individual's self-identification and outsiders' ethnic designations -- i.e., what *you* think your ethnicity is, versus what *they* think your ethnicity is.... Ethnic boundaries, and thus identities, are constructed by both the individual and the group as well as by outside agents and organisations. (1994: 154-155).

In other words, ethnic groups are both internally and externally defined; distinguishing 'us' from 'them' is always a two-way process. Where the balance might lie between internal and external definitions of ethnicity, however, remains an open question. As Jenkins (1994) observes, in any given instance it is a question of degree. The continuum which is possible here is perhaps best illustrated by the commonly drawn distinction between ethnic *categories* and ethnic *communities*. Anthony Smith (1991) argues that the former are identified by others as constituting separate cultural and historical groupings. However, they may have little self-awareness at the time that they form such separate collectivities. Ethnic categories, in short, are named, characterised and delineated principally by others (Jenkins, 1996). Ethnic communities, in contrast, define themselves, their name(s), their nature(s) and their boundaries, and are thus more akin to Barth's notion of an ethnic group. As Paul Brass describes it, an ethnic community 'has adopted one or more of its marks of cultural distinctness and [has] used them as symbols both to create internal cohesion and to differentiate itself from other ethnic groups' (1985: 17). Such communities are thus characterised by a sense of ethnic *solidarity* which, in turn, is usually mobilised via an insistence on certain social and political rights. These rights are said to derive from the specific 'group character' (Glazer & Moynihan, 1975) and often involve an association with a particular territory or homeland.[10] I will return to the notion of ethnic community in my discussions below on Anthony Smith's (1986, 1991, 1995a) use of the comparable French term 'ethnie'.

Ethnicity and 'race'

Discussion of the balance between internal and external ascription also allows us to explore the crucial distinction between ethnicity and 'race'. Michael Banton, for example, argues that this distinction can be made on the basis that 'membership in an ethnic group is usually voluntary; membership in a racial group is not' (1983: 10). In other words, ethnicity is internally defined, 'race' is externally ascribed. There are serious weaknesses with Banton's argument here -- not least, the implicit assumption that racial groups are somehow real[11] -- to which I will return. However, the distinction he draws is useful in highlighting the processes of ascription which have led to the stigmatising of certain groups on supposedly racial grounds and, from that, the establishment of social -- and, in some cases, political -- hierarchies between various groups.

This racialisation process has occurred in two principal ways. One has been via the imputation of biologically determined characteristics as a means of distinguishing between various groups. This process has been most prominently associated with the scientific racism of the nineteenth century (see Gould, 1981), although it continues to be represented in current academic discourse (see Kohn, 1995) and is still widely held at a popular 'common-sense' level (Omi & Winant, 1986; Miles, 1989, 1993; Small, 1994).

A second, comparable process of ascribing essentialised cultural differences to groups has also become increasingly widespread. This has led to the rise of 'new racisms' which describe group differences principally in cultural and/or historical terms -- ethnic terms, in effect -- without specifically mentioning 'race' or overtly racial criteria (Barker, 1981; Wetherell & Potter, 1992; van Dijk, 1993; Small, 1994). New racisms, in this sense, can be described as a form of *ethnicism* which, as Avtar Brah describes it:

> defines the experience of racialised groups primarily in 'culturalist' terms: that is, it posits 'ethnic difference' as the primary modality around which social life is constituted and experienced.... This means that a group identified as culturally different is assumed to be internally homogenous.... ethnicist discourses seek to impose stereotypic notions of common cultural need upon heterogenous groups with diverse social aspirations and interests. (1992: 129)

Before proceeding further, however, a number of additional caveats need to be raised in relation to Banton's initial distinction between 'race' and ethnicity. First, the distinction considerably understates the reciprocal nature of group identification and categorisation discussed in the preceding sections. As Jenkins (1994) argues, the definition of 'them' in terms of 'race' is likely to be an important aspect of our definition of 'us' (which will, in turn, incorporate a 'racial' dimension). Second, while many examples of ethnic categorisation do involve the imputation of essentialised notions of racial and/or cultural difference -- and, from that, the positing of a hierarchy of group difference -- many also do not. In this sense, racism in its various forms can be viewed as a particular subset -- or, more accurately perhaps, *specific subsets* -- of ethnic categorisation. However, they are not reducible one to the other. Ethnic categories *may* be essentialised in the same way as 'race' categories have been historically *but they need not be.* Nor are ethnic relations *necessarily* hierarchical, exploitative and conflictual in the same way that 'race relations' invariably are (Rex, 1973; Jenkins 1994). Indeed, it has often been the case that the

global impact of racism has overridden previously non-hierarchised ethnic categories (Balibar, 1991; Fenton, 1998). As such, it is simply wrong to conflate 'race' with ethnicity as some commentators are in the habit of doing (see, for example, Wallman, 1978, 1986; Anthias, 1992; Anthias & Yuval-Davis, 1992). Third, groups as well as being identified negatively by others, may actually seek to identify themselves in positive 'racial' terms; a feature which is notable in many forms of black nationalism and also within some indigenous peoples' movements. Finally, 'racial' and ethnic ascription both remain, in the end, comparable processes of social and cultural *construction*. As the development of 'new racisms' indicates, and as Richard Jenkins argues, 'it is emphatically not the case that the difference between ethnicity and "race" is a simple difference between the physical and the cultural, although it may be a difference between *purported* physical and cultural characteristics' (1994: 208; my emphasis; see also Goldberg, 1993; Ch. 4). Paul Gilroy, in his discussion of 'race' and racism, similarly asserts:

> Races are not ... simple expressions of either biological or cultural sameness. They are imagined -- socially and politically constructed.... Dealing with these issues in their specificity and in their articulation with other [social] relations and practices constitutes a profound and urgent theoretical challenge. It requires a theory of racisms that does not depend on an essentialist theory of races themselves. (1990: 264)

Much the same could be said for the broader concept of ethnicity. Acknowledging that ethnicity is a social and cultural construction allows us to explore its articulation with other social forces and the various, or multiple, manifestations which may result (including various racisms). In so doing, the way in which ethnicity is deliberately employed -- or mobilised -- in specific contexts becomes central, as do the particular ends pursued in the process of mobilisation. The mobilisation of ethnicity here can be summarised as 'the process by which a group organises along ethnic lines in pursuit of collective political ends' (Stack, 1986: 5). In order to examine this process more closely, we need to turn to discussions on the *instrumental* utility of ethnicity.

Instrumental ethnicity

Accepting a situational view of ethnicity invites an obvious corollary: if ethnicity is primarily an aspect of social relationships, then it can best be analysed through the various uses to which individuals and/or groups put it. Ethnicity can thus be regarded principally as a social and political *resource* and ethnic groups as specific *interest groups*, comparable to other groups that might

mobilise on the basis of social class, or trade unionism, for example. This appears to be the consensus of most current commentators on ethnicity (see, for example, Cohen, 1974; Glazer & Moynihan, 1975; Worsley, 1984; Rex & Mason, 1986; Nash, 1989; Roosens, 1989; Marc, 1993; Nagel, 1994). It is summarised, in its most trenchant form, by Peter Worsley: 'Cultural traits are not absolutes or simply intellectual categories, but are invoked to provide identities which legitimise claims to rights. They are strategies or weapons in competitions over scarce social goods' (1984: 249).

Such a view also presupposes the *fluidity* or *malleability* of ethnicity. In effect, the origin, content and form of ethnicity are all open to negotiation, reflecting the creative choices of individuals and groups as they define themselves and others in ethnic ways (Nagel, 1994). Such choices involve a wide range of possibilities. At one level, ethnic choices may be limited to what Gans (1979) has termed 'symbolic ethnicity'. This is common among many immigrant minority groups and, as Gans suggests, is 'characterised by a nostalgic allegiance to the culture of the immigrant generation, or that of the old country; a love for and pride in a tradition that can be felt without having to be incorporated in everyday behaviour' (1979: 9). In this regard, many hyphenated white identities in the United States (Italian-Americans, Jewish-Americans etc.) continue to exhibit a 'symbolic ethnicity' even when previously demarcated ethnic boundaries within the white population (such as language, religion and endogamy) have atrophied over time (see Kivosto, 1989; Fishman, 1989; Alba, 1990; Waters, 1990; Yinger, 1994). At the other end of the spectrum, ethnicity may be constituted as a (or the) principal form of social identity and political organisation -- a context which is literally *saturated* by ethnicity (Fenton, 1998). As Fenton argues, ethnicity becomes here a more or less dominant element of the framing of political power, its legitimation and exercise. This can be seen historically in Nazi Germany and Apartheid South Africa, and currently in such places as Rwanda, Burundi, and the former Yugoslavia.[12]

When viewed in this light, ethnic histories and ascriptions can be *adopted* and *adapted* by individuals and/or groups according to the particular social and political aims being pursued at the time. Eugeen Roosens (1989) provides one of the most pointed examples of this process at group level in his depiction of the Huron Indians of Québec. Roosens argues that the Huron developed -- or rather reconstituted -- their history as a Native American tribe in order to claim access to the

political rights and rewards associated with 'indigenousness'. This 'invention of tradition' (Hobsbawm & Ranger, 1983) involved the establishment of a pan-Indian identity where before there was none. It also saw the development of a reified 'ethnic counterculture' (Roosens, 1989) in which the uniformly positive characteristics of Huron 'culture' were juxtaposed against the largely negative depictions of the colonial cultures which supplanted it. Of course, such reconstructions are not limited to indigenous peoples and, indeed, are a common characteristic of national as well as ethnic histories; a point which I will elaborate upon in the following chapter on nationalism and national identity. However, Roosens' principal argument -- that the construction of ethnicity may comprise a largely fictive element in some instances -- is a hard one to ignore (see also Sollors, 1989).

A comparable degree of scepticism is directed at individuals who decide to adopt or change a particular ethnic affiliation. As Roosens again observes, 'many people change their ethnic identity only if they can profit from doing so' (1989: 13; see also Steinberg, 1981: 256). In his ensuing discussion of ethnic minority group members in the USA, Roosens also elaborates on the particular utility of choosing to mobilise on the basis of an ethnic identity rather than, for example, on the basis of social class:

> It becomes more interesting to appear socially as a member of an ethnic group than as a specimen of a lower socio-economic category. In a world where a re-evaluation of 'oppressed' cultures is in vogue in many circles, this is a way of self-valorisation that cannot be achieved by considering oneself, for example, a member of the working class or the lower middle class. (1989: 13-14)

Similarly sceptical views have been expressed about the changing processes of ethnic ascription evident among the indigenous Māori of New Zealand (Hanson, 1989; Mulgan, 1989). Suffice it to say at this point, that any notion of individual choice with regard to ethnicity is usually viewed pejoratively, particularly by majority group members in any given society. This rejection of an apparent 'designer ethnicity' among minority groups occurs despite the fact that majority group members may exhibit considerable latitude in their own ethnic choices and social identifications (Alba, 1990; Waters, 1990). Conversely, the latter may mobilise a composite 'white' identity to similar instrumental ends (Lieberson, 1985; Roediger, 1991; McLaren, 1995; Pearson, 1990; Young, 1993); a point I will explore in more detail in Chapter 3.

Multiple identities

Mobilising particular identities will also depend, to a large extent, on the audience(s) being addressed. This may produce a pattern of 'ethnic layering' for different ethnic groups (Nagel, 1994). For example, Cornell (1988) discusses the various levels of ethnic identity available to Native Americans, including sub-tribal, tribal, regional and pan-Indian identities. A similar pattern is found for Māori in New Zealand -- ranging from whānau (extended family), through hapū (sub-tribe) and iwi (tribe), to a pan-Māori identity (R. Walker, 1990). A variety of situational levels of ethnic identification can also be found among African Americans (Waters, 1990), Hispanic Americans (Padilla, 1985), white Americans (Kivosto, 1989; Alba, 1990; Waters, 1990), British Asians (Anthias & Yuval-Davis, 1992; Modood, 1992, 1997), and African-Caribbeans in Britain (Goulbourne, 1991a; Gilroy, 1987, 1993).

Of course, the variety of ethnic identifications available to these -- and, by implication, all other -- ethnic groups should not surprise us. A situational view of ethnicity requires it. As Nagel observes, a 'chosen ethnic identity is determined by the individual's perception of its meaning to different audiences, its salience in different social contexts, and its utility in different settings' (1994: 155). Relatedly, these various identities may overlap with, or cut-across other social identities. For example, one may be a woman, a Muslim, a Bangladeshi, an Asian, working class, a Londoner, English, and British, all at the same time. However, which of these identities predominate in any given circumstance, and how they interact with each other, will depend on the context, the audience, and the ongoing balance between internal definition and external ascription of social identities, discussed above. This complex dialectic also suggests that there will be significant *intra*-ethnic differences evident within any given ethnic group. The varying confluence of ethnicity, class, religion and gender, for example, will result in a full repertory of social identifications and trajectories among individual members of a particular ethnic group.

Ethnicity, class and gender

The potential mobilisation of a range of social identities brings us to the interconnections between ethnicity, social class and gender. However, it is important to note at the outset that these

interconnections are not only outworked at the level of social *identity*, they are also articulated within the wider social *relations* of which they form a part. Moreover, the various interrelationships which result are necessarily complex, overlapping, shifting, and at times contradictory. Thus, in relation to ethnicity and social class, ethnic mobilisation may at times subsume internal class distinctions, and class mobilisation may override ethnic distinctions. However, it is also possible for different ethnic groups to collaborate in relation to common class interests while retaining a strong sense of their respective ethnic identities (Brass, 1985). The varied combinations possible here (and they are by no means limited to the above) are also contingent on whether particular ethnic communities include a full range of class distinctions or whether they are located principally within a single class category. This is particularly important in explaining the often differing economic and social trajectories of majority and minority ethnic groups, since majority groups tend to be located in the former context and minority groups in the latter. Accordingly, the socio-economic conditions within which particular ethnicities are formed and mobilised are crucial to their analysis (Enloe, 1973; Worsley, 1984; Hagendoorn, 1993).

One example of this ethnic/class nexus can be seen in Roosens' discussion above on ethnic minorities in the USA. Here, he argues that ethnicity is employed *at the expense of* social class as a central organising principle of collective action. Nonetheless, his comments also indicate, perhaps unwittingly, the importance of a predominantly working-class location (and related socio-economic disadvantage) for these particular ethnic minority groups. Ethnicity may have been chosen as the principal means of mobilisation in this instance but class and socio-economic circumstances remain significant to the actual processes of mobilisation undertaken, and the need for such groups to mobilise along these lines in the first place. A parallel can also be clearly drawn here with Māori in New Zealand whose mobilisation on the basis of ethnicity is closely (although not solely) linked to the degree of historical marginalisation and socio-economic disadvantage which they have experienced in that society (Pearson, 1990; Sharp, 1990; May, 1997).

However, ethnic and class mobilisation may also work in opposition to each other and/or to different ends. In Wales, for example, the industrialised south of Wales has been characterised by a largely class-based mobilisation, closely allied to British (as opposed to Welsh) working-class

and socialist interests. This stands in sharp contrast to a pattern of ethnic mobilisation also apparent in Wales -- particularly, in rural mid and North Wales -- with its origins in nineteenth century religious Nonconformity and political liberalism. The latter movement is based principally on the preservation of Welsh language and culture and is generally opposed to their encroachment by the British state. I will explore these different (and competing) forms of mobilisation -- and their antecedents -- more fully in Chapter 6. Suffice it to say at this point, that while class and ethnic groups, and their forms of mobilisation, often intersect, they do not always do so. As van den Berghe has observed:

> Ethnicity and class are interrelated but *analytically distinct* phenomena. The fact that different social classes most commonly show sub-cultural differences and, conversely, that ethnic groups living under a common government are more often than not ordered in a hierarchy of power, wealth and status does not make class reducible to ethnicity, or ethnicity to class. (1975: 73)

This observation remains apposite when gender is added to the equation. In relation to the division of labour for example, some forms of labour participation which may be described as generally shaped by ethnicity and class may also be specifically gendered. Examples here might include: the international exploitation of Filipina maids and Thai prostitutes; the disproportionate location of African-Caribbean female nurses in the UK in the low-status areas of mental health and geriatrics, as well as on night shift; and the predominance of Latinas in the US in low-level service industries such as cleaning (see, for example, Anthias & Yuval-Davis, 1992; Stasiulus & Yuval-Davies, 1995). The interconnections between ethnicity, class and gender should be readily apparent here although I am not suggesting that *cumulative* disadvantage (in the labour market or elsewhere) is necessarily the result; there are just as many cross-cutting and counter-examples. In this light, it also needs to be constantly borne in mind that ethnic, class and gender groups are themselves not solidary groups but have their own broad-based internal divisions. Paul Brass is thus surely right when he argues in relation to ethnicity and class (and one can add gender here also):

> that the processes of ethnic -- and class -- identity formation and of intergroup relations always have a dual dimension, of interaction/competition with external groups and of an internal struggle for control of the group.... It [thus] becomes critical to have analytical categories that can be used to analyse both the internal conflicts and the external relations of the group and the points of intersection between the two. (1985: 33)

Limits to the social construction of ethnicity

I will proceed to outline such analytical categories in my discussion of habitus and ethnic below. However, before doing so, it is important to ask where this modernist conception of ethnicity leaves us? Can we be satisfied that ethnicity is a modern construction, only incidentally related to culture? Is it completely fluid and malleable -- able to be mobilised at will, in virtually any form, by individuals and groups in their pursuit of social and political gain? Not entirely. For all its persuasiveness, there is an obvious degree of overstatement in the situational view of ethnicity. If taken to its extreme, for example, all ethnic choices become possible; a position represented by the methodological individualism of rational choice theory (see Banton, 1977, 1980, 1987; Hechter, 1986, 1987).[13] As I have already discussed, such a position fails to address adequately the external constraints facing actors in their ethnic choices. Ethnicity may well be a social construction but it is clear that not everything will function equally well in the social legitimation of ethnic identities.[14] As Eriksen argues,

> If the agents themselves hold that a certain description of their culture is obviously false, it cannot provide them with a powerful ethnic identity. If a group's version of its cultural history is seriously contested by other groups ... it may also be problematic to maintain the identity postulated by that account of history. So we cannot conclude that anything goes and that everything about ethnicity is deception and make-believe.... rather, [ethnic] identities are ambiguous, and ... this ambiguity is connected with a *negotiable* history and a *negotiable* cultural content. (1993: 73; my emphases)

Negotiation is a key element here to the ongoing construction of ethnicity, but there are also limits to it. Individual and collective choices are circumscribed by the ethnic categories available at any given time and place. These categories are, in turn, socially and politically defined and have varying degrees of advantage or stigma attached to them (Nagel, 1994). Moreover, the range of choices available to particular individuals and groups varies widely. A white American may have a wide range of ethnic options from which to choose on the basis of their ancestry. An African American, in contrast, is confronted with essentially one ethnic choice -- black; irrespective of any preferred ethnic alternatives they might wish to employ. As Nagel observes:

> the extent to which ethnicity can be freely constructed by individuals or groups is quite narrow when compulsory ethnic categories are imposed by others. Such limits on ethnic identification can be official or unofficial. In either case, externally enforced ethnic

> boundaries can be powerful determinants of both the content and meaning of particular ethnicities. (1994: 156)

The above example also suggests that the different ethnic choices available to majority and minority group members are a product of *unequal* power relations in the wider society. In particular, it is the differing location(s) of particular ethnic groups within the nation-state which shapes and constrains the ethnic options available to them; a theme I will pursue more fully in the following chapters. Suffice it to say at this point, that when ethnicity is viewed solely as an instrumental resource these differences in power are not adequately addressed. Similarly, the power differentials *within* a particular ethnic group, and the broad-based divisions which may result, are also ignored (Brass, 1985; O. O'Brien, 1993).

Limits to the instrumental use of ethnicity

Relatedly, there are limits to the central instrumentalist notion that ethnic groups are simply one of many interest groups seeking resources in and from the nation-state. Such a view is problematic because it fails to answer the question of *why* ethnicity is so often chosen as a means of mobilisation over other possibilities. In attempting to answer this question we can leave aside the somewhat limited suggestion that ethnicity is more effective in attaining social and political goals. In some cases it may well be (see, for example, Roosens' comments above). In other instances, it clearly is not. After all, ethnic groups have been known to reproduce their ethnicity *even when* it reduces their chances of attaining prosperity and political power (Eriksen, 1993). Why is this? The reasons lie principally in the 'ineffable' cultural and symbolic attributes of ethnicity largely dismissed in instrumental accounts. Ethnic groups differ from other interest groups in their particular concern with cultural attributes and symbols, kinship, and historical memory. These features are predicated principally on 'belonging' rather than 'accomplishment' (Kymlicka, 1995a; Margalit & Raz, 1995) and provide the basis not only for political action but also, crucially, for identity and meaning (Melucci, 1989; Guibernau, 1996). They may well be socially constructed (or reconstructed) but their enduring influence cannot be explained on the basis of functionality alone. Ignoring the cultural matters that are important to ethnic groups is thus an analytical error since these are central to their distinction from other interest groups. Paul Brass argues to this end:

> Ethnic groups, by definition ... are concerned not only with material interests but with symbolic interests. Moreover, no matter how old or new, 'genuine' or 'artificial', rich or superficial, the culture of a particular ethnic group may be, its culture and the definition of its boundaries are crucial matters that do not arise in the same way for other interest groups. (1985: 31)

Finding common ground -- ethnicity as habitus

The dichotomous approach adopted in much of the primordialist/instrumentalist debate on ethnicity -- like so many dichotomies posited in the social sciences -- seems to have led us to a theoretical impasse. Indeed, as Richard Jenkins has observed,

> the debate about whether or not ethnicity is 'situational' or 'primordial' seems futile; it confuses the *ubiquity* of a social phenomenon such as ethnicity with 'naturalness', implying fixity, determinism and some kind of pre-social power of causation. (1994: 220; see also Nash, 1989: 124)

Given this, I want to suggest that primordial and situational views *do not* form mutually exclusive conceptualisations of ethnicity but that each formulation represents a *partial* representation of the underlying social and cultural movements which they seek to describe (Fenton & May, 1998). Following Jenkins, ethnicity can thus be viewed as both a cultural creation *and* a primary or first-order dimension of human experience: 'on the one hand, ubiquitous and, on the other, possessing a particular immediacy and compelling urgency in many social situations' (Jenkins, 1996: 72). As Jenkins argues, despite its limitations, the 'primordialist' position outlined by Geertz, Isaacs and Shils rightly highlights that ethnicity is something in which we actively participate, an integral aspect of ourselves, rooted in our earliest socialisation (see also Stack, 1986; Fenton, 1998). John Rex muses along similar lines that this may well explain 'why it is that, despite the very strong pressure in complex societies for groups to be formed on the basis of congruence of interest, many individuals do in fact stubbornly continue to unite with those whom they have ties of ethnic sameness, even though such alliances might run contrary to patterns of group formation determined by shared interests' (1991: 11).

However, to take ethnicity seriously as a primary social sentiment in this way does not *necessarily* entail its reification as a set of fixed cultural properties.[15] We do not need to abandon the social

constructionist consensus on ethnicity. Nor do we need to naturalise ethnicity as a socio-biological phenomenon as, for example, do van den Berghe (1979) and Kellas (1991). Ethnicity can still be viewed as socially constructed and fluid, *within certain limits* (see above). Likewise, its mobilisation by individuals and groups in the social and political domain, and within specific temporal and historical contexts, can be fully acknowledged and explored. In this sense, ethnicity can be viewed as both situational *and* pervasive (Smith, 1995a; Billig, 1995).

A way in which this apparent dualism can be effectively incorporated and expressed is through Bourdieu's concept of habitus. Bourdieu's analysis of habitus is principally concerned with social class (see Bourdieu, 1984, 1990a, 1990b; Bourdieu & Passeron, 1990; Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992). However, since Bourdieu describes habitus as 'a system of dispositions common to all products of the same conditionings' (1990b: 59), the application of habitus to ethnicity and ethnic identity formation is equally applicable (see Bentley, 1987; Smaje, 1997; May, 1994, 1998b). For Bourdieu, habitus comprises *all* the social and cultural experiences that shape us as a person; his use of the term 'dispositions' is an attempt to capture fully this meaning. Specifically, there are four key aspects of habitus highlighted in Bourdieu's work which are useful to our discussion here: embodiment; agency; the interplay between past and present, and; the inter-relationship between collective and individual trajectories (see Reay, 1995a, 1995b). I will look at each of these elements in turn.

First, habitus is not simply about ideology, attitude or perception, it is a *material* form of life which is 'embodied and turned into second nature' (1990a: 63). It is, in effect, an orientation to social action (Bourdieu, 1990b). Thus, via the concept of habitus, Bourdieu explores how members of a social group come to acquire, as a result of their socialisation, a set of *embodied* dispositions -- or ways of viewing, and living in the world. This set of dispositions -- what Bourdieu would call 'bodily hexis' -- operates most often at the level of the unconscious and the mundane and might comprise in the case of ethnicity such things as attitudes to language, dress, diet and customary practices (Smaje, 1997). The key point for Bourdieu is that habitus is both shaped by, *and also shapes*, the objective social and cultural conditions which surround it. As Roy Nash observes, the habitus is 'a system of durable dispositions inculcated by objective structural conditions, but since it is embodied the habitus gains a history and generates its [own]

practices [over] time even when the objective conditions which give rise to it have disappeared' (1990: 433-434). Ethnic attitudes and practices (including language use) may thus be lived out implicitly as a result of historical and customary practice. As such, they may provide the parameters of social action for many. However, in the course of those very actions they may also begin to take on a life of their own (see below).

Second, Bourdieu's notion of habitus is concerned to explore the inter-relationship between agency and structure. While many have dismissed Bourdieu's position as structurally determinist (for a critique of this position, see Harker & May, 1993; May, 1994), his specific aim is actually to overcome the agency/structure dichotomy in sociological thought -- 'to escape from structuralist objectivism without relapsing into subjectivism' (1990a: 61). Thus, Bourdieu argues that habitus does not *determine* individual behaviour. A range of choices, or strategic practices, is presented to individuals within the internalised framework of the habitus. Moreover, these practices, based on the intuitions of the practical sense, *orient* rather than strictly determine action. Choice is thus at the heart of habitus. However, not all choices are possible. As Bourdieu observes, 'habitus, like every "art of inventing" ... makes it possible to produce an infinite number of practices that are relatively unpredictable (like the corresponding situations) but [which are] also limited in their diversity' (1990b: 55). These limits are set by the historically and socially situated conditions of the habitus' production; what Bourdieu terms both 'a conditioned and conditional freedom' (1990b: 55). As he proceeds to elaborate,

> being the product of a particular class of objective regularities, the habitus tends to generate all the 'reasonable' and 'commonsense' behaviours (and only those) which are possible within the limits of these regularities, and which are likely to be positively sanctioned because they are objectively adjusted to the logic characteristic of the field, whose objective future they anticipate. At the same time ... it tends to exclude all 'extravagances' ('not for the likes of us'), that is, all the behaviours that would be negatively sanctioned because they are incompatible with the objective conditions. (1990b: 55-56)

In short, improbable practices, or practices viewed as antithetical to the mores of a particular group, are rejected as unthinkable. Concomitantly, only a particular range of possible practices is considered, although this range of possibilities may evolve and change over time in relation to changing circumstances. Thus, Bourdieu posits that individuals and groups operate strategically

within the constraints of a particular habitus, but also that they react to changing external conditions; economic, technological and political (Harker, 1984, 1990; May, 1994).

This recursive position allows Bourdieu to argue that the habitus is both a product of our early socialisation, yet is also continually modified by individuals' experience of the outside world (Di Maggio, 1979). Within this complex interplay of past and present experience -- the third key dimension highlighted here -- habitus can be said to reflect the social and cultural position in which it was constructed, while also allowing for its transformation in current circumstances. However, the possibilities of action in most instances will tend to reproduce rather than transform the limits of possibility delineated by the social group. This is because habitus, as a product of history, ensures the active presence of past experiences which tend also to normalise particular cultural practices and their constancy over time (Harker & May, 1993). Nonetheless, this tendency towards reproduction of group mores and practices does not detract from the *potential* for transformation and change.

The fourth element of habitus -- the inter-relationship between individual action and group mores -- also reflects this tension. In many instances, individual practices will conform to those of the group since, as Bourdieu argues, 'the practices of the members of the same group ... are always more and better harmonised than the agents know or wish' (1990b: 59). Yet Bourdieu also recognises the potential for divergence between individual and collective trajectories. In effect, habitus within, as well as between, social groups differs to the extent that the details of individuals' social trajectories diverge from one another (Reay, 1995a):

> The singular habitus of the members of the same [group] are united in a relation of homology, that is, of diversity within homogeneity reflecting the diversity within homogeneity characteristic of their social conditions of production. Each individual system of dispositions is a structural variant of the others, expressing the singularity of its position within the [group] and its trajectory (1990b: 60)

There is, in all of this, a certain sense of vagueness and indeterminacy in Bourdieu's rendition of habitus and debates about its efficacy in bridging the structure/agency divide remain ongoing (see Harker *et al.*, 1990; Robbins, 1991; Jenkins, 1992; Calhoun *et al.*, 1993; Harker & May, 1993; May, 1994). However, if the concept is employed as social *method* rather than as social *theory* --

that is, as a way of thinking and a manner of asking questions, which is actually Bourdieu's preference (see Harker *et al.*, 1990) -- it can be usefully applied to a discussion of ethnicity. As Gilbert summarises it, Bourdieu's approach 'suggests an explanation of the regularities of social practice [in this case, ethnicity] as structured by the relations between, on the one hand, an objective set of historically produced material conditions, and on the other, historically produced definitions of those conditions and predispositions to act in certain ways in any historical conjuncture' (1987: 40-41). In other words, ethnicity as socially constructed *and* as a material form of life is addressed by the concept of habitus. In so doing, the 'primordialist' mistake of assuming a realist definition of ethnicity is avoided without diminishing the *significance* of ethnicity and the processes of ethnic identification (see also Smaje, 1997). As Bourdieu observes of social class, for example -- and one can clearly add ethnicity here also:

> My work consists in saying that people are located in a social space, that they aren't just anywhere, in other words, interchangeable, as those people claim who deny the existence of 'social classes' [or ethnic groups], and that according to the position they occupy in this highly complex space, you can understand the logic of their practices and determine, *inter alia*, how they will classify themselves and others and, should the case arise, think of themselves as members of a 'class' [or ethnic group]. (1990a: 50)

Similarly, the dichotomy between the 'ineffable' nature and the 'calculated' use of ethnicity is also rendered negotiable by employing the concept of habitus. As Gilbert again observes:

> The notion of habitus, while recognising conscious intention, need not inflate it in explaining action, nor relegate the dynamic of social action to an ineffable consciousness. Further, the theory offers an explanation of human understanding and action which goes beyond individualism, but does not resort to abstract social forces, functionalist mechanisms or reified institutions as agents of social practice. Finally it allows us to see how ideologies through their symbols and representations are part of the objective presentation of the contexts of practice, the means for defining a situation, and the medium in which past and present practices are installed in the interpretive and generative operations of the habitus. (1987: 41)

Finally, habitus is also extremely pertinent to a discussion of ethnicity because it is employed by Bourdieu principally in order to explore inequalities in power between dominant and subordinate groups. As Bourdieu argues, the individual and collective *habitus* of the former is invariably constituted as *cultural capital* -- that is, recognised as socially valuable -- whereas the habitus of the latter is not. This has obvious parallels with the negative, and commonly expressed views of

ethnic minority cultures and practices (including the speaking of a minority language) as regressive and 'pre-modern'. These views are expressed both by majority group members and by minority group members themselves; the latter usually as the end result of a process of negative *internalisation*. While I have already briefly addressed the historical antecedents of this pattern of negative ascription in the early part of the chapter, I will explore its social and political implications more fully in Chapters 3-5. At this point, it is sufficient to observe that the habitus of ethnic minority individuals and groups tend to be specifically marginalised and devalued, both as a legitimate means of identity, and for their apparent lack of 'relevance' to the modern world.

Ethnies

If habitus provides us with a useful methodological framework for exploring ethnicity, Anthony Smith's notion of ethnie provides a consonant explanation of how the actual *particularities* of ethnicity and ethnic identity are *enacted* by individuals and groups. Smith's central argument -- as in this account -- is that the divide between primordialist and instrumentalist conceptions of ethnicity leads us into a theoretical cul-de-sac. As he observes in *The Ethnic Origins of Nations*:

> By fixing attention mainly on the great dimensions and 'fault lines' of religion, customs, language and institutions, we run the risk of treating ethnicity as something primordial and fixed. By concentrating solely on the attitudes and sentiments and political movements of specific ethnie or ethnic fragments, we risk being so caught up in the day-to-day ebb and flow of ethnic phenomena that we see them as wholly dependent 'tools' or 'boundary markers' of other social and economic forces. (1986: 211)

In order to avoid this dichotomy, Smith argues that any realistic account of ethnicity and ethnogenesis must 'reconstitute the notion of collective cultural identity itself in historical, subjective and symbolic terms' (1991: 25). As Smith elaborates, a conception of ethnic identity along these lines:

> refers not to a uniformity of elements over generations but to *a sense of continuity* on the part of successive generations of a given cultural unit of population, to shared memories of earlier events and periods in the history of the unit and to notions entertained by each generation about the collective destiny of that unit and its culture. (1991: 25; my emphasis)

The parallels with habitus are obvious here. Particular sets of social networks are formed on the basis of believed or actual (ethnic) connectedness and are sustained, crucially, by a collective sense of continuity. Thus, ethnic groups in Smith's conception change more slowly than is often assumed by modernist commentators and may express deeply held group values and meanings (Hutchinson, 1994). However, this sense of continuity does not preclude cultural change and adaptation, and the unit itself may rise or fall, subject to the vicissitudes of history. In this sense, Smith argues, such collectivities are doubly 'historical' since 'not only are historical memories essential to their continuance but each ... is the product of specific historical forces and is therefore subject to historical change and dissolution' (1991: 20).

For Smith, the concept of ethnie, or ethnic community, best expresses the historical and symbolic processes highlighted here. Specifically, ethnies are said by Smith to comprise the following characteristics:

- a collective proper name
- a myth of common ancestry
- shared historical memories
- one or more differentiating elements of common culture
- an association with a specific 'homeland', and
- a sense of solidarity

As can be seen, most of these characteristics reflect a significant cultural and historical content and, except for aspects of a common culture, a strongly subjective component also. Given this, ethnies are not incompatible with a situational view of ethnicity. For example, in relation to the characteristic of common ancestry, Smith argues that it is 'myths of common ancestry, not any fact of ancestry (which is usually difficult to ascertain), that are crucial. It is fictive descent and putative ancestry that matters for the sense of ethnic identification' (1991: 22). Likewise, attachments to a specific territory or homeland tend to be most significant to ethnic identity for their mythical and subjective qualities; the 'sense of place' that they evoke. Even in relation to the more objective aspects of a common culture -- language, religion and kinship, for example -- it is the *diacritical significance* attached to these elements which makes them salient to ethnic

identity, not the actual elements themselves (cf. Barth, 1969). Finally, while Smith argues that these attributes are clearly characteristic of ethnic groups, they are also in a state of constant flux. They may vary in their salience; singly and in relation to each other, within and between historical periods, and among individual group members and thus the group itself:

> As the subjective significance of each of these attributes waxes and wanes for the members of a community, so does the cohesion and self-awareness of that community's membership. As these several attributes come together and become more intense and salient, so does the sense of ethnic identity and, with it, of ethnic community. Conversely, as each of these attributes is attenuated and declines, so does the overall sense of ethnicity, and hence the ethnie itself would dissolve or be absorbed. (1991: 23)

Smith's notion of ethnie allows us then to see ethnic identification as a *dynamic* quality of group relations. More importantly perhaps, it provides us with an operational concept that encapsulates 'the central paradox of ethnicity: the coexistence of flux and durability, of an ever-changing individual and cultural expression within distinct social and cultural parameters' (Smith, 1991: 38).[16] As we shall see, the concept of ethnie also allows us to explore effectively the close inter-relationship between ethnic and national identities. As such, it seems appropriate at this point to turn to the comparable discussions surrounding the latter before considering further the specific links between the two.

Notes -- Chapter 1

1. I will outline in the following chapter the important distinctions which may be drawn between different minority groups -- including national, indigenous, and ethnic minorities -- along with their often widely differing social and political objectives. For now though, I will follow the popular convention of subsuming such groups within the generic phrase 'ethnic minorities'. However, its adoption here is only for convenience and should *not* be construed as an endorsement of its general use in this way.

2. Britain is not a nation, it is a multi-national state comprising four nations - England, Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland. I will explore these distinctions in more detail in Chapter 2.

3. Another prominent nineteenth century commentator, Alex de Tocqueville (1956), provides an equivalent argument in relation to the democratic development of the USA.

4. There are important exceptions to this position within liberal ideology, as Will Kymlicka (1989, 1995a, 1995b) highlights. I will return to this point, and its implications, in Chapter 3 when I discuss the question of the legitimacy of minority rights within the modern nation-state.

5. Marxist commentators vary widely here in the degree to which they regard capitalism as *determining* the construction of ethnic relations. Strongly class determinist theories of ethnicity seek to reduce ethnic categories to the exigencies of more encompassing (class-based) experiences. Weaker versions attempt a more open-ended examination of the interconnections between ethnic and class mobilisation(s). However, in both cases, Marxist perspectives on ethnicity have considerable difficulty in accounting for the *specificity* of ethnic form and meaning in the circumstances of their mobilisation (Smaje, 1997; see below).

6. Globalisation 'refers to those processes, operating on a global scale, which cut across national boundaries, integrating and connecting communities and organisations in new space-time combinations, making the world in reality and in experience more interconnected' (Hall, 1992a: 299).

7. As Fishman (1997) observes, this largely negative semantic association derives from the Biblical Hebrew distinction between goy and 'am, the former denoting an ungodly people and the latter a godly people. In the third century Greek translation of the Hebrew Bible (the Septuagint) the Greek word 'ethnos' was used for 'goy', hence its subsequent association with heathenism.

8. Weber's inclusion of racial characteristics as a part of ethnicity points to the close relationship between 'race', racism and ethnicity. I will explore further these interconnections -- and, more crucially perhaps, the distinctions between them -- later in the chapter.

9. It seems to me that Geertz is talking principally about primordialism here rather than ethnicity *per se* and that the two are not necessarily reducible to each other.

10. Handelman (1977) proposes a more detailed continuum between ethnic categories and ethnic communities. Based on the principle of differing degrees of ethnic incorporation, he suggests two intermediary levels -- the ethnic *network* and the ethnic *association*. An ethnic network 'suggests

that people will regularly interact with one another in terms of an ethnic membership set' (1977: 269). An ethnic association involves the addition of some form of political organisation, enabling the collective interests of the ethnic group to be represented in the formal political sphere, usually in the form of a pressure group.

11. This process of equating group differences on 'racial' grounds is now considered to be scientifically invalid (see, for example, Gould, 1981; Miles, 1989, 1993); hence, the use of quotation marks around the term 'race'.

12. The recent immolation in the former Yugoslavia also demonstrates the varying *salience* of ethnicity over time with regard to social and political organisation. For example, from the time of the Second World War to the beginning of the major ethnic conflicts of the late 1980s, ethnicity had *not* been mobilised as a principal form of social and political delineation in the relations between Serbian, Muslim and Croatian groups in the area (see, for example, Glenny, 1993; Bowman, 1994; Silber & Little, 1995).

13. Methodological individualism assumes that groups are 'constituted from individual behaviour and are subject to continual change as individuals respond to changes in their circumstances' (Banton, 1987: 140). In this view, social relations become a form of market relations with individuals making rational choices about their ethnic alignment(s) solely on the basis of the social and material gain it will be bring them. As Banton observes of this process, an individual will join in ethnic group mobilisation 'only when he expects the benefits of his participation to exceed the costs' (1987: 136; see also Hechter *et al.*, 1982). On this basis, it is argued that the ethnic options of individual actors can be predicted. However, serious limitations can be attributed to this analysis. The central premise that rationality equals self-interest is too narrow; one may also act rationally in someone else's -- or a collective group's -- interest. Likewise, not all ethnic choices may be rational or freely chosen (see below). Given this, rational choice theory presents us with a socially and economically reductive account of ethnicity (for a useful critique, see Figueroa, 1991).

14. Even avowed social constructionists, such as Eugeen Roosens, concede this point. As Roosens observes, 'Ethnic groups and their cultures are not merely a completely arbitrary construct: there is always a minimum of incontestable and noninterpretable facts necessary to win something from the opponent.... The reality [of ethnicity] is very elastic but not totally arbitrary' (1989: 156; see also below).

15. Stack (1986) argues, for example, that the primordialist position of Geertz, Shils and Isaacs has never denied the significant role of socioeconomic and political factors as intervening variables in the crystallisation of ethnicity. Nor, as I suggested earlier, has it conceptualised ethnicity as immutable and static (see, for example, Geertz, 1973: 258).

16. Interestingly, this position is close to Barth's later (1989) formulation of 'streams of tradition' or 'universes of discourse' in which individual actors differentially participate but which possess a degree of stability over time (see also Jenkins, 1995).

Chapter 2

NATIONALISM AND ETHNICITY

Many of the academic arguments surrounding ethnicity have also been rehearsed at length in relation to national identity and nationalism. Given this, it is perhaps surprising that these discussions have until recently been conducted largely in isolation from one another. As Eriksen (1993) observes, the remarkable congruence between theories of nationalism and national identity, and anthropological theories of ethnicity, seems to have gone unrecognised, or at least unremarked, by many theorists of nationalism (see, for example, Gellner, 1983; Hobsbawm, 1990; Anderson, 1991). This may well be attributable to the well-known solidity of academic boundaries. However, it may also be due to the prevailing modernist view among theorists of nationalism that ethnicity and nationalism are separate phenomena. Hobsbawm argues, for example, that nationalism and ethnicity are 'different, and indeed non-comparable, concepts' (1992: 4). Consequently, any connection between the two is seen as more or less coincidental. By this, modernist commentators on nationalism have attempted to debunk the central claim of many nationalist movements in the modern world; that the right to nationhood is based principally on *pre-existing* ties of ethnicity. In its most extreme form, this latter position equates nations directly with ethno-cultural communities which are, in turn, defined by fixed cultural characteristics -- particularly, but not exclusively, a common language. While this view is now largely limited to nationalist proponents themselves, it also had some early currency in the academic writings of the late eighteenth century 'German Romantics', Herder, Humboldt and Fichte. However, like the debates on ethnicity in the previous chapter, the common orthodoxy

nowadays is to reject this primordial position as essentialist and to argue for a more subjective, situational, and socially constructed account of nationalism and nationhood.

I will explore these debates more fully in due course. However, before doing so, I want to foreshadow my own position. As in the previous chapter, my argument will be that the polarisation of primordial and modernist accounts has been unhelpful -- resulting in limited and partial accounts of the phenomena of nationalism and nationhood which they seek to explain. Thus, after outlining the key tenets of the primordial/modernist debates, I will once again advocate an alternative position -- one that combines salient elements of both extremes and, in so doing, returns ethnicity to the study of nationalism. This alternative can broadly be described as 'ethnicist' and it has been most prominently associated with the long-standing work of Anthony Smith on nationalism and, in particular, his elaboration of the central concept of ethnie (see Chapter 1). An ethnicist perspective avoids the trap of essentialism associated with primordial accounts while still being able to explain the crucial interrelationship of ethnicity with nationalism and national identity, something modernist accounts have seen fit to ignore. As such, it provides an appropriate basis for the ensuing arguments in Chapters 3-5 in support of *minority rights* -- both generally, and in particular relation to language and education. It is my view here that the historical denigration of ethnic minority language(s) and culture(s) within the nation-state, and their concomitant exclusion from the public or civic realm, are fundamentally misguided. Moreover, for those groups which can claim to be *national* minorities (ethnies) in their own historic territory, such an approach can actually be said to be *illegitimate* (see also Guibernau, 1996).

The processes of denigration and exclusion to which minority groups have been subject stem from the long-standing pejorative views of ethnicity in both political and social science commentary, discussed in Chapter 1. As I will argue in this and the next chapter, these views can be traced historically to an over-emphasis on *political* nationalism and its institutional embodiment in the modern nation-state, and to the concomitant valorisation of civic over ethnic ties; the latter usually being invoked in support of liberal democracy. Such a position suits well the interests of majority (or dominant) ethnic groups in nation-states since it ends up representing their ethnic affiliations, particularly their language and cultural traditions, *as those of* the nation-state. In effect, the *ethnic*

interests of the majority group are legitimated and naturalised as *civic* ones which, in turn, are equated directly with modernity. Concomitantly, the legitimate claims of minorities for similar recognition and inclusion in the public or civic realm are ignored, discounted and/or suppressed on the basis that they are merely 'ethnic'. At best, minority group members may be able to continue to maintain their ethnic habitus in private; although the pressure to assimilate to the civic language and culture may remain intense. At worst, minority language(s) and culture(s) may be actively suppressed -- as, for example, was the case for the Catalan and Basque national minorities in Franco's Spain.

Terminology

Before proceeding further, however, it behoves us once again to clarify our terms. Indeed, if it is not already clearly apparent, one of the principal difficulties in discussions of both ethnicity and nationalism has been the indeterminacy and confusion that have surrounded the meaning and use of key terms. As such, it is crucial at the start to define, and distinguish between, the following four central concepts: the 'nation', 'nationalism', the 'state' and the 'nation-state'. In due course, I will also examine the distinctions that can be drawn between 'political nationalism', 'cultural nationalism', the 'multinational state' and the 'polyethnic state', and will specify in detail how a variety of ethnic and national minority groups are positioned in relation to all of the above.

Following Guibernau (1996), a 'nation' refers to a group of people who are conscious of forming a distinct community and who may be said to share:

- an historic territory, or homeland
- common historical memories
- a common culture
- a common (political) destiny and, relatedly,
- a desire for at least some degree of social and/or political self determination

Thus, the 'nation' includes five key dimensions -- psychological (consciousness of forming a group), territorial, historical, cultural and political -- and may be regarded, for the purposes of the following discussion, as equivalent to the concept of ethnie outlined in the previous chapter.

Following Breuilly (1993) and Smith (1994), the ideology of nationalism can be broadly summarised as follows:

- the world is divided into nations, each with its own identity and destiny;
- the nation is the sole source of political power, and the interests and values of the nation take priority over all other interests and values. Loyalty to the nation is pre-eminent;
- everyone must belong to a nation, if everyone is to be truly free;
- to realise themselves, nations must be as politically independent as possible. Political autonomy, or at least some degree of self-determination, are central tenets of nationalism;
- to maintain peace and justice in the world, nations must be both sufficiently free and sufficiently secure to pursue their own (national) interests (see Breuilly, 1993: 2; Smith, 1994: 379).

Admittedly, it needs to be stressed here that the history of nationalism(s) is replete with numerous and wide variations. Accordingly, some commentators have despaired of finding, or even attempting a universal definition of nationalism. Hall, for example, makes the blunt assertion that 'no single, universal theory of nationalism is possible. As the historical record is diverse, so too must be our concepts' (1993: 1). Other commentators, while not endorsing this degree of relativism, argue that explanations of nationalism must at least take due account of the temporal and societal context (see, for example, Gellner, 1983; C. Williams, 1994; Jenkins, 1995; Smith 1995a). However, these caveats notwithstanding, there is sufficient consistency among nationalist proponents to present the above as the 'core doctrine' of nationalism, particularly as it has been mobilised historically and politically in the establishment of 'nation-states'.

Which brings us to the 'state' and the 'nation-state'. The 'state', first of all, has been defined in western social science theory as an entity a) with political sovereignty over a clearly designated territorial area, b) with monopoly control of legitimate force and c) consisting of citizens with terminal loyalty to it (Giddens, 1984; Oommen, 1994). The 'nation-state' -- the raison d'être of so many historical and current nationalisms -- is the confluence of the nation *and* the state. As Gellner asserts in his seminal *Nations and Nationalism*, 'nationalism is *primarily* a political principle, which holds that the political and the national unit should be congruent' (1983: 1; my emphasis). In other words, the core tenet of what might be termed 'political nationalism' is the

belief that 'the national state, identified with a national culture and committed to its protection, is the natural political unit' (Gellner, 1993: 409). It follows directly from this principle, of course, that all nations should aspire to be represented in and by a state of their own. Moreover, as Gellner's latter comment implies, once this coincidence of nation and state has occurred, the principal aim of the institutional nation-state is, recursively, to create (or recreate) and maintain a particular conception of nationhood and/or national identity. Thus, the Italian nationalist Massimo d'Azeglio could declare: 'We have made Italy, now we have to make Italians' (cited in Hobsbawm, 1990: 44). In so doing, the nation-state conflates the cultural/historical and the political/legal dimensions of nationhood in order to create an homogenous national culture with which its members can identify and to which they will be committed. As we shall see, this is achieved principally through the establishment and promotion of a common language and civic culture, and via the agencies of the state -- most notably, education.

The nation-state is thus a specifically modern phenomenon; the product, in effect, of the nationalism of the last two centuries. However, such is the pervasiveness of the nation-state in the modern world, and so unquestioned are the political principles upon which it is predicated, that it has come to be largely naturalised and taken for granted. So much so, in fact, that the 'nation-state' is often seen as synonymous with both 'society' and 'modernity'. Of the equation of the nation-state with society, Zygmunt Bauman observes of western social science generally, and of sociology in particular:

> Sociology, as it came of age in the bosom of Western civilisation and as we know of it today, is endemically national-based. It does not recognise a totality broader than a politically organised [nation-state]: the term 'society' ... is, for all practical purposes, a name for an entity identical in size and composition with the nation-state. (1973: 42-43; (see also Halle, 1962; Bauman, 1973; Tilly, 1984)

Of the correspondence of modernity and the nation-state, Hobsbawm asserts that 'the basic characteristic of the modern nation and everything associated with it is its modernity' (1990: 14). These two tenets combine when nation-states -- or, more specifically, those 'nations' whose culture is currently represented within and by a 'state' -- are compared with those nations, or ethnies, which currently are not. As David McCrone observes in this regard, of the early development of *British* sociology:

> British sociology simply accepted that 'society' was coterminous with the British state, unitary and highly centralised, driven by social change in the political and cultural heartland of southern Britain [i.e., England]. If there was a particular sociology of the 'periphery' -- in Wales, Ireland and Scotland -- it had to do with analysing a 'traditional', pre-capitalist way of life. It was judged to be the task of the sociologist of these parts merely to chart its decline and ultimate incorporation into 'modern' society, or so it seemed. (1992: 5)

And so, by implication, we return once again to the pejorative distinction between 'ethnicity' and the modern 'nation-state', first discussed in Chapter 1. However, we can also now specifically include within the former category the sublimation of 'national minorities', or nations not currently represented by a (corresponding) state. In order to explore further the origins, nature, and validity of this particular construction, I want now to turn to a closer examination of nationalism and the various debates and controversies which have surrounded it.

Romantic nationalism

For many nationalists, nations are perennial; they have always existed in one form or another. In this view, modern nations can trace their antecedents to the Middle Ages and, in some cases, to 'nationes' in antiquity. Relatedly, in a position which closely parallels the primordial conceptions of ethnicity, the enduring influence of nations, and nationhood, is explained by an ideology of pre-existing kinship or ethnic ties. From this, the nation is objectified via a range of 'national' characteristics -- including language, history, and a variety of specific cultural practices. Both primordial ties and the weight of history are thus regularly invoked by nationalists in their assertions of (and for) nationhood. Indeed, it is this 'deep-seated sense of kinship which infuses the nation' (Connor, 1993) that nationalist leaders have so effectively employed in mobilising individual members of nations on behalf of nationalist causes.

This view of nations as objective, pre-given, and fixed social entities has been principally expounded by nationalists themselves, although it was also to gain some early currency in academic commentary on nationalism. Schleiermacher, for example, viewed the nation as 'a natural division of the human race, endowed by God with its own character' (cited in Kedourie, 1960: 58). However, it was the late eighteenth century triumvirate of Herder, Humboldt and

Fichte -- the 'German Romantics' as they have come to be known -- who have been most closely associated with this position in the social sciences. Thus, Johann Gottfried Herder (1744-1803) argued, along very much the same lines, for the divine inspiration of the nation as a natural form of human organisation: 'a nation is as natural as a plant, as a family, only with more branches' (1969: 324). From this, Herder and Humboldt, and subsequently Fichte, were to advocate an 'organic' or 'linguistic ' nationalism where culture -- and particularly, language -- were viewed as central to the essence or character (Volksgeist) of the nation. In this perspective, language came to be the *most* important distinguishing characteristic of nationhood -- indeed, its very soul.[1] As Kedourie observes, language was seen as 'an outward sign of a group's particular identity and a significant means of ensuring its continuation' (1960: 71). Or, put another way, the continuing existence of a nation was inconceivable without its own language. Without a language, Herder argued, a Volk is an absurdity (Unding), a contradiction in terms (see Barnard, 1965: 57).

Romantic nationalism's culturalist emphases on 'language, blood and soil' as constitutive elements of the Volk were established in direct opposition to the political nationalism of the French Revolution and its associated notions of equality and popular sovereignty. Indeed, the anti-French feeling of Herder, Humboldt and Fichte, and their general ethnocentrism, are prominent features of their writings. Fichte (1762-1814) is the most extreme in this regard. In his *Addresses to the German Nation* [1807], he argued that of all the 'Teutonic' peoples only the Germans retained their original language: 'the German speaks a language which has been alive ever since it first issued from the force of nature, whereas the other Teutonic races speak a language which has movement on the surface but is dead at the root' (1968: 58-59). On the basis of this anthropomorphic view of language, Fichte asserted that if German was superior to all other languages, then on Herder's principle of the centrality of language to nationhood, the German nation was also, by definition, superior to all others. Consequently, Fichte has been attributed with extrapolating Herder's (and Humboldt's) ideas about language distinctiveness into the wider socio-cultural and political arena (Kedourie, 1960).[2] Kedourie succinctly summarises the logic of this process of extrapolation as follows: 'a group speaking the same language is known as a nation, and a nation ought to constitute a state' (1960: 68).

I will have much more to say about the interrelationship between language, ethnicity and nationalism in Chapter 4 and will outline there why language *can* be regarded as a significant marker of ethnic and national identity. Suffice it to say at this point, that the arguments of romantic nationalism do little to give this view any kind of credibility, and rightly so. The view of nations as both natural and linguistically determined -- or, as Richard Handler's describes it, as 'bounded cultural objects' (1988: 27) -- is both essentialist and determinist. As such, it holds little if any currency today, except perhaps among some nationalists. Certainly, it is widely dismissed by most commentators on nationalism, many of whom have instead opted for a modernist perspective. In this latter view, two principles are seen to be central to any sensible discussion of nations and nationalism:

1) attempts to adduce a clearly definable set of 'national' criteria (such as language, for example) simply cannot account for all contexts and variants. Consequently, more subjective criteria are necessary to describe effectively the formation of nations and national identities.

2) modern nations can be distinguished quite clearly from their historical antecedents; the link between the two is not necessarily continuous.

I will deal with each of these key tenets in turn.

The will to nationhood

As we have seen in our discussions on ethnicity, objectivist definitions exclude as much as they include; there are always variants and exceptions which do not fit easily into an established schema of objective criteria. Kohn, for example, argues that nationalities 'come into existence only when certain objective bonds delimit a social group' (1961: 3). However, he also quickly concedes that these 'bonds' are not sufficient in themselves to provide an adequate definition of the nation. This 'subjectivist' view was first articulated in the nineteenth century -- generally, in direct response and opposition to the tenets of cultural and linguistic nationalism outlined above. One of the most notable early proponents of this more subjectivist account of nationhood was Ernest Renan (1823-

1892). In his seminal lecture, 'Qu'est ce qu'une nation?', delivered at the Sorbonne on March 11 1882, he argued that various objective criteria -- language, religion, material interest, geography and 'race'[3] -- were all insufficient delimiters of the nation. In relation to language, for example, and in direct contravention to Fichte, he states: 'Language may invite us to unite but it does not compel us to do so' (1990: 16). This leads him to conclude that the nation is, in essence, 'a soul, a spiritual principle' (1990: 19) that is not directly linked to any particular objective marker(s). Rather, two aspects constitute this principle for Renan, one of which lies in the past, one in the present:

> One is the possession in common of a rich legacy of memories; the other is present-day consent, the desire to live together, the will to perpetuate the value of the heritage that one has received in an undivided form. A nation is therefore a large-scale solidarity.... It presupposes a past; it is summarized, however, in the present by a tangible fact, namely consent, the clearly expressed desire to continue a common life. A nation's existence is, if you will pardon the metaphor, a daily plebiscite... (1990: 19)

The *will* to nationhood both unifies historical memory -- that history 'received in an undivided form' -- and secures present-day consent. The former requires some serious forgetting, or sublimating, of countervailing and contradictory histories. As Renan famously observes, 'forgetting, I would even go so far as to say historical error, is a crucial factor in the creation of a nation' (1990: 11). The latter implies a continual renegotiation of the boundaries of consent -- the desire to live together: 'the wish of nations is, all in all, the sole legitimate criterion, the one to which one must always return' (1990: 20). Both dimensions suggest our active participation in the *construction* of nationhood; that is, the construction of a particular 'discourse on society that *performs* the problem of totalizing the people and unifying the national will' (Bhabha, 1994: 160-161).

Max Weber, in his essay on the structures of power, reaches some remarkably similar conclusions. Near the outset of his brief analysis of the nation, he states:

> If the concept of 'nation' can in any way be defined unambiguously, it certainly cannot be stated in terms of empirical qualities common to those who count as members of the nation. In the sense of those using the term at a given time, the concept undoubtedly means, above all, that one may exact from certain groups of men a specific sentiment of solidarity in the face of other groups. *Thus, the concept belongs in the sphere of values.* Yet, there is no agreement on how these groups should be delimited or about what concerted action should result from such solidarity. (1961: 172; my emphasis)

Weber's analysis, like Renan's, suggests the constructed nature of nationhood; its place 'in the sphere of values'. As a result, Weber goes on to explore, and discount, a number of commonly invoked prerequisites of nationhood. With regard to a common language, for example, he suggests that 'national solidarity among men speaking the same language may be just as well rejected as accepted' (1961: 173). Likewise, he dismisses the notion of 'ethnic solidarity' as a *sufficient* condition of nationhood, although he does concede that 'the idea of the "nation" is apt to include the notions of common descent and of an essential, *though frequently indefinite*, homogeneity' (1961: 173; my emphasis); a point to which I will return.

The conclusions drawn by Renan and Weber clearly emphasise the subjective over the objective in the development of nationhood; a cental characteristic of modernist accounts. The will to nationhood, in Renan's evocative terms, is both a conscious choice and a particular construction of history and therefore cannot be equated directly with pre-existing ethnic, cultural and/or linguistic communities. This position seems to be given credence by the many instances where the use of objective 'national' criteria is shown to be clearly inadequate as a predictor of nationhood and nationalism. With regard to ethnic affiliation, for example, Connor (1991) notes that modern Greeks are not descended from their alleged ancestors, the ancient Hellenes, but from Slavs who first migrated to mainland Greece in the sixth century AD. Language and religion are also problematic as national indicators. Language may or may not be a key focus of national identity, as seen in the nationalist movements of Wales and Scotland respectively. Even where it is, as in Wales, it may not be so across the population as a whole (see Chapter 6). Likewise, religion differs in significance from one national context to another. For example, the Catholic/Protestant religious divide is a principal factor in nationalist struggles in Northern Ireland but not in Scotland.[4] More complicated still, objective characteristics such as religion and language may vary in salience both internally within a national group and across different historical periods. When the Belgium state was established in 1830, for instance, religious differences were far more important than linguistic ones. However, more recently, there has been far greater emphasis in Belgium on the linguistic differentiation between French and Flemish speakers (Vos, 1993). A similar trend is observable in Québec where nationalist claims since the Quiet Revolution have focused increasingly on the French language at the expense of an earlier focus on Catholicism (Handler, 1988; Penrose, 1995; see Chapter 5).

In short, no single distinguishing feature fits all national contexts. As Anthony Smith observes, 'a national identity is fundamentally multi-dimensional; it can never be reduced to a single element' (1991: 14). The strident claims of linguistic nationalism can thus be safely dismissed since language, it seems, is only one of many characteristics which may (or may not) be salient at any given time and place. Where national symbols do achieve significance in particular national contexts, and/or in particular historical periods, it is principally because of their role in differentiating 'us' from 'them'. As Armstrong (1982) observes, objectified national characteristics act in this way as symbolic 'border guards'. These border guards are closely linked to specific cultural codes and function to identify people as members or non-members of the specific national collectivity. This is not too dissimilar a position to a situational account of ethnicity (cf. Barth, 1969).

The modern nation

The second, and related, tenet of the modernist position on nationalism is the argument that modern nations are just that -- modern -- and thus fundamentally distinct from previous forms of collective organisation. In short, modernists proclaim that nations -- by which they actually invariably mean nation-*states* (see below) -- are the product of the age of nationalism (see, for example, Kedourie, 1960; Kohn, 1961; Deutsch, 1966; Seton-Watson, 1977; Nairn, 1981; Gellner, 1964, 1983; Hobsbawm & Ranger, 1983; Giddens, 1984; Hobsbawm, 1990; Anderson, 1991; Breuilly, 1993). Moreover, it is argued that this age of nationalism arose out of the specific historical and social developments of modernisation and its concomitants -- industrialisation, political democracy, and universal literacy -- in eighteenth and nineteenth century Europe. Prior to this, the feudal, dynastic and largely agrarian societies of the day had little notion of national sentiment -- those feelings of collective 'national' belonging -- that characterises the modern nation.[5] In this view, to equate the modern nation with its ancient predecessors is to commit the sin of 'retrospective nationalism'. As Smith summarises it: 'according to the modernist perspective, nations and nationalism are not logically contingent; they are sociologically necessary only in the modern world' (1994: 377).

The important distinctions between pre-modern and modern nations highlighted by modernists can be summarised as follows. First, modern nations tend to be equated directly with their political representation in the nation-state. In other words, modern nations are seen as 'mass' nations, based on the notion of universal enfranchisement, and with the specific goal of administrative and political representation in the form of the nation-state (Smith, 1995a). In this, they are a product of post-enlightenment political rationalism and the ideology of nationalism, both of which emerged only in the eighteenth century.[6]

Second, and relatedly, the term 'nation' in its modern sense embodies two interrelated meanings -- the 'nation' as the people living *within* a nation-state and the 'nation' *as the* nation-state (Billig, 1995). Accordingly, the modern nation is viewed as both an 'historical culture-community' *and* a 'legal-political' one (Smith, 1995a), with the latter invariably taking precedence over the former. These two dimensions, and their coalescence in the institutionalised nation-state, are again products of the ideology of political nationalism. Thus, on the one hand, nationalism legitimates the construction of a particular sense of national identity for those historical culture-communities which are said to inhabit their own nation-state. This involves the exercise of *internal* political and legal jurisdiction over its citizens and the construction (or attempted construction) of an homogenous national culture in which political and ethnic boundaries are seen to coincide (Gellner, 1983). On the other hand, political nationalism also includes the general principle that nations should, if at all possible, possess their own state. For already established nation-states this latter principle involves the exercise of *external* rights to sovereignty and self-government in the present inter-state system, along with the defence of these rights -- by war if necessary. For those historical culture-communities which do not currently possess their own state, this principle is expressed via the many secessionist and irredentist nationalist movements in the world today.

Third, the link between the modern nation, and its institutional embodiment in the nation-state, is further predicated on the rise of a bureaucratic state organisation, a capitalist economy, and a 'high' literate and scientific culture; the latter based, usually, on a single and distinctive vernacular language. All of these are characteristic of modernisation (see below). In contrast, previous cultural communities tended to be localised, largely illiterate, and culturally and linguistically heterogeneous (Birch, 1989; Hutchinson, 1994; C. Williams, 1994).

In the modernist view then, nations (as represented in and by the nation-state) are the product of very specific social, economic and political circumstances. Their emergence as the primary social community in the modern era is directly related to the advent of modernisation and the concomitant rise of the state and the ideology of nationalism.[7] As such, any attempt to present the nation as a natural and/or ancient form of human organisation must involve what we saw described in our discussion of ethnicity in Chapter 1 as 'the invention of tradition' (Hobsbawm & Ranger, 1983; see also Hobsbawm, 1990). Like situational accounts of ethnicity, modernists commentators on nationalism view nations as, at best, socially constructed and, at worst, simply invented. In either case, the central relationship between a pre-existing ethnicity and nationhood is specifically disavowed.[8]

The modernists

What is broadly termed the modernist position on nationalism, however, is by no means undifferentiated. In particular, modernists differ over the historical timing of nationalism, and the nation-states to which it gave rise, and over the key influences which have surrounded the development of nationalism. In relation to the former, a range of starting points for nationalism is offered. Kohn (1961) and Greenfeld (1992) suggest the seventeenth century British rebellion against the monarchy, Anderson (1991) the American Revolution, Best (1988) and Alter (1989) the French Revolution, and Kedourie (1960) and Breuilly (1993) the German response of Herder *et al.* to the political implications of the French revolution. All are agreed, however, about the historical recency of nationalism[9] and its rapid and widespread development. As Best (1982) succinctly observes, by the beginning of the nineteenth century the world was full of it. In relation to the latter, a range of key influences is attributed by modernist writers to the rise of nationalism. Gellner (1983) has argued, for example, that the emergence of nationalism is predicated on the impact of industrialisation, Anderson (1991) on the role of print capitalism, and Giddens (1984) and Breuilly (1993) on the development of the modern state.

It is not my intention here to explore in any depth the full range of modernist theories; there are numerous books already devoted to such a task (for some recent examples, see Breuilly, 1993; Hutchinson, 1994; Smith, 1991; 1995a). However, it is my intention to examine in some detail

two exemplars of this position -- Ernest Gellner (1983, see also 1964) and Benedict Anderson (1991). These two theorists illustrate the modernist position writ large and their work on nationalism has been particularly prominent and influential. As we shall see, both theorists also place a prominent emphasis on the interconnections between nationalism, language and education, a concern which is central to this account and which will be explored more fully in the following chapters.

Gellner's theory of industrialisation

Gellner argues, in *Nations and Nationalism* (1983), that the rise of nationalism cannot simply be explained ideologically -- that is, as the result of a contest of ideas -- but must be rooted in the *material* changes brought about in Europe at the end of the eighteenth century by industrialisation. In this, his analysis is essentially functionalist, although it bears similarities to some Marxist perspectives on nationalism.[10] For Gellner, nationalism developed within the context of the transition from traditional agrarian societies to modern industrial societies. In the former, literacy performed a specialised function and, along with occupational mobility, was limited to a small elite. Mass public education was unheard of. Political control was also largely decentralised and populations spoke a variety of languages and dialects. Localism in both speech form and cultural identification was the norm and, consequently, there was little, if any, emphasis on achieving a uniform state culture. As Gellner observes, 'what is virtually inconceivable within such a system is a serious and sustained drive for linguistic and cultural homogeneity.... Both the will and the means [and, one might add, the *need*] for such an aspiration are conspicuously lacking' (1987: 15).[11]

In contrast, the modern industrialised society -- with its literate, mobile, and occupationally specialised division of labour -- required cultural continuity and, where possible, cultural homogeneity in order to function effectively. In this context, individuals needed to be 'substitutable' -- that is, they had to be able to cope with and move between the increasingly complex and differentiated roles created by the division of labour. What makes the individual 'substitutable' in this way is a significant degree of cultural and linguistic *homogeneity* and this was achieved via the implementation of state sponsored 'national' education systems. For Gellner, mass education -- established, maintained and monitored by the state -- provided the

literacy and 'technological competence' necessary for producing 'full' or 'effective' citizens in modern industrial societies.

The principle of 'one state, one culture' thus saw the state, via its education system, increasingly identified with a specific language and culture. As Gellner asserts: 'whereas in the past the connection [between state and culture] was thin, fortuitous, varied, loose and often minimal.... now it [became] unavoidable. That is what nationalism is all about...' (1983: 38). The result was the emergence of the nation-state in which cultural and political boundaries were seen to conveniently converge. In Gellner's view, the rise of nationalism is thus inextricably linked to the *prior* development of a strong state culture from which an homogenous nation could be shaped. As he observes:

> It is not the case that the 'age of nationalism' is a mere summation of the awakening and political self-assertion of this, that, or the other nation. Rather when general social conditions make for standardized, homogenous, centrally sustained high cultures, pervading ethnic populations and not just elite minorities, a situation arises in which *well-defined educationally sanctioned and unified cultures* constitute very nearly the only kind of unity with which men willingly and often ardently identify. The cultures now seem to be the natural repositories of political legitimacy. Only *then* does it come to appear that any defiance of their boundaries by political units constitutes a scandal. (1983: 55; my emphasis in the first instance)

Gellner's analysis situates nationalism in the social, economic and political changes of the time while also linking nationalism specifically to the development of a literate, national 'high' culture. Nationalism has flourished, he suggests, because 'well-defined, educationally sanctioned and unified cultures' offer a path to modernity, a basis of political legitimacy, and a means of shared cultural identity.

Anderson's 'imagined communities'

Benedict Anderson's likening of the modern nation to an 'imagined political community' evokes a similar conception. In his influential analysis, Anderson argues that all national communities are '*imagined* because the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion' (1991: 6). This is not to say that a sense of national consciousness or identity is *imaginary*. It is merely to suggest that the idea of a collective 'national' community, like all large-

scale collectivities, has to be *specifically* and *consciously* cultivated since it involves conceiving of something that is beyond one's immediate day-to-day experience. As he outlines, 'my point of departure is that nationality, or, as one might prefer to put it in view of that word's multiple significations, nation-ness, as well as nationalism, are cultural artefacts of a particular kind' (1991: 4).

Anderson argues that the development of the modern nation 'conceived as a solid community moving steadily down (or up) history' (1991: 26) arose from the congruence of industrial capitalism and print technology in fifteenth and sixteenth century Europe. The convergence of capitalism and print technology at this time saw the rapid spread in print of previously localised vernacular languages. These developments gave a new fixity to language and created unified fields of exchange and communication below Latin (the dominant administrative language of the day) and above the spoken vernaculars. As a result, vernacular languages came to assume many of the administrative functions previously enjoyed only by Latin and rose to be 'languages-of-power'. As speakers of languages with widely different dialects became capable of comprehending one another, via print, they also came to recognise themselves as belonging to one particular language (and cultural) group among many. With the advent of modernisation and the increasing centralisation of state control, this was to lead, in turn, to an emerging sense of national consciousness. By this process, a *shared* sense of a particular nation's history -- along with its associated language(s) and cultural symbols -- began to be cultivated.

Anderson argues that this emerging national consciousness 'could arise historically only when substantial groups of people were in a position to think of themselves as living lives *parallel* to those of other substantial groups of people -- if never meeting, yet certainly proceeding along the same trajectory' (1991: 188). In this way, a new kind of indirect relationship was formed in which the biographies of individuals, and the nation as a whole, could be joined in a common historical narrative (Calhoun, 1993a). We may all have our own personal histories but the claim to nationhood provides us with a collective sense of history:

- by linking us to past and future generations;
- by situating us in the global context as a member of one nation among many, and;
- by providing formal equivalence for us as one member among many of a specific nation.

Other modernist commentators (see, for example, Hobsbawm & Ranger, 1983; Hobsbawm, 1990; Balibar, 1991) would suggest at this point that the construction of such collective histories is fictive. In the British context, for example, this is said to be reflected in the invented traditions of Scottish tartans and highland culture (Trevor-Roper, 1983), in the nineteenth century druidic inventions of the Welsh eisteddfodau (see Chapter 6), and even in the supposed centrality of the monarchy to conceptions of British identity (Cannadine, 1983; Colley, 1992). This 'inventionist' position, most trenchantly outlined by Hobsbawm (1990), has clear parallels with Roosens' (1989) account of the construction of Huron ethnicity outlined in Chapter 1. However, Anderson is less concerned here with outlining a moral position on nationalism.[12] He argues simply that *all* modern nations are imagined in this way. It is not so much the falsity/genuineness of nations which is thus in question but the *style* in which they are imagined.[13]

Like Gellner then, Anderson's principal thesis is that the rise of nationalism has *effected* the construction of the modern nation as we know it in its nation-state form -- an anonymous, socially differentiated and large scale collectivity with its basis in the categorical relationships of equivalent individuals. The sense of commonality that results has seen 'the "imagined community" ... spread out to every conceivable contemporary society' (1991: 157). Nonetheless, the nation and nationality are, for all that, still cultural artefacts. Nationalism has produced nations (as nation-states) and national identity, not the other way around.

Limits of the modernist account

However, as with situational accounts of ethnicity, modernist conceptions of nationalism and national identity may be overstated. Modernists have been rightly sceptical of perennial and primordial accounts which attempt to 'naturalise' nationhood via a pre-existing ethnicity and/or language and have also highlighted the apparent disjunctures between modern nation-states and earlier collectivities. However, on this basis, modernists cannot account for the ongoing *persistence* of nationalism in the modern world -- particularly in situations where political modernisation has already been achieved. After all, the logic of the modernist argument is that as nationalism supersedes ethnicity, so should internationalism replace nationalism as the next stage of the modernisation process. Instead, neither has really occurred. The rise today of an

increasing internationalisation appears *in conjunction with* nationalism rather than as a replacement for it (Robertson, 1992; see Chapter 1). Likewise, ethnicity continues to feature prominently in relationship to nationalism, as the increasing proliferation of 'ethnonationalisms' in the modern world highlights.

Part of this inability to predict the ongoing salience of ethnicity and nationalism, and their interconnections, can be explained by Anthony Smith's observation that, in rejecting primordial accounts entirely, modernist commentators on nationalism have confused individual and collective levels of ethnicity. As I argued in Chapter 1, we may, as individuals, demonstrate a considerable degree of latitude in our attachment to and choice of particular social and political identities. As such, ethnic choices and identifications may vary in their salience -- both in themselves, and in relation to other social identities -- at any given time and place. However, this view needs to be balanced by the recognition that 'at the collective as opposed to the individual level, ethnicity remains a powerful, explosive and durable force' (Smith, 1995a: 34).

Some modernists have countered here with an economic 'core-periphery' explanation -- that ethnonationalism persists because modernisation proceeded unequally, leading to the uneven economic development of certain historical culture-groups within particular nation-states and, thus, to the growth of ethnonationalist movements (see, for example, Deutsch, 1966; Wallerstein, 1979). An obvious example here is the 'internal colonialist' thesis advanced by Hechter (1975; see also Nairn, 1981). Hechter argued that uneven economic development in Britain led to a stratified 'cultural division of labour' in the 'Celtic fringe' of Wales, Ireland and Scotland which, in turn, could account for their respective nationalisms:

> To the extent that social stratification in the periphery is based on observable cultural differences, there exists the probability that the disadvantaged group will, in time, reactively assert its own culture as equal or superior to that of the relatively advantaged core. This may help it conceive of itself as a separate 'nation' and seek independence. (1975: 10)

However, the model of internal colonialism has since been widely contested. McCrone (1992), for example, points out that while the Scottish highlands, or Gaeltachd, may have been seen as a suitably appropriate example of the model, the 'culturally anglicised' and 'overdeveloped'

lowlands of Scotland certainly were not. Likewise, in relation to Wales, internal colonialism considerably understates the centrality of south Wales to the rapid development and expansion of *British* industrialisation (G.A. Williams, 1982, 1985). In Williams' view, the industrialised south of Wales was no mere satellite of an imperial economic core based in London, as Hechter would have it. Rather, the imperial core came to Wales. This can be demonstrated by the huge influx of migrants to the area in the late nineteenth century, and by the consequent reconstruction of local Welsh issues and concerns as British ones (C. Williams 1994; see Chapter 6).

If we look more widely, the relatively prosperous Catalan, Basque and Québécois nationalist movements also illustrate the limits of the core-periphery approach.[14] While adverse economic factors *may* play a significant part in *some* ethnonationalist movements (as we saw in Chapter 1), they are not a *sufficient* explanation for the ongoing prominence of such movements in the modern world. Moreover, economic considerations aside, a modernist conception still cannot answer the question of *why* ethnicity -- as opposed to religion, regionalism or class, for example -- is so often chosen as the principal focus of nationalist mobilisation.

Ethnicist approaches to nationalism

For a more adequate explanation, we need to consider an approach which returns ethnicity and ethnic identity to the study of nationalism (see, for example, Armstrong, 1982; Fishman, 1989b; Smith, 1983, 1986, 1991, 1995a; Hutchinson, 1994; Jenkins, 1995). As Richard Jenkins argues:

> If the concept [of nationalism] is to retain its analytical value, the varieties of what we persist in calling 'nationalism' must also have something in common. Although not the only common thread -- political membership conceived as citizenship might be another -- ethnicity, personal and collective identity which draws upon a repertoire of perceived cultural differences, is the most ubiquitous and plausible... (1995: 369)

Ethnicist approaches accept many of the tenets of modernism -- particularly the, at times, constructed nature of national identity. However, they also address three of the key weaknesses of the modernist thesis: its historicity, its conflation of the 'nation' and the 'nation-state', and its separation of political and ethnic nationalism(s). I will deal with each of these key issues in turn.

Historical continuity

First, while ethnicist commentators acknowledge the distinctive characteristics of the modern nation, they also argue that the processes of nation formation need to be examined within and through a longer and more cyclical account of history. In this view, nationalism comes to be situated within a wider theory of ethnic formation, an approach which emphasises *commonalities* as well as *differences* between the pre-modern and modern eras. As Anthony Smith argues, the rise of nationalism and the nation-state *has* been shaped by pre-modern ethnic identities (ethnies), whatever modernists might say, and thus can be situated within a larger cycle of ethnic resurgence and decline in history.[15] His position specifically links 'the consequences of modernity with an understanding of the continuing role played by cultural ties and ethnic identities which originated in pre-modern epochs' (1995a: 47). Richard Jenkins reiterates this view in his observation that 'nationalism is an aspect of the growth of ... complex political units, based, to some degree, on notions of ethnic and cultural commonality (however, much, *pace* Anderson, imagined)' (1995: 370).

Following this argument, the formation of modern nations is seen to involve the appropriation of some of the key attributes of pre-existing ethnies. In the process, many extant memories, myths and symbols are assimilated, while additional ones are invented where necessary. Crucially, this view also allows us to extend the principle of nation formation beyond established nation-states to include those nations which are currently not represented by a corresponding state (see below), something not countenanced in modernist accounts. Thus, for example, the modern Breton nationalist movement draws heavily on the persistence of Breton traditions, myths, memories and symbols which have survived, in various forms, throughout the period of French domination since 1532. Likewise, Catalan nationalism -- first instigated in 1880, revived in the 1930s, and again in the 1980s -- draws on Catalonia's long maritime history and the attraction and prestige of the Catalan language and culture (see Smith 1995a: 57-58). Accordingly, the difference between modern nations and ethnies becomes a question of degree rather than kind. As Jenkins observes, 'the boundary between "ethnicism" and "nationalism" ... becomes indeterminate, lying somewhere along a continuum of change within historically evolving traditions or universes of discourses' (1995: 372).

In adopting a more evolutionary position, however, ethnicist commentators do not make the mistake of assuming a *causal* relationship between prior ethnies and the subsequent formation of modern nations. As Hutchinson observes, 'to do so without empirical examination is to make uncritical assumptions about continuities between pre-modern ethnic and modern national identities and to fall into the post hoc ergo propter hoc fallacy' (1994: 26: see also Fishman, 1989b: 111). Nonetheless, they hold that the distinction between modern nations and pre-modern ethnic communities has been too starkly drawn by modernists. Thus, a modernist account such as Gellner's can be criticised for its teleological overtones in emphasising a single and revolutionary transition from pre-industrial to industrial society as an explanation for nationalism. Gellner's difficulties here are that in many contexts (e.g., Eastern Europe) nationalism predates industrialisation. Moreover, a causal link between industrialisation and mass education may be overstated since Britain, the first industrialised country, did not develop a state education system until 1870.

In ethnicist accounts then, nationalism is viewed not only as a means to achieve modernity but also, crucially, as a means of (re)creating a sense of distinctive collective identity and autonomy (Hutchinson, 1994). The nation is not just seen as a *political* community represented by the nation-state. It is also viewed as an *ethnocultural* community which may or may not be so represented and yet which is still shaped by shared myths of origins, and a sense of common history and ways of life. Moreover, it is principally this latter dimension which endows its members with identity and purpose (Armstrong, 1982; Fishman, 1989b; Hutchinson, 1994; Smith, 1986, 1991, 1995a). In this sense, nationalism and national identity can be understood in relation to the notion of habitus, and to the related limits concerning the constructedness of ethnic identities discussed in Chapter 1. Bhikhu Parekh argues, for example, that national identity is a process of self-creation that does not occur in a historical vacuum. Rather,

> A [national] community *inherits* a specific way of life ... which sets limits to how and how much it can change itself. The change is lasting and deep if it is grafted on the community's suitably reinterpreted deepest tendencies and does not go against the grain. A community's political [and cultural] identity then is neither unalterable and fixed, nor a voluntarist project to be executed as it pleases, but a matter of *slow* self-recreation within the limits set by it past. (1995b: 264; my emphases)[16]

Such a position shifts the focus away from the increasingly arid debates surrounding the historical and political legitimacy of nationalism. As Joshua Fishman has argued, in an essay first published in 1972, 'we must not ask if [nationalism] is "good", if it is "justified", if it is based on "valid arguments". Rather, we must ask "why does it occur, and when, and how can its obvious power be most productively channelled"?' (1989b: 104). These questions are crucial to unravelling the ongoing salience and alliance of ethnicity and nationalism in the modern world. By attending to the popular base and cultural framework of nationalism -- an area which modernists have chosen to ignore -- ethnicist accounts provide us with a plausible explanation to these questions. After all, it is not chronological or factual history that is the key to the nation but *sentient* or *felt* history (Connor, 1993). As Craig Calhoun observes, 'ethnicity or cultural traditions are bases for nationalism when they effectively constitute historical memory, when they inculcate it as habitus ... not when (or because) the historical origins they claim are accurate' (1993a: 222).

Uncoupling the nation-state

In so doing, an ethnicist approach also allows us to untangle the confluence of the historical-cultural and legal-political dimensions of nationhood as they have come to be represented in the institutionalised form of the nation-state. As I have already suggested, this has arisen from the central principle of political nationalism -- nation-state congruence -- which holds that the boundaries of political and national identity should coincide. The view here is that people who are citizens of a particular state should also, ideally, be members of the same national collectivity. Gellner's definition of nationalism as a 'theory of political legitimacy which requires that ethnic boundaries should not cut across political ones' (1983: 1) clearly illustrates this standpoint. The end result of nationalism, in this view, is the establishment of the ethnically exclusive and culturally homogenous nation-state.

This attempt to make both state and national culture coextensive entities has resulted in the nation-state system as we know it today and continues to form the basis of many of the current nationalist claims for self determination. And yet, interestingly, the earliest uses of the term *nationalism* did not actually conflate the nation and the state in this way (Connor, 1978). However, by the nineteenth century nationalist doctrine had come to hold that nation and state

were coterminous; that every nation deserved a state. Not only this, an important corollary had also by then emerged -- that each state should represent one nation. As Gellner describes it, nationalism holds that the nation and state 'were destined for each other; that either without the other is incomplete, and constitutes a tragedy' (1983: 6). Max Weber appears to reiterate this in his observation that '...a nation is a community which normally tends to produce a state of its own' (1961: 176). This crucial interlinking of the idea of nation, and its political representation in the state is perhaps not too surprising. As Immanuel Wallerstein observes:

> Why should the establishment of any particular sovereign state within the interstate system create a corresponding 'nation', a 'people'? This is not really difficult to understand. The evidence is all around us. States in this system have problems of cohesion. Once recognised as sovereign, the states frequently find themselves subsequently threatened by both internal disintegration and external aggression. To the extent that 'national' sentiment develops, these threats are lessened. The governments in power have an interest in promoting this sentiment, as do all sorts of subgroups within the state.... States furthermore have an interest in administrative uniformity that increases the efficacy of their policies. Nationalism is the expression, the promoter and the consequence of such state-level uniformities. (1991: 81-82)

Wallerstein argues, along with other modernist commentators, that nationalism arose *out of* the emergence of the modern state system: 'in almost every case statehood precede[s] nationhood' (1991: 81). Political expression in the form of the nation-state thus *legitimates* and *institutionalises* nationhood. However, a sense of national sentiment is also at the same time promoted by the agencies of the state -- particularly education and the media -- and this acts recursively to maintain the nation-state's internal cohesion. This, in turn, provides a basis on which to counter possible outside threats to its autonomy. The state's role is thus crucial in accomplishing the three recurrent goals of nationalism which I outlined at the beginning of this chapter -- national identity, national unity and national autonomy (see Smith, 1994). The imbuement of citizenship with 'national' sentiment also helps to explain for modernists why 'national' identities -- or, rather, 'civic' ones -- commonly 'trump' other personal or group identities (Calhoun, 1993a).

The principal difficulty with the formulation of nation-state congruence, however, is *its inability to accommodate and/or recognise the legitimate claims of nations without states, or national minorities*. This limitation has two related dimensions; one theoretical and one practical.

Theoretically, the conflation of the nation and the state assumes that the two concepts are reducible to each other when they clearly are not. Nations are often but *not always* represented in and by a [nation-]state. Or, to put it another way, *citizenship* does not always equate directly with *nationality*.[17] Practically, and following from this, the 'nation-state' is actually a misnomer since its construction as ethnically exclusive and culturally homogenous is directly contradicted by demographic and political realities.

In relation to the former, it is worth noting that Weber's earlier comment on the link between nation and state contains an important qualification: 'a nation ... *normally tends* to produce a state of its own' (1961: 176; my emphasis). The qualification suggests a distinction between nation and state and Weber reiterates this distinction even more clearly elsewhere in his observation that a '"nation" is ... not identical with the "people of the state", that is, with the membership of a given polity' (1961: 172). In short, nation and state are not one and the same thing. As such, the 'nation' should be seen as a separate ideological and political construct from that of the 'nation-state' (Anthias & Yuval-Davis, 1992).

In relation to the latter, the happy coincidence of national and state loyalties, while the central aim of political nationalism, seldom actually occurs. Smith (1983) notes, for example, that even in Europe – where, arguably, the ideal of the nation-state is strongest -- there were, at the time of his writing, 73 nations and only 24 states. Likewise, several nations can co-exist within the boundaries of a particular state – Britain and India are obvious examples here. The Welsh nationalist Dafydd Elis Thomas is at pains to point out this distinction between nation and state in the British context:

> Britain is a state rather than a nation. The British state, imposed upon the English, Scottish, Welsh and part of the Irish peoples and then imposed world wide, is an inherently imperial and colonial concept at home and abroad. The British state cannot and should not be an object of affection, save for those who want to live in a form of authoritarian dependency. (cited in Gilroy, 1990: 263)

A comparison of the terms 'nationalism' and 'patriotism' may help to illustrate this distinction further. As Walker Connor argues, 'Nationalism, in correct usage, refers to an emotional attachment to one's people - one's ethnocultural group. It is therefore proper to speak of an

English, Scottish, or Welsh nationalism, but not of 'British' nationalism, the latter being a manifestation of PATRIOTISM' (1993: 374; emphasis in original). On this argument, nationalism and patriotism will only coincide in 'true' nation-states; that is, in states where the population is ethnically homogenous. However, Connor proceeds to point out that this is extremely rare since most states, by this definition, are not actually nation-states at all. For example, in 40 percent of all states there are at least five or more statistically and/or politically significant ethnic groups, while in nearly one-third of all states (31 per cent) the largest national group is not even the majority (Connor, 1993; see also Nielsson, 1985). These groups comprise both national and indigenous minorities -- such as Irish, Scots and Welsh in Britain, Hawai'ians and Native Americans in the USA, Québécois and Aboriginal peoples in Canada, Sámi in Finland, Norway and Sweden, and Māori in New Zealand -- and a wide variety of immigrant groups. The result is that most states are *multi-national* (comprising a number of national minorities) and/or *polyethnic* (comprising a range of immigrant groups). Indeed, most countries in the world have been historically, and remain today, a combination of the two (Kymlicka, 1995a).[18] As Anthias & Yuval-Davis conclude:

> Today there is virtually nowhere in the world in which ... a pure nation-state exists, if it ever did, and therefore there are always settled residents (and usually citizens as well) who are not members of the dominant national collectivity in the society. The fact that there still exists this automatic assumption about the overlap between the boundaries of the state citizens and 'the nation', is one expression of the naturalizing effect of the hegemony of one collectivity and its access to ideological apparatuses of both state and civil society. This constructs minorities into assumed deviants from the 'normal', and excludes them from important power resources. (1992: 21-22)

If, as these commentators suggest, the ethnically exclusive and culturally homogenous 'nation-state' is a misnomer, how has it come to so dominate conceptions of nationalism and nationhood? This, in turn, leads us to another question. Even if we acknowledge the primacy of multinational and polyethnic states -- and it is hard not to -- why does the dominant ethnic group in these states so often continue to perceive the state as the political expression of *their* particular ethnic group (and, usually, theirs' alone)? I will explore these questions more fully in the final section of this chapter. Before doing so, however, I want to turn to the final limitation of modernist conceptions of nationalism -- which is closely related to much of the preceding discussion -- that is, the dominance of statist (or political) nationalisms over what might be termed 'cultural nationalisms'.

Statist and cultural nationalisms

An inevitable corollary of the modernist rejection of ethnicity as a central variable in nation formation is, as we have seen, an over-emphasis on the political and civic elements of nationalism at the expense of its cultural dimensions. In effect, this has involved the legitimation of the 'Staatsnation' over the 'Kulturnation'. The latter, accordingly, has often been relegated to an 'ethnic' rather than a 'national' concern, a move illustrated by the commonly invoked distinction between ethnicity and nationalism in the academic literature. Anthias & Yuval-Davis provide us with a representative example of this distinction:

> there is no inherent difference (although sometimes there is a difference in scale) between ethnic and national collectivities. What is specific to the nationalist project and discourse is the claim for a separate political representation for the collectivity. This often -- but not always -- takes the form of a claim for a separate state (1992: 25).

However, in reality, the distinction drawn here between ethnicity and nationalism is not nearly so straightforward. As Craig Calhoun observes, in a somewhat more nuanced analysis:

> The relationship between nationalism and ethnicity is complex.... Nationalism, in particular, remains the pre-eminent rhetoric for attempts to demarcate political communities, claim rights of self-determination and legitimate rule by reference to 'the people' of the country. Ethnic solidarities and identities are claimed most often when groups do not seek 'national' autonomy but rather a recognition internal to or cross-cutting national or state boundaries. The possibility of a closer link to nationalism is seldom altogether absent from such ethnic claims, however, and the two sorts of categorical identities are often invoked in similar ways. (1993a: 235)

Even this analysis though does not go far enough, since it continues to assume, unproblematically, nationalism's principal preoccupation with *political* and *civic* legitimation -- externally via its autonomy in the inter-state system, and internally via the establishment of national citizenship. In this regard, the aspiration of nations for statehood may be overdrawn. While attaining statehood *is* often the central aim of nationalist movements *it may not always be* and nationalist movements may be content to pursue more limited political aims in relation to self-determination. Nationalist sentiments need not therefore be limited to the questions of state formation or secession; indeed, statehood need not even be the central issue at stake. The long-held emphasis on statist definitions of nationalism has tended, as a result, to preclude the recognition of a much

wider range of *cultural* nationalisms (Fishman, 1989b; Hutchinson, 1987, 1994). These cultural nationalisms are a recurring force in the modern world and, ironically perhaps, seem currently to affect most those western nations whose state power and boundaries have long been settled. Such nationalisms are concerned principally with what constitutes national *identity*, and with the moral regeneration of the national *community*, or 'way of life', rather than with state secession as such. Via this communitarian emphasis, cultural nationalisms attempt to reconstruct tradition (be it historical, cultural or linguistic) in order to meet more adequately the demands of modernity (Hutchinson, 1994).

That said, cultural nationalisms will always incorporate some political aims and, as such, may develop into political nationalisms with their attendant claims to independent statehood -- as seen, for example, in Québec in recent times. In effect, as Calhoun's comment above suggests, both political and cultural emphases are likely to be present at any given time in nationalist movements, even if different weightings are ascribed to them. Moreover, these weightings may also vary in salience over time. Nonetheless, cultural and political nationalism can be seen as distinct variants, with differing emphases and concerns. Cultural nationalisms are principally concerned not so much with tradition per se but with the modernisation of national communities *from within*, thereby enabling socio-political development on more indigenous lines.[19] They also differ from political nationalisms in the nature and extent of their political organisation -- comprising largely small-scale 'grass roots' movements which have as their principal foci specific historical, linguistic and educational concerns (Hutchinson, 1994).[20]

Wales provides us with a clear example of cultural nationalism here. As Richard Jenkins (1991, 1995) argues, Wales has had a long history of political and economic incorporation into the British state. Wales is institutionally far less autonomous and distinct than Scotland, for example; the latter still having its own church, law and education system. The degree of Welsh political incorporation into the British state is clearly illustrated by the administrative term 'England and Wales' which is employed to describe a wide range of shared institutions and programmes (as in, for example, the 'National Curriculum of England and Wales'). Given this, Welsh nationalism has sought its legitimacy historically largely in 'cultural continuity' and collective memory (C. Williams, 1994). This can be seen particularly in the promotion of Welsh culture, and its

associated traditions, and in the importance placed on the Welsh language. As Jenkins argues: 'In Wales, the defence and promotion of Welsh culture -- symbolised most sharply by the Welsh language -- is the dominant item on the nationalist agenda, with some form of devolved self-government coming a poor second' (1991: 32). While this does not preclude the quest for statehood among some Welsh nationalists -- particularly in light of a slightly more positive attitude to Welsh devolution in recent times (see Chapter 6) -- the history of Welsh nationalism demonstrates that there are means other than state recognition by which national distinctiveness can be attained and maintained.

Moreover, the move to greater regional autonomy in Britain, and elsewhere, does not necessarily fuel the fires of political nationalism at the expense of former culturalist emphases. In continental Europe, for example, the European Union's increasing emphasis on regional autonomy has strengthened rather than weakened the tenets of some cultural nationalist movements. Thus, in relation to Catalan nationalism, Jordi Capo, Professor of Political Science at Barcelona University, can observe: 'The Catalans prefer the pragmatic route to obtain maximum regional powers. The most important thing was to guarantee our language. The notion of sovereignty, on the other hand, has lost its importance and will have steadily less importance as the European Union gets stronger' (*The Guardian*, 8 May, 1996: 16).

The modernist mistake then has been to assume that cultural and political nationalisms are entirely separate phenomena -- the former related only to 'ethnic' groups, the latter only to 'national' ones -- rather than distinct variants of the same phenomenon. This dominance of statist or political forms of nationalism, and the consigning of cultural nationalism to the realms of 'mere ethnicity' can be traced back to the principle of nation-state congruence, discussed in the preceding section. Nationalism is only nationalism (and therefore justifiable), it seems, when it is tied to the modernising state (Calhoun, 1993a). This is to miss an essential element of the power of nationalism, its chameleon-like quality (Smith, 1995a). However, as Smith proceeds to observe:

> It is also crucially to misunderstand the relationship between culture and politics in nationalism. Nationalism cannot be reduced to the uniform principle that the cultural unit must be made congruent with the political unit. Not only does this omit a number of other vital nationalist tenets, it fails to grasp the fact that the development of any nationalism depends on bringing the cultural and moral regeneration of the community into a close

> relationship, if not harmony, with the political mobilisation and self-determination of its members. (1995a: 13)

In short, the principal consequence of this approach has been to legitimate the 'legal-political' dimensions of nationhood over the 'cultural-historical'. For majority ethnic groups the result has been relatively unproblematic since the latter dimension (their ethnic habitus, in effect) is seen to *correspond* directly with the former. In so doing, their 'ethnic' ties are normalised and legitimated as 'civic' ones. For minority groups, however, their ethnic habitus is seen to be *distinct* from and *oppositional* to the legal-political interests of the nation-state. Accordingly, any claims that are made for some degree of ethnic autonomy vis-à-vis the nation-state, and/or greater civic representation within it, are rejected as inherently parochial and destabilising.

Dominant ethnies

The fundamentally different treatment of majority and minority ethnic groups within the nation-state is indicative of what Michael Billig (1995) describes as the 'projection' of nationalism onto 'others' and the 'naturalisation' of one's own. Billig describes the latter process as *banal* nationalism and he equates this, as I have, with contemporary 'civic' loyalties to nation-states. The naturalisation of such ties means that banal nationalism -- that is, the nationalism of the dominant ethnie -- 'not only ceases to be nationalism ... it ceases to be a problem for investigation' (1995: 17). By this, the *hegemonic* construction of the nation-state is overlooked, or at the very least, is viewed as unproblematic. And yet, as Billig again observes:

> The battle for nationhood is [specifically] a battle for hegemony, by which a part claims to speak for the whole nation and to represent the national essence.... The triumph of a particular nationalism is seldom achieved without the defeat of alternative nationalisms and other ways of imagining peoplehood. (1995: 27, 28)

Walker Connor (1973, 1993) uses the term 'Staatsvolk' to illustrate the process by which the dominant ethnic group comes to determine the 'national essence' of the nation-state. Staatsvolk describes a people who are culturally and politically pre-eminent in a state, even though other groups are present in significant numbers. Connor suggests that, by their pre-eminence, the dominant group's culture and language come to be represented as the core or *national* culture and

language. Minority groups, and their languages and cultures, consequently tend to be excluded from 'national' recognition. At the same time, minority groups are also variously encouraged and/or coerced by the dominant ethnie to assimilate to 'national' (i.e, dominant ethnie) norms. These countervailing pressures place minority groups in a double bind. If they resist, their attempts at maintaining a distinct identity are often labelled as a parochial and anti-national form of communalism. This is despite the fact that the dominant ethnie's advocacy of a 'universalistic' national consensus is simply a majoritarian version of the same process (Dench, 1986). If they acquiesce, minority groups may still face exclusion from the full benefits of a 'national' identity determined and delimited by the dominant ethnie (see below).

The ethnic hegemony which results sees a situation in which members of the Staatsvolk control knowledge/power, and thus the creation of socio-cultural reality, through both their socio-economic dominance and their control over the major institutions of the state (Bullivant, 1981). This process of ethnic hegemony can be clearly demonstrated, in the British context, by the dominance of England, and particularly its south-east region, over the affairs of the British state (see, for example, Hechter, 1975; Nairn, 1981; Evans, 1989a). Many English people, for example, have a tendency to use the term *England* to describe the entire British state and *English* to describe all the people therein. This, of course, simply reminds the Welsh, Scots, and other non-English peoples living in Britain that they live in a multinational state dominated by the English (Connor, 1993; Crick, 1989, 1995; Miles, 1996; see Chapter 6).

Most modernist accounts of nationalism accept this process of ethnic hegemony uncritically, assuming it to be the necessary price of modernisation.[21] Gellner, for example, has argued that it was the requirements of a modern industrialised society that led to the perceived need for an homogenous national culture in the first place, particularly in the form of a common language and culture. This was reflected in the 'one state, one culture' principle discussed above. As he states:

> the culture needs the state and the state *probably* needs the homogenous cultural branding of its flock, in a situation in which it cannot rely on largely eroded sub-groups either to police its citizens, or to inspire them with that minimum of moral zeal and social identification without which social life becomes very difficult... (1983: 140; my emphasis)

The need for a 'minimum of moral zeal and social identification' is the basis on which an homogenous national culture is advanced. Accordingly, any alternative form of ethnic and cultural identification is seen as *oppositional* to this overarching conception of national culture and, thus, undermining of social cohesion. Furthermore, since the nation-state represents in the modernist view the end point of the transition from tradition to modernity, alternative ethnic and cultural identifications are also, by definition, seen as regressive and pre-modern. As such, the nation-state appears as a new form of group life *at odds* with that of separate ethnic groups; these being, no doubt, the 'largely eroded sub-groups' to which Gellner refers (Rex, 1991). This position is not too dissimilar to the nineteenth century views of Mill, Michelet and Engels on minority groups, outlined in Chapter 1. For Gellner, the best such groups can hope for is to be represented in the modern nation-state 'in a token and cellophane-packaged form' (1983: 121).

The construction of sociological minorities

To recapitulate, it has been my argument that modernist accounts of nationalism fail adequately to explain the ongoing link between ethnicity and nationalism in the modern world. This inadequacy is demonstrated in both the historical and cultural realms. In relation to the former, explaining the rise of nationalism via the transition to modernity in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries leads to a teleological account of history which over-emphasises the role of modernism and underplays, or ignores, the influence of pre-existing ethnies. In relation to the latter, nation-state congruence leaves little or no room for minority ethnies to have their historical, cultural and linguistic concerns recognised by, and expressed within, appropriate state hierarchies. As Richard Jenkins concludes, both these dimensions are interconnected:

> Historically, the [modernist] argument tends towards tautology: nationalism is what supersedes ethnicity which is what precedes nationalism. Culturally, we are left with no authentic place within modern-nation states for ethnicity, other than an axiomatic homogeneity on the one hand, or an immigrant or peripheral presence on the other. (1995: 372)

The result has seen the juxtaposition in today's nation-states of (modern) 'national' and (pre-modern) 'ethnic' identities and, relatedly, of *dominant ethnies* and a wide range of *sociological minorities*. The distinction drawn here between dominant ethnies and sociological minorities

highlights two often overlooked features of national life. The first relates to its *heterogeneity* -- a characteristic which, at the individual level, we may take for granted but at the level of the polity we tend to ignore. As I noted earlier, for example, Max Weber highlights this disjuncture in his observation that the idea of the nation includes 'an essential, *though frequently indefinite*, homogeneity' (1961: 173; my emphasis). As he proceeds to observe:

> If one believes that it is at all expedient to distinguish national sentiment as something homogenous and specifically set apart.... one must be clearly aware of the fact that sentiments of solidarity, very heterogenous in both their nature and origin, are comprised within national sentiments. (1961: 179)

The second, and related, aspect is that if some 'sentiments of solidarity' take precedence over, and/or subsume others in the construction of the nation-state, they must do so on the basis of a differential apportionment of status and value. As Billig succinctly comments, 'the aura of nationhood always operates within contexts of power' (1995: 4; see also Hall, 1992a). Given this, sociological minorities can be defined as groups which are a numerical minority in a given state *and* which are also politically non-dominant (Minority Rights Group, 1990). Indeed, in this context, while the term 'minorities' tends to draw attention to numerical size, its more important reference is to groups with few rights and privileges (although see Chapter 5). This is not to suggest that majority/minority relationships are fixed since, by definition, they are relative and relational and may differ from one context to the next (Eriksen, 1993; Young, 1993). Nonetheless, sociological minorities are *usually* characterised by a history of social, economic and political marginalisation and/or exploitation by dominant ethnies within given 'nation-states' (Hechter, 1975; Byram, 1986; Churchill, 1986; Dench, 1986; Thornberry, 1991; Tollefson, 1991).[22]

In this final section, I want to outline briefly the key distinctions that can be drawn between various sociological minorities. In so doing, I will employ Eriksen's (1992, 1993) useful attempts at a typology along these lines. Given the inevitable limitations of typologies, I will also draw on a number of complementary categorisations where appropriate (see, for example, Churchill, 1986; Ogbu, 1986; Gibson & Ogbu, 1991; Kymlicka, 1995a). However, this attempt at a more nuanced categorisation notwithstanding, the following distinctions should be seen primarily as useful heuristic devices rather than as definitive and/or exhaustive categories. It should also be borne

in mind that these minority ethnies are no more homogenous than any other grouping and will, accordingly, reflect significant *intra*group as well as *inter*group differences, along with a considerable degree of overlap (see Chapter 1).

Indigenous peoples

Indigenous peoples refer to aboriginal groups who are politically non-dominant and who are not, or are only partially, integrated into the nation-state. They include such groups as Māori, Sámi, Koori, Native Americans, Hawai'ians and Inuit. These groups are associated historically with a non-industrial mode of production and a stateless political system (Minority Rights Group, 1990). The extreme disadvantages faced currently by many indigenous groups in modern nation-states are the result of colonisation and subsequent marginalisation within their own historic territories. Such historic processes have usually seen the expropriation of land, and the destruction, or near destruction of their language(s) and traditional social, economic and political practices -- not to mention the very groups themselves. In Australia, for example, British colonisers in the previous century declared sovereignty on the basis that the land was terra nullius. In effect, the indigenous Koori were deemed to be so uncivilized as to be safely ignored. Indeed, as late as 1953, the Australian delegate to the United Nations Sub-Commission on the Prevention of Discrimination and the Protection of Minorities could state that 'there were no minority problems in Australia.... There were, of course, the aborigines [sic], but they had no separate competing culture of their own' (cited in Kingsbury, 1989: 145).

Accordingly, the predominant concerns of indigenous peoples are for separate political and cultural recognition *within* the nation-state and, where possible, for political and economic redress for past injustices. In this regard, political pressure from indigenous peoples has led to a limited range of reparative legislation within nation-states in recent times. Such legislation includes the 1984 Treaty of Waitangi Act in New Zealand and the 1992 Mabo land judgement in Australia. Indigenous concerns have also been articulated at an international level by the World Council of Indigenous Peoples (WCIP) and the United Nation's Working Group on Indigenous Populations (WGIP). The increasing influence of this broad movement has led, for example, to the recent development by the United Nations of a Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous People

(1993), although the final status of this document in international law is by no means assured (see Chapter 3).

As Eriksen (1992, 1993) observes, however, the concept of 'indigenous peoples' is not an accurate analytical one since it excludes groups such as the Welsh, Catalans and Basques who could also claim to be 'indigenous' but who do not share all the attributes ascribed to these groups as they have come to be defined. In this regard, Stacy Churchill's (1986) distinction between 'indigenous' and 'established' minorities is a useful addendum here. Churchill argues that 'established' and 'indigenous' minorities are both minority groups which have been long-established in their native countries. However, where indigenous peoples are characterised by a 'traditional' culture which is often regarded as being at odds with that of the majority group, established minorities are characterised by a lifestyle similar to the remainder of the national society, although sometimes falling behind in rate of evolution. As such, established minorities are more likely to be able to lay claim to a right to conserve their identity and to back it with political might. This distinction is not entirely unproblematic (see Chapter 3). However, it does point to the overlap of established minorities with the next group in Eriksen's typology, 'proto-nations'.

Proto-nations

Proto-nations are most commonly associated with the growing number of secessionist and irredentist nationalisms in the world today that have come to be termed 'ethnonational movements'. As discussed previously, these comprise historical culture-communities which are territorially based and which do not currently possess their own nation-state. Such groups are usually no more or less modern than other national groups and are fully differentiated along class and educational lines. Their numbers may be said currently to include Serbs, Kurds, Palestinians, Southern Tamils, Northern Irish Catholics, Basques, and the Québécois. The most commonly associated aim of ethnonational movements is to (re)claim statehood and to be recognised subsequently in the world inter-state system. As such, their concerns are more closely reflective of political nationalisms (see above). However, there is also often a considerable degree of overlap within such movements between an overtly separatist political approach and one which

favours more culturalist (and non-secessionist) emphases. The distinctions between the Basque separatist ETA organisation and moderate Basque politicians, Sinn Fein/IRA and the mainline nationalist SDLP party in Northern Ireland, and the separatist Parti Québécois and other Francophone nationalist organisations in Québec, are illustrative of these differences.

Urban ethnic minorities

Unlike the preceding groups which can be broadly classified as national minority ethnies -- that is, as previously self-governing and with an historic claim to a particular territory -- urban ethnic minorities comprise immigrant groups which have settled in the country of destination. Usually such groups have come to be concentrated in urban areas, although this may not have been the case historically. Thus, Indian and Chinese minorities in Malaysia, Fiji and New Zealand were initially employed as predominantly agricultural migrant labour in the nineteenth century before subsequently settling in cities in this century.[23] African-Caribbeans in Britain provide a more recent example of direct migration to urban areas in the 1950s as part of a post-war British employment policy to fill low-skill, low wage positions in the depleted labour market of the time.

While these ethnic minority groups may retain elements of their culture, language and traditions -- sometimes over the course of a number of generations -- their general aim is to integrate into the host society and to be accepted as full members of it. As such, immigrant minority groups can be distinguished from national minority ethnies since their ethnic and cultural distinctiveness is manifested primarily in the private domain and is not inconsistent with their institutional integration into the nation-state (Kymlicka, 1995a). This is not to suggest that such groups do not face racism, discrimination and exclusion within the host nation-state, nor that they may resist assimilation to the norms of the dominant ethnie. Quite the reverse in fact, since the so-called 'ethnic revival' that emerged in the 1960s has seen immigrant groups increasingly assert the right to express their ethnic particularities (see Chapter 3). However, such minorities do not usually seek separate and self governing status within the nation-state, as is typically demanded by national minorities. Rather, they argue for a more *plural* and *inclusive* conception of national identity and culture which recognises their contribution to, and influence on the historical and contemporary development of the host nation-state. In the process, the boundaries of nationhood

-- what it is that constitutes the national community -- is opened up for debate. Of central concern in this debate are the questions of who is (and who is not) to be included in the national collectivity, and on what (and whose) terms are the criteria for inclusion to be based.

That said, there are a number of caveats which need to be addressed before proceeding further. First, these so called 'ethnic minorities' may become national minorities over time if they settle together and acquire self governing power in the interim (Kymlicka, 1995a). This is particularly evident in ex-colonial societies such as the USA, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand where white settler groups have subsequently come to constitute the dominant ethnic(s) in the modern nation-state. Likewise, the one possible exception to the broad distinctions so far outlined is the example of African-Americans in the USA. African-Americans clearly fit neither the national nor immigrant category. They have no historic territorial claim to the Americas (unlike Native Americans) and their historical subjection through slavery clearly precludes voluntary immigration.

In this regard, John Ogbu's (1987) distinction between 'voluntary' (immigrant) and 'involuntary' (caste-like) minorities proves a useful point of comparison (see also Gibson & Ogbu, 1991). Adopting a predominantly culturalist approach, Ogbu argues that all minority groups are subject to racism and discrimination to some degree, as well as facing cultural and language discontinuities in relation to their integration in the nation-state. However, for voluntary minorities these discontinuities are seen as *primary cultural/language differences*; that is, they existed prior to their immigration to the host country and are thus viewed as barriers to be overcome. As such, voluntary minorities are more likely to accommodate to the 'cultural model' of the majority group or dominant ethnie. In contrast, involuntary minorities -- including in Ogbu's view, African-Americans and indigenous people groups -- are characterised by a history of exploitation and/or subjugation *within* a particular nation-state. Accordingly, involuntary minorities tend to develop a *secondary cultural system* in which cultural differences are viewed in light of that history, and in opposition to the majority group.

Cultural and language differences thus come to serve a boundary maintenance function (see Chapter 4). They are seen as symbols of identity to be maintained rather than barriers to be

overcome and may consequently develop into oppositional cultural (and political) nationalist movements. Such political nationalism has been represented among African-Americans principally through the call for a separate Black state. This was first supported in the 1930s, resurfaced again briefly in the 1960s in association with the 'Nation of Islam' movement, and has again gained prominence in the 1990s under the current leader of the Nation of Islam, Louis Farrakhan. These developments notwithstanding, however, much of the political effort among African-Americans -- including the principal concerns of the civil rights movement -- has centred on gaining full and equal rights and benefits for African-Americans *as US citizens*. As such, the concerns of African-Americans approximate more closely immigrant minorities than national ones (Kymlicka, 1995a).

Ethnies in plural societies

Eriksen (1992, 1993) makes one final distinction based on ethnic groups within so called 'plural societies'. Plural societies are most prominently associated with the work of Furnivall (1948) on Burma and M.G. Smith (1965) on the British West Indies. They have come to refer to ex-colonial societies, primarily Asian and Caribbean, with self consciously culturally heterogenous populations. The groups which make up these societies are divided internally by class and rank but are also clearly identifiable through ethnic and cultural differences. They are compelled to participate in uniform political and ethnic systems although one particular group will usually dominate. Ethnic relations are characterised consequently by inter-group competition. Secessionism is usually not an option since the groups involved have no external nation-state to which they realistically relate.

Having said this, the utility of the term 'plural society' has more recently been brought into question (see Jenkins, 1986). This is because, as I have already discussed, most contemporary states can be regarded as plural or *polyethnic* in this way. In short, contemporary 'nation-states' increasingly comprise a variety of ethnic groups which are in competition for the resources of the state -- a process I outlined more fully in my discussion of situational ethnicity in Chapter 1. The USA is perhaps the clearest example of a polyethnic state in this regard. To complicate matters further, polyethnic states are often *multi-national* ones as well. In other words, indigenous and national minority groups are also present in many of the same states (the USA being no exception;

see Chapter 3). However, what has tended to happen up until now is that both these types of minority group have been treated *in the same way* by the dominant ethnic. In other words, indigenous peoples and other national minorities have been denied their historical rights as ethnies and have been treated as merely one of a number of competing 'ethnic groups' laying claim to the nation-state's limited social, economic and political resources.

As I have argued, this elision has been the inevitable result of the exclusion of ethnicity from the realms of nationalism which has, in turn, been predicated on the principle of nation-state congruence and the related separation of political and cultural nationalisms. It may also help to explain the continued spread of ethnonationalism(s) in the (post-)modern world. The voices of dissenting national minorities are increasingly questioning the pejorative distinction drawn between the (modern) 'national' identity of the dominant ethnic and their own supposedly (pre-modern) 'ethnic' identities. Not only this, they are also increasingly dissatisfied with the concomitant rejection by the former of their claims for greater civic recognition and inclusion within the nation-state. As Homi Bhabha argues, we are confronted with the nation-state 'split within itself, articulating the heterogeneity of its population.... a liminal signifying space that is *internally* marked by the discourses of minorities, the heterogenous histories of contending peoples, antagonistic authorities and tense locations of cultural difference' (1994: 148).

Of course, such minority disenchantment is by no means a new phenomenon, nor is the state-minority relationship from which it springs. However, what I have argued here is that these developments include a growing number of indigenous and established national minorities who are less concerned with independent statehood -- although it may inevitably spill over into this -- than with challenging and changing the hegemonic construction of 'national' culture upon which nation-states have traditionally been based. As Colin Williams observes, 'it is clear that as many societies become increasingly multi-ethnic in composition the question of national congruence will have to be re-defined and more appropriate answers given than those which are currently practised in many states' (1994: 12). What might be involved exactly in re-defining or re*imagining* the nation-state to this end is the focus of the next three chapters.

Notes -- Chapter 2

1. The interrelationship between language and the soul or spirit of the nation is most clearly stated by Wilhelm von Humboldt (1767-1835): '[the nation's] language is its spirit and its spirit is its language' (Cowan, 1963: 277). Indeed, Humboldt is credited as a result with the development of the twin theories of linguistic determinism and linguistic relativism -- that language plays a significant role in determining culture, and that each language has a different way of 'looking at the world' (Clyne, 1997; see Chapter 4).

2. It is important here, however, to distinguish between the differing political objectives of Herder and Fichte. While Herder was not entirely immune to anti-French sentiment (see Edwards, 1985, 1994), his general view of the direct links between language and 'national' communities led him to adopt a pluralist and egalitarian stance towards other ethno-cultural/language groups (see Fishman, 1989d: 570-571). This can be contrasted directly with Fichte's subsequent hierarchising of these same communities; principally, via his application of Herder's views on language to the tenets of political nationalism.

3. Interestingly, in his discussion, Renan clearly rejects any notion of 'pure' races (see 1990: 13-16).

4. I am not suggesting here that religious sectarianism is absent in Scotland (see, for example, Walker, 1990; McCrone, 1992), simply that, unlike Northern Ireland, it is not the *principal* factor in questions of Scottish nationalism and national identity.

5. It is important to distinguish national sentiment -- understood here as those feelings of collective belonging to a nation -- from the ideology and movement of nationalism itself. As Smith (1994) argues, one can have nationalist movements and ideologies among a given population without any corresponding diffusion of national sentiment in that population. The reverse can also be found, although rarely. For example, Norway, Switzerland, Denmark and Holland have widely diffused national sentiment but also appear to have little need for an explicit nationalist movement. Jenkins (1995) adds a caveat here, however. In his discussion of nationalism in Denmark, he suggests that while Denmark has no apparent national*ist* movement it is still characterised by a weak discourse of national*ism*. The problem is not so much then whether nationalism is present or absent in a particular country but whether our definitions are sufficiently broad enough to incorporate the full range of nationalisms.

6. One only has to look to the nation-states which comprise the United Nations to confirm this since most did not exist, either in name or as an administrative unit, more than two centuries ago. Indeed, as Immanuel Wallerstein argues, there are actually very few states which can trace a name and a continuous administrative entity in a particular geographical area to a period prior to 1450. Of some 200 contemporary states, perhaps only France, Russia, Portugal, Denmark, Sweden, Switzerland, Morocco, Japan, China, Iran and Ethiopia can claim such a lineage. However, even these claims are somewhat problematic since it can still be argued that these states only came into existence as modern sovereign states with the emergence of the present world system. A number of other modern states such as Egypt, India and Greece have perhaps had a longer lineage but theirs' has been discontinuous (see Wallerstein, 1991: 80-81).

7. This is an important qualification to Renan's and Weber's emphasis on the 'will to nationhood' discussed above. As Gellner (1964, 1983) argues, for example, the volitional aspect of nationhood is an important but insufficient identifier of the modern nation since other collectivities have also possessed this in various historical periods. In Gellner's view, the emergence of the modern nation is thus primarily associated with the structural changes brought about by modernisation (see below).

8. There is, admittedly, some variation here. Some modernist commentators do acknowledge a connection between ethnicity and nationhood (see, for example, Gellner, 1983; Anderson, 1991), while others, like Hobsbawm (1990), argue that the two phenomena are entirely unrelated. These differences notwithstanding, modernists *are* all agreed that nationhood is the *result* of political modernisation -- expressed in nationalism and the construction of the nation-state -- and not the result of pre-existing ethnicity.

9. The historical recency of nationalism is highlighted by the term 'nationalism' itself which, as Connor (1978) points out, only gained a permanent place in dictionaries in the nineteenth century. Likewise, it was probably Lord Acton (1907) who first coined the term 'nationality' (Edwards, 1985).

10. The main difference between Gellner's theory and most Marxist perspectives (see, for example, Nairn, 1981; Hroch, 1985; Hobsbawm, 1990) is that Gellner sees nationalism as the concomitant of industrialisation (in any form) whereas Marxist analyses link nationalism more specifically to capitalism.

11. Previous political forms required neither the demarcation of clear territorial boundaries nor the fostering of internal integration and homogenisation (Calhoun, 1993b). Feudal elites, for example, controlled wide territories but exercised little centralised control. Empires, larger in scale again, demanded political loyalty from their diverse people groups but made little, if any, demands for cultural homogenisation. In either case, the state systems and ruling castes of antiquity and feudalism presided *over* society. However, with the development of modernisation, and the concomitant centralisation of administrative control (see below), the whole people actually became incorporated for the first time as *part of* society (Gramsci, 1971; Nairn, 1981).

12. Adopting a moral position on nationalism (which invariably means a negative one) has been a principal feature of most political and social science commentary, dating from Lord Acton's critical account in 1862.

13. In this sense, Anderson adopts a position that is closer to earlier modernists such as Kedourie (1960), Deutsch (1966), Seton-Watson (1977), and Tilly (1975). These earlier commentators highlighted the fictive elements of nation-formation. However, they also assumed that nations, once formed, were real communities of culture and power; a Durkheimian 'social fact', in effect (Smith, 1995b).

14. The Catalan national minority, for example, was politically and culturally oppressed under Franco's fascist regime until his death in 1975. However, the Catalan region itself has been historically one of the strongest economic regions in Spain. Thus, in 1980 Catalans comprised 16% of the Spanish population but 20% of GDP, while per capita income was 30% above the Spanish average. Moreover, this long-standing economic and demographic power had, in the

nineteenth century, formed the basis of the cosmopolitan and high culture Catalan language movements *Renaixenca* and *Modernista* (Miller & Miller, 1996).

15. Smith argues that there are two principal types of ethnic: *lateral*, which develop round a centralised state and are confined to a social and political elite; and *vertical*, which are usually subordinated status groups that are sustained by cultural and religious institutions and values that act to unify the population (see, 1986; Ch. 4). In either case, however, the pre-existing profile serves to shape the contours of the modern nation-state.

16. Parekh does not adopt an ethnicist position in the way described here. Nonetheless, his description of national identity lends itself well to a comparison with habitus.

17. This is not to suggest that modernist commentators on nationalism have not attempted to make the distinction between the nation and state (for useful examples of such attempts, see Connor, 1978, 1993; Gellner, 1983). However, modernists remain largely constrained within the nation-state model of political nationalism (cf. Fishman, 1989b; Oommen, 1994; Smith, 1994).

18. I will explore the distinctions between multinational and polyethnic states, and between national, indigenous, and immigrant minorities, more fully in the final section of this chapter.

19. The central emphasis of cultural nationalism on 'modernisation from within' counters the often invoked criticism that such movements are merely traditionalist and reactionary (see, for example, Kohn, 1961; Gellner, 1964, 1983; Schlesinger, 1992). I will explore these criticisms, and their inherent weaknesses, more fully in the following chapters.

20. Anthony Smith has argued that the different historical and organisational trajectories of statist and cultural nationalisms relate to the distinction between lateral and vertical ethnies (see n.15); a position that Hutchinson in his formulation of cultural nationalism, also implicitly accepts. However, I am inclined to agree with Jenkins' (1995) conclusion that this perpetuates the 'ethnic' and 'civic' divide within nationalism and that, rather, all nationalisms should be regarded as in some sense 'ethnic'. If there is a more appropriate distinction to be drawn then, perhaps it is between those nationalisms which claim territory on the basis of putative ethnic commonality and those which attempt to construct ethnic commonality within an already occupied territory (see, Jenkins, 1995: 387). The latter, in my view, are more often associated with cultural forms of nationalism.

21. Interestingly, some recent 'primordial' accounts of nationalism adopt a similar position (see, for example, Shils, 1995).

22. Although see my previous provisos in relation to the spread of ethnonationalisms.

23. Fijian Indians are an exception here, since they are still principally agriculturally based.

Chapter 3

LIBERAL THEORY AND MINORITY RIGHTS

It has been my argument thus far that the construction of national and ethnic minorities, and their pejorative and marginalised status, are the result of what Stacy Churchill (1996) has termed the *philosophical matrix of the nation-state*. A philosophical matrix denotes 'a combination of ideas, not easy to separate or define, that embodies the expectations of society as to how it should function' (MacLachlan, 1988: x-xi). The philosophical matrix of the nation-state, rooted in the political nationalism of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, has been predicated on the confluence of nation and state and on the establishment (often retrospectively) of a common civic or 'national' language and culture.

Interestingly, this linking of nation, state and language into an indissoluble whole was first advocated by Fichte. Fichte, as we have seen, incorporated Herder's views on language and culture within a statist account of nationalism (Hutchinson, 1994). This led to the development of the linear 'one language, one nation, one state' principle of romantic nationalism; a principle which has subsequently been widely discredited as essentialist and which has also been associated (pejoratively) with many contemporary ethnonationalisms. In contrast, political nationalism argued that it was the state which preceded and precipitated the rise of the nation, not the other way around. The key principle which followed from this can be summarised as 'one state, one nation, one language' and it has since come to represent the common orthodoxy in discussions of nationalism, not to mention the development of modern nation-states themselves. Indeed, as

early as 1862, Lord Acton argued unequivocally on this basis for the superiority of political nationalism over romantic nationalism:

> The State may in course of time produce a nationality ... but that a nationality should constitute a State is contrary to the nature of modern civilisation.... [Such a position is] in defiance of the modifying action of external causes, *of tradition and of existing rights*. It overrules the rights and wishes of the inhabitants, absorbing their divergent interests in a fictitious unity, sacrifices their several inclinations and duties to the higher claim of nationality and crushes all natural rights and established liberties for the purpose of vindicating itself. (1907: 288; my emphasis)

And yet political nationalism, and the modern nation-state to which it gives rise, can be accused of these very same proclivities. The nation-state, as it has come to be constructed, *creates* sociological minorities by establishing a civic language and culture that is largely limited to, and representative of the dominant ethnie or Staatsvolk. Minorities are, in turn, denied legitimate rights to their *existing* language and cultural traditions where these differ from those of the dominant ethnie. Political nationalism may thus have prided itself on the reversal of the romantic nationalists' nation-state-language connection but it has left the *linearity* of the principle untouched. As such, what results is still ethnic and linguistic hegemony, albeit from a different direction. Moreover, the hegemonic construction of the nation-state is far less readily apparent than more 'overt' ethnonationalisms. Cloaked as it is in the apparently neutral representation of a modern 'national' language and culture, the legitimation and valorisation of the dominant ethnie's habitus often escapes notice or critical comment. As Billig observes, this 'banal nationalism' is simply 'overlooked, forgotten, even theoretically denied' (1995: 17) which perhaps helps to explain why dominant groups so seldom come to define themselves as 'ethnic'.

A further explanation of the uncritical acceptance of this elision of civic and ethnic ties rests with the key liberal democratic principles of universal political citizenship, and the related primacy of individual over collective rights. These principles have been regularly invoked over the last two centuries by liberal commentators in their dismissal of ethnicity as a valid form of collective social and political organisation and identity (see Chapter 1). Concomitantly, they have also been consistently employed in support of the present political organisation of the nation-state. In this chapter, I will examine the cogency of this orthodox liberal defence of the nation-state, and the key tenets on which it is based, and will argue that these accounts are framed within, and thus

constrained by, the notion of nation-state congruence arising from political nationalism. If this assumption is dropped, the recognition of a more plural conception of the nation-state -- based, at least to some degree, on group-differentiated rights -- becomes a possibility. In this regard, it is my view that *national* minorities (including indigenous and established minorities) have rights to greater inclusion within the civic realm of the nation-state -- that is, 'civil society' in Gramsci's (1971) sense[1] -- than many currently enjoy. Moreover, these rights of inclusion are *distinct* from those of other ethnic minorities (see Chapter 2). Accordingly, I will concentrate in much of what follows on the particular rights of national minorities. However, I will return to the question of other ethnic minority groups, and the wider implications of my own position with regard to them, in Chapters 5 and 9.

The pluralist dilemma

A central concern in current debates surrounding the organisation and legitimacy of modern nation-states has to do with what Brian Bullivant (1981) has termed 'the pluralist dilemma'. The pluralist dilemma, for Bullivant, is 'the problem of reconciling the diverse political claims of constituent groups and individuals in a pluralist society *with the claims of the nation-state as a whole*' (1981: x; my emphasis); what he elsewhere describes as the competing aims of 'civism' and 'pluralism'. Other commentators have suggested similar distinctions: 'roots' and 'options' (Rokkan & Urwin, 1983); 'state' and 'community' (Smith, 1981); and, drawing on Saussure, 'parochialism' and 'intercourse' (Edwards, 1994). All these distinctions emphasise, like Bullivant's, the apparent polarities involved in the task of national integration; the difficulties of reconciling social cohesion on the one hand with, on the other, a recognition *and incorporation of* ethnic, linguistic and cultural diversity within the nation-state. In an earlier analysis, Schermerhorn has described these countervailing social and cultural forces as *centripetal* and *centrifugal* tendencies. As he observes:

> Centripetal tendencies refer both to cultural trends such as acceptance of common values, styles of life, etc, as well as structural features like increased participation in a common set of groups, associations, and institutions.... Conversely, centrifugal tendencies among subordinate groups are those that foster separation from the dominant group or from societal bonds in one way or another. Culturally this most frequently means retention and presentation of the group's distinctive tradition in spheres like language, religion, recreation etc. (1970: 81)

How then can the tensions arising from the pluralist dilemma best be resolved in the social and political arena? Two contrasting approaches have been adopted in response to this central question which Gordon (1978, 1981) has described as 'liberal pluralism' and 'corporate pluralism'. Liberal pluralism is characterised by the absence, even prohibition, of any ethnic, religious, or national minority group possessing separate standing before the law or government. Its central tenets can be traced back to Rousseau's conception of the modern polity as comprising three inseparable features: freedom (non-domination), the absence of differentiated roles, and a very tight common purpose. On this view, the margin for recognising difference within the modern nation-state is very small (Taylor, 1992). Corporate pluralism, in contrast, involves the recognition of minority groups as legally constituted entities, on the basis of which, and depending on their size and influence, economic, social and political awards are allocated. Glazer (1975) and Walzer (1992a, 1992b) draw similar distinctions between an approach based on 'non discrimination' -- which involves, in Glazer's memorable phrase, the 'salutary neglect' of the state towards ethnic minorities -- and a 'corporatist' (Walzer) or 'group rights' (Glazer) model.

It is clear, however, that for most liberal commentators the merits of liberal pluralism significantly outweigh those of a group rights approach.[2] In effect, the answer to the pluralist dilemma has been consistently to favour civism over pluralism. As such, the 'claims of the nation-state as a whole' -- emphasising the apparently inextricable interconnections between social cohesion and national homogeneity -- have invariably won the day over more pluralist conceptions of the nation-state where ethnic, linguistic and cultural differences *between different groups* are accorded some degree of formal recognition. This should perhaps not surprise us, since the former is situated squarely within the 'philosophical matrix of the nation-state' to which I referred earlier. Relatedly, liberal pluralism also accords closely with the long-standing pejorative distinction between *citizenship* and *ethnicity* -- a distinction first illustrated in Chapter 1 by the likes of the nineteenth century liberals, Mill and Michelet, and the socialists, Marx and Engels.[3] The result has been the construction in contemporary orthodox liberal accounts of a range of interrelated, and at times overlapping, polarities which are outlined below. In each, the former feature is associated (positively) with liberal pluralism while the latter is associated (negatively) with a corporatist approach:

- universal or particularist
- individual or collective
- autonomy or identity
- private or public
- informal or formal
- fluid or bounded
- dialogic or ghettoised
- changing or static
- modernity or tradition
- commonality or difference
- cohesion or fragmentation

In orthodox liberal accounts, individual and universal 'citizenship' rights are invariably constructed in opposition to collective and particularist 'ethnic' rights. As such, formal differentiation within the nation-state on the grounds of (ethnic) group association is rejected as inimical to the individualistic and meritocratic tenets of liberal democracy. Where countenanced at all, alternative ethnic affiliations should be restricted solely to the private domain since the formal recognition of collective (ethnic) identity is viewed as undermining personal and political autonomy, and fostering social and political fragmentation. As Will Kymlicka observes, 'the near-universal response by liberals has been one of active hostility to minority rights.... schemes which single out minority cultures for special measures ... appear irremediably unjust, a disguise for creating or maintaining ... ethnic privilege' (1989: 4). Any deviation from the strict principles of universal political citizenship and individual rights is seen as the first step down the road to apartheid. Or so it seems.

If this wasn't enough, many liberal critics have also argued that an approach which acknowledges and accommodates group-related differences is, by definition, inherently flawed since it must significantly understate the fluid and dialogic nature of inter- and intra-group relations (Goulbourne, 1991a, 1991b; Edwards, 1985, 1994; Waldron 1993, 1995; see also Chapter 1). The resulting liberal consensus is well illustrated by Brian Bullivant:

> Certain common institutions essential for the well-being and smooth functioning of the nation-state as *a whole* must be maintained: common language, common political system, common economic market system and so on. Cultural pluralism can operate at the level of the *private*, rather than public, concerns such as use of ethnic [sic] language in the home.... But, the idea that maintaining these aspects of ethnic life and encouraging the maintenance of ethnic groups almost in the sense of ethnic enclaves will assist their ability to cope with the political realities of the nation-state is manifestly absurd. (1981: 232)

Defending liberal democracy

This 'de-ethnicised' view of liberal democracy, and the various polarities which characterise it, are clearly evident in the work of three contemporary liberal commentators -- John Porter, Arthur Schlesinger Jr, and Harry Goulbourne. In what follows, I want to explore briefly their respective arguments. Before doing so, however, I should point out that Porter and Schlesinger tend towards the conservative end of the liberal continuum while Goulbourne's position is considerably further to the left. This raises an important point. The orthodox defence of liberal democracy, in the form of liberal pluralism, is advocated by commentators on both the left and right of the political spectrum -- albeit, for somewhat different reasons, as we shall see. Nonetheless, the wide support that liberal pluralism garners reinforces the degree to which the political tenets of nation-state congruence underlying it have come to be taken as given.[4]

The vertical mosaic

The late John Porter (1965, 1972, 1975) wrote extensively on pluralism in Canada, particularly in relation to the 'ethnic revival' of the 1960s and 1970s. In this regard, he was a strong advocate of liberal pluralism and a sharp critic of the corporatist model. As he observes, 'the organisation of society on the basis of rights or claims that derive from group membership is sharply opposed to the concept of a society based on citizenship, which has been such an important aspect in the development of modern societies' (1975: 297). From this, Porter argued that the maintenance of collective ethnicity in modern societies was regressive and historically naive. Moreover, it resulted in a form of ethnic stratification or 'vertical mosaic' which, in combination with social class, reduced the social and economic mobility of individuals.[5] The stark choice facing Canadians, he asserted, was 'between ethnic stratification that results from ethnic diversity and the greater possibilities for equality that result from a reduction of ethnicity as a salient feature of

modern society' (1972: 205; see also 1975: 288-304). Like many other liberals, Porter directly equated 'modern society' here with the homogenous civic culture of the nation-state. On this basis, he advocated the *assimilation* of ethnic minorities into Canadian national life and rejected any form of multiculturalism which would perpetuate ethnic and/or cultural distinctiveness. This was clearly in the best interests of ethnic minority groups, he believed, since in modern society:

> the emphasis was on *individual* achievement and in the context of a new nation with *universalistic* standards of judgement it meant forgetting ancestry and attempting to establish a society of equality where ethnic origin did not matter. (1975: 293; my emphases)

In advocating this position, Porter does allow for some recognition of ethnic minority languages. As he concedes, 'identification with and the use of their own language, particularly in school, may be important in providing opportunity for very low status groups' (1975: 302). However, he quickly proceeds to argue that 'such use of language is quite different from the goal of having ethnic communities become a permanent compensation for low status, or as psychic shelters in the urban-industrial world' (1975: 303). For Porter, it was only *citizenship* which could provide minority ethnic group members with the individual social mobility and achievement necessary to make their way in the modern world. This, in turn, implied 'a commitment to the values of modernism and a movement away from the [minority] ethnic community with each succeeding generation' (1975: 302). The reason for this was obvious enough. Minority cultures were 'tradition bound' and 'less and less relevant for the post-industrial society' (1975: 303). As Porter concludes, ethnicity in the modern world is simply an anachronism: 'Many of the historic cultures are irrelevant to our futures. Opportunity will go to those individuals who are future oriented in an increasingly universalistic culture. Those oriented to the past are likely to lose out' (1975: 304).

The cult of ethnicity

More recently, these themes have been echoed in the often vituperative debates surrounding multiculturalism, bilingualism and 'Afrocentricity' in the United States, particularly in relation to education (see, for example, Bloom, 1987; Hirsch, 1987; D'Souza, 1991; Ravitch 1992; Schlesinger, 1991, 1992; Hughes, 1993). Albert Schlesinger's *The Disuniting of America* (1992) provides us with a representative example of the conservative critique of corporate pluralism here.

As his title suggests, Schlesinger, a noted liberal historian, has argued to much public acclaim against the 'disuniting' of America by the 'cult of ethnicity':

> A cult of ethnicity has arisen both among non-Anglo whites and among non-white minorities to denounce the idea of the melting pot, to challenge the concept of 'one people', and to protect, promote, and perpetuate separate [ethnic] communities.... The new ethnic gospel rejects the unifying vision of individuals from all nations melted into a new race [sic]. Its underlying philosophy is that America is not a nation of individuals at all but a nation of groups, that ethnicity is the defining experience for most Americans, that ethnic ties are permanent and indelible..... The ethnic interpretation, moreover, reverses the historic theory of America as one people -- the theory that has thus far managed to keep American society whole. (1992: 15-16)

For Schlesinger, this 'ethnic cheerleading' is *preservationist* rather than *transformative* and results in a view of America which, instead of being 'composed of individuals making their own unhampered choices', is increasingly 'composed of groups more or less ineradicable in their ethnic character'. The result is a 'multiethnic dogma [which] abandons historic purposes, replacing assimilation by fragmentation, integration by separatism' (1992: 16-17). In the face of this assault, Schlesinger gloomily wonders: 'The national ideal had once been *e pluribus unum* [out of many, one]. Are we now to belittle *unum* and glorify *pluribus*? Will the centre hold? Or will the melting pot give way to the Tower of Babel?' (1991: 14; see also 1992: 18).

In this regard, Schlesinger directs particular opprobrium at the emergence among African-Americans of an 'Afrocentric' view of American (and world) history, along with its formal promotion in schools under the rubric of multiculturalism. For Schlesinger, these developments are simply nationalist myth making, along the lines of Hobsbawm's 'invention of tradition', and lead inevitably to cultural reification and essentialism. The rise of Afrocentricity may be understandable, he argues -- given the consistent exclusion of black voices in previous historical accounts -- but it is still *bad* history, albeit of a manifestly different kind from that which preceded it. Moreover, the whole notion of using history as therapy, whose principal function is to raise minority self-esteem, is misguided. After all, as Schlesinger points out, 'the absence of historical role models seems [not] to have handicapped two other groups in American society -- Jewish Americans and Asian Americans' (1992: 89).

In saying this, Schlesinger does acknowledge the effects of racism -- both historically and currently -- on the African-American community. As he observes, 'black Americans, after generations of psychological and cultural evisceration, have every right to seek affirmative action for their past.... For blacks the American dream has been pretty much a nightmare and, far more than white ethnics, they are driven by a desperate need to vindicate their own identity' (1992: 60). However, in his view, Afrocentricity is not the answer to the problem since it simply replaces one form of ethnic and/or cultural exclusiveness (and exclusion) with another. Indeed, Schlesinger argues that the end game of this 'filiopietistic commemoration' (1992: 99) -- or, more prosaically, the worship of ancestors -- will actually confirm rather than ameliorate self-pity and self-ghettoisation among African-Americans. Rather, he asserts:

> would it not be more appropriate for [ethnic minority] students to be ... encouraged to understand the American culture in which they are growing up and to prepare for an active role in shaping that culture?.... As for self-esteem, is this really the product of ethnic role models and fantasies of a glorious past? Or does it not result from a belief in oneself that springs from achievement, from personal rather than [ethnic] pride? (1992: 90, 92).

Finally, Schlesinger extends his trenchant and apocalyptic critique to include an attack on bilingualism and the bilingual movement in the USA, along with its strong links to Hispanic communities.[6] Unlike Porter, who was at least prepared to countenance a limited role for minority languages, Schlesinger rejects the official recognition of minority languages out of hand -- a position presaged by his previous allusion to the Tower of Babel:

> The separatist movement is by no means confined to the black community. Another salient expression is the bilingualism movement.... In recent years the combination of the ethnicity cult with a *flood* of immigration from Spanish-speaking countries has given bilingualism new emphasis. The presumed purpose is transitional.... Alas, bilingualism has not worked out as planned: rather the contrary.... indications are that bilingual education retards rather than expedites the movement of Hispanic children *into the English-speaking world* and that it promotes segregation more than it does integration. Bilingualism shuts doors. It nourishes self-ghettoisation, and ghettoisation nourishes racial antagonism.... using some language other than English *dooms* people to second class citizenship in American society (1992: 107-108; my emphases)[7]

In attributing bilingualism with the same fractious and regressive characteristics as Afrocentricity, Schlesinger invokes, once again, the rhetoric of national cohesion. 'A common language is a *necessary* bond of national cohesion in so heterogeneous a nation as America.... *institutionalised*

bilingualism remains another source of the fragmentation of America, another threat to the dream of "one people"' (1992: 109-110; my emphases; see also Hirsch, 1987). His parting comments echo this conclusion when he returns directly to the question of the pluralist dilemma: 'The question America confronts as a pluralistic society is how to vindicate cherished cultures and traditions without breaking the bonds of cohesion -- common ideals, common political institutions, common language, common fate -- that hold the republic together?' (1992: 138). His answer, by now, should come as no surprise: 'the bonds of social cohesion in our society are sufficiently fragile, or so it seems to me, that it makes no sense to strain them by encouraging and exalting cultural and linguistic apartheid. The American identity will never be fixed and final; it will always be in the making' (1992: 138). Quod erat demonstrandum, or so it seems.

The communal option

The final example of liberal pluralism that I want to discuss is Harry Goulbourne's (1991a) account of the position of non-white ethnic minorities in post-imperial Britain. As I suggested earlier, Goulbourne's arguments are somewhat different in both tenor and substance to the previous two commentators, largely due to his long involvement with, and commitment to antiracism in the British context. In particular, he clearly acknowledges that *majoritarian* conceptions of a common (national) culture and identity may be just as exclusive and exclusionary as those of ethnic minority groups -- more so, perhaps, since they tend to be implemented and maintained by the machinery of the state.[8] This ethnic nationalism 'which in a very real sense *belongs* to the majority although it formally claims the loyalty of all' (1991a: 14) stimulates, in turn, an 'ethnic' response within minority communities. In this regard, Goulbourne's account is far more aware of the cultural hegemony with which the 'common culture' argument of conservative apologists like Porter and Schlesinger is imbued. Nonetheless, his conclusions can still be situated broadly within an orthodox liberal defence of the nation-state.

The reasons for this lie principally with his dismay -- in line with other liberal commentators -- about the growing 'assertion of difference' between various ethnic groups in Britain. As he observes of these developments:

> Whilst in the past *similarities* between groups of people formed the basis of unity or collective existence, the growing demand, or emphasis, today, is for communities to be bound together by the factors which establish *difference* from others.... This new

> nationalism demands ethnic *singularity* and ... often exhibits unnecessary intolerance and insistence on securing particularist rights, [even though] its righteousness and demands are generally couched in terms of strengthening democracy. (1991a: 12)

For Goulbourne, such emphases lead to what he describes as 'the communal option' by which he means 'the generalised encouragement, and the increasing desire, of many individuals to be a part of an identifiable group, and for each group not only *to exist entirely within its own confines* but also to ensure that individuals conform to the supposed norms of the group. This is rapidly becoming the British experience' (1991a: 13). Indeed, in his view, the pursuit of the communal option is clearly evident in both 'cultural conservative' and 'new pluralist' or multicultural conceptions of Britain. The former seeks to establish a narrow sense of Britishness which excludes non-white minorities from full participation in the national community (see, for example, Honeyford, 1988).[9] The latter wishes to present as a desirable social good the image of Britain as characterised by a diverse range of ethnic, cultural and linguistic groups (see, for example, The Swann Report; DES, 1985). While clearly more sympathetic to the politics of the new pluralism, Goulbourne remains sharply critical of both positions, arguing for the abandonment of the harping nostalgia and exclusivism of cultural conservatism and the optimism and naivete of multiculturalism:

> Where the one wishes to maintain a pre-imperial, almost nativist, conception of the British community, the other would arrest the present imperfect, still emerging, moment and make that the ideal, preferred, social condition. The cultural conservative's position suggests that Britain's non-white population have made no contribution to the community in which they, in any event, ought not to belong. Multiculturalism holds out the prospect that the cultural differences between groups in Britain should not be respected only by social institutions; these differences should be publicly supported and maintained. Its pessimism lies in its underlying assumption that present differences between groups of people in Britain is a desirable long-term good for the nation [sic]. (1991a: 31)

Goulbourne's solution is to argue for a reconceived multiculturalism which rejects 'defensive minority communalism' (1991a: 14) and is reconstituted within the tenets of liberal pluralism. This would involve firstly separating the claims of social justice for ethnic minority groups from those of cultural preservation. Thus, instead of the current emphasis in much multiculturalism on *cultural* recognition, the *social* and *political* implications of equality and justice would come to dominate (see also Bullivant, 1981). Second, greater emphasis should be placed on commonality

since the assumption that 'the social aggregate of ... separate ethnic groups amounts to the whole and this whole is, or will, constitute the full expression of British society' (1991a: 236-37) is fundamentally misplaced. In his view, it is simply naive to think that different groups can live together peacefully without having anything in common; a position which echoes Furnivall's (1948) and M. Smith's (1965) discussions of ethnies in plural societies (see Chapter 2). Finally, Goulbourne returns to the merits of individualism as an answer to the pluralist dilemma: 'What is obviously required is a *will*, a *disposition*, on the part of most if not all groups to participate -- not as groups but as individuals -- in the construction of a common national community' (1991a: 241). For this to occur, however, he does concede that much depends on the largesse of the dominant ethnie: 'Whilst the challenge for [this] social synergism ... is likely to come from non-white minorities, it will largely be the willingness within the majority population to abandon its own communal response to [such minorities] which will determine success or failure' (1991a: 242).

Critiquing liberal democracy

Such is the current orthodoxy among liberals to the question of the pluralist dilemma. When in doubt, the historical and political imperatives of nation-state congruence should prevail, as should (for conservative commentators at least) the related prerogative of the dominant ethnie to determine civic culture. But how satisfactory is this broadly articulated position and what viable alternatives are there, if any? We can begin to unravel these questions by first highlighting some of the key inconsistences that are evident in each of the preceding accounts.

Porter's strong advocacy of assimilation, for example, was based on his long-held and principled commitment to egalitarianism. Unlike other conservative commentators, his arguments did not stem principally from a sense of nativism, racism, or exclusion towards ethnic minorities. Rather, his advocacy of assimilation was promoted specifically on behalf of, and for the benefit of ethnic minority groups. In this sense, Porter represents the 'old' liberal position of the likes of Mill and Michelet. 'Ethnic' practices were seen as antediluvian and, it was assumed, would thus atrophy and eventually die in the face of modern (and modernist) civic culture. Consequently, the sooner ethnic groups were disabused of such 'traditional 'practices the sooner they could contribute in

and to the forward march of progress and civilisation. This march of progress was also, by implication, most clearly evident in the dominant ethnie. However, its actual representation was couched almost exclusively in terms of the more 'objective' notions of 'individual achievement' and 'universalistic standards of judgement', with the state assuming the role of neutral arbiter. From this, all individuals were to be treated as 'equal' members of the civic polity -- irrespective of their personal, social, religious and ethnic backgrounds -- in order to 'establish a society of equality where ethnic origin did not matter' (1975: 293).

Porter's position is consistent here with an orthodox view of liberalism which addresses the person *only* as a political being with rights and duties attached to their status as *citizens*. Such a position does not countenance private identity, including a person's communal membership, as something warranting similar recognition. These latter dimensions are excluded from the public realm because their inevitable diversity would lead to the complicated business of the state mediating between different conceptions of 'the good life' (Dworkin, 1978; Rawls, 1985). On this basis, personal *autonomy* -- based on the political rights attributable to citizenship -- always takes precedence over personal (and collective) *identity* and the widely differing ways of life which constitute the latter. In effect, personal and political participation in liberal democracies, as it has come to be constructed, ends up denying group difference and posits all persons as interchangeable from a moral and political point of view (Young, 1993).

However, this strict separation of citizenship and identity in the modern polity is problematic on two key counts. First, it understates, and at times disavows, the significance of wider communal affiliations, including ethnicity, to the construction of individual identity. As Michael Sandel (1982) observes, in a communitarian critique of liberalism, there is no such thing as the 'unencumbered self' -- we are all, to some extent, *situated* within wider communities which shape and influence who we are.[10] Likewise, Charles Taylor argues that identity 'is who we are, "where we're coming from". As such, it is the background against which our tastes and desires and opinions and aspirations make sense' (1992: 33-34). These arguments have clear parallels with my discussion of habitus in Chapter 1. They also highlight the obvious point that certain goods such as language, culture and sovereignty, cannot be experienced *alone*; they are, by definition, *communally shared* goods. A failure to account for these communal goods, however, has led to

a view of rights within liberal democracy which is inherently individualistic and which cannot appreciate the pursuit of such goods other than derivatively (Van Dyke, 1977; Taylor, 1992; Coulombe, 1995). In short, individualistic conceptions of the good life may preclude shared community values that are central to one's identity.[11] This approach can be regarded as even more problematic when one considers, for example, that indigenous and other non-western groups tend to place greater emphasis on shared communal values *as ends in themselves* than does the more individualistically oriented west (Corson, 1993; May, 1994).

Second, and relatedly, there is no such thing as the neutral state. As I have argued in the preceding chapters, ethnicity is not absent from the civic realm. Rather, the civic realm represents the particular (although not necessarily exclusive) *communal* interests and values of the dominant ethnie *as if* these values were held by all. In Taylor's succinct analysis, the 'supposedly neutral set of difference-blind principles [that constitute the liberal] politics of equal dignity is in fact a reflection of one hegemonic culture.... [it is] a particularism masquerading as the universal' (1992: 43-44). In a similar vein, Iris Young argues that if particular groups 'have greater economic, political or social power, their group related experiences, points of view, or cultural assumptions will tend to become the norm, biasing the standards or procedures of achievement and inclusion that govern social, political and economic institutions' (1993: 133).

This hegemonic process is clearly illustrated in Porter's direct equation of citizenship with modernity and the associated valorisation of homogeneity as simply the proper application of Reason (Goldberg, 1994). It is even more starkly apparent in Schlesinger's advocacy of a common American culture. In Schlesinger's account, the possibilities of heterogeneity are at least acknowledged by him, albeit somewhat grudgingly. However, his overall argument is unequivocal about homogeneity as the historically prevalent condition of social life and, as such, an ideal to be pursued and recaptured at all cost. This conclusion is encapsulated in his bald assertion of American history as 'the dream of one people' (1992: 110); a far from unproblematic assertion, as it turns out, since it can be accused of the very same features of 'bad history' and 'history as therapy' which Schlesinger had levelled at Afrocentricity. As Robert Hughes, another liberal commentator, candidly concedes, America 'has always been a heterogenous country and its cohesion, whatever cohesion it has, can only be based on mutual respect. There never was a core

America in which everyone looked the same, spoke the same language, worshipped the same gods and believed the same things' (1993: 12; see also Chapter 5). The idea of an homogenous common culture is thus simply another variant of nationalist myth making since, as we saw in Chapter 2, *all* nationalist histories are therapeutic to some extent and contain inevitable elisions and absences. The key question then becomes not so much the teaching of bad or therapeutic history but *whose* history one wants to teach. And this returns us once again to the central issue of hegemonic power relations. As Peter McLaren asserts of Schlesinger and other conservative critics in the USA:

> conservative attacks on multiculturalism as separatist and ethnocentric carry with them the erroneous assumption by White Anglo constituencies that North American society fundamentally constitutes social relations of uninterrupted accord. The liberal view is seen to underscore the idea that North American society is largely a forum of consensus with different minority viewpoints accretively added on. We are faced here with the politics of pluralism which largely ignores the workings of power and privilege. (1995: 126-127)

McLaren's analysis allows us to question the very notion of a commonly shared (American) culture and the supposedly unified and consensual history underpinning it. Common to whom, one might ask, and on whose terms? Who determines its central values and/or sets its parameters? Who is subsequently included and/or excluded from full participation in its 'benefits' and, crucially, *at what cost?* After all, those whose cultural and linguistic habitus are not reflected in the public realm are more likely to pay a far higher price for their subsequent participation in that realm. In contrast, those whose habitus is consonant with the civic culture and language -- and, as such, are regarded as cultural and linguistic capital -- have no such difficulties.

I will return to these questions more fully in the following chapter. Suffice it to say at this point, that Schlesinger does not address them. Like other conservative commentators, he assumes an homogenous common culture as an historical and political given and, following from this, that the choice in the pluralist dilemma is one of either/or. Ethnic minorities must *either* give up their cultural and linguistic identities *or* prejudice both the social cohesion of the nation-state and the possibilities of their own individual social and economic success. As McLaren observes, this approach wants to assimilate ethnic minorities 'to an unjust social order by arguing that every member of every ethnic group can reap the benefits of neocolonialist ideologies and corresponding social and economic practices. But a prerequisite of "joining the club" is to become denuded, [de-

ethnicised] and culturally stripped' (1995: 122). Indeed, even those minority members who plead the conservative line -- and who are, accordingly, much trumpeted as a result -- generally do so from a position of personal ethnic and/or cultural dislocation (see D'Souza, 1991; Rodriguez, 1983, 1993). The result leaves little or no room for *negotiation*; little or no opportunity for changing 'the rules of the game'. And why is this? Because 'our' common bonds are too fragile, too easily dismembered or dismantled by the demands of particularism. One wonders what should be so fragile about western civilisation and, conversely, what is so radical about multiculturalism that this should be the case (Hughes, 1993). But this, conservatives like Schlesinger insist, is what is centrally at stake.

This brings us to two related inconsistencies in conservative account of liberal pluralism, of which Schlesinger's polemic is an exemplar. On the one hand, Schlesinger derisively describes group-based affiliations as mere 'ethnic cheerleading' and argues that these are essentially preservationist rather than transformative. And yet, on the other hand, he ends up, as we have seen, invoking a majoritarian version of the same process -- a *prior*, and *preeminent* civic or 'national' identity to which all should subscribe. While deploring the nationalistic jargon of Afrocentricity, Schlesinger thus ask us to make the same kind of nationalistic choice -- to choose an homogenous *national* identity over an *ethnic* one. It must be one *or* the other -- a prior nationalism that trumps all other identities (Calhoun, 1993a). Such a position not only considerably understates the possibilities of holding dual or multiple identities, except oppositionally, it also allows no room for a *dynamic* and *multifarious* conception of nationhood. The end result is not too dissimilar to the preservationist and group-based conceptions that conservatives like Schlesinger have purportedly set themselves against. As Sonia Nieto (1995) observes, the charge of ethnic cheerleading by conservatives may stem more from the fear that *their* ethnic cheerleading is being challenged than from any notion of wanting to retain a common national identity 'for the good of all'. In this light, the racism underlying much of the conservative critique of cultural and linguistic pluralism also becomes more readily apparent, despite protestations to the contrary (see Chapter 5). For example, it is hard to imagine Schlesinger defending his view of bilingualism as self ghettoisation in relation to speaking French or some other 'prestigious' language variety (Dicker, 1996); indeed, one might well expect the reverse to be the case. Rather, in directing his critique of bilingualism towards Hispanic communities in the USA, it is clear that the central issues for

Schlesinger have more to do with 'race', immigration and class than with bilingualism per se (see also Wildavsky, 1992).

Moreover, the inevitable connections that are drawn by Schlesinger and other conservatives (see, for example, Honeyford, 1988; D'Souza, 1991; Ravitch, 1992) between ethnic differentiation, conflict, and fragmentation remain open to question. While conflict and fragmentation have undoubtedly occurred from ethnic differentiation, *they need not always do so*. Likewise, the national integration envisaged by conservatives has not always resulted in -- indeed has seldom actually achieved -- inclusion, consensus and cohesion for *all* ethnic groups within multinational and/or polyethnic states. (Nor, one might venture, would some necessarily want it to). Rather, as Young asserts, 'when oppressed or disadvantaged social groups are different from the dominant groups, then an allegedly group-neutral assimilationist strategy of inclusion only tends to perpetuate inequality' (1993: 133).

These criticisms, however, cannot be levelled at Goulbourne's analysis. Unlike Schlesinger, he is aware of the hegemonic processes involved in the construction of civic culture -- in this case, in relation to Britain -- and the nativism, racism and exclusion which often attend it. Consequently, Goulbourne's analysis is far more even handed -- criticising the retreat into communal laagers of a majoritarian communalism on the one hand and a defensive minority communalism on the other. Both militate, in his view, against the formation of a new *plurally defined* British national community. That said, Goulbourne's argument is still principally concerned with a favourite theme of liberal commentators -- the idea that a communitarian approach to rights in a liberal democracy necessarily essentialises and reifies ethnic groups. For Goulbourne, this process arises from an unhealthy emphasis on ethnic differences at the expense of what may be shared in common. Moreover, the communal politics which are its source promote the misplaced notion that ethnic groups should exist 'almost entirely within [their] own confines' and, relatedly, that individuals should be required to 'conform to the supposed norms of the group' (1991a: 13). Goulbourne's response to these developments is rightly sceptical. An over-emphasis on inter-ethnic differentiation, he argues, clearly understates the traffic between cultures, the fluidity of individual ethnic identification(s), and the possibilities therein of significant *intra*-ethnic differences, all of which may operate in combination with a variety of other social,

cultural and political allegiances (see Chapter 1). Relatedly, the limiting of individual freedom in the face of supposedly fixed group norms can be regarded as patently illiberal. As he observes elsewhere, ascriptive group membership denies the separate existence of individuals, thus undermining 'much that has taken centuries of struggle to define and secure' (1991b: 225).

These are valid and serious criticisms which Goulbourne raises, and ones that are shared widely by other liberal theorists. In effect, communitarians are charged with operating a model of group membership which is at odds with the complexities of identity in the modern world (Burtonwood, 1996). As Edward Said argues, in a similar vein, 'no one today is purely one thing. Labels like Indian, or woman, or Muslim, or American are no more than starting points' (1994: 407). Likewise, Jeremy Waldron objects to the idea that our choices and self-identity are defined by our ethnicity and asserts, instead, the need for a 'cosmopolitan alternative'. As he dismissively observes, 'though we may drape ourselves in the distinctive costumes of our ethnic heritage and immure ourselves in an environment designed to minimise our sense of relation with the outside world, no honest account of our being will be complete without an account of our dependence on larger social and political structures that goes far beyond the particular community with which we pretend to identify' (1995: 104). On this view, people can pick and choose 'cultural fragments' from various ethnocultural sources, without feeling an allegiance to any one in particular. Thus, Waldron argues, an Irish American who eats Chinese food, reads Grimm's Fairy Tales to their child, and listens to Italian opera actually lives in a 'a kaleidoscope of cultures'. While Waldron concedes that we need cultural meanings of some kind, he argues that we do not need *specific* cultural frameworks: 'we need to understand our choices in the contexts in which they make sense, but we do not need any single context to structure our choices. To put it crudely, we need culture, but we do not need cultural integrity' (1995: 108).

However, there various criticisms also have their limitations. In Goulbourne's account, for example, there is still an implicit assumption throughout that the *recognition* of ethnic differences is regressive, leading ultimately to the destruction of any sense of national commonality. Yet, at the same time, much of his analysis of post-war Britain demonstrates how a 'difference-blind' approach has specifically disadvantaged and marginalised non-white minorities. This has led, in some cases, to the denial of basic civil rights -- as seen, for example, in Britain's increasingly

repressive immigration laws (Goulbourne, 1991a: Ch. 5; Solomos, 1993). Given this, it is not enough for Goulbourne to lamely conclude that the merits of individualism will somehow provide the answer to a new plurally defined Britain where 'difference is merely secondary' (1991a: 242) and where justice and equality reign for all. One wonders how exactly? Goulbourne does not say, except to suggest vaguely, and somewhat hopefully, that it lies in the ability of ethnic minority groups to initiate such change and, more crucially, in the willingness of the majority to accept it. However, the recent history of Britain's approach to non-white ethnic minorities, so clearly outlined by Goulbourne, would seem to make this particular scenario highly unlikely.[12]

More broadly, orthodox liberal critiques of communitarianism may well be overstated. As I will proceed to argue, a corporatist model of rights within liberal democracies may often result in, but does not necessarily entail a reified and essentialised view of groups themselves. Nor, indeed, are essentialism and reification limited to communitarian approaches. We have already seen, for example, that such processes may just as easily result from the hegemonic construction of civic culture, as represented in and by the dominant ethnic. Moreover, in contrast to Waldron's position, a group-based approach may be able to accommodate a view of ethnic and cultural groups as dynamic and fluid while still retaining some sense of distinct cultural identity. In this regard, Margalit & Raz (1995) argue that people today may well participate in a wide range of different social and cultural activities but that this does not necessarily diminish their allegiance to an 'encompassing group' with which they most closely identify (see also Miller, 1995). And finally, an approach which acknowledges the importance of cultural membership to the allocation of rights within a liberal democracy need not necessarily conflict with and/or supersede the rights of individuals as citizens.

While far from easy then, the two broad approaches of liberal and corporate pluralism may be, if not reconcilable, at least not mutually exclusive. As Pierre Coulombe observes: 'No one (I hope) wants to live in a society which only protects our personal autonomy. Nor does anyone (I'm sure) want to be treated as an heteronomous being. The challenge, therefore, is to rethink a political community that springs from our self-image as self-authored, yet situated, citizens' (1995: 21). One might add here, of course, that we need to do this while, at the same time, avoiding the traps of reductionism and essentialism that have beset so many previous attempts at

recognising some notion of group-related rights. This difficult balancing act can be found in the work of Iris Young (1989, 1990, 1993) and Will Kymlicka (1989, 1995a, 1995b).

Rethinking liberal democracy

Those theorists who have become increasingly disenchanted with the orthodox liberal position on minority rights, and the philosophical matrix of the nation-state which underpins it, have begun to ask a number of key questions in their quest for a viable alternative approach. Following Mallea (1989), these questions may be summarised as follows:

- How can the values of individualism and pluralism be pursued simultaneously?
- Does the existence of ethnic and cultural diversity necessarily result in reduced levels of social cohesion?
- Can any society that embraces a monistic view of culture be considered democratic?
- What form might consensual theories of government take in plural societies?
- How much decentralisation can political systems cope with in responding to the legitimate aspirations of national and ethnic minority groups?
- Does the concept of valid community lie in the extent to which it creates and maintains its own cultural norms?
- What levels of tolerance for contradiction and ambiguity can and should exist in plural societies?

Iris Young and Will Kymlicka provide us with the first significant attempts within liberal theory at addressing these questions (see also Taylor, 1992). It is not my intention here to examine each of these questions in specific detail. However, it will soon become apparent that their various themes resonate throughout the work of Young and Kymlicka discussed below. In what follows, I will discuss Young's attempt to formulate an approach to rights within liberal democracies that is based on a recognition of group-related disadvantage and oppression, along with her recognition and accommodation of the relational and fluid nature of group identities. Will Kymlicka's work is examined for its development of the importance of cultural membership within a liberal (as opposed to communitarian) theory of rights. His central distinction between national

and ethnic minorities, and the premise of historical rights which underpins it, will also be explored in relation to my own arguments along these lines. Finally, these arguments, and their implications, will be illustrated by the current position of indigenous peoples within national and international law.

Differentiated citizenship

Iris Young is a prominent critic of the conservatism and uniformity inherent in the notion of equal citizenship in liberal democracies. Her principal theoretical focus has to do with the impact of this undifferentiated process on women as a disadvantaged social group. However, her work also has much broader application to other social, cultural and, for the purposes of this discussion, ethnic groups. Young argues, in effect, that the process of treating everyone as abstract individuals, undifferentiated by ethnicity, sex, or class, actually reinforces the norms of the dominant group(s) within the nation-state at the expense of a wide variety of marginalised and/or oppressed groups. As she asserts:

> In a society where some groups are privileged while others are oppressed, insisting that as citizens persons should leave behind their particular affiliations and experiences to adopt a general point of view serves only to reinforce privilege; for the perspectives and interests of the privileged will tend to dominate this unified public, marginalising or silencing those of other groups. (1989: 257)

Instead, she advocates a form of 'differentiated citizenship' where group representation rights are accorded to marginalised and oppressed groups within a single polity on the basis of their systemic disadvantage: 'the solution lies at least in part in providing institutionalised means for the explicit recognition and representation of oppressed groups' (1989: 258; see also 1990: 183-191). Her suggested list of those groups in the USA for which such recognition might be appropriate is extremely broad. It includes: 'women, blacks, Native Americans, Chicanos, Puerto Ricans and other Spanish-speaking Americans, Asian Americans, gay men, lesbians, working class people, poor people, old people and mentally and physically disabled people' (1989: 261). The inclusion of such diverse groupings is not without its problems, as I will discuss below in relation to Kymlicka's more focused position. However, Young's argument for a more heterogenous conception of the nation-state is an important one. Various social, cultural and ethnic groups have the right in her view to a differentiated place in the civic realm. This right, in turn, is based

on the *mutual* recognition and valuing of their specificity and worth in the public domain (Young, 1993). The notion of social justice is central here to Young's argument:

> The primary moral ground for this heterogenous public is to promote social justice in its policies. Besides guaranteeing civil and political rights, and guaranteeing that the basic needs of individuals will be met so that they can freely pursue their own goals, *a vision of social justice provides for some group related rights and policies.* These group institutions will adhere to a principle that social policy should attend to rather than be blind to group difference in awarding benefits or burdens, in order to remedy group based inequality or [to] meet group specific needs. (1993: 135-136; my emphasis)

However, in advocating this notion of a differentiated and heterogenous public, Young does not make the mistake of reifying groups. In fact, she specifically rejects the two common alternatives in addressing the pluralist dilemma -- assimilation and separatism -- for doing exactly this. Assimilation, she suggests, rightly champions individual freedom, equality and self-development. However, it wrongly assumes that *any* assertion of group identity and difference is, by definition, essentialist. Separatism may help establish cultural autonomy and political solidarity for oppressed groups and does challenge the hegemonic construction of the nation-state. However, it tends also to understate the historical *interrelations* between different groups -- particularly, in modern mass, urban societies -- and to simplify and freeze its own group identity in ways that fail to acknowledge intra-group differences. Consequently, both of these options end up reinforcing the notion of difference as 'Otherness'. In this view, each group has its own nature and shares no attributes with those defined as Other. In effect, difference as Otherness 'conceives social groups as mutually exclusive, categorically opposed' (1993: 126).[13] Young argues that this particular logic of identity essentialises and substantialises group natures, generates dichotomy at the expense of unity (even when it is couched in terms of the latter), and runs counter to the relational and fluid nature of inter- and intra-group relations. In a position which echoes Eriksen's observation that ethnicity is 'essentially an aspect of relationship, not a property of a group' (1993: 12; see Chapter 1), Young observes:

> Defining groups as Other actually denies or represses the heterogeneity of social difference, understood as variation and contextually experienced relations. It denies the difference among those who understand themselves as belonging to the same group; it reduces the members of the group to a set of common attributes.... The practical realities of social life, especially but not only in modern, mass, economically interdependent societies, defy the attempt to conceive and enforce group difference as exclusive

> opposition, there are always ambiguous persons who do not fit the categories.... partial identities [that cut] across more encompassing group identities. (1993: 127-128)

In contrast, Young argues that her conception of a differentiated approach to public policy is better able to recognise heterogeneity and the interspersion of groups. Such an approach does not posit a social group as having an essential nature composed of a set of attributes defining only that group, nor does it repress the interdependence of groups in order to construct a substantial conception of group identity. Rather,

> a social group exists and is defined as a specific group only in social and interactive relation to others. Social group identities emerge from the encounter and interaction among people who experience some differences in their way of life and forms of association, even if they regard themselves as belonging to the same society.... Group identity is not a set of objective facts, but the product of experienced meanings. (1993: 130)

This position is closely parallel to the conclusions drawn about situational ethnicity in Chapter 1. It is also akin to Charles Taylor's (1992) emphasis on the *dialogical* nature of identity formation in his comparable discussion on 'the politics of recognition'. The result is a conception of difference which allows for specificity, variation, and heterogeneity *within* the nation-state. The expression of group differences is encouraged but within common institutions and a shared commitment to a larger political order. Moreover, groups are understood 'as overlapping, as constituted in relation to one another and thus as shifting their attributes and needs in accordance with what relations are salient' (1993: 123-124). As Young concludes, 'different groups always potentially share some attributes, experiences, or goals.... The characteristics that make one group specific and the borders that distinguish it from other groups are always *undecidable*' (1993: 130). Accordingly, a relational and contextualised conception of difference within the plurally conceived nation-state helps make more apparent 'the necessity and possibility of togetherness in difference' (1993: 124).

Young's critique of liberal pluralism is principally concerned with equalising political influence for oppressed groups within the nation-state. In this regard, her remit can be seen as quite wide-ranging -- indeed, too wide-ranging, perhaps, since the conglomeration of oppressed groups is potentially unending. Her own description of the diverse range of groups who might be included

in her formulations bears this out. There is also a problem with bringing such disparate groups together on the singular basis of disadvantage and/or oppression. One can argue, for example, that the rights of Native Americans as an indigenous people in North America, or of Māori in New Zealand -- both of whom she includes in her discussions of group-differentiated citizenship (see 1990: 175-183; 1993: 143-147) -- are quite distinct from those of a broad social group such as poor people. Focussing on disadvantage as the principal criterion for their inclusion thus obscures the *particular* demands of these national minorities to greater self-determination within the nation-state. Native Americans and Māori can claim greater access to, and representation within the state not *simply* because they are marginalised groups (although they *are* marginalised), but because of their legitimate historical and territorial rights as ethnies. Relatedly, an emphasis on disadvantage implies only *temporary* representation until such time as the disadvantage has been redressed. This form of political affirmative action, in effect, is again clearly inadequate in addressing the long term demands of national minorities for greater acknowledgement and representation in the civic realm (Kymlicka, 1995a; see below).

However, Young's failure to distinguish the rights of national minorities from other ethnic, cultural and social groups is not unusual in discussions of the pluralist dilemma. Indeed, this elision is also clearly apparent in the countervailing accounts of Porter, Schlesinger and Goulbourne. It is clear, for example, that each of these more orthodox liberal accounts is characterised by an almost exclusive preoccupation with *ethnic* or *immigrant* minorities -- that is, urban ethnic minorities and ethnic groups in plural societies, as defined in Chapter 2. Accordingly, the arguments employed in defence of the nation-state gain much of their moral suasion from the implicit underlying belief that immigrant groups should have less claim to official recognition by the state than the national 'majority'. Apart from a few desultory references to aboriginal peoples, Native Americans, and the Celtic national minorities by Porter, Schlesinger and Goulbourne, respectively, none addresses, or even acknowledges, the question of national minority rights. In so doing, they fail to differentiate the claims of national minorities from those of other ethnic minority groups. Indeed, even within the latter category, Schlesinger adopts an undifferentiated approach, as seen, for example, in his glib comparison between the social and educational trajectories of African-Americans, and Jewish and Asian ethnic communities in the USA. Such a comparison is clearly both inadequate and inappropriate since it takes little, if any,

account of class as a significant factor, or the voluntary/involuntary status of these groups (Ogbu 1987; see Chapter 2).

Multicultural citizenship

Will Kymlicka, in his various discussions on multicultural citizenship, is one of the few theorists on either side of the pluralist dilemma debates to draw a clear distinction between the rights of national minorities (including indigenous peoples) and other minority ethnic, cultural and social groups (see also Walzer, 1982; Taylor, 1992). As he observes of these discussions, most 'focus on the case of immigrants, and the accommodation of their ethnic ... differences within the larger society. Less attention has been paid to the situation of indigenous peoples and other non-immigrant "national minorities" whose homeland has been incorporated into the boundaries of a larger state, through conquest, colonisation, or federation' (1995a: vii). On this basis, Kymlicka defines national minorities 'as distinct and *potentially self-governing* societies incorporated into a larger state' and ethnic minority groups as 'immigrants who have left their national community to enter another society' (1995a: 19; my emphasis). The key distinction for Kymlicka is that national minorities, at the time of their incorporation, constituted an ongoing 'societal culture' -- that is, 'a culture which provides its members with meaningful ways of life across the full range of human activities ... [and] encompassing both public and private spheres' (1995a: 76). Ethnic minorities, in contrast, may well wish to maintain aspects of their cultural and linguistic identities within the host nation-state but this is principally in order to contribute to, and modify the existing national culture rather than to recreate a separate societal culture of their own (see also Gurr, 1993: 15).[14] In addition, both of these broad groupings can be distinguished from 'new social movements' such as gays, women, and the disabled who have been marginalised within their own national society or ethnic group. Kymlicka thus provides us with a more nuanced analysis which allows for the possibility of attributing *differing* rights to various minority groups within the nation-state. In this regard, his position is a significant advance on much of the literature concerned with multiculturalism which has largely failed historically to make these kinds of distinctions. This, in turn, has led to the valid charge of cultural relativism levelled against multiculturalism by its critics on both the right and the left, not to mention the attendant difficulties that such cultural relativism inevitably entails.[15] In what follows, I will concentrate principally on the specific concerns of indigenous and other national minority groups, although

I will also briefly address the specific rights attributable to ethnic minority groups and new social movements. I will return, however, to the wider implications of the latter, and specific ways of addressing the problems of cultural relativism, in Chapter 9.

Meanwhile, as we saw in Chapter 2, the distinction between the respective positions of national and ethnic minorities in modern nation-states can be illustrated by the terms 'multinational' and 'polyethnic'. As Kymlicka observes of this, most states are actually a combination of the both: 'obviously, a single country may be both multinational (as a result of the colonising, conquest, or confederation of national minorities) and polyethnic (as a result of individual and familial immigration)' (1995a: 17). However, most countries are also reluctant, more often than not, to acknowledge this combination in their public policy. Indeed, nation-states may well acknowledge neither, although this is rare, at least in liberal-democratic states. More usually, they may acknowledge one or the other. Thus, in the USA there is recognition of the country's polyethnicity -- albeit, a grudging one among conservatives -- but an unwillingness to distinguish and accept the rights of national minorities such as Native Americans, Hawai'ians and Puerto Ricans. Likewise, Australia and New Zealand have historically argued that they are settler colonies and hence have no national minorities; a position which ignores entirely the rights of the indigenous Koori and Māori who were the subject of European colonisation. In Belgium and Switzerland, however, the reverse applies. The rights of national minorities have long been recognised but an accommodation of immigrants and a more polyethnic society has been less forthcoming. A recognition of both dimensions then, and the respective rights attendant upon them, is the central challenge for developing a more plurally conceived approach to public policy in modern nation-states.

Following from this, Kymlicka argues that in addition to the civil rights available to all individuals, three forms of group-specific rights should be recognised in liberal democracies: 1) self-government rights; 2) polyethnic rights; and 3) special representation rights (see 1995a: 26-33). Self-government rights acknowledge that the nation-state is not the sole preserve of the majority (national) group and that legitimate national minority ethnies have the right to equivalent inclusion and representation in the civic realm. Accordingly, national minorities should be provided with rights to their autonomy and self-determination within the nation-state which, if necessary, could

be extended to incorporate the possibilities of secession. Ostensibly, this right of minority national groups to self-determination is not inconsistent with international law. The (1945) United Nations' Charter, for example, clearly states that 'all peoples have the right to self-determination'. However, the term 'peoples' is not defined by the UN and the injunction has tended to be interpreted only in relation to overseas colonies (the 'salt water thesis') rather than to national minorities, even though the latter may have been subjected to the same processes of colonisation. Self-determination has thus been limited *in practice* to existing states and attempts at broadening the principle to include national minorities have until recently met with limited success (Thornberry, 1991a; see below). Where national minorities have been recognised within existing nation-states, federalism has been the most common process of political accommodation that has been adopted. An obvious example here is the degree of autonomy given to the predominantly French-speaking Québec as part of a federal (and predominantly Anglophone) Canada (see Chapter 5). Self-government rights then, typically involve the devolution of political power to members of a national minority who are usually, but not always, located in a particular historical territory. The key in providing for such rights is their *permanent* status. They are not seen as a temporary measure or remedy which may one day be revoked.

Polyethnic rights also challenge the hegemonic construction of the nation-state but for a different clientele and to different ends. Polyethnic rights are intended to help ethnic (and/or religious) minority groups to continue to express their cultural, linguistic and religious heritage, principally in the private domain, without it hampering their success within the economic and political institutions of the dominant national society. One might add here that these rights are also available so that an undue burden of cultural and linguistic loss and/or change is not placed upon such groups (see Chapter 4). Like self-government rights, polyethnic rights are thus also seen as permanent, since they seek to protect rather than eliminate cultural and linguistic differences. However, their principal purpose is to promote integration *into* the larger society (and to contribute to and modify that society as a result) rather than to foster self-governing status among such groups. In this regard, integration comes to be seen as a *reciprocal* process rather than a simple accommodation of ethnic minority groups to the majoritarian national culture. It is a *revision* of integration rather than a *rejection* of it. Finally, special representation rights, along the lines outlined by Young above, are a response to some systemic disadvantage in the political

process which limits a particular group's view from being effectively represented. Special representation rights aim to redress this disadvantage but do so principally on a temporary basis. Once the oppression and/or disadvantage has been eliminated the rights no longer apply.

Taken together, these three kinds of rights can be regarded as distinct but not necessarily mutually exclusive. Indigenous peoples, for example, may demand special representation rights on the basis of their disadvantage, *and* self-governing rights on the basis of their status as a national minority ethnic. However, the key point is that these claims need not go together. Thus, the disabled may claim special representation rights but would not be able to claim either polyethnic or self-government rights. Likewise, an economically successful ethnic minority group may seek polyethnic rights but would have no claim to special representation or self-governing rights, and so on. Assuming the validity of such group-differentiated rights in the first place, however, does return us to the central questions surrounding the *legitimacy* of minority rights in liberal democracies and the difficulties involved in ascribing and/or determining particular group identities for the apportionment of such rights. Kymlicka's response to both these concerns is to defend minority rights on the basis of liberal theory rather than from a communitarian stance. In so doing, he manages to uphold the importance of individual citizenship rights while, at the same time, develop an understanding of the importance of cultural membership to such rights.

Kymlicka brings a range of arguments to bear in support of his position. First, he rejects the assumption that group-differentiated rights are 'collective' rights which, ipso facto, stand in opposition to 'individual' rights. Group-differentiated rights are not necessarily 'collective' in the sense that they privilege the group over the individual -- they can in fact be accorded to individual members of a group, or to the group as a whole, or to a federal state/province within which the group forms a majority. For example, the group-differentiated right of Francophones in Canada to use French in federal courts is an *individual* right that may be exercised at any time. The right of Francophones to have their children educated in French-medium schools, outside of Québec, is an individual right also but one that is subject to the proviso 'where numbers warrant' (see Chapter 5). In contrast, indigenous land and fishing rights are usually exercised by the collective tribal group -- as, for example, in the case of Native Americans in North America and Māori in New Zealand. Finally, the right of the Québécois to preserve and promote their distinct culture

in the province of Québec highlights how a minority group in a federal system may exercise group-differentiated rights in a territory where they form the majority, an example I will discuss in more depth in Chapter 5. In short, there is no simple relationship between group-differentiated rights accorded on the basis of cultural membership and their subsequent application. Thus, the common criticisms of 'collective rights' in the debates on the pluralist dilemma have little actual relevance to the question of group-differentiated rights. As Kymlicka concludes of the latter, 'most such rights are not about the primacy of communities over individuals. Rather, they are based on the idea that justice between groups requires that the members of different groups be accorded different rights' (1995a: 47).

Second, Kymlicka rejects the inevitable association of group-differentiated rights with illiberality. In this regard, he draws a key distinction between what he terms 'internal restrictions' and 'external protections' (1995a: 35-44). Internal restrictions involve *intra*-group relations where the ethnic or national minority group seeks to restrict the individual liberty of its members on the basis of maintaining group solidarity. These rights are often associated with theocratic and patriarchal communities and, when excessive, may be regarded as illiberal. External protections relate to *inter*-group relations where an ethnic or national minority group seeks to protect its distinct identity by limiting the impact of the decisions of the larger society.[16] This too has its dangers, although not in relation to individual oppression in this case but rather the possible unfairness that might result between groups. The ex-apartheid system in South Africa provides a clear example of the latter scenario. However, as Kymlicka argues, external protections need not result in injustice: 'Granting special representation rights, land claims, or language rights to a minority need not, and often does not, put it in a position to dominate other groups. On the contrary ... such rights can be seen as putting the various groups on a more equal footing, by reducing the extent to which the smaller group is vulnerable to the larger' (1995a: 36-37). On this basis, liberals can endorse certain external protections where they promote fairness between groups while still contesting internal restrictions which unduly limit the individual rights of members to question, revise, or reject traditional authorities and practices. In relation to the various group-differentiated rights outlined above, Kymlicka concludes that 'most demands for group-specific rights made by ethnic and national groups in Western democracies are for external protections' (1995a: 42). Even where internal restrictions are also present, these are usually seen

as unavoidable by-products of external protections rather than as desirable ends in themselves -- an issue I will explore more fully in relation to minority language rights in the following two chapters.

Third, Kymlicka argues that a recognition of the importance of cultural membership to one's individual rights has historical precedent in both liberal theory and political practice. Indeed, the rigid separation of individual *autonomy* from individual and collective *identity* has only really occurred in liberal theory and practice since the Second World War. Prior to this, liberal commentators did not assume that the state should treat cultural membership as a purely private matter. On the contrary, 'liberals either endorsed the legal recognition of minority cultures, or rejected minority rights not because they rejected the idea of an official culture, but precisely because they believed there should only be *one* official culture' (1995a: 53-54). The latter position is clearly illustrated by the arguments of Mill discussed in Chapter 1. The former view is exemplified in the work of Hobhouse and Dewey who argued, on the basis of the importance of cultural membership, that some accommodation should be made for the distinctive group-related rights of national minorities within the nation-state (Kymlicka, 1989). Hobhouse, for example, believed that if the claims of national minorities were satisfied by greater cultural equality, the distinctive problems of secession would not arise. In contrast, failure to address the legitimate rights of national minorities might actually hasten the break up of the nation-state rather than the reverse. On this view, individual citizenship rights were *insufficient* to the continued maintenance of the nation-state:

> The smaller nationality does not merely want equal rights with others. *It stands out for a certain life of its own*.... [To] find the place for national rights within the unity of the state, to give scope to national differences without destroying the organisation of a life which has somehow to be lived in common, is therefore the problem which the modern state has to solve if it is to maintain itself. It has not only to generalise the common rights of citizenship as applied to individuals, but to make room for diversity and give some scope to common sentiments *which in a measure conflict with each other*. (1928: 146-147; my emphases)

These concerns for the cultural protection of minorities were also reflected in political practices prior to the Second World War. In the nineteenth century, treaties were often employed for the protection of minority groups, initially on the basis of religion and later on the grounds of

nationality (Thornberry, 1991a). These practices culminated in the general organisation of the League of Nations, established in the wake of the First World War. The League endorsed a range of treaties aimed at securing special political status for minority groups within Europe in what came to be known as the Minority Protection scheme.[17] This was to change significantly, however, with the advent of the Second World War and the associated excesses and abuses of the said scheme by the Nazi regime.[18] As a result, there was a post-war shift in emphasis to establishing generic human rights, irrespective of group membership, through the establishment and subsequent activities of the United Nations and other supra-national agencies such as the EU. In so doing, it was assumed that no additional rights need be attributed to the members of specific ethnic or national minorities. As Claude has observed of these developments:

> The leading assumption has been that members of national minorities do not need, are not entitled to, or cannot be granted rights of special character. The doctrine of human rights has been put forward as a substitute for the concept of minority rights, with the strong implication that minorities whose members enjoy individual equality of treatment cannot legitimately demand facilities for the maintenance of their ethnic particularism. (1955: 211)

Consequently, all references to the rights of ethnic and national minorities were deleted from the (1948) **United Nation's Universal Declaration of Human Rights.**[19] Relatedly, a widespread conviction began to emerge among liberals that minority group rights were somehow incompatible with national and international peace and stability. However, as Kymlicka asserts, these assumptions are fundamentally misplaced. As we have seen, individual autonomy is inevitably dependent, at least to some extent, on one's cultural membership. Moreover, the failure of modern liberal theory and practice to acknowledge the specific rights of minorities has left them subject to the majoritarian decision-making processes of the state. The result has been to render minorities 'vulnerable to significant injustice at the hands of the majority, and to exacerbate ethnocultural conflict' (1995a: 5), trends which the UN and other supra-national bodies have only recently begun to address (see below).

Fourth, Kymlicka argues that Waldron's 'cosmopolitan alternative', which disavows the importance of one's *particular* cultural membership, is significantly overstated.[20] On this basis, Waldron rejects the codification of minority rights as a misplaced and misguided anachronism since most people now move easily between cultures and thus do not *need*, it seems, to be

attached to just one. Concomitantly, there is no reason on this view why minority group members should not simply dispense with their cultural and linguistic backgrounds and adopt those of the dominant ethnic's. And yet, while people do clearly move between cultures -- immigrants are an obvious example here -- cultural loss and/or subsumption is not nearly as easy and as unproblematic a process as Waldron suggests. In contrast, Margalit & Raz (1995) have argued that the transfer from one culture to another is often extremely difficult, even for voluntary migrants, not only because it is 'a very slow process indeed' but because of the importance of cultural membership to people's self-identity (see also Taylor, 1992; Tamir, 1993). This is even more so for national minorities who are often forced, in effect, to renounce the language and culture of their own 'societal' or 'encompassing' group for another's (see Chapter 4). As Margalit & Raz observe, this ignores the fact that:

> membership of such groups is of great importance to individual well-being, for it greatly affects one's opportunities, one's ability to engage in the relationships and pursuits marked by culture. Secondly ... the prosperity of the culture is important to the well-being of its members.... people's sense of their own identity is bound up with their sense of belonging to encompassing groups and ... their self-respect is affected by the esteem in which these groups are held. (1995: 86-87; see also Taylor, 1992)

In short, ethnic and national identities cannot simply be exchanged like last years clothes, as we saw Michael Billig observe in Chapter 1. Moreover, if members of the dominant ethnic typically value their own cultural membership, it is clearly unfair to prevent national minorities from continuing to value theirs'. As Kymlicka concludes, 'leaving one's culture, while possible, is best seen as renouncing something to which one is reasonably entitled' (1995a: 90). Relatedly, he argues:

> The freedom which liberals demand for individuals is not primarily the freedom to go beyond one's language and history, but rather the freedom to move within one's societal culture, to distance oneself from particular cultural roles, to choose which features of the culture are most worth developing, and which are without value. (1995a: 90-91)

Kymlicka's (and Margalit & Raz's) position closely accords with my own view of ethnicity as habitus, outlined in Chapter 1.[21] In addition, Kymlicka's last observation provides us with a rejoinder to a related criticism of Waldron's, that a defence of minority rights inevitably reinforces an homogenous conception of ethnic groups (see Waldron, 1995: 103-105). Waldron is

particularly critical here of notions of cultural 'purity' and 'authenticity' which, he argues, are regularly employed by indigenous peoples and other national minorities in support of their claims to self-government. These attempts at cultural delineation are manifestly artificial in his view and can only result in cultural stasis and isolationism. As such, they should be regarded as anathema by liberals. However, as Kymlicka counters, the assertion of national minority rights does not necessarily preclude the possibilities of cultural adaptation, change and interchange:

> there is no inherent connection between the desire to maintain a distinct societal culture and the desire for cultural isolation. In many cases, the aim of self-government is to enable smaller nations to interact with larger nations on a more equitable basis. It should be up to each culture to decide when and how they adopt the achievements of the larger world. It is one thing to learn from the larger world; it is another to be swamped by it, and self-government rights may be needed for smaller nations to control the direction and rate of change. (1995a: 103-104)

Indeed, the desire of national minorities to survive as a culturally distinct society is most often *not* based on some simplistic desire for cultural 'purity'. Defenders of minority rights are rarely seeking to preserve their 'authentic' culture if that means returning to cultural practices long past. If it was, it would soon meet widespread opposition from individual members. Rather, it is the right 'to maintain one's membership in a distinct culture, and to continue developing that culture in the same (impure) way that the members of majority cultures are able to develop theirs' (1995a: 105). Cultural change, adaptation and interaction are entirely consistent with such a position. As Kymlicka argues elsewhere (1995b: 8-9), minority cultures wish to be both cosmopolitan and to embrace the cultural interchange that Waldron emphasises. However, this does not necessarily entail Waldron's own 'cosmopolitan alternative' which denies that people have any deep bond to their own historical cultural and linguistic communities. In similar vein, Kymlicka asserts that minority rights 'help to ensure that the members of minority cultures have access to a secure cultural structure *from which to make choices for themselves*, and thereby promote liberal equality' (1989: 192; my emphasis). On this view, national minorities continue to exercise their individual rights within their particular cultural (and linguistic) milieux and, of course, contextually, in relation to other cultural groups within a given nation-state (see Young, 1993). The crucial element, however, is that members of the national minority are themselves able to retain a significant degree of control over the process -- something which until now has largely

been the preserve of majority group members. The key issue thus becomes one of cultural *autonomy* rather than one of retrenchment, isolationism, or stasis.

Kymlicka's liberal defence of national minority rights is a cogent one. In reconceptualising liberal theory -- principally, by unshackling it from the 'philosophical matrix of the nation-state' within which it has come to be subsumed -- he provides a powerful theoretical framework and intellectual justification for such rights. In so doing, he also comes closest to balancing what Hobhouse earlier highlighted as those 'common sentiments *which in a measure conflict with each other*' (1928: 146-147; my emphasis); namely, citizenship and (minority) ethnicity. This is not to say, however, that the measure of conflict between such sentiments is resolved by Kymlicka. Indeed, no account which deals with such issues could ever do so fully, nor indeed would it necessarily be helpful to do so, since the point in the end is that the various claims involved are *competing* ones (see also Chapter 9). As Homi Bhabha argues, 'the question of cultural difference faces us with a disposition of knowledges or a distribution of practices that exist beside each other, abseits designating a form of social contradiction and antagonism that has to be negotiated rather than sublated' (1994: 162). On this basis, what is required is a *negotiated* settlement that acknowledges difference, and accommodates it where it can, rather than a compromise which subsumes it and/or attempts to resolve all its contradictory aspects.

The inevitability of these ongoing tensions does mean though that Kymlicka has faced his own fair share of criticism. For example, communitarian critics such as Charles Taylor (1992) have argued that while Kymlicka's argument accounts for the cultural survival of *existing* groups who currently face pressure from majority cultural forces, it does not ensure their continued survival over generations which, for such groups, is the central issue at stake. For the latter to occur, collective goals would in some circumstances have to be preferred to individual one's, a position that Kymlicka is reluctant to take. Indeed, for Kymlicka, the principal importance of cultural membership is that 'it allows for meaningful individual choices' (1989: 172). Thus, freedom of choice must be regarded as prior to the ties that bind us to community; in effect, community must remain commensurable with individual liberty (Coulombe, 1995). However, as Moore (1991) argues, there remains a certain contradiction in a position which claims that the value of autonomy is derived from its role in fostering community while also asserting that autonomy is the ultimate

value on which that community is to be assessed. Relatedly, there is an ambiguity at times as to what actually constitutes a group for Kymlicka and, by extension, who might be eligible for the rights associated with such groups (Burtonwood, 1996). Kymlicka is rightly sceptical here of any notion of a group identity that is pre-given or fixed but articulates this less clearly than, say, Iris Young. Accordingly, the problem of closure -- the risk that institutionalised forms of group representation could block further development and change -- is not completely obviated (Phillips, 1995), even if, as we have seen, cultural fluidity and change is clearly countenanced by Kymlicka. Marrying a theory of rights to the complexities of political practice is a necessarily difficult and, at times, fraught process. Nonetheless, it remains my conviction that Kymlicka's arguments about rights, combined with Iris Young's more nuanced conception of the fluidity and interfusion of groups, provide us with a powerful explanatory model for a legitimate defence of national minority rights within liberal theory.

The rights of indigenous peoples

To illustrate the arguments concerning minority rights outlined thus far, I want to conclude this chapter with a brief review of the debates surrounding the legal rights and standing of indigenous peoples. Indigenous peoples are currently at the forefront of developments regarding recognition of their group-differentiated rights in relation to both national and international law. However, these recent developments have only occurred after a long history of colonisation which has seen such groups faced with systematic disadvantage, marginalisation and/or alienation in their own historic territories (see Chapter 2). In the process, indigenous peoples have been viewed extremely pejoratively in relation to modernisation. Consequently, they have been subjected in many cases to forced assimilation, on the misplaced assumption that this was the only viable option for their social and cultural survival and/or advancement. More often than not, indigenous peoples have also been treated solely as a disadvantaged ethnic minority group rather than as a national minority ethnie within the nation-state. Alternatively, indigenous peoples have been granted, in certain circumstances, some 'special privileges' and protection not afforded 'regular' citizens. Traditional systems of social order, for example, including the right to very limited forms of governmental autonomy (e.g., tribal or band government on Native American reservations) have been preserved in some cases in order to *allow* indigenous minorities to exercise a modicum

of control over their traditional territories and ways of life (Churchill, 1986; Kymlicka, 1989).[22] However, the extremely limited nature of these concessions has tended simply to place indigenous peoples in a double bind. On the one hand, such concessions have done little, if anything, to redress the extreme marginalisation facing indigenous peoples in nation-states. On the other hand, the granting of even very limited local autonomy to indigenous peoples is usually viewed with a good deal of suspicion, and often with outright opposition, because it may infringe on the individual rights of majority group members.

Given this, indigenous groups have become increasingly disaffected with their treatment by national majorities and have sought the right to greater *self-determination* within nation-states, via both national and international law. In this respect, the definition of what constitutes an indigenous people becomes important. However, as we saw in Chapter 2, such definitions are not entirely unproblematic and indigenous groups themselves, like all broad groupings, exhibit a range of significant inter- and intra-group differences. These caveats notwithstanding, the International Labour Organisation's (ILO) Convention 169 (Article 1.1), formulated in 1989, may serve as a useful starting point:

> a) tribal peoples in independent countries whose social, cultural and economic conditions distinguish them from other sections of the national community, and whose status is regulated wholly or partially by their own customs or traditions or by special laws or regulations;
>
> b) peoples in independent countries who are regarded as indigenous on account of their descent from the populations which inhabited the country, or a geographical region to which the country belongs, at the time of conquest or colonisation or the establishment of present state boundaries and who, *irrespective of their legal status*, retain some of their own social, economic, cultural and political institutions. (my emphasis)

Lest objectivist definitions be accorded too much weight, however, Article 1.2 adds the rider that 'self-identification as indigenous or tribal shall be regarded as a fundamental criterion for determining the groups to which the provisions of this Convention apply' (cf. Chapter 1). Suffice it to say at this point, that self-identification, along with the qualification 'irrespective of their legal status' highlighted above, are both central to any discussion of indigenousness since not all nation-states are willing to recognise indigenous groups in their territories.[23]

The ILO Convention 169 is also significant for another reason. It replaces an earlier convention (107), drawn up in 1957, which exhibited a much more paternalistic approach to indigenous peoples. These differences are reflected in both the wording and the general intent of the two conventions. With regard to wording, for example, Convention 107 (a) uses the phrase 'tribal populations' whereas 169 (a) employs 'tribal peoples'. This is significant, given the connotations of the term 'peoples' in international law (see below). Convention 169 (a) also states that the social, cultural and economic conditions of tribal groups are *distinguished* from other sections of the national community whereas 107 (a) employs the more pejorative phrase 'at a less advanced stage'. Likewise, where Convention 169 (b) states that indigenous peoples 'retain some of their own social, economic, cultural and political institutions', 107 (b) specifically equates these institutions with pre-modern practices and contrasts them with 'the [modern] institutions of the nation to which they belong'. These differences are not simply semantic ones. More broadly, Convention 107 clearly views indigenous culture as a temporary obstacle to modernisation. As such, it is as much concerned with the assimilation of indigenous peoples as their protection. In contrast, Convention 169 reflects a far more positive view of indigenous cultures and is specifically anti-assimilationist in intent (see Thornberry, 1991b: 18; de Varennes, 1996a: 252-253).

The distinctions between the two ILO Conventions illustrate the different status that has gradually come to be accorded to indigenous peoples in international law over the intervening 40 year period. Central to this change has been the argument of indigenous groups themselves that they are not ethnic minorities but *peoples*, with the associated rights of self-determination attributable to the latter under international law. This argument has been articulated by such organisations as the World Council of Indigenous Peoples (WCIP) and the Working Group on Indigenous Populations (WGIP), the latter being established in 1982 as part of the United Nation's Sub-Commission on the Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities. The work of the WGIP has been particularly influential here and has contributed to a growing tendency to regard indigenous peoples 'as a separate issue [from other minority groups] in international and constitutional law' (Thornberry, 1991b: 6). The culmination of these developments thus far has been the (1993) **United Nations Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous People**, a document which clearly outlines the key legal and political demands of indigenous peoples.

Article 8 of the Declaration states, for example: 'Indigenous peoples have the collective and individual right to maintain and develop their distinct identities and characteristics, including the right to identify themselves as indigenous and to be recognised as such'. Article 3 is even more unequivocal: 'Indigenous peoples have the right to self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development'.

Such demands, if accepted, would involve a fundamental reconceptualisation of national and international law and practice. As such, it is perhaps not surprising that, despite the more favourable view adopted towards indigenous peoples in recent times, there remains considerable reticence about the right of self determination being accorded to them. Much of this has to do with the specific meaning of self-determination in international law. The right of self-determination includes, crucially, the right to secession and this is why it has been limited in practice to existing states in the post Second World War era. Thus, in the ILO Convention 169 -- which is clearly positive towards indigenous peoples -- there is also a clear caveat which states: 'The use of the term "peoples" in this Convention shall not be construed as having any implications as regards the rights which may attach to the term under international law' (Article 1.3). Likewise, governmental responses to the Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples have been mixed. The New Zealand government, for example, while adopting a predominantly positive stance towards the Declaration, observes:

> There is no indication at present that governments will recognise a right of *external* self-determination for indigenous peoples, that is, including the right to secede from a state. Any 'right of self-determination' for indigenous people would therefore have to be understood differently from its traditional meaning in international law if it were to be acceptable to governments. [In this regard] international law may be moving towards recognition of an 'aboriginal right to self-determination' or autonomy which does not include the right of secession. (Te Puni Kokiri, 1994: 9; my emphasis)

And so it seems. As a result of the advocacy of indigenous groups, there *is* an increasing openness to an intermediate position which acknowledges the right to greater *autonomy* within the nation-state for indigenous peoples but which does not necessarily include the right to secession. This form of 'internal self-determination' emphasises *negotiated* power sharing, both through constitutional reform and within existing institutions, and extends well beyond the

desultory measures of local autonomy already established for some indigenous groups. As Madame Daes, the UN rapporteur for the WGIP observes of this: 'the existing state has the duty to accommodate the aspirations of indigenous peoples through constitutional reforms designed to share power democratically. It also means that indigenous peoples have the duty to try and reach an agreement, in good faith, on sharing power within the existing state and to exercise their right to self-determination by this means to the extent possible' (cited in Te Puni Kokiri, 1994: 11).

Internal self-determination, as outlined here, bears a remarkable resemblance to the concept of cultural nationalism, discussed in Chapter 2, with its emphasis on the transformation of national communities from *within* the nation-state, rather than with secession per se. The link with cultural nationalism also highlights -- or, rather, reiterates -- that secession need not be the only avenue for expressing nationalist aims. Indigenous peoples are not consumed with questions of secession since, generally, their limited socio-economic, demographic and political strength precludes such an option. Rather, indigenous peoples are advocating a right to separate representation, *alongside* national majorities, on the basis that they constitute a distinct ethnic in the nation-state.[24] These claims are clearly nationalist ones and contrast with the usual polyethnic concerns of (immigrant) ethnic minority groups for the abolition of barriers that lead to disadvantage and preclude greater integration into the nation-state (see Chapter 2). This is not to say, of course, that the latter are of no concern to indigenous peoples -- they clearly are. However, polyethnic claims are not their *principal* preoccupation. Thus, state policies which address only these concerns, on the basis that indigenous peoples are simply one of many disadvantaged ethnic minority groups, do little to allay their specific demands.

That such demands are beginning to be addressed though, however tentatively, signals a significant change in post Second World War liberal theory and practice. As de Varennes comments of these developments: 'Whilst their is certainly no unanimity, both international and national law appear to be heading towards increased recognition of the special position which indigenous peoples occupy within a [nation-state's] legal and political order ' (1996a: 274).[25] National and international developments with regard to indigenous peoples have also been parallelled recently by moves towards greater recognition of national minorities more generally --

most notably, in the draft **Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities** agreed by the European Union in November, 1994.[26] In both these instances, the pivotal roles of language and education have been to the fore. The protection of language and culture is one of the central themes to be found in the Framework, while national and international instruments for the protection of indigenous peoples also place great emphasis on their linguistic and educational rights. The issues surrounding the linguistic and educational rights of national minorities within nation-states are the focus of the next two chapters.

Notes – Chapter 3

1 As Gramsci argues, in order to understand any nation-state as a whole, one must always distinguish between its 'State' or political and administrative structure, and its 'civil society'. The latter comprises, for example, its principal non-political organizations, its religious and other beliefs, and its specific 'customs' or way of life. In making these distinctions, there are inevitably features which do not fit easily under either category. However, as Nairn summarises its: 'that is relatively unimportant. What matters is that they are distinguishable, and that the singular identity of a modern society depends upon the relationship between them' (1981: 131).

2. This is certainly the position of Gordon, Walzer and Glazer in their respective analyses of the two approaches (see also Bullivant, 1981; Gleason 1984; Rorty, 1991; Edwards, 1985, 1994; Waldron, 1993, 1995).

3. It is worth observing that the consensus between liberal and Marxist commentators on the position of ethnic and national minorities within the nation-state has also been reflected in the subsequent construction of liberal-democratic and socialist states. As such, while I will concentrate in what follows on the political organisation of liberal democracies, it should be pointed out that socialist and other non-democratic states have also tended to adopt a very similar position vis-à-vis national and ethnic minorities. In this latter regard, Churchill (1996: 268-269) provides a useful discussion of the former Soviet Union (see also Kymlicka, 1995a: 69-74).

4. As I have already suggested, the clear parallels between liberal and Marxist accounts in the nineteenth century also reflect this broad consensus.

5. In his seminal study *The Vertical Mosaic* (1965), Porter argued that ethnicity was a principal factor in the formation and persistence of the social stratification system in Canada. In his view, this stratification process, or vertical mosaic, was initiated by the colonial contest between the British and French. When the French settlers lost this contest, they were accorded secondary status to their British counterparts. Subsequent immigrant groups were assigned an 'entrance status' which located them at various positions lower down the social hierarchy while Native American and Inuit occupied the lowest levels (see also Chapter 5).

6. Hispanic communities in the USA are not a single category, as so often described in the literature. Rather they comprise a diverse range of groups, including Spanish-speaking national minorities (Puerto Ricans and Chicanos), various Spanish-speaking immigrants from Latin America, Cuban refugees, and illegal Mexican migrant workers (Kymlicka, 1995a: 15-17; see also Macías, 1979; Hernández-Chávez, 1995).

7. The arguments about bilingualism, the role of English, and the particular preoccupation with Hispanic communities will be revisited in greater depth in Chapter 5 where I examine the key tenets of the 'English Only' movement in the USA.

8. In this regard, Goulbourne provides a cogent review and critique of official immigration policy in Britain which, since the 1960s, has been increasingly aimed at limiting and/or excluding non-white minorities.

9. As Goulbourne observes of this, 'while the membership of [non-white] minorities is accorded formal recognition, this recognition is constructed in such a manner that their legitimate presence and participation in Britain are nearly always questioned' (1991a: 2).

10. Communitarians believe that we discover our ends embedded in a social context, rather than choosing them ex nihilo. Their principal objection in this regard is thus to the idea of a self divorced from, or stripped of, the social features of identity (Coulombe, 1995).

11. Criticism of this orthodox liberal position is not limited to communitarians, however. Kymlicka (1989) argues from a liberal perspective that the attempts of theorists like Rawls's and Dworkin's to separate citizenship from communal identity actually still retain an *implicit* recognition of cultural membership as a primary good. The only reason they do not explicitly give it status as a grounds for differential rights claims, Kymlicka suggests, is because they accept uncritically the notion of the nation-state as politically and culturally coterminous (see Chapter 2). If this assumption is dropped, cultural membership has to be explicitly recognised as a possible source of injustice and/or inequality -- a point which earlier theorists of liberalism, like Hobhouse and Dewey, actually recognised. I discuss this latter point, and the significance of Kymlicka's wider contribution, more fully below.

12. As an aside, this apparent contradiction is also linked to Goulbourne's analysis of multiculturalism -- or the 'new pluralism' as he refers to it -- in which he highlights the Swann Report (DES, 1985) as an exemplar. Goulbourne is rightly critical here of the Report's emphasis on cultural rather than social and political change (see also Troyna, 1993; May, 1994), a limiting feature characteristic of much of the literature on multiculturalism. However, his own conclusions on liberal pluralism end up, somewhat ironically, very close to those of the Swann Report -- a point which seems to escape him. In this regard, it is apparent that the report, while adopting the catch phrase 'diversity in unity', clearly favours the latter over the former. In so doing, it advocates an approach to cultural pluralism which 'enables all ethnic groups, both minority and majority, to participate fully in shaping society ... *within a framework of commonly accepted values*, practices and procedures, whilst also allowing, and where necessary assisting the ethnic minority communities in maintaining their distinct ethnic identities within this common framework' (1985: 5; my emphasis). In emphasising this 'framework of commonly accepted values', however, the Swann Report fails crucially to address the key questions of *which* values are agreed, how they are chosen, and who benefits most from the choice. In the end then, Swann's conclusions are little different from Goulbourne's own ambivalent and somewhat contradictory position on the pluralist dilemma; it is 'cultural diversity *within* social unity' which matters most, although why this should be so, and how we get there, remain far from clear.

13. This process of social relations may occur between different groups that are relatively equal or unequal, although the latter is usually more common. Where the social relation of the groups is one of privilege and oppression, this attribution of Otherness is clearly asymmetrical:

> While the privileged group is defined as active human subject, inferiorised social groups are objectified, substantialised, reduced to a nature or essence. Whereas the privileged groups are neutral, exhibit free, spontaneous and weighty subjectivity, the dominated groups are marked with an essence, imprisoned in a given set of possibilities.... Using its own values, experience, and culture as [universal] standards, the dominant group measures the Others and finds them essentially lacking... (Young, 1993: 124-125)

14. Kymlicka's analysis here closely accords with my own discussion in Chapter 2 of the key distinctions between ethnic and national minorities and the related significance of cultural and political nationalisms. As I argued there, political nationalism is not the only determining feature of nationalist movements since such a view, while received wisdom for many, relegates national minorities which are not (yet) politically active to the status of mere 'ethnic groups'. Kymlicka's emphasis on incorporation into the nation-state, rather than on political mobilisation per se, provides a useful complement to my own argument. It allows for quiescent national minorities and highly mobilised immigrant groups without confusing the political status of the two.

15. For a more extensive critique of multiculturalism in this regard, see May (1994, 1998c).

16. External protections are thus intended to ensure that individual members are able to maintain a distinctive way of life *if they so choose* and are not prevented from doing so by the decisions of members outside of their community (see Kymlicka, 1995a: 204. n.11).

17. It must be said that the League of Nations did not initially encompass a formal concern for minority rights. Indeed, no provisions dealing with the protection of minorities, nor for that matter human rights generally, were incorporated within its original remit. However, these omissions created significant controversy and led the League of Nations to subsequently adopt and oversee the Minority Protection scheme. It should also be pointed out here that the latter was as much concerned with providing a mechanism for the protection of individual rights, especially the right to equality, as with the specific concerns of national minorities. As such, the League of Nations' approach is not inconsistent with the more recent adoption of universal human rights (see de Varennes, 1996a: 26-27; see also below).

18. Hitler used a supposed concern for minority rights against the political settlement agreed in Versailles in 1919, employing, in the process, pressure from vociferous German minorities allegedly denied self-determination.

19. Article 2 of the Declaration states: 'Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race [sic], colour, sex, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status'. Consequently, minorities, as such, do not enjoy rights in the Declaration. Various attempts at including a recognition of minorities in the text were strongly opposed at the draft stages, the consensus being that 'the best solution of the problems of minorities was to encourage respect for human rights' (see Thornberry, 1991b: 11-12).

20. Waldron's view here is reminiscent of the advocates of situational ethnicity, discussed in Chapter 1, who emphasise the fluid and multiple nature of ethnic (and other group) identities and the varied instrumental ends to which these are put. As we shall see, criticisms of Waldron's position are also similar to those directed at the more extreme instrumentalist positions adopted by some advocates of situational ethnicity.

21. Indeed, Margalit & Raz's (1995: 81-91) discussion of encompassing groups could easily be applied to the notion of ethnicity as habitus. At one point, for example, they observe: 'familiarity with a culture determines the boundaries of the imaginable. Sharing a culture, being part of it, determines the limits of the feasible' (1995: 86).

22. Of course, protectionism in this form has also simply been used as a variant of assimilation. As Hartwig argues, concerning Māori in New Zealand and Koori in Australia: 'whatever the differences between "amalgamationist" and "protectionist" strategies, the ultimate aim of the state for long periods in both countries was the disappearance of Aboriginal and Māori societies as distinguishable entities' (1978: 170; cited in Harker & McConnochie, 1985). Joshua Fishman is also particularly critical of this kind of 'protectionism'. As he argues, 'even in such settings indigenous populations are robbed of control of the natural resources that could constitute the economic bases of a more self-regulatory collective life and, therefore, robbed also of a possible avenue of cultural viability as well' (1991: 62).

23. Governments in Malaysia, India, Burma and Bangladesh have at times claimed that everyone is indigenous and that no-one is thus entitled to any special or differential treatment (de Varennes, 1996a). This unwillingness by national governments to recognise indigenous peoples is also extended to minorities more generally. Article 27 of the (1966) **International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights** provides for the limited protection of minorities 'in those states in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exist'. However, this rather tentative formulation almost invites denial by states that any such minorities exist within their jurisdiction. France, for example, simply asserts that 'Article 27 is not applicable as far as the Republic is concerned' while many Latin American states have made similar claims (Thornberry, 1991a, 1991b). I will return to the broader intent of Article 27, and its overall effectiveness, in my discussion of language and education rights in Chapter 5.

24. Indeed, many states acknowledge as part of their internal law that indigenous peoples have either retained some degree of inherent sovereignty that has not been extinguished by conquest and/or colonisation, or have a continuing legal status that sets them apart (de Varennes, 1996a, 1996b).

25. Examples of these developments at the national level include Brasil, where the adoption in 1988 of a new constitution recognised for the first time the indigenous Indians' social organisation, customs, languages, beliefs and traditions, along with the right of native title to their lands (Brasil, *Constituição*, 1996, Chapter VIII, Art. 231; see Hornberger, 1997). The Mabo decision (*Mabo v. Queensland* (no. 2), 1992) in Australia has also recognised, again for the first time, traditional Aboriginal ownership of land after more than two centuries of European colonisation based on the contrary notion of terra nullius. While in New Zealand, Te Tiriti o Waitangi (The Treaty of Waitangi) -- originally signed in 1840 between the indigenous Māori and the British Crown -- has, after over a century of neglect, once again come to be regarded as a pivotal constitutional document. Te Tiriti o Waitangi emphasises the partnership between Māori and Pākehā (European New Zealanders) as distinct ethnies and upholds the former's rights as indigenous people (Orange, 1987; R. Walker, 1990).

26. Article 1 of the Convention states: 'The protection of national minorities and of the rights and freedoms of persons belonging to those minorities forms an integral part of the international protection of human rights, and as such falls within the scope of international cooperation'. However, like other such documents, the Framework Convention suffers from an inability to define the national minorities to which it refers. This allows nation-states, in implementing the convention, to determine for themselves who constitutes a national minority (see also n. 23). Thus, the Turkish delegation argued during the course of discussions on the Framework that Turkish guest workers in Germany constituted a national minority but that the Kurds did not.

Chapter 4

LANGUAGE, IDENTITY AND MINORITY RIGHTS

Much of the debate surrounding the pluralist dilemma has been concerned with -- some would say, consumed by -- its implications for language and education within the nation-state. Conservative commentators like Schlesinger (1992), for example, are quick to denounce bilingualism in the USA and to point out the supposedly pernicious influence of multicultural and bilingual education on the fabric of American society. Likewise, advocates of cultural and linguistic pluralism often invest education with the capacity to transform public policy -- and, by implication, public attitudes -- to their more pluralist ends. The Swann Report (DES, 1985) in Britain, with its prominent advocacy of multicultural (but not bilingual) education, provides an exemplar here.

This preoccupation with language and education should not surprise us, given their centrality to the formation and maintenance of modern nation-states (Gellner, 1983; Anderson, 1991; see Chapter 2). In effect, the battle for nationhood is often a battle for linguistic and cultural hegemony. Consequently, education – and, crucially, the language(s) legitimated in and through education – play a key role in establishing and maintaining the subsequent cultural and linguistic shape of the nation-state. However, this is not a 'once and for all' process, as much as some conservative commentators would want it to be. In contrast, established nation-states in the western world are having to revisit these questions in the light of changing demographic patterns and, more significantly for our ends, the increasing disenchantment of national minority groups with current cultural and linguistic hegemonies. In this chapter I want to explore the validity of

these national minority claims in specific relation to language and identity, along with the various issues to which this gives rise. In Chapter 5 I will examine more closely the role of education. However, in discussing language and education separately here, it needs to be borne in mind that it is often extremely difficult to separate the two dimensions *in practice* when it comes to the pluralist dilemma. This point should already be self evident from what has been discussed thus far. It will also be clearly demonstrated over the course of the next two chapters since issues of language and education will inevitably impinge on one another. Thus, while attempting to maintain some analytical distance between the two in what follows, I will return to their specific interconnections at the conclusion of the following chapter. There I will examine at some length a case study where language, education and minority rights are inextricably intertwined -- the 'English Only' movement in the United States.

Language and identity

In Chapter 1 we saw how language may be a salient marker of ethnic identity in one instance but not in another. While a specific language may well be identified as a significant cultural marker of a particular ethnic group, there is no *inevitable* correspondence between language and ethnicity. In effect, linguistic differences do not always correspond to ethnic ones -- membership of an ethnic group does not necessarily entail association with a particular language, either for individual members or for the group itself. Likewise, more than one ethnic group can share the same language while continuing without difficulty to maintain their own distinct ethnic (and national) identities. Indeed, even where language *is* regarded as a central feature of ethnic identity, it is the *diacritical significance* attached to language which is considered crucial not the actual language itself (cf. Barth, 1969; see below). Moreover, languages, along with other cultural attributes, vary in their salience to ethnicity both within and between historical periods. Languages may come and languages may go, or so it seems. These themes were reiterated in Chapter 2 when we examined the tenets of romantic or linguistic nationalism aka Herder, Humboldt and Fichte. There we concluded, along with most modernist commentators, that the view of nations as both natural and linguistically *determined* was little more than sociological (and linguistic) nonsense. As Ernest Renan argued, language may well be a factor in national identity

but it certainly not the only one, nor is it even essential: 'language may invite us to unite but it does not compel us to do so' (1990: 16).

Given this, one might be able to assume that language has little actual significance to, or bearing on questions of ethnic and national identity. However, this would be to make a grave mistake, for a number of reasons. First, there is considerable evidence that while language may not be a *determining* feature of ethnic and national identity, it remains nonetheless a *significant* one in many instances. To say that language is not an inevitable feature of identity is not the same as saying it is unimportant, yet many commentators in (rightly) assuming the former position have also (wrongly) assumed the latter. As I will argue below, language may not be intrinsically valuable in itself -- it is not primordial -- but it does have strong and felt associations with ethnic and national identity. As such, language cannot be relegated, as some commentators would have it, to a mere secondary or surface characteristic of ethnicity (see, for example, Glazer, 1975, 1983; Eastman, 1984; Edwards, 1984, 1985; Rodriguez, 1983, 1993).

Second, and relatedly, the *cultural* significance of language to ethnic and national identity may help to explain, at least in part, its *political* prominence in many ethnic and ethnonationalist movements. In this regard, the interconnections between the cultural and political dimensions of language become central, no more so than in the official status accorded to particular languages within the nation-state. As Manning Nash observes:

> Language seems straightforwardly a piece of culture. But on reflection it is clear that language is often a political fact, at least as much as it is a cultural one. It has been said that 'language is a dialect with an army and a navy'. And what official or recognised languages are in any given instance is often the result of politics and power interplays. (1989: 6)

The official status of language(s) to which Nash refers is a key dimension in many of the debates on the pluralist dilemma and concerns majority group members as much as it does minorities. We have already seen the salience of language (and language rights) to the dominant ethnic from Schlesinger's comments in the preceding chapter, and we will encounter this preoccupation with language, from all sides, in the various examples which follow. However, Nash's comment also alludes to the fact that the official status ascribed to any one language is a somewhat arbitrary

process -- as much to do with political and social power relations an with anything else. This point has already been presaged by Gellner's (1983) and Anderson's (1991) accounts in Chapter 2 of the development of national languages (often retrospectively) within nation-states. And it brings me to the third reason for not underestimating the significance of language to ethnic and national identity. Language construction and/or reconstruction may well be a somewhat arbitrary process at times. Nonetheless, a certain linguistic arbitrariness does not, ipso facto, diminish the affective and/or political importance of the languages concerned for those who come to speak them. Indeed, if this were the case, it would be hard, if not impossible, to explain why particular national languages have such socio-political currency and meaning for their adherents; a currency which extends far beyond the reach of its solely 'linguistic' functions. In short, the legitimacy, or otherwise, of a language's provenance does not much matter. If a particular language comes to serve important cultural and/or political functions in the formation and maintenance of a particular ethnic or national identity, it *is* important. With this in mind, I want now to turn to a more detailed examination of each of these three principles just outlined, along with the related role of English in the modern national and international arena.

Identity in language

Towards the end of his seminal account *Imagined Communities*, Benedict Anderson avers of language:

> What the eye is to the lover -- that particular, ordinary eye he or she is born with -- language -- whatever language history has made his or her mother tongue -- is to the patriot. Through that language, encountered at mother's knee and parted only at the grave, pasts are restored, fellowships are imagined, and futures dreamed. (1991: 154)

And yet Anderson is also the first to reject any suggestion of some kind of primordial status to language. It is always a mistake, he argues, to treat languages in the way that certain nationalist ideologues treat them -- 'as *emblems* of nation-ness, like flags, costumes, folk dances and the rest'. Much the more important aspect of language is 'its capacity for generating imagined communities, building in effect *particular solidarities*' (1991: 133; emphases in original). The sociolinguist, Monica Heller, makes a similar point when she discusses the interrelationship between language and ethnic identity in a French immersion school in Toronto, Canada:

> Language use is ... involved in the formation of ethnic identity in two ways. First, it constrains access to participation in activities and to formation of social relationships. *Thus at a basic level language use is central to the formation of group boundaries.* Second, as children spend more and more time together they share experience, and language is a central means of making sense out of that shared experience. (1987: 199; my emphasis).

Language, as a communally shared good, serves an important boundary-marking function (Tabouret-Keller, 1997).[1] After all, being unable to speak a particular language places immediate restrictions on one's ability to communicate -- and, by extension, identify -- with those who speak that language and any ethnic and/or national identities with which it is associated. This process of demarcation may be more salient for minority groups since such groups are likely to be more conscious of the need for clear linguistic boundaries in relation to a surrounding dominant language and culture. The usefulness of linguistic demarcation may also thus help to explain why language often has a heightened sense of saliency in relation to identity when its role as only one of a number of cultural markers might suggest otherwise.[2] Moreover, to the extent that language boundaries are employed as a demarcating feature of identity, then a decreasing emphasis on, or a blurring of these boundaries would be regarded as a threat to a group's existence (Khleif, 1979).

Relatedly, where language is regarded as central to identity -- or, as Smolicz (1979, 1993, 1995) terms it, where language is a 'core cultural value' -- the *sharing* of that language may engender particular solidarities. Certainly, ethnic and nationalist movements have seen the potential this connection offers -- often choosing language as a rallying point for the alternative histories, and associated cultural and political rights, that they wish to promote. In so doing, many such movements are simply reflecting long-held views of the language and identity link that are reflected in the language itself. The Welsh word 'iaith', for example, originally meant both language and community; the word for foreigner, 'anghyfiaith', means 'not of the same language'; while the word for a compatriot, 'cyfiaith', means 'of the same language'. Likewise, the Basque define their territory 'Euskalherria' on the basis of where 'Euskera', the Basque language, is spoken. Frequently invoked nationalist slogans also reflect the primacy given to the language and identity link: 'Sluagh gun chanain, sluagh gun anam' is Gaelic for 'A people without its language is a people without its soul', while 'Hep brezhoneg, breizh ebet' is Breton for 'without Breton

there is no Brittany', and there are countless other examples on which one could draw (see, for example, Edwards, 1994: 129; Fishman, 1997: 331-333).

From the above, it is clear that the link between language and identity encompasses both significant cultural and political dimensions. The former is demonstrated by the fact that one's individual and social identities, and their complex interconnections, are inevitably mediated in and through language. The latter is significant to the extent that languages come to be formally (and informally) associated with particular ethnic and national identities. These interconnections also help to explain why a 'detached' scientific view of the link between language and identity may fail to capture the degree to which language is *experienced* as vital by those who speak it. Concomitantly, it may also significantly understate the role that language plays in social organisation and mobilisation (Fishman, 1997). In short, the 'shibboleth of language', as Toynbee (1953) coined it, still holds much sway. While the cultural and political dimensions of language and identity are inevitably closely intertwined, I want to look briefly in what follows at each of these aspects in turn.

Language and culture

It does not take much to demonstrate that language is a communally shared good since language, almost by definition, requires dialogue. What is harder to determine is whether one's *own* language is a good. Is a particular language significantly related to one's cultural identity or would any language suffice? This is a crucial question since, if the latter is proved, the case for specific language rights -- that is, rights relating to the protection and promotion of specific languages -- is dealt a perhaps terminal blow. However, even if the former tenet is accepted, one must be able to account for the historical, social and political *construction* of the language and identity link and its clear *variability*, both at the inter- and intra-group level. This is not an easy task by any means but the work of the prominent sociolinguist Joshua Fishman provides us with a useful place to start.

Fishman (1991) argues that language and ethnocultural identity are crucially linked in three key ways: indexically, symbolically, and in a part/whole fashion. First, a language associated with a

particular culture 'is, at any time during which that linkage is still intact, best able to name the artifacts and to formulate or express the interests, values and world-views of that culture' (1991: 20). This is the indexical link between language and culture. Such a link does not assume that a traditionally associated language is a perfect isomorphic match with an attendant culture, nor that other languages might not be able to replace this traditional link in the longer term. However, in the *short* term (that is, at any particular point in time), 'no language but the one that has been most historically and intimately associated with a given culture is as well able to express the particular artifacts and concerns of that culture' (1991: 21). In other words, the traditionally associated language reflects and conveys its culture more felicitously and succinctly than other languages, *while that language-in-culture link remains generally intact*.

Fishman's position here reflects a weak version of what is known in linguistics as the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis. This theory -- named after its proponents, Edward Sapir and Benjamin Whorf -- was popular in the early part of this century and can be traced back, in turn, to Herder and Humboldt's views on language. Sapir's argument was that one's social and cultural experience is organised by language and thus each language represents a particular world view. His pupil Whorf extended this by arguing that thought is not independent of the language used because language carves up experience according to its particular grammatical structure, categories and types. Accordingly, the key implication of the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis is that people who speak different languages are likely to have somewhat different cultural outlooks on the basis that the particular structure of each language results in a culturally-specific structuring of reality. Indeed, a strong version of the hypothesis attests that languages are *causal* vis-à-vis culturally specific behaviours; a view which is broadly comparable to that held by Herder et al. and which has been widely rejected as linguistically determinist. However, a weak version of the thesis, as here, highlights the *influence* of language in shaping our *customary* ways of thinking and can be regarded as both reasonable and unsurprising (Edwards, 1994).[3] If identity is understood here in relation to habitus as 'the background against which our tastes and desires and opinions and aspirations make sense' (Taylor, 1992: 33-34), then a traditionally associated language would seem to have a significant part to play. Indeed, linguistic habitus, in Bourdieu's (1991) terms, is a *sub-set* of the dispositions which comprise the habitus: it is that set of dispositions acquired in the course of learning to speak in particular social and cultural contexts.

Language and culture are also linked symbolically; that is they come to stand for, or symbolically represent, the particular ethnic and/or national collectivities that speak them. Accordingly, the fortunes of languages are inexorably bound up with those of their speakers (Edwards, 1985, 1994). Languages do not rise or fall simply on their own linguistic merits -- indeed, it has long been accepted that all languages are potentially equivalent in linguistic terms. Rather, the social and political circumstances of those who speak a particular language will have a significant impact on the subsequent symbolic and communicative status attached to that language. This fact often escapes speakers of dominant national languages, and particularly English as the current world language, who take the 'natural' ascendency of these languages for granted. In contrast, the current international currency of a language like English has much to do with the socio-political dominance of those nation-states, notably the USA, for which English is the accepted language of public discourse (Tollefson, 1991; Phillipson, 1992; Pennycook, 1994; see below). Likewise, national languages reflect the greater socio-political status of their speakers in relation to minority languages and cultures within the nation-state.

The final aspect -- the part/whole link -- reflects the partial identity between a particular language and culture. Since so much of any culture is verbally constituted (its songs and prayers, its laws and proverbs, its history, philosophy and teachings), there are parts of every culture that are expressed, implemented and realised via the language with which that culture is most closely associated. Fishman argues that it is within this part/whole relationship that:

> child socialisation patterns come to be associated with a particular language, that cultural styles of interpersonal relations come to be associated with a particular language, that the ethical principles that undergird everyday life come to be associated with a particular language and that even material culture and aesthetic sensibilities come to be conventionally discussed and evaluated via figures of speech that are merely culturally (i.e. locally) rather than universally applicable. (1991: 24)

Fishman's analysis highlights the cultural significance of language to identity. This does not imply, however, the reification of the latter or the assumption that such identity can be 'preserved' in some pure, unaltered state. Nor does it link particular languages inexorably with particular identities. Rather, a traditionally associated language is viewed as a significant *resource* to one's ethnic identity, both at the level of societal integration and social identification (see also Ruiz, 1984). While such a resource may ultimately be discarded (see below), it remains important until

such a time as this occurs. As Fishman concludes, 'a preferred, historically associated mother tongue has a role in [the] process of individual and aggregative self-definition and self-realisation, not merely as a myth (i.e. as a verity whose objective truth is less important than its subjective truth) but also as a genuine identificational and motivational desideratum in the ethnocultural realm' (1991: 7). Given this, the concern to repudiate language as a significant feature of identity may be overstated. However, be that as it may, Fishman's argument still needs to account for the exceptions it implicitly acknowledges but does not necessarily explain. How do we accommodate those individuals and groups for whom language is clearly not an important feature of their identity? How do we explain language shift which suggests that these associations, while important, are by no means irreplaceable? And how do we counter the charge that the language and identity link is largely arbitrary -- a social and political construction along the well-rehearsed lines of the 'invention of tradition' argument? To answer these questions we need to explore further the interconnections between the cultural and political dimensions of language and identity.

Language, culture and politics

The language and identity link cannot be understood in isolation from other factors of identity, nor from the specific political conditions in which it is situated. The relation between language and identity is thus *contingent* on both subjective factors and particular political circumstances (Coulombe, 1995). On this basis, it can be argued that the language we speak is crucial to our identity *to the degree to which we define ourselves by it*. This will obviously vary widely, both among individuals and within and between groups. As such, it may well be that some individuals and groups will regard a particular language as a largely superficial marker of their identities and have no great sense of loss in abandoning it. Immigrant ethnic minorities, for example, often adopt the language of the host country in which they reside, albeit usually over the course of two or three generations, on the basis of enhancing their integration and social mobility within that country. On this view, Carol Eastman has proffered the explanation that language use is merely a surface feature of ethnic identity and thus adopting another language would only affect the language use aspect of our ethnic identity, not the identity itself. As she asserts, 'there is no need to worry about preserving ethnic identity, so long as the only change being made is in what language we use' (1984: 275). Accordingly, immigrant ethnic groups may retain their original

language as an 'associated' language -- one which group members no longer use, or perhaps even know, but which continues to be a part of their heritage. Such an association is clearly comparable with Gans' (1979) notion of symbolic ethnicity discussed in Chapter 1.

These arguments can be extrapolated to the relationship between language and national identity as well. Gellner, for example, has argued that 'changing one's language is not the heart-breaking or soul-destroying business which it is claimed to be in romantic nationalist literature' (1964: 165). Ireland is regularly invoked as an example here because, over the course of the last two centuries, English has come to largely supplant Irish Gaelic as the ethnic (and national) language. Irish may still be spoken by a minority in the Gaeltacht (the Irish-speaking heartland),[4] and it still retains official status as the 'first official language' of Ireland. However, the reality of Irish as a rapidly declining language has been clear for some considerable time now. For example, an extensive sociolinguistic research study conducted in the 1970s, entitled 'Committee on Irish Language Attitudes Research' (CLAR, 1975), found that less than three per cent of the overall population used Irish in any regular way. There was also little interest in the restoration of Irish, hostility to the compulsory aspects associated with learning Irish (see below), and significant pessimism about the continued maintenance of the Irish still in use at the time. Nonetheless, a symbolic valuing of Irish was still evident and, as such, was thought to continue to form part of Irish ethnic and national identity (Edwards, 1985). That said, a more cynical view is reflected in Ussher's well known observation: 'the Irish of course like their Irish, but they like it *dead*' (1949: 107).

Two complementary explanations can be offered for this clear process of language shift in Ireland. One is that while language is often a 'core cultural value' for many ethnic and national groups, it is not so in relation to Irish identity. Thus, Smolicz, who has promoted this notion of core cultural values, argues that the core values of the Irish ethnic group are 'unquestioningly centred on the Catholic religion' (1979: 63) rather than on the Irish language itself, a process that has been intensified by the fact that English was adopted as the language of Irish Catholicism from the late eighteenth century onwards. As Smolicz concludes of these developments: 'Bereft of their ancestral tongue, it was in Catholicism that the Irish found the refuge and shield behind which they could retain their identity and awareness of their distinction from the conquering

British Protestants...' (1979: 64). This might well explain why the various nationalist attempts this century to revive Irish as the common language of communication -- principally, through education -- have proved to be largely unsuccessful (see below).

There is some merit in this explanation, although how the 'Irish ethnic group' is defined remains extremely problematic since intra-group differences are likely to be much more complex than such an analysis allows. In this regard, it is almost self evident that different sections of the community, not to mention individuals, will have different relationships to their language(s) for a variety of political, social and/or religious reasons, thus significantly weakening the core value explanation (Clyne, 1997).[5] A more compelling explanation of language shift resides in the social and political processes which have seen the rise of English as the language of Ireland over the course of the last few centuries. These socio-political factors have linked English inextricably with modernisation, thus garnering the language with increasing symbolic and communicative currency in Ireland. As such, the socio-political milieu of Ireland merits closer examination since it illustrates, writ large, the difficulties facing minority languages and cultures in the modern world.[6]

Language decline: the death of Irish?

Irish enjoyed its 'Golden Age' from the sixth to the ninth centuries where it was spoken as a common vernacular, alongside Latin, not only in Ireland[7] but also in the coastal areas of both southern and northern Britain. Indeed, Irish was so highly regarded at this time that by the eighth century it had supplanted Latin as the principal literary and religious medium, while the reach of the Irish-speaking community had extended over almost the whole area of present day Scotland. The dominance of Irish first began to be undermined though with the advent of the Norman invasions of the twelfth century. New towns were built by the Normans in Ireland, as elsewhere in Britain, and a largely English-speaking bourgeoisie introduced (Ó Murchú, 1988). Even so, this process, which continued until the sixteenth century, was a slow and limited one. Irish continued to have a strong societal and regional base and remained the dominant language among all classes in the countryside. It also remained the primary language of communication in urban areas (although English was used for public affairs) in what appears to have been some form of Irish-English diglossia.[8] From the sixteenth century, however, English began to make its

irrevocable advance. Henry VIII issued proclamations discouraging Irish and, more significantly, plantation schemes were initiated to replace Irish with English settlers. By 1800, English -- or, at least, an Irish variant of it -- was spoken regularly by half the population; crucially the most powerful half. Irish speakers were increasingly limited to the poor and underdeveloped Gaeltacht while English speakers constituted the propertied rural and urban population. This language decline was compounded by the abandonment of Irish by the Catholic church, its formal exclusion from the English language National School system established in 1831, and the impact of rural depopulation (by both death and emigration) from the Famines of the 1840s. These trends, which can be regarded as largely external, were also hastened by the apparent willingness of Irish speakers themselves to abandon the language. As Edwards observes, 'the mass of Irish people were more or less active contributors to the spread of English' (1984: 285). Despite various attempts to revive Irish from the mid-nineteenth century on -- exemplified most prominently in the activities of such nationalist inspired language bodies as the Gaelic League (Conradh na Gaeilge), established in 1893 -- the seemingly terminal decline of Irish continued into this century.

By the time the Irish Free State was established in 1922 the pattern of language decline was largely confirmed. At most, only ten per cent of the population now used Irish as their daily language and this group was almost exclusively situated in the Gaeltacht (Ó Ciosáin, 1988). Broader language trends were equally bleak. Census figures in 1926 indicated that only 18 per cent could actually speak Irish (compared with 25 per cent in 1861) and that very few of these were monoglot speakers (Ó Gadhra, 1988). Indeed, in 1901 census figures recorded only 21,000 monoglot speakers -- less than one per cent of the population. Given the parlous state of the language, much effort was consequently made to reverse this decline, but with little success. Initially, education was viewed as the answer. Two main strategies were promoted here. In English-speaking areas, Irish would be compulsorily taught to all children by immersion methods. This, it was hoped, would produce an adult population with functional competence in Irish within a generation. The second strategy was to strengthen and extend the use of Irish in the Gaeltacht (Ó Ciosáin, 1988). These initiatives arose from the belief that if the nineteenth century education system had contributed to the demise of Irish via its advocacy of English, the reverse could also well apply. Indeed, such was the faith invested in schools that Timothy Corcoran, an educational advisor at the time, could assert: 'the popular schools can give and can restore our native

language. They can do it even without positive aid from home' (1925: 387; cited in Edwards, 1985: 56).

However, such optimism was ill-founded, at least in the Irish case. While I will proceed to argue that education *is* a key component of any minority language policy, the example of Ireland demonstrates that the aim of restoring communicative competence in a language cannot be achieved on the backs of schools alone (see also Fishman, 1991; Edwards, 1984, 1985, 1994; Williams, 1994). This over-emphasis on education in the Irish context was further compounded by a lack of suitable teachers of Irish and by the ambivalence of many teachers towards the language restoration project. Accordingly, by the 1960s/1970s the bulk of educational effort had been restricted to teaching Irish in the primary (elementary) sector. Even here though, teacher-training colleges were no longer instructing their students in Irish with the result that teachers of Irish were themselves not particularly competent. That said, the more recent development of Naíonraí -- locally initiated Irish-immersion-speaking pre-schools, initially outside of the regular school system -- is an example of a possible counter-trend, growing in number from one in 1968 to 185 in 1988. The result has been the subsequent re-emergence of Irish-medium schools to cater for Naíonraí graduates although, once again, their development cannot in itself be expected to redress the language loss outlined above (Fishman, 1991; see Chapter 5).

Allied initiatives in the public sector have also largely met with limited success in Ireland. Support for Irish at the state level continues, with most official documents printed bilingually, while the Bord na Gaeilge (Irish Language Board) was established in 1975 by the government to promote Irish in daily life.[9] However, neither has had much impact on the actual language use of ordinary Irish people themselves. Moreover, as the CLAR (1975) sociolinguistic study found, and as more recent studies have confirmed (Ó Ciosáin, 1988; Ó Riagáin, 1988a), the compulsory dimensions associated with Irish -- particularly, the Irish language requirement for the Civil Service -- engendered actual hostility towards the language. This hostility to the compulsory language requirement remained prominent until its eventual abandonment in 1974, and despite a generally favourable attitude to Irish and to bilingualism at the level of ethnic and cultural association.

Finally, even economic measures aimed at preserving some measure of Irish in the Gaeltacht have backfired. For example, efforts to discourage the emigration of Irish speakers from the Gaeltacht have included industrialisation projects aimed at improving employment prospects. However, rather than safeguarding and reinforcing the Irish-speaking community, such projects have actually undermined them further by importing skilled and supervisory staff with no knowledge of Irish. Likewise, those Irish speakers who have been drawn back have, in the interim, acquired non-Irish-speaking partners, thus increasing the number of non-Irish-speaking households in the area (O'Cinneide et al., 1985).

The result is that 'Irish as a group seem not to have lost their national identity, but to have enshrined it in English' (Edwards, 1985: 62), a conclusion encapsulated in the title of Hindley's (1990) *The Death of the Irish Language*. Even those with a more optimistic view of Irish, such as Ó Riagáin, who argues that there has been 'some measure of revival', also concedes that it is 'of a scale that is continuously vulnerable to final submersion in the mainly English-speaking population' (1988b: 7). All of this would seem to indicate the futility -- not to mention, the naivety and misguidedness -- of attempting to maintain minority languages in the face of modern social and political realities. But before consigning Irish -- and, by extension, other minority languages -- to what might seem to be their inevitable fate, let us examine more closely the constituent elements of the Irish case.

Language revival: flogging a dead horse?

Ireland is an instructive example of a minority language policy which has met with limited success. As such, it is often invoked as a cause célèbre by sceptics and opponents of minority language rights. John Edwards, for example, employs the Irish case to argue that the concerted revival of such languages should not be attempted when this operates 'in the face of historical realities' (1985: 64). Language revival in these circumstances is inherently artificial and bound to fail. As he argues elsewhere:

> language shift reflects *sociopolitical change* and this, given the historical perspective, absolutely dwarfs efforts made on behalf of language alone. This is not to say ... that language cannot serve a vital rallying purpose in nationalistic political movements, but it only does so when it retains some realistic degree of communicative function. (1984: 288)

On this basis, it is a profound error to think of language decline as anything other than a symptom of widespread social confrontation between unequal forces (Edwards, 1994). If this is the case, the next question must surely be 'should we attempt to reverse language decline at all'? Edwards and other like-minded commentators (see, for example, Bentahila & Davies, 1993) answer this question in the negative; endorsing, in effect, a form of linguistic social Darwinism. Such a conclusion may seem to many simple common-sense. However, it betrays a number of inherent contradictions that I want to explore further, not only in relation to the Irish case but also in relation to some of its wider implications.

To begin with, there are specific aspects of the Irish case that militated against successful language revival. For example, by the time that serious language restoration attempts were promoted and implemented in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, much of the language had already been lost to the majority of the population. Thus, while state support and a prominent role for education *are* important factors in language revival, as I will proceed to argue in the next chapter, they cannot be expected *by themselves* to reverse an already changed linguistic demography. Fishman (1991) makes exactly this point, in contradistinction to the Irish approach, when he asserts that inter-generational family transmission of any language is the key to its continued survival. While he argues that 'the family (and even the immediate community) *may not be enough* [to reverse language shift], particularly where outside pressures are both great and hostile ... without this stage safely under ... control the more advanced stages have nothing firm to build on' (1991: 94). In short, 'nothing can substitute for the rebuilding of a society at the level of ... everyday, informal life' (1991: 112).[10] This conclusion is reiterated in the Irish context by Ó Gadhra's observation that 'the failure to recognise, for a very long time, the extremely low base from which we set out, has been one of the failures of the Irish revival effort' (1988: 254).

A related feature of the Irish case which merits discussion is the political context in which language restoration came to be situated. The well known comment by the Irish nationalist, Eamon de Valera clearly illustrates this context: 'If I had to make a choice between political freedom without the language [Irish], and the language without political freedom.... I would choose the latter' (cited in Edwards, 1994: 129). De Valera's assertion highlights the prominent political prerogative underpinning the motivation to restore Irish -- namely, to employ the

language as a distinguishing characteristic of the newly emergent nation-state. However, this position was eventually to founder both politically and linguistically. In relation to the former, the attempt to promote the language as the unique heritage of *all* Irish people, including long established English settlers and a much larger segment of 'native Irish' who had abandoned the Irish language in the nineteenth century, inevitably excluded more than it included (Ó Gadhra, 1988). From the start, the changed linguistic demography -- coupled with long-standing forms of Irish identity not associated with the Irish language -- militated against the successful adoption of the language as a unifying feature of modern Irish nationalism. In relation to the latter, the nationalists' advocacy of Irish did little, if anything to reverse its linguistic decline. In fact, the language policy subsequently adopted by the nationalists may have further precipitated language loss by limiting itself largely to the promotion of the language's *symbolic* qualities. De Valera illustrates this process well since he himself made little effort to give the language much more than symbolic import (Dwyer, 1980). This limited symbolic emphasis is thus likely to have been a contributing factor in the failure of the language to regain wider communicative currency. The state sector provides a clear example of this process here because while the *formal* promotion of Irish has long been a key aspect of language policy, actual language use has remained desultory and, despite the long-standing compulsory language components, largely nominal.[11]

More broadly, the Irish example demonstrates just how long it may actually take for the traditionally associated language of a particular ethnic to decline and be replaced -- in this case, several centuries. This is not to suggest that language shift always occurs this slowly but it does demonstrate that the process of change is neither insignificant nor peripheral. Such a view is consistent with my previous discussions on the *slow* process of change associated with habitus and encompassing cultures and, relatedly, on the significance of language to ethnic identity. Language shift does clearly occur -- it would be foolish to suggest otherwise. However, it is more problematic and traumatic than is often assumed, particularly for those ethnies for whom a certain language represented, at least at one time, an important feature of their collective identity (Taylor, 1992; Margalit & Raz, 1995). Fishman reiterates this view when he asserts that 'language shift generally and basically involves cultural change as well indeed, initially, quite devastating and profound cultural change' (1991: 16).[12] This is not to say, using Fishman's terminology, that 'Xmen' cannot be Xmen if they do not speak the language 'Xish'. Indeed, as we have already

seen, the detachability of language from ethnic identity is clearly demonstrated by those Xmen who have already come to speak 'Yish' -- usually as a result of Yish being a language of greater power and opportunity, as in the Irish context. Nonetheless, we can assert on the basis of the link between language and identity, that it is a *different kind* of 'Xishness' that results. As Fishman concludes:

> The fact that the traditional symbolic relationship between Xish and Xishness can ultimately be replaced by a new symbolic relationship between Yish and Xishness merely indicates that in the fullness of time such transformations are possible and they have, indeed, occurred throughout human history. This does not mean that such symbolic redefinitions and self-redefinitions are either desirable or easily attained, or that Xishness is the same under both sets of linguistic circumstances. (Fishman, 1991: 34)

Fishman's argument raises another pertinent question, however. Adopting another language may result in a different kind of Xishness but if it is a more powerful and widely used language, if it results in a cultural shift towards greater modernity, surely this is a good thing? Again, this position is one adopted by most sceptics of minority language rights and it is one that bears remarkable similarities to the broadly pejorative views of ethnicity outlined in Chapter 1. On this view, minority languages are constructed as an impediment to modernisation and social progress. Not only this, proponents of minority languages are dismissed as self-interested and unrepresentative elites who are intent on maintaining such languages solely for nostalgic and/or nationalistic reasons. This, critics suggest, is invariably at the expense of the wider social mobility of those who speak the minority language and, concomitantly, largely against not only the latter's interests but also their wishes as well.

Schlesinger's views of bilingualism, discussed in the previous chapter, reflect well this dual attack on the twin 'perils' of linguistic self ghettoisation and the self-interested elites who perpetuate it. Edwards (1985) is likewise dismissive of the apparent disparity between proponents of minority rights and their supposed constituents and uses the Irish case as an exemplar.[13] For the many who actually realise the 'benefits' of shifting to a more 'modern' language, Edwards argues that economic rationality plays a significant part. In effect, this amounts to a linguistic variant of rational choice theory -- loyalty to a particular language persists only as long as the economic and social circumstances are conducive to it (see also Dorian, 1981, 1982). As Edwards proceeds to

observe, this contrasts with what he sees as the clearly regressive interests of minority language proponents:

> Note here how patronising and naive are attempts to *preserve people as they are*, on the grounds that they are really better off if only they knew it, that progress is not all it is made out to be.... Little wonder, then, that sensible populations themselves do not accept this line, and that the major proponents of the view are usually securely ensconced within that very segment of society they rail against.... looking backwards has been a favourite sport for disaffected intellectuals for a long time, but actually moving backwards has not been so popular. (1985: 95, 97; my emphasis)

Such views are also echoed in the developing world and are well represented by Kay's (1993) arguments on the 'new African'. Drawing on Zambia as an example,[14] Kay argues for the displacement of African languages in favour of international languages such as English. African languages, with their reduced communicative power and symbolic purchase, reflect for Kay the old order while the likes of English now represent the best means of escaping both poverty and the strictures of ethnic identity in Africa. Consequently, language loss is seen as a necessary, perhaps inevitable aspect of modernisation and development, even if, in the process, it risks the 'destruction' of cultures (see also Mazrui, 1975; Eastman, 1991).

How can one respond to this critique? For a start, it can be argued that the question of minority leadership is largely a red herring -- merely a useful stick, in effect, with which to beat proponents of minority language rights. After all, the charges of self-interest and distinction from the 'rank and file' can be invoked against any leadership (including those advocating a majority language). Likewise, it should be entirely unsurprising that a full range of opinion is expressed within minority groups about such central issues as language maintenance and shift. Internal differences are an inevitable characteristic of *all* groups. It is accordingly a reductio ad absurdum to imply that the presence of such differences negates the legitimacy of minority language claims. Indeed, critiques along these lines tend simply to obfuscate rather than clarify the competing goals, aims, values and opinions of the various protagonists involved in the minority language(s) debate (Fishman, 1991). Similarly, the charge of inherent *preservationism* -- apparent in Edwards' comments above -- does not necessarily follow, as I will argue below. Nonetheless, the view presented here of minority languages as a brake on individual social mobility and collective modernisation -- as a *problem*, in effect -- does seem convincing. It certainly has significant

purchase among many actual minority language speakers themselves, as commentators like Edwards are more than willing to point out. Relatedly, majority language advocates generally pose as (and consider themselves to be) both humanitarians and realists, with nothing but the best interests of minority language speakers at heart (Fishman, 1991). But this position, however benevolent it might seem, also harbours a number of significant problems of its own that are seldom acknowledged or addressed, and it is to these that I now want to turn.

Re-evaluating language shift

Language shift appears to be an increasing feature of the modern world. Certainly, there is a noticeably greater tendency for members of ethnolinguistic minorities to bring up their children in a language other than their native one, a process which often leads to the eventual displacement of the former language(s). This process of language displacement usually takes at least three generations. It involves: 1) initial language contact leading to minority status of the historically associated language; 2) bilingualism where the original language is retained but the new language is also acquired; 3) recessive use of the old language, limited largely to intra-ethnic communication; 4) increasingly unstable bilingualism, eventually leading to monolingualism in the new language (Brenzinger, 1997).

Such trends have led to some dire predictions concerning the 'endangered' status of these former languages. Hill (1978: 69) estimates, for example, that in the last 500 years at least half of the languages in the world have disappeared, and Krauss (1992: 7), in a much cited article, argues that as few as 600 of the currently estimated 6000 languages in the world will remain secure through the next century. Inevitably perhaps, there are disputes about the accuracy of such projections but the general trend is not in doubt (Grenoble & Whaley, 1996). To take just one example, when Australia was annexed to Britain in 1770 more than 250 languages were used by different Aboriginal communities in Australia. Some 200 years on only 90 of these languages remain in use, with 70 of these threatened with extinction in the near future. Only about ten per cent of Koori still speak indigenous languages, that is, 30,000 out of 300,000 (Brenzinger, 1997).

The reference to language 'extinction' here is a pertinent one since parallels are often drawn between endangered languages and endangered species. James Crawford draws such comparisons directly when he argues that endangered languages 'fall victim to predators, changing environments, or more successful competitors', are encroached on by 'modern cultures abetted by new technologies', and are threatened by 'destruction of lands and livelihoods; the spread of consumerism, individualism, and other Western values; pressures for assimilation into dominant cultures; and conscious policies of repression' (1994: 5; see also Hornberger, 1997). Lest the predatory allusion be taken too far, however, it should be stressed that most language shifts are not solely the result of coercion or 'language murder' (Calvet, 1974). However, neither are they solely the result of a 'voluntary' shift, or 'language suicide' (Denison, 1977), as critics of minority language right are want to suggest. Both internal pull and external push factors are invariably involved -- although, as I will proceed to argue, it is usually the latter that direct the former. Likewise, it needs to be borne in mind that no two language contact situations are alike, nor do two language shifts resemble each other exactly (Brenzinger, 1997). Thus, while I will attempt to extrapolate general trends in what follows, it is regionally-specific, or even community-specific factors that dictate the ultimate patterns and effects of language shift in any given context (Grenoble & Whaley, 1996).

One further caveat needs to be addressed before proceeding further. It is often thought that the *number* of actual speakers is the key variable in predicting the likelihood or otherwise of a particular language's survival. While numbers are clearly important -- the fewer speakers, the less likely that a language will be maintained over time -- this assumption is to some extent misplaced. It is not so much how many speak the language but *who* speaks it (and why) that is of most significance (Romaine, 1995). For example, in a recent report on the current situation of 48 minority language groups in the European Union, Nelde et al. found that 'the demographic size of a language group is no guarantee of the group's [linguistic] vitality, with the existence of some of Europe's largest language groups being severely threatened' (1996: Executive Summary). Two other variables were identified as far more influential in their analysis: 1) the low status of many minority groups and their often related social, cultural and economic marginalisation; and 2) the degree to which minority languages were recognised by the state *and* supported within civil society -- what Nelde et al., along with others (see below), have termed the processes of

'legitimation' and 'institutionalisation'. Both these variables highlight the importance of underlying *power relations* in situations of language shift, a key factor that is seldom acknowledged by its many apologists.

Acknowledging power relations

The significance of the often unequal power relations that exist between minority and majority language communities tends to be ignored, or at least downplayed, by proponents of language shift. In this regard, it is interesting to note that language death seldom occurs in communities of wealth and privilege, but rather to the dispossessed and disempowered (Crawford, 1994). Even where unequal sociopolitical conditions are ostensibly recognised as a central factor, as in Edwards' and Kay's accounts discussed above, these are legitimised in the name of 'linguistic modernisation'. However, this type of argument exhibits a curious schizophrenia. Edwards (1985), for example, is quite willing to acknowledge that language loss has little to do with linguistic merit and almost everything to do with the (unequal) exercise of social and political power. Yet, at the same time, he is prepared to endorse the arrogation of a majority language on the basis of its greater 'communicative currency'. In other words, the notions of 'communicative currency' or 'languages of wider communication' come to serve as linguistic proxies for the legitimation of the greater socio-political status of the majority language group.

Moreover, attempts to provide a minority language with a greater communicative currency of its own are largely derided on the grounds that if another language already has such currency why bother? The best that can be hoped for, it is argued, is the retention of some of the minority language's symbolic or totemic qualities but its continued communicative currency is ruled out of court (see Edwards, 1984: 289-291; 1985: 17-18). This is a specious, not to mention historically ill-founded argument though, since all the current major languages in the world today have at some time undergone a comparable process of communicative expansion. One wonders, for example, what the current status of English would be in Britain, let alone globally, had it not undergone its own significant social and lexical expansion in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. In the process, English was transformed within the British Isles from a language with a status lower than both Latin and French to effectively the 'national' language, or at least the accepted language of wider communication![15] Thus, while establishing a symbolic/communicative

distinction to language may well help to explain the detachability of language from ethnic identity, the implicit assumption that the latter should atrophy and die is inherently a *political* not a *linguistic* judgement.

Relatedly, if the loss of a particular language is the result largely of political processes then apologists of such language shift demonstrate little credibility in their own decrial and/or dismissal of minority language promotion as 'politically motivated'. If we accept the assumption that the socio-political dominates the linguistic when it comes to questions of language shift, then we must also accept that arguments both for *and* against any language shift are inherently political. On this basis, Edwards' arguments, and their like, simply represent a particular *value judgement* -- a judgment which equates minority language loss, and language shift to a majority language with progress and modernity. In effect, this position amounts to little more than linguistic social Darwinism -- only the languages with the greatest communicative currency should and/or will survive.[16] Concomitantly, any efforts undertaken to protect minority languages from such 'inexorable' processes are viewed as antediluvian; as forlorn attempts to maintain some kind of cultural and linguistic stasis. Edwards' previous comments on the role of elites demonstrate this view clearly and he reiterates this position when he asserts: 'language in its communicative sense is ... an element of identity very susceptible to change. We may lament the fact, we may wish it were not so -- but it is. To expect otherwise is tantamount to asking for change itself to cease' (1985: 97). Yet, as with the criticism of minority rights more generally (see Chapter 3), this argument is simply misplaced. There is no *necessary* correlation between the continued maintenance of one's minority language and cultural and linguistic stasis -- cultural and linguistic continuity and change are always and inevitably intertwined (Fishman, 1991). Likewise, cultural nationalism, which often incorporates a defence of minority language rights, is principally concerned with the *reconstruction* of tradition -- modifying it, where necessary -- in order to meet more adequately the demands of modernity (Hutchinson, 1994; see Chapter 2). The key question in both these contexts is thus not one of stasis but, rather, one of greater *control* and *self-regulation* of the process of cultural and linguistic change. As Fishman argues:

> A call for RLS [reversing language shift] must ... be seen and explained [principally] as a call for cultural reconstruction and for greater self-regulation.... RLS is an indication of the dissatisfaction with ethnocultural (and, often, also with ethnopolitical and ethno-economic) life as it currently is, and of a resolve to undertake planned ethnocultural

> reconstruction. This change does not need to be backward looking in its thrust, regardless of the historical metaphors that it may utilise (because of their recognised symbolic and emotional significance). Indeed, most RLS-efforts are actually syncretistic and modernistic with respect to their cultural implications and goals. (1991: 17)

This is not to say that all attempts to reverse language shift are shorn of their nostalgic elements. Nor does it preclude the unfortunate *potential* that still exists to reify language and culture. Nonetheless, the inevitable association of such movements with narrow provincialism is misjudged. As with the conclusions drawn in Chapter 3, maintaining one's minority language does not in any way preclude ongoing cultural and linguistic change, adaptation and interaction. Indeed, it can be argued that those who wish to maintain their historically associated language, usually *alongside* that of another more dominant language, actually exhibit a greater ability to manage multiple cultural and linguistic identities. Narrower identities do not necessarily need to be traded in for broader ones -- one can clearly remain both Welsh-speaking and British, or Catalan-speaking and Spanish -- and to insist on doing so exhibits its own particular form of ethnocentrism.

But there is still a problem here. Arguments for the maintenance of minority languages are all very well but if increasing numbers of people are voluntarily choosing to opt instead for a majority language, as seems to be the case, then the cause already appears to be a lost one.[17] However, the degree to which *voluntary* shift actually occurs is extremely problematic. After all, if minority languages are consistently viewed as low status, socially and culturally restrictive, and an obstacle to social mobility, is it little wonder that such patterns of language shift exist? In effect, these widely-held views place minority language speakers in a seemingly intractable dilemma. This dilemma, as Fishman summarises it, is 'either to reman loyal to their traditions and to remain socially disadvantaged (consigning their own children to such disadvantage as well), on the one hand; or, on the other hand, to abandon their distinctive practices and traditions, at least in large part, and, thereby, to improve their own and their children's lots in life via cultural suicide' (1991: 60). However, one can reasonably question here the *legitimacy* of this juxtaposition and the apparently forced choice it entails. To what extent is language shift *on these terms* actually necessary? Moreover, what are the *costs* involved in this process and to what extent can they be

regarded as fair or warranted? And finally, what, if anything, can be done to change 'the rules of the game' that constitute this dilemma in the first place?

To explore these questions further, we need to examine the central issue of language status and the crucial role of the state in its apportionment. In particular, the role of the state has a significant part to play here with regard both to the official recognition of a language, and its acknowledged and accepted domains of use within civil society.

A question of status

It is surprising the extent to which the relationship between language and politics has been overlooked in much sociological and political analysis. After all, language is a contributing feature in many political conflicts in the world today including the Baltics, Belgium, Canada, Spain, Sri Lanka and Turkey, to name but a few (see Horowitz, 1985: 219-224). Yet, as Weinstein (1983) observes, while commentators have had much to say about 'the language of politics', very few have had anything to say about 'the politics of language' (see also Kymlicka, 1995a, 1995b).

What constitutes the politics of language then? Principally, it is a contest for linguistic control (and, by extension, social and cultural control) of the nation-state. In this regard, 'national' languages are so called because they have been *legitimated* by the state and *institutionalised* within civil society, usually to the exclusion of other languages. Legitimation involves the formal recognition by the state of a particular language variety and this recognition is realised, usually, by the constitutional and/or legislative benediction of official status.[18] Accordingly, 'la langue légitime a partie liée avec l'État' (Bourdieu, 1982: 27) -- the legitimate (or standard) language becomes an arm of the state -- and other language varieties are consequently relegated to the lower status of 'dialects'. This process of 'language standardisation', as it is known in sociolinguistics, usually comprises four main aspects (see Leith & Graddol, 1996: 139):

1. *Selection*: of an existing language variety, usually that of the most powerful social or ethnic group;

2. *Codification*: reduction of internal variability in the selected variety, and the establishment of norms of grammatical usage and vocabulary;
3. *Elaboration*: ensuring the language can be used for a wide range of functions;
4. *Implementation*: promoting the language variety via print (cf. Anderson's account in Chapter 2), discouraging the use of other language varieties within official domains, and encouraging users to develop a loyalty to and pride in it.

Given this, it is important to stress that the often invoked distinction between languages and dialects is not principally a linguistic one. Indeed, to attempt a linguistic distinction of the two is fraught with difficulty. One cannot distinguish, for example, a language and dialect on the basis of mutual intelligibility. There are some languages -- such as Norwegian, Swedish and Danish -- which are mutually intelligible and there are some languages which encompass dialects that are mutually incomprehensible. Rather, the distinction between language and dialect is primarily a political consequence of the language legitimation processes undertaken by nation-states. As Haugen (1966) observes, a 'dialect' is usually a language which did not succeed politically. Or, returning to an observation made at the beginning of this chapter, a language can be seen as a dialect with an army and navy! The boundaries between languages, and the classification of dialects, have invariably followed the politics of state-making rather than the other way around (Billig, 1995; see also Gramsci, 1971; Bakhtin, 1981; Harris, 1981).[19]

The legitimation of a language variety is thus an important first step in the political creation of a 'national' language.[20] However, it is not, in itself, enough to ensure a central role for that language variety within the nation-state, since it is possible to legitimise a language without this having much influence on its actual use. We saw this clearly demonstrated in the case of Irish, for example. Crucially, what is needed, in addition, is the institutionalisation of the language variety within civil society. Indeed, this may be the more important aspect. By this, the language variety comes to be accepted, or 'taken for granted' in a wide range of social, cultural and linguistic domains or contexts, both formal and informal. The degree to which a language variety comes to be institutionalised in this way will also have a significant bearing on the subsequent status attached to the language in question and, by extension, its speakers. In effect, an ethnic

group's cultural vitality, especially its linguistic vitality, is closely related to the degree of institutional support it enjoys (Bourhis, 1984; see also Giles et al., 1977).[21]

The result of this *joint* process of legitimation and institutionalisation is to *privilege* a particular language variety over others; imbuing it, in the process, with high status. Not only this, but the privileging of the language becomes *normalised* -- it is simply accepted or taken for granted. Consequently, speakers of the dominant language variety are immediately placed at an advantage in both accessing and benefiting from the civic culture of the nation-state. A dominant language group usually controls the crucial authority in the areas of administration, politics, education and the economy, and gives preference to those with a command of that language. Concomitantly, other language groups are limited in their language use to specific domains, usually solely private, and are thus left with the choice of renouncing their social ambitions, assimilating, or resisting in order to gain greater access to the public realm (Nelde, 1997). If language conflict results, this is attributable, at least to some degree, to the differential social status and preferential treatment of the dominant language by the state and within civil society, and the related stigmatisation of other varieties. Indeed, the dynamics of ethnic tension involving language, leading in some cases to political conflict, occur most often *not* when language compromises are made or language rights recognised, but where they have been historically avoided, suppressed or ignored (de Varennes, 1996a). The ongoing linguistic and political tensions in Canada and Belgium provide a case in point here. These two examples are often cited as clear evidence of the inherent instability of multilingual states. However, in contrast, much of the present political instability in these nation-states is attributable to the long-standing *denial* of specific language rights to French and Dutch speakers respectively, and the related socio-economic and socio-political disadvantages that these groups have experienced as a result (see Chapter 5).

Such linguistic and political tensions are exacerbated by the continued assumption that the civic culture of the nation-state is somehow neutral and, concomitantly, that the adoption of a national language depoliticises that particular language variety. Yet, as I have argued, the ascription of a state-endowed or 'national' language must be regarded as an inherently deliberate (and deliberative) political act; an act, moreover, that advantages some individuals and groups at the expense of others.[22] In this regard, the public legitimation of a language, and its associated

institutionalisation in particular domains, become crucial to the ongoing maintenance of the dominant ethnie's cultural and linguistic hegemony within the nation-state. Relatedly, without these same processes being applied to minority languages, it is difficult to envisage a long-term future for minority language groups in the modern world of nation-states (Nelde et al., 1996). Given the spread of standardised education, the associated literacy demands of the labour force, and the inevitable and widespread interaction required in dealing with state agencies, any language which is not widely used in the public realm becomes so marginalised as to be inconsequential.[23] Such languages may persist among a small elite, as we have seen demonstrated in the case of Irish, or in a ritualised form, but not as a living and developing language of a flourishing culture (Kymlicka, 1995a).

Linguistic markets and symbolic violence

To explore further the implications of language legitimation and institutionalisation for ethnolinguistic minorities, I want to turn again to the work of Pierre Bourdieu. Bourdieu has written widely, though disparately, on language, and his work in this regard includes the two seminal essays 'Le fétichisme de la langue' (Bourdieu & Boltanski, 1975) and 'The economy of linguistic exchanges' (1977). Where his thoughts on language (and linguistics) are perhaps most clearly articulated, however, are in *Ce que parler veut dire* (1982) and its English language adaptation *Language and Symbolic Power* (1991).[24] His principal concern in these various accounts is to situate language in its proper socio-historical context. In this regard, he is particularly scathing of the preoccupation in modern linguistics with analysing language in isolation from the social conditions in which it is used. As he comments ironically of this process: 'bracketing out the social ... allows language or any other symbolic object to be treated like an end in itself, [this] contributed considerably to the success of structural linguistics, for it endowed the "pure" exercises that characterize a purely internal and formal analysis with the charm of a game devoid of consequences' (1991: 34).[25]

For Bourdieu, the inherent formalism of so much modern linguistics rests on a central distinction between the internal form of the language and its outworking in speech. This distinction, in turn, arises from the conception of language as a 'universal treasure', freely available to all -- a view

that was first articulated by Auguste Comte and subsequently adopted by the founding fathers of modern linguistics, Ferdinand de Saussure and Noam Chomsky. Saussure invokes the distinction via his celebrated comparison between 'langue' and 'parole' while Chomsky's notions of 'competence' and 'performance' reflect a similar conception.[26] Bourdieu describes the resulting orthodoxy, which posits a particular set of linguistic practices as a normative model of 'correct' usage, as the 'illusion of linguistic communism that haunts all linguistic theory' (1991: 43). By this, Bourdieu argues, the linguist is able to produce the illusion of a common or standard language while ignoring the socio-historical conditions which have established this particular set of linguistic practices as dominant and legitimate -- usually, as we have seen, as the result of nation-state formation. However, this dominant and legitimate language -- this *victorious* language, in effect -- is simply taken for granted by linguists (Thompson, 1991):

> To speak of *the* language, without further specification, as linguists do, is tacitly to accept the *official* definition of the *official* language of a political unit. This language is the one which, within the territorial limits of that unit, imposes itself on the whole population as the only legitimate language.... The official language is bound up with the state, both in its genesis and its social uses.... this state language becomes the theoretical norm against which all linguistic practices are objectively measured. (Bourdieu, 1991: 45)

In addition to habitus, Bourdieu employs a number of key concepts that illuminate the processes which underpin language domination and legitimation. These include: 'linguistic capital', 'linguistic markets', 'misrecognition' and 'symbolic violence'. Linguistic capital, in Bourdieu's terms, describes the 'value' given to one's linguistic habitus in particular linguistic markets. In a given linguistic market (such as the civic culture of the nation-state), some habitus are valued more highly than others. Accordingly, different speakers will have different amounts of linguistic capital depending on their ability to meet the requirements of the particular linguistic market concerned. Moreover, the distribution of linguistic capital is closely related to the distribution of other forms of capital (economic, cultural capital etc.) which define the location of an individual within the social space (Thompson, 1991). Those whose habitus is consonant with the demands of the linguistic market are thereby able to secure an advantage, or 'profit of distinction', since the linguistic capital required is far from equally distributed. Concomitantly, those whose habitus is assigned a lesser value by the market come to *accept* this diminution as legitimate, a process which Bourdieu has described as 'symbolic violence'. Bourdieu argues here that symbolic violence occurs when a particular (linguistic) habitus, along with the hierarchical relations of

power in which it is embedded, is 'misrecognised' (méconnaissance) as legitimate and tacitly accepted -- *even by those who do not have access to it* -- as a 'natural' rather than a socially and politically constructed phenomenon. To understand the nature of symbolic violence, Bourdieu argues, it is crucial to see that it presupposes a kind of active complicity, or implicit consent, on the part of those subjected to it; a process, in effect, which induces 'the holders of dominated linguistic competencies to collaborate in the destruction of their [own] instruments of expression' (1991: 49). While by no means limited to such a comparison, Bourdieu's conceptual analysis is clearly helpful here in explicating the unequal relationship that exists between 'national' and 'minority' languages and the subsequent devaluation of the latter by both majority *and* minority speakers. As he observes:

> In order for one mode of expression among others (a particular language in the case of bilingualism, a particular use of language in the case of a society divided into classes) to *impose* itself as the only legitimate one, the linguistic market has to be *unified* and the different dialects (of class, region or ethnic group) have to be measured practically against the legitimate language or usage. Integration into a single 'linguistic community', which is the product of the political domination that is endlessly reproduced by institutions capable of imposing universal recognition of the dominant language, is the condition for the establishment of relations of linguistic domination. (1991: 46-47; my emphases)

The single linguistic community, or the unified linguistic market, to which Bourdieu refers is most clearly represented in and by the homogenous civic culture of the modern nation-state. Indeed, the triumph of official languages and the suppression of their potential rivals are prominent characteristics of the construction of statehood and the achievement of national hegemony, as we have seen. Bourdieu illustrates the particular processes of language domination involved here by tracing the emergence of his own language of French as the 'national' language of post-revolutionary France.[27]

Vive la France: the construction of la langue légitime

There were five main languages spoken in medieval France. In addition to the langue d'oïl (the antecedent to modern French) in the north, and the langue d'oc (Occitan) in the south -- both of which were subject to regional variations and a multitude of local dialects -- Basque, Breton and Flemish were also widely spoken. Latin was the administrative language and, as such, was

confined largely to the church, the university and the royal administration (Johnson, 1993). The rise of what was to become modern French began with the (1538) **Ordonnance de Villers-Cotterêts**, issued by King Louis XII, which made the 'maternal French tongue' (in the sense of langue d'oïl, spoken in and around Paris) the language of the law. The initial intent of the decree was not to make French the 'national' language but simply to ensure that the language of the King's court would be used in the quarters significant to his power (Weber, 1976). However, the decree's admonition (Article III) to transact and record all public acts in French, along with the establishment in 1635 of the Académie Française which was charged with preserving the 'purity' of the French language,[28] were to foreshadow the eventual decline of other languages and dialects. The demise of these competing languages was not immediately apparent though, since they continued to be maintained *in practice* by local administrations until the advent of the French Revolution in 1789. It was during the Revolution in fact that the regional linguistic diversity of France was fully apprehended. A linguistic survey carried out by the abbé Grégoire in 1790 revealed that only little more than a tenth of the population could speak French with any degree of fluency (Johnson, 1993). Even as late as 1863, official figures indicated that a quarter of the country's population, including half the children who would reach adulthood in the last quarter of the nineteenth century, still spoke no French (Weber, 1976).

Nonetheless, the Revolution was to initiate significant and permanent social and linguistic change. If we recall the French historian, Michelet, and his comment in Chapter 1 advocating the 'sacrifice of the diverse interior nationalities to the great nationality', we can begin to understand why. In short, the ideal of the Revolution lay in uniformity and the extinction of particularisms. To this end, a single national language, representing and reflecting the interests of the new revolutionary order, was regarded as an essential foundation for the new Republic and its advocacy of égalité. To this end, the Jacobins insisted: 'The unity of the Republic demands the unity of speech.... Speech must be one, like the Republic' (cited in Weber, 1976: 72). As Bourdieu observes: 'it was not only a question of communication but of gaining recognition for a new *language of authority*, with its new political vocabulary, its terms of address and reference, its metaphors, its euphemisms and the representation of the social world which it conveys...' (1991: 48; my emphasis).

This vision of a brave new world, represented in and through French, took some time to effect in practice, as the above language figures for 1863 indicate. However, a combination of legal enforcement and an increasingly central role for education was to prove pivotal over the course of the nineteenth century in achieving this end. In the latter regard, the passing of the Lois Ferry in the 1880s ensured that French was taught in schools throughout France to the detriment of regional languages. Not only this, but the regional languages were viewed by the hussards noirs, the Republic's teachers, as worthless, barbarous, corrupt and devoid of interest (Bourdieu, 1982). A poignant illustration of this is provided by a prefect in the Department of Finistère in Brittany who, in 1845, formally exhorted teachers: 'Above all remember, gentleman, that your sole function is to kill the Breton language' (cited in Quiniou-Tempereau, 1988: 31-32). Such attitudes reflect how Breton, and other regional languages -- now derisively termed 'patois' -- were increasingly regarded as parochial vestiges of the ancien régime, the sooner forgotten the better.[29] In contrast, French was seen as the embodiment of civilisation and progress, and was promoted, not only in education, but in all official language domains, making its eventual ascendancy inevitable.

The rise of French provides us then with a clear example of the centrality of power relations and associated language status in the construction of national languages. By implication, it also defuses the charge often levelled against many minority languages, and their related advocacy, concerning the arbitrary and/or artificial link between language and identity. After all, one cannot have it both ways. If there is a certain arbitrariness to the construction of national languages one might expect a similar pattern to be evident among minority languages also. Moreover, in neither instance do questions surrounding a language's provenance necessarily diminish the affective ties associated with that language. For all their constructedness, evolution and change, both national *and* minority languages remain, for many of their speakers, important indicators of individual and collective identity. To accept this principle for one and not the other is clearly unjust.

Instead, we need to change the terms of the debate. If, as I have argued, the legitimation and institutionalisation of a language are the key to its long term survival in the modern world, there is a strong moral (and political) argument for providing national minority languages with these very same attributes. In so doing, national minority ethnies would be accorded the necessary

cultural and linguistic capital to embark on their own process of linguistic modernisation; a modernisation initiated and shaped *from within* rather than from without as has largely been the case until now. Such a process does not preclude individuals from continuing to exercise their own language choices although, given the continuing balance in favour of dominant languages, and the questions this raises about so called 'voluntary' language shift, the potential for conflict inevitably remains. Perhaps only when the new found status of minority languages becomes firmly established might the tendency for individuals to shift to a majority language begin to change. Meanwhile, the association of modernity with one 'common' language and culture needs to be recognised as the nationalist myth making that it is. Only if language change is separated from the current hegemonic imperatives of the nation-state can the prospect of more representational multinational and multilingual states be secured. The politics of language need not always remain subsumed by the language of politics. As Tollefson concludes:

> the struggle to adopt minority languages within dominant institutions such as education, the law, and government, as well as the struggle over language rights, constitute efforts to legitimise the minority group itself and to alter its relationship to the state. Thus while language planning reflects relationships of power, it can also be used to transform them. (1991: 202)

Changing the language preferences of the state and civil society, or at least broadening them, would better reflect the cultural and linguistic demographics of most of today's multinational (and polyethnic) states. Not only this, it could significantly improve the life chances of those national minority individuals and groups who are presently disadvantaged in their access to, and participation in public services, employment and education. As I have consistently argued, linguistic consequences cannot be separated from socio-economic and socio-political consequences, and vice versa. This hold true too, of course, for other ethnic minority groups. Indeed, in concentrating once again here on national minority ethnies, I am not wishing to ignore or diminish the language rights attributable to these other groups. After all, the strong arguments in favour of the link between cultural and linguistic identities, which I have outlined in this chapter, clearly point to the right of *all* ethnic minorities to retain and maintain their traditionally associated language should they so wish (see Chapter 5). Likewise, changing 'the rules of the game' that automatically presume an exclusive relationship between dominant languages and modernity should make the process of maintaining minority languages a little easier. However,

as I have also consistently argued throughout this account, one can distinguish the rights of national minority ethnies from ethnic minority groups in relation to their *formal* inclusion in, and representation within the civic culture of the nation-state. As such, the specific emphasis here on the legitimation and institutionalisation of minority languages is necessarily limited to national minorities.[30]

That said, to effect a greater recognition and acceptance of the languages of national minority ethnies, let alone those of other ethnic minorities, remains an extremely tall order. The idea of national (and linguistic) congruence within the current nation-state system remains as deeply entrenched as ever and, crucially, continues to be rigorously defended by those majority groups who benefit most from it (see Chapter 5). Indeed, in the long term, one must always concede the possibility of failure -- given the weight of the various forces that continue to arraign themselves against minority ethnies and the languages they speak. In this light, I want to highlight briefly here one final, and perhaps obvious example of what minority languages have to contend with -- the position of English as the current lingua franca or world language.

Rule Britannia: English in the ascendant

It is indisputable (except perhaps to the French!) that English is the international language of the modern world (Crystal, 1997a). From an estimated four million speakers in 1500 (Jespersen, 1968), limited almost exclusively to the British Isles, English is currently spoken by at least 700 million speakers worldwide, of whom approximately 300 million use English as a first language, 300 million use English as a second language and a further 100 million use it fluently as a foreign language. This is an increase of 40 per cent since the 1950s and an almost ten-fold increase since 1900. Bolder estimates project the number of English speakers at nearer 1-1.5 billion, although this includes those who have lower levels of fluency in English as a foreign language (Crystal, 1997b). While such numbers are undoubtedly significant, they are not the only, or even the principal reason for the current ascendancy of English (Mandarin Chinese still has far more first and second language speakers, for example). Rather, as David Crystal highlights in the *Cambridge Encyclopedia of Language*, the current ascendancy of English is demonstrated by its dominance in a wide range of key areas:

> English is used as an official or semi-official language in over 60 countries, and has a prominent place in a further 20. It is either dominant or well-established in all six continents. It is the main language of books, newspapers, airports and air-traffic control, international business and academic conferences, science, technology, medicine, diplomacy, sports, international competitions, pop music, and advertising. Over two-thirds of the world's scientists write in English. Three quarters of the world's mail is written in English. Of all the information in the world's electronic retrieval systems, 80% is stored in English. People communicate on the Internet largely in English. English [language] radio programmes are received by over 150 million in 120 countries. Over 50 million children study English as an additional language at primary [elementary] level; over 80 million study it at secondary level... (1997b: 360)

As a consequence of the increasing global ascendancy of English, the language has come to be linked inextricably with modernity and modernisation, and the associated benefits which accrue to those who speak it. In particular, the spread of English is linked to modernisation in two key ways. First, it is seen as a central tool by which the process of modernisation can be effected, particularly in developing societies. Second, and relatedly, monolingualism (preferably in English) is seen as a practical advantage for modern social organisation while multilingualism, in contrast, is viewed as a characteristic of 'pre-modern' or 'traditional' societies (Tollefson, 1991). We have already seen these arguments developed by Kay (1993) in relation to Africa. On this view, English is seen as a language which is neutral and pragmatic, beneficial, and freely chosen. Indeed, these underlying assumptions inform linguistics, applied linguistic and English language teaching circles to such an extent that their legitimacy is hardly ever questioned. Instead, much of the academic discussion in these areas over the last two decades has centred on the perceived threat to 'standard English' of the proliferation of English (or English*es*) around the world (see Quirk 1981, 1985; Kachru, 1982, 1986, 1990).

However, this kind of hermetic analysis considerably underplays, if not simply ignores, the more problematic nature of the spread of English. For example, the view of English as freely chosen fails to address the wider economic, political and ideological forces which shape and constrain such a choice at both the individual and collective level. Likewise, treating English as natural and neutral rests on a structuralist and positivist view of language which ignores the wider historical, cultural and political forces that have led to the current dominance of English (cf. Bourdieu). And finally, the view of English as beneficial assumes, rather naively, that people and nation-states deal with each other on an equal footing when clearly they do not. As such, those who advocate the

'benefits' of English largely fail to address the relationship between English and wider inequitable distributions and flows of wealth, resources, culture and knowledge (Pennycook, 1994).[31]

To illustrate this point, it is worth considering briefly the historical and political origins of English. After all, the fact that English is the pre-eminent international language, in whatever local form it might take, is far from accidental. As most of us know, it has much to do with the role of Great Britain as the dominant colonial power over the last three centuries. This saw English established as a key language of trade across the globe under the auspices of the expansionist British Empire. With the decline of Britain as a world power in the latter part of this century, this mantle has now passed to the United States. With its dominance since the Second World War, and its increasingly widespread influence over global trade, media and communications, the USA has ensured that English remains at the forefront of the world's languages. Having said that, the British Council continues to play a pivotal role in the widespread promotion of English for economic and political purposes. In any one year, the British Council helps a quarter of a million foreign students to learn English (Crystal, 1997b). The reasons behind this are clear enough and are outlined in the *British Council Annual Report* of 1983-84. The Report states that because the British 'do not have the power we once had to impose our will ... cultural diplomacy must see to it that people see the benefits of English ... *and the drawbacks with their own languages* ... then, consequently [they will] want [to learn] English ... for their own benefit' (my emphasis). As a result, 'Britain's influence endures, out of all proportion to her economic and military resources' (cited in Phillipson, 1992: 286-287).[32] In a similar vein, Ndebele observes: 'the British Council continues to be untiring in its efforts to keep the world speaking English. In this regard, teaching English as a second or foreign language is not only good business ... it is [also] good politics' (1987: 63).

In short, the English language, and the ideology of modernisation it conveys, are far from neutral. Indeed, it is simply disingenuous to present English as some kind of a tabula rasa, available at no cost and for the benefit of all. Rather, this type of reasoning should be recognised for what it is:

> [a] part of the rationalisation process whereby the unequal power relations between English and other languages are explained and legitimated. It fits into the familiar ... pattern of the dominant language creating an exalted image of itself, other languages being devalued, and the relationship between the two rationalised in favour of the dominant language. (Phillipson, 1992: 287-288).

Phillipson, in his searing critique of the international English language teaching industry,[33] proceeds to summarise the 'glorification' of English linguistic hegemony, and the related devaluing of other languages. This summary is presented in the following table.

Glorifying English	Devaluing other languages
World language	Localised language
International language	(Intra-)national language
Language of wider communication	Language of narrower communication
Auxiliary language	Unhelpful language
Additional language	Incomplete language
Link language	Confining language
Window on the world	Closed language
Neutral language	Biased language

Table 4.1: The labelling of English and other languages

(Source: Phillipson, 1992: 282)

Many of the juxtapositions highlighted here have already been encountered in relation to national and minority languages. The role of English as lingua franca merely extends these comparisons to the next level. In Alistair Pennycook's (1994) account of the cultural politics of English as an international language, further aspects of the pre-eminent position of English are highlighted which also resonate closely with our previous discussions. Drawing on Pennycook's excellent analysis, these include the following:

1. *The promotion of a continuing English language hegemony*. As we have already seen, this acts to reinforce the dominant economic and political position of nation-states such as Britain and the USA in the modern world. It is also facilitated by the role that English has come to assume as the language of international capitalism (Naysmith, 1987). The combined result is the perpetuation of social, economic and political inequality between English and non-English speakers, both within and between nation-states. This process has been termed 'English linguistic imperialism' or, more broadly, 'linguicism' by Phillipson (1992).[34]

2. *The dominance of English in prestigious domains* such as popular culture, academia, and electronic information transfer. Information on the Internet or World Wide Web, for example, is almost exclusively in English. Likewise, popular culture -- in the form of popular music, film and video -- is predominantly in English; so much so, in fact, that even countries like France are concerned by its impact on French language and culture (Flaitz, 1988; Truchot, 1990; Lamy, 1996).[35] The result is a complex set of relationships between English and other local types of culture and knowledge, usually leading to the diminution in value of the latter. As Pennycook argues, 'access to prestigious ... forms of knowledge is often only through English, and thus, given the status of English both within and between countries, there is often a reciprocal reinforcement of the position of English and the [associated] position of imported forms of culture and knowledge' (1994: 21).

3. *The related threat that English poses to the continuing viability of other languages* -- what Day (1985) has termed the potential for 'linguistic genocide'. In this regard, the pattern of English as a 'replacing language' (Brenzinger, 1997) is increasingly evident, particularly among indigenous and other small and less powerful groups. The Australian Koori is one example I have already discussed, others include Māori in New Zealand and Celtic languages in Great Britain. Even when not directly threatening linguistic genocide, however, English may nonetheless contribute significantly to what Pennycook describes as 'linguistic curtailment'; in effect, the restricting of competing languages to particular domains.

4. *The extent to which English functions as a gatekeeper to positions of prestige within societies.* Due to the central role that English often assumes within many education systems, it has become one of the most powerful means of inclusion into or exclusion from further education, employment or influential social positions. This pattern is particularly evident in many post-colonial countries where small English-speaking elites have continued the same policies as their former colonisers in order to ensure that (limited) access to English language education acts as a crucial distributor of social prestige and wealth.[36] Indeed, Alexandre (1972) has gone as far as to suggest that in post-colonial Africa social class can be distinguished more clearly on linguistic than economic lines. However, as we will see, such patterns are by no means limited to post-colonial settings, being clearly evident in many developed countries in the western world as well.

Given this, I want to turn in the next chapter to the specific debates surrounding the role of minority language education in modern nation-states. In particular, I want to explore:

- the relationship between minority language education and the life chances of minority individuals and groups, and;

- the impact of minority language education on the formulation and conception of the nation-state.

Notes -- Chapter 4

1. The boundary marking function of language has clear parallels with Armstrong's (1982) notion of 'symbolic border guards', discussed in Chapter 2.

2. This is no more clearly demonstrated than in the example of the Old Testament account of Judges (12: 4-6) where the Gileadites identified their enemies the Ephraimites (and killed them) by their pronunciation of the word 'shibboleth'.

3. Discussions on the Sapir-Whorf theory in linguistics, like discussions of linguistic nationalism in sociology, tend towards caricature on the basis that much of the analysis is predicated solely on the more extreme versions of the position. Concomitantly, the result in linguistic commentary has often been the instant and fatuous dismissal of the central interconnections between language, culture and thought. In the process, much gets distorted. For example, the linguistic merits of Whorf's work have been consistently misrepresented. Likewise, the political motivation of his struggle to support a view of difference and diversity -- developed principally in response to the genocide of Native American cultures and languages -- has been frequently overlooked (Fishman, 1989d; see also Pennycook, 1994).

4. The term 'Gaeltacht' is taken to mean a substantially Irish-speaking community or district -- or, as I have paraphrased it more loosely here, the Irish language heartland. However, it should be noted that the term is now somewhat problematic since, traditionally, the Gaeltacht was viewed as a composite geographical area whereas currently many parts of Ireland which were once part of the Gaeltacht are no longer so. Accordingly, the plural term 'Gaeltachtaí' is increasingly used to describe present Irish-speaking communities (Ó Gadhra, 1988). These communities, which are situated mainly in coastal areas in the north-west, west, and south, currently constitute only 2.3 per cent of Ireland's population but still account for 7.4 per cent of all Irish speakers and 45 per cent of all Irish-speaking families (Fishman, 1991).

5. A more nuanced approach to core cultural values has been attempted in more recent times. While still holding that some cultures are more language-centred than others, Smolicz & Secombe (1988) differentiate four broad approaches to minority languages that are evident between and within ethnic minority groups. These comprise: *negative evaluation* of the language; *indifference* -- seeing no purpose in language maintenance and showing no interest in it; *general positive evaluation* -- regarding the language as a vital element of ethnicity but not being prepared personally to learn it; *personal positive evaluation* -- regarding the language as a core cultural value and putting this language commitment into practice (see also Clyne, 1990).

6. Much of the following summary of the Irish context is drawn from Edwards (1984: 284-289, 1985: 53-65). Additional references are cited in the text.

7. Obviously, this period long predates the actual nation-state of Ireland. As such, I use the term here simply as a geographical referent to describe the island which presently includes the Irish Republic and Northern Ireland.

8. Diglossia can be defined as the pattern of language behaviour within a bilingual community where one language is associated with certain domains of social activity (commerce, for example)

while the other language is usually associated with different domains (such as family life). As Ó Murchú (1988) observes, this appears to be the only instance of bilingual diglossia in Irish history.

9. The Bord's remit involves the provision of language advice and information, language courses, and translation services.

10. In relation to this point, Fishman provides us with a useful 8 point scale -- The Graded Intergenerational Disruption Scale -- which charts the levels, in descending order, at which a minority language is maintained within the nation-state (see 1991: 81-121). Stage 6 of this scale involves intergenerational family transmission. As Fishman argues, many language revitalisation movements tend to overlook this crucial stage in their rush to establish ostensibly more 'advanced' stages such as minority language education (Stage 4). Invariably, he suggests, this proves counter-productive in the long term, as in the Irish case.

11. There is an inevitable balance to be struck in any language planning effort between what might be termed language breadth and depth. It can be argued that the promotion of Irish at all levels resulted in an ostensibly wide but ultimately superficial use of the language. A contrasting approach would have been to foster the use of Irish in particular language domains (see below).

12. The sometimes profound cultural dislocation that accompanies language shift for the individual in this context is illustrated well by the personal accounts of Hoffman (1989) and Rodriguez (1983, 1993). Grosjean (1982) also provides examples of the psychological costs experienced by individuals as a result of language loss.

13. This disparity is highlighted in the Irish context by the contrasting efforts of a small bilingual elite in Dublin, who were at the heart of nationalist efforts to promote the Irish language, and the rest of the population who were far more interested in acquiring English.

14. Kay's Zambian case study demonstrates how the country is currently divided into 72 ethnic and seven regional languages but is united by one official language, English.

15. Prior to the fourteenth century, English was not even taught as a language. Latin was regarded as the language of record, or the literary language. Moreover, due to the Norman invasion of 1066, French was the language associated with the nobility and thus social aspiration. Indeed, the first king of England since 1066 to speak English as a first language was Henry IV, who assumed the throne in 1399 (Graddol et al., 1996; see also McCrum et al., 1986).

16. Admittedly, the sophistication of those who argue this position varies widely. Edwards, for example, provides us with a considered and nuanced defence of this particular view of language shift, although obviously I continue to remain unconvinced by it. However, far cruder versions of this general thesis are evident elsewhere. There is, of course, Schlesinger's account of bilingualism, discussed in Chapter 3. But for one of the crudest of all, see the various contributions on language in Frost (1997).

17. Nathan Glazer argues, for example, in the US context, that most immigrants want 'to become Americanized as fast as possible, and this [means appropriating] English language and culture.... while they often found, as time went on, that they regretted what they and their children had lost, this was *their* choice rather than an imposed choice' (1983: 149).

18. It should be pointed out, however, that many so called 'national' language(s) hold de facto rather than de jure status (see Ruiz, 1990). In the UK, for example, English is the only accepted language of the state (except in Wales where Welsh has recently been recognised as having equivalent status; see Chapter 7) but the role of English is not constitutionally or legislatively enshrined. A similar situation pertains in the USA, although there have been recent attempts by pressure groups to have English made the only official language (see the discussion of the 'English Only' movement in Chapter 5).

19. The status of languages and dialects may also change as the result of changes in nation-state formation. In the former Czechoslovakia, for example, a common language was deemed to be spoken. However, with the breakup of the former nation-state into the Czech Republic and Slovakia, language differences are now being promoted (Tabouret-Keller, 1997).

20. This is demonstrated by the fact that out of the 6000 or so living languages contained within approximately 200 nation-states, fewer than a hundred currently enjoy official status. Of these, 120 nation-states have adopted either English, French, Spanish or Arabic as official languages, while some 50 nation-states have their own indigenous official language (15 per cent have two or more). Even when the 45 or so regional languages with official status are added, the combined total still only accounts for about 1.5 per cent of the total number of spoken languages (Mackey, 1991; C. Williams, 1996).

21. Giles et al. (1977) provide a more extensive socio-linguistic model to indicate ethnolinguistic vitality which is also broadly consonant with the position outlined here. They argue that ethnolinguistic vitality is based on a combination of the following components: economic status, self-perceived social status, socio-historical factors and demographic factors (including institutional support). I will explore some of these other dimensions of ethnolinguistic vitality in my ensuing discussion of Bourdieu's notions of linguistic markets and symbolic violence.

22. De Varennes summarises the process and its implications thus:

> By imposing a language requirement, the state shows a definite preference towards some individuals on the basis of language.... In other words, the imposition of a single language for use in state activities and services is by no means a neutral act, since:
> 1) The state's chosen language becomes a condition for the full access to a number of services, resources and privileges, such as education or public employment....
> 2) Those for whom the chosen state speech is not the primary language are thus treated differently from those for whom it is: the latter have the advantage or benefit of receiving the state's largesse in their primary tongue, whereas the former do not and find themselves in a more or less disadvantaged position.... Whether it is for employment in state institutions ... or the need to translate or obtain assistance ... a person faced with not being able to use his primary language *assumes a heavier burden* (1996a: 86-87; my emphasis).

23. In effect, the limitation of a language to particular domains can mean the social and political impoverishment of the language concerned. Using it solely in the home domain, for example, limits its ultimate usefulness since speakers will be unable to deal adequately with the interpenetration of other domains such as talking about work or school at home (Clyne, 1997). The increasing marginalisation of a language thus limits the linguistic functions of the language itself while the latter, recursively, contributes further to the language's marginalisation. As Florian

Coulmas argues: 'Today the future of many languages in uncertain not only because their functional range is scaled down, but because they are never used for, and adapted to newly emerging functions which are associated with another language.... Lack of functional expansion is thus a correlate and counterpart of scaled-down use' (1992: 170).

24. As with many of Bourdieu's writings, *Language and Symbolic Power* is a reworking of *Ce que parler veut dire* rather than a simple translation of it.

25. For an allied critique of the preoccupation with linguistic formalism at the expense of a wider analysis of the social and political social conditions in which language comes to be used, see Vološinov (1973: 77-82) and Mey (1985). The latter observes, for example, 'that linguistic models, no matter how innocent and theoretical they may seem to be, not only have distinct economical, social and political presuppositions, but also consequences.... Linguistic (and other) inequalities don't cease to exist simply because their socio-economic causes are swept under the linguistic rug' (1985: 26).

26. This is not to suggest that Saussure's and Chomsky's conceptions are indistinguishable -- Chomsky's model, for example, is more dynamic in its attempt to incorporate the generative capacities of competent speakers. However, both approaches rest on the notion that language can be constituted as an autonomous and homogenous object, amenable to linguistic study (Thompson, 1991).

27. In examining briefly the rise of French as a national language in what follows, I will draw not only on Bourdieu but also, as appropriate, on a range of additional commentary.

28. Established by Cardinal Richelieu, the principal aim of the Académie Française was to promote its conception of clarity, simplicity and good taste in French. This led to the first French language dictionary in 1694. In modern times, the Académie has become best known for its prominent role in 'protecting' French from foreign borrowing -- particularly English ones -- and creating equivalent French terms where necessary (Edwards, 1994; see also below).

29. As Bourdieu observes, 'measured de facto against the single standard of the "common" language, they are found wanting and cast into the outer darkness of *regionalisms*'. As a result, 'a system of *sociologically pertinent* linguistic oppositions tends to be constituted which has nothing in common with the system of *linguistically pertinent* linguistic oppositions' (1991: 54).

30. The different linguistic possibilities that hold for other ethnic minority groups will be further explored in relation to education in Chapter 5 and, more broadly, in Chapter 9.

31. There is strong evidence to suggest, for example, that the adoption of English as an official language by nation-states has little influence on subsequent economic development. The poorest countries in Africa are for the most part those which have chosen English (or French) as an official language, whilst the majority of the Asian 'tiger economies' have opted instead for an indigenous language. In short, their is simply no correlation between the adoption of English and greater economic well being (Phillipson & Skutnabb-Kangas, 1994). Other factors, particularly the relative powerlessness and disadvantage experienced by such states within the wider nation-state system, exert far greater long-term influence.

32. France's 'mission to civilise' strategy is also a variant of this same theme.

33. For ongoing debate on Phillipson's thesis, see A. Davies (1996), and Phillipson's (1997) reply.

34. English linguistic imperialism operates when 'the dominance of English is asserted and maintained by the establishment and continuous reconstitution of structural and cultural inequalities between English and other languages' Linguicism (of which English linguistic imperialism forms a part) is the process by which 'ideologies and practices ... are used to legitimate, effectuate and reproduce an unequal division of power and resources (both material and immaterial) between groups that are defined on the basis of language' (Phillipson, 1992: 47). In the latter case, linguicism is also equated directly with other forms of inequality such as racism and ethnicism (see Skutnabb-Kangas & Phillipson, 1995: 105).

35. Such has been the concern in France with the growing fashion for English words -- what has come to be known as 'franglais' -- that legislative measures have been recently introduced in addition to the general policing role performed by the Académie Française. The (1975) **Bas-Lauriol bill**, for example, laid out a number of prescriptions in this regard but was never fully implemented. More recently, the (1995) **Toubon law** has decreed the following measures: consumer goods must not be sold without a set of instructions in French; all-English advertisements must not be published either in the French press or in French cinemas; and bilingual signs must not give less prominence to the French part of their message. Breaches can be referred directly to the police although its efficacy, and the opposition that it might generate, are as yet unclear.

36. Examples of this pattern are described by Pattanayak (1969) in relation to India, Ngũgĩ (1985) in relation to Kenya, and Tollefson (1991) in relation to the Phillippines.

Chapter 5

LANGUAGE, EDUCATION AND MINORITY RIGHTS

In the preceding chapter, we encountered an apparent conundrum in relation to the role that education plays in language maintenance and shift. On the one hand, the example of Ireland demonstrates that, however much one might want it to, education is not sufficient in itself to stem societal change. Indeed, a consistent weakness of many minority language movements has been an over-optimistic view of what education can accomplish in halting, and reversing, language shift (see Fishman, 1991). In short, the fate of a language cannot be borne on the back of education alone. And yet to dismiss education as simply peripheral to the process of minority language maintenance is also clearly wrong (cf. Edwards, 1985: Ch. 5). After all, education is recognised as a key institution -- perhaps *the* key institution -- in the apparatus of the modern nation-state, a point that is acknowledged by sociological commentators as diverse as Durkheim and Althusser (see May, 1994). Moreover, as we have already seen in Chapter 2, education has played a key role historically in effecting the homogenous civic culture of the nation-state, a process which has led to the advent of much minority language shift in the first place. As Gellner (1983) has outlined, the nationalist principle of 'one state, one culture' saw the state, *via its education system*, increasingly identified with a specific language and culture. Indeed, a well-defined, educationally sanctioned and unified linguistic culture was seen as a prerequisite for modernity, a basis of political legitimacy, and a means of shared cultural identity. The example of France, discussed in the previous chapter, clearly illustrates how education was employed to promote a state sanctioned language, at the expense of other varieties, as a central part of a modernising nationalist project.

Educating for the majority

Similar examples of education's role in establishing and reinforcing the civic culture of the nation-state are legion, particularly in the nineteenth century which first saw the establishment of mass education systems. The English language National School system in Ireland, established in 1831, is another example we have already encountered. Similarly, the Welsh language was formally proscribed from schools via the (1870) **Education Act** of the UK parliament and did not re-emerge again until 1939 when the first private Welsh language primary (elementary) school was established. This legislation was the culmination of a long-standing vitiation of the Welsh language within the UK which dated back to the time of Henry VIII and the (1536) **Act for the English Order, Habite and Language** (see Chapter 6). In New Zealand a similar legislative pattern emerged in the nineteenth century with the (1847) **Education Ordinance** requiring that mission schools teach Māori children in English where previously they had taught in Māori. This was followed by the (1867) **Native Schools Act** which established state educational provision for Māori and formalised an English language only policy (R. Walker, 1990). Comparable educational legislation in Australia was enacted after the 1850s, leading to the 'linguistic genocide' (Day, 1985) of most Australian aboriginal languages, also discussed previously.

These educational developments are not confined to the nineteenth century, however. Spain, under Franco's rule, prohibited the Catalan and Basque languages from all formal domains, including education, in favour of Castilian. These edicts, which were implemented just prior to the Second World War, were draconian to say the least and included the threat to exclude from the profession any teacher -- even in private schools -- who used a language other than Castilian. As stated in an order issued 18 May, 1938: 'the Spain of Franco cannot tolerate aggressions against the unity of its language' (cited in de Varennes, 1996a: 22). Moreover, as recently as 1997, Chinese authorities have proscribed the indigenous Tibetan language in Tibetan schools in favour of Mandarin Chinese. Ostensibly, this is a measure aimed at 'improving' the educational attainment of Tibetan children. In reality, it is principally an attempt at curbing Tibet's nationalist aspirations for independence from China since language is a central feature of a separate Tibetan identity (*The Independent*: 5 June, 1997).[1] As Kedourie has observed: 'On nationalist theory ... the purpose of education is not to transmit knowledge, traditional wisdom, and the ways devised

by a society for attending to the common concerns; its purpose rather is wholly political, to bend the will of the young to the will of the nation' (1960: 83-84). Plus ça change.

If education is used so effectively to these assimilationist ends, its significance as an alternative vehicle for minority language aspirations should not be underestimated. Those who dismiss the significance of education in this latter regard usually do so on the basis that education cannot be reasonably expected to cater for the language and identity needs of all pupils (see Edwards, 1985: 130-131). The Swann Report on multicultural education in Britain clearly outlines this position when it concludes: 'the role of education cannot be, and cannot be expected to be, to reinforce the values, beliefs, and cultural identity which each child brings to school' (1985: 321). However, this begs a key question: given that education accomplishes this for majority group members -- whose cultural and linguistic habitus are viewed as consonant with the school's -- why can it not do so for minority group members as well? As I have argued consistently elsewhere (May, 1994, 1995, 1998b), there is a strong argument for schools extending and reconstituting what counts as 'accepted' and 'acceptable' cultural and linguistic knowledge. Moreover, the charge that such recognition would inevitably lead to a rampant cultural and linguistic relativism does not necessarily follow. The differing rights attributable to various minority groups, discussed in Chapters 2 and 3, can be applied with respect to language and education. In short, greater ethnolinguistic *democracy* does not necessarily imply ethnolinguistic *equality* (Fishman, 1995) -- reasonable limits can still be drawn. Likewise, a recognition of minority habitus as cultural and linguistic capital in schools can co-exist, albeit not always easily, with an ongoing valuing of a common or 'core' curriculum (see May, 1994).

Educating for the minority

In this light, the long-held assimilationist emphases apparent in education have come under increasing attack in recent years, particularly from minority groups themselves. This attack has been launched on two key fronts: 1) that assimilationist policies have failed to address and ameliorate the comparative social and educational disadvantages faced by many minority groups (May, 1994, 1997);[2] 2) that an education which requires minority students to dispense with their ethnic, linguistic and/or cultural identities is not necessarily an educational opportunity *worth*

wanting (Howe, 1992).[3] In this latter respect, even if social and educational advancement were to be forthcoming -- and, as 1) above suggests, it most often is not -- the individual and collective costs of such cultural and linguistic evisceration are increasingly regarded by minority groups as too high a price to pay (see also Chapter 4).[4] Under pressure from such groups, there has thus been a considerable expansion in more recent years of alternative policy approaches to minority education. In what still stands as one of the most comprehensive and informed accounts of its kind, Stacey Churchill (1986) outlines the six principal policy responses to the educational and language needs of minority groups within the OECD. While he suggests that the differences between the various stages are not always clear cut, he attempts the following ranking (in ascending order) by the degree to which such policies recognise and incorporate minority cultures and languages.

- *Stage 1 (Learning Deficit)*: where the educational disadvantages faced by minority groups are associated with the use of the minority language. Accordingly, rapid transition to the majority language is advocated. This is the assimilationist educational approach in its starkest form.

- *Stage 2 (Socially-Linked Learning Deficit)*: sometimes but not always arrived at concurrently with Stage 1, this stage associates a minority group's educational disadvantage with family status. Additional/supplementary programmes are promoted -- such as Headstart in the USA -- which emphasise *adjustment* to the majority society. This is a modified form of assimilation which still clearly views minority languages and cultures as a social and educational *problem*.[5]

- *Stage 3 (Learning Deficit from Social/Cultural Differences)*: most commonly associated with multicultural education, this stage assumes minority educational disadvantage arises from the inability of the majority society -- particularly the education system -- to recognise, accept and view positively the minority culture. However, a multicultural approach does not usually include a commensurate recognition of the minority language. The essence of the multicultural model is the recognition of the right to be different and to be respected for it, not necessarily to maintain a distinct language and culture.[6]

- *Stage 4 (Learning Deficit from Mother Tongue Deprivation)*: while still linked to the notion of deficit, the need for support of the minority language is accepted, at least as a transitional measure. Accordingly, transitional bilingual education programmes are emphasised. These programmes acknowledge the growing linguistic research consensus that instruction in one's first language is both linguistically and educationally beneficial (see Cummins & Swain, 1986; Appel & Muysken, 1987; Corson, 1993; Romaine, 1995; Baker, 1996). Nonetheless, they remain predicated on a 'subtractive' view of individual and societal bilingualism. In other words, in assuming that the first (minority) language will eventually be replaced by a second (majority) language, bilingualism is not *in itself* regarded as necessarily beneficial, either to the individual or to society as a whole. In this respect, transitional bilingualism is little different from assimilationist perspectives in its (pejorative) view of minority languages within the nation-state. The (1968) **Bilingual Education Act** in the USA is an example of this approach and will be discussed more fully below in relation to the US 'English Only' movement.

- *Stage 5 (Private Use Language Maintenance)*: recognises the right of national and ethnic minorities to maintain and develop their languages and cultures in private life to ensure these are not supplanted by the dominant culture and language. A group maintenance approach to bilingual education is the most usual policy response here. In contrast to the 'subtractive' view of bilingualism held in transitional bilingual programmes, a group maintenance approach regards bilingualism as an 'additive' or 'enriching' phenomenon for the individual.[7] However, as its name suggests, the wider cultural and linguistic benefits of maintaining a minority language are also regarded as central, both for minority groups themselves and for their subsequent contribution to the nation-state. Accordingly, maintenance bilingual education is characterised by 'minority language immersion' programmes where school instruction is largely or solely in the minority language. This ensures that the minority language is maintained and fostered, given that the majority language is usually dominant in most other social and institutional domains.

- *Stage 6 (Language Equality)*: the granting of full official status to a national minority language. This would include separate language provision in a range of public institutions,

including schools, and widespread recognition and use in a range of social, institutional and language domains. Such an approach is usually based on one of two organising principles: 1) the 'territorial language principle' grants language rights that are limited to a particular territory in order to ensure the maintenance of a particular language in that area. The most prominent examples of this principle can be found in Switzerland (in relation to German, French, Italian and Romansch)[8] and Belgium (French and Dutch),[9] 2) the 'personality language principle' attaches language rights to individuals, irrespective of their geographical position. However, it is also often associated with the criterion 'where numbers warrant' -- that is, that there are a sufficient number of particular language speakers to warrant language protection. Examples here include Finland (Swedish and Finnish), Canada (French and English),[10] and India.[11]

Churchill argues that Stages 1-4 all posit that minority cultural and language groups should seek the same social, cultural and linguistic outcomes as the majority; that is, that the instrumental objectives of education, *as defined by the majority ethnic group*, should be the same for all ethnic groups within the nation-state. The premise is thus the incorporation of minority groups into the hegemonic civic culture of the nation-state with minimal accommodation to minority languages and cultures. It is only as Stages 5 and 6 that objectives and outcomes also come to incorporate the *cultural and linguistic values* of minority groups and, by so doing, begin to question the value of a monocultural and monolingual society. Both stages thus assume that minority groups can (and should) maintain their language and culture over time, whereas Stages 1 through 4 clearly take the opposite approach. However, significant differences still remain between the latter two approaches. Stage 5 recognises, in addition to instrumental aims, the cultural value of retaining a minority language, at least in private domains. In so doing, it assumes that recognising language and culture is an *enduring need* for minority group members (cf. Margalit & Raz, 1995), although changes to the formal linguistic uniformity of the nation-state are not usually countenanced. Stage 6 requires a far greater shift, with the majority ethnic group having to accommodate minority groups and their language(s) in all shared domains, a process which has been described elsewhere as *mutual accommodation* (May, 1994; Nieto, 1996). By this, Stage 6 assumes that the retention of a minority language and culture is an enduring need *for the majority as well*. A prerequisite for this more plurilingual view of the nation-state is the formal legitimation and institutionalism

of minority languages within both the state and civil society, as discussed in the preceding chapter (cf. Kymlicka, 1995).[12]

In this light, and bearing in mind the likelihood of significant inter- and intra-group differences, a broad parallel categorisation of minority group responses to minority language education can also be attempted (see Churchill, 1986: 48-49):

- *Level 1, the recognition phase*: the minority group seeks to obtain initial recognition of its distinct educational needs and, in many cases, of its very existence as a distinct cultural and/or linguistic group within the nation-state (cf. the distinction between ethnic categories and groups discussed in Chapter 1).

- *Level 2, the start up and extension phase*: having obtained some recognition from educational authorities, the minority group seeks to obtain the creation of minority language educational services or, where these already exist, their further legitimation, extension and improvement. At this stage, either transitional or group maintenance bilingual education aims can be pursued. As discussed previously, transitional bilingual education aims to expedite successful transference from the minority to the majority language by employing the minority language in the early years of primary schooling. This acts as a bridge for the child to transfer their first language skills to the replacing language and, while educationally sound, remains essentially assimilative in intent. In contrast, maintenance bilingual education aims 'to the maximum extent possible, [to] involve use of the minority language as a means of instruction [in order] to resist assimilation pressures outside the school environment' (Churchill, 1986: 49).

- *Level 3, the consolidation and adaptation phase*: If Level 2 is principally concerned with increasing the quantity of minority language programmes, this level is concerned with enhancing their quality. In transitional terms, the emphasis may be placed on greater, more effective social and economic integration of the minority group within the nation-state (including a greater awareness and acceptance of the minority by the majority). In group maintenance terms, emphasis might be placed not only on fostering the minority

language as a medium of instruction but also on employing the minority culture as a specific source and context of instruction.

- *Level 4, the multilingual co-existence phase*: At this level, distinct minority educational rights are legally and practically enshrined. Different language groups are accorded formal language and education rights on the basis of the principle of *ethnolinguistic democracy* (Fishman, 1995). As discussed above, this may not amount to actual ethnolinguistic equality, nor does it imply necessarily *a lack of friction* between the groups involved. Nonetheless, minority language rights are formally recognised and employed in state and civil society. In this regard, a considerable degree of autonomy is usually accorded to minority groups in relation to the actual control, organisation and delivery of minority language education. While granting a measure of control over their education holds considerable symbolic purchase for the minority group concerned, three other benefits have also been recognised as a consequence of this process: 1) while no causal link can be demonstrated, there appears to be a high correlation between greater minority participation in the governance of education and higher levels of academic success by minority students within that system;[13] 2) the greater the participation in educational decision-making by minority group members the more likely the match between minority aspirations and subsequent educational provision; 3) direct involvement in the governance of minority education strengthens community links among the members of the minority group themselves. Such involvement may also ameliorate the negative historical experiences of education held by many within the community.

This at least is the ideal. Churchill concludes his summary by suggesting that the discrepancies between minority education policy and practice, along with minority responses to them, remain significant. Notwithstanding the more pluralist approaches that have been promoted in more recent times, these discrepancies occur both within and between nation-states and within and between particular minority groups. In relation to different policy approaches, for example, only the very old bilingual or multilingual OECD states (Belgium, Finland and Switzerland) have reached Stage 6 in Churchill's study. Sweden is at Stage 5, at least in relation to its Finnish

minority (Skutnabb-Kangas, 1988), while Canada ranges from Stage 6 down to Stage 2 in relation to its Francophone minority, depending on provincial variations (Corson, 1993).

In relation to differences between minority groups, the indigenous Māori are moving towards Stage 5, and ultimately Stage 6 in New Zealand, although the approach to other minorities, such as Pacific Island groups, is not so advanced (May, 1997). Likewise, while the USA's **Bilingual Education Act** officially sanctions a Stage 4 approach to minority education, the actual responses of many schools and local school systems are far more varied. Many Hispanic children, for example, are in schools which are still at Stages 1 and 2, promoting the merits of an English language approach. Even those which promote bilingual education vary widely between a transitional and group maintenance ethos (Edwards, 1985, 1994; Dicker, 1996). Canada's approach of 'multiculturalism within a bilingual framework' also illustrates well the discrepancies evident between different minority groups. Bearing in mind the caveat of provincial variation outlined above, Article 23 of the (1982) **Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms** advocates the right of English and French speakers, who represent 90 per cent of the country's population, to an education in their mother tongue 'where numbers warrant'. However, the linguistic rights of Canada's indigenous peoples are far less clearly endorsed.

Responses to minority language education approaches from within particular minority groups are also extremely varied, as one might expect. In the 1980s, the UK broadly adopted a Stage 3 multicultural approach to education, as exemplified in the Swann Report (DES, 1985), although again actual school practice seldom reflected this, tending towards more assimilative models. The responses from within minority groups to even this limited form of multiculturalism, however, have ranged from enthusiastic endorsement (Verma, 1989) to outright rejection (Stone, 1981; see also Chevannes & Reeves, 1987).[14] Key arguments here have concerned the degree to which multiculturalism ameliorated or contributed further to the social and educational marginalisation of ethnic minorities in Britain (cf. Goulbourne, 1991a). Likewise, in the USA some of the most prominent exponents against multicultural and bilingual education initiatives are from ethnic minority groups (cf. Rodriguez, 1983; D'Souza, 1991).

That said, the current variations in approach, and in their delivery, need not be seen as insurmountable. With regard to the latter, discrepancies between policy formulations and actual practice are increasingly being addressed by the concerted political efforts of minority groups themselves. For all their current inadequacies, minority language education policies *are* being shaped by the growing cultural and linguistic aspirations of minority groups. These aspirations are also, recursively, a product of the growing acceptance of minority rights in the wider social and political arena (cf. Chapter 3). With regard to the former, there is no necessary problem with differing policy approaches being directed at different minority groups. Indeed, it is my general position that variations of approach should exist between, for example, national and ethnic minority groups. Thus, while the ideal might be that nation-states provide a *Stage 5 (Private Use Language Maintenance)* minority education policy approach for *all* minority groups, only national minorities could be reasonably expected to be entitled to a *Stage 6 (Language Equality)* policy approach. Likewise, all minorities might expect the right to mobilise to at least *Level 3 (Consolidation and Adaptation Phase)* in terms of their own language and education requirements. However, again, only national minorities could legitimately claim a right to the *Level 4 (Multilingual Co-existence Phase*).

Minority language and education in international law

The broad position that I have outlined here accords with recent developments in international law with respect to minority language and education rights. Two broad approaches can be observed here: tolerance-oriented rights and promotion-oriented rights (Kloss, 1977; see also Macías, 1979).[15] Tolerance-oriented rights ensure the right to preserve one's language in the private, non-governmental sphere of national life. These rights may be narrowly or broadly defined. They include the right of individuals to use their first language at home and in public, freedom of assembly and organisation, the right to establish private cultural, economic and social institutions wherein the first language may be used, and the right to foster one's first language in private schools. The key principle of such rights is that the state does 'not interfere with efforts on the parts of the minority to make use of [their language] in the private domain' (Kloss, 1977: 2).

Promotion-oriented rights regulate the extent to which minority rights are recognised within the *public* domain, or civic realm of the nation-state. As such, they involve 'public authorities [in] trying to promote a minority [language] by having it used in public institutions -- legislative, administrative and educational, including the public schools' (1977: 2). Again, such rights may be narrowly or widely applied. At their narrowest, promotion oriented rights might simply involve the publishing of public documents in minority languages. At their broadest, promotion-oriented rights could involve recognition of a minority language in *all* formal domains within the nation-state, thus allowing the language minority group 'to care for its internal affairs through its own public organs, which amounts to the state's allowing self government for the minority group' (1977: 24). The latter position would also necessarily require the provision of state-funded minority language education *as of right*.

As one might expect, given the debates outlined in Chapter 3, both sets of rights -- particularly the latter -- continue to face considerable opposition from some quarters. In this respect, the long-held liberal antipathy towards separate minority rights and entitlements has been particularly evident where language is concerned. As Fishman observes:

> Unlike 'human rights' which strike Western and Westernized intellectuals as fostering wider participation in general societal benefits and interactions, 'language rights' still are widely interpreted as 'regressive' since they would, most probably, prolong the existence of ethnolinguistic differences. The value of such differences and the right to value such differences have not yet generally been recognised by the modern Western sense of justice... (1991: 72)

Nonetheless, there is a nascent consensus on the validity of minority language and education rights. This is predicated on the basis that the protection of minority languages falls within generalist principles of human rights. Concomitantly, there is a growing acceptance of differentiated linguistic and educational provision for minority groups, along with the degree of institutional autonomy that such developments necessarily entail. Accordingly, ongoing disputes are increasingly concerned with the degree to which these activities should be state funded, not whether they should exist at all.

The debates over minority language and education rights within international law can be traced back to the minority treaties overseen by the League of Nations prior to World War II (see also

Chapter 3). These treaties included two principal types of measures: 1) individuals belonging to linguistic minorities, amongst others, would be placed on an equal footing with other nationals of the state; 2) the means of preserving the national characteristics of minorities, including their language(s), would be ensured. In the most prominent legal ruling on these provisions -- the (1935) **Advisory Opinion on Minority Rights in Albania** -- the Permanent Court of International Justice stated that these two requirements were inseparable. It concluded that 'there would be no true equality between a majority and a minority if the latter were deprived of its own institutions and were consequently compelled to renounce that which constitutes the very essence of its being a minority' (see Thornberry, 1991a: 399-403). On the basis of this judgement, linguistic minorities were confirmed in their right to establish private schools and institutions, a *minimum* tolerance-oriented right. However, where numbers warranted, public funding of minority language-medium schools was also advanced, a more promotion-oriented right. In respect of this, and other similar decisions, linguistic minorities were defined purely on a numerical basis -- that is, as constituting less that 50 per cent of the population. That said, freedom of choice as to membership in a minority also seemed to permeate the treaties, a point to which I will return.

However, as we have seen, subsequent developments in international law were rapidly to supersede these treaties and the principles upon which they were based. Minority language and education rights were largely subsumed within the broader definition of human rights adopted by the United Nations since World War II. Human rights were thought, in themselves, to provide sufficient protection for minorities. Accordingly, no additional rights were deemed necessary for the members of specific ethnic or national minorities.[16] Nonetheless, even within this more generalist framework of rights, there have been echoes, albeit weak ones, of the principles of minority protection with respect to language and education. The most notable of these has perhaps been Article 27 of the (1966) **International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights** which imposes a *negative* duty on nation-states with respect to the protection of the languages and cultures of minority groups:

> In those states in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exist, persons belonging to such minorities *shall not be denied* the right, in community with the other members of their group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practise their own religion, or *to use their own language*. (my emphases)

I have already noted in Chapter 3 the problematic nature of the phrase 'in those states in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exist'. While seemingly innocuous, this caveat allows some nation-states to deny that any such minorities exist within their jurisdiction, and to thus conveniently avoid the obligations entailed by Article 27. However, here I am more concerned with what these actual obligations might involve -- in particular, to what extent these reflect a tolerance- or promotion-orientation to minority language rights. Likewise, I am interested in exploring further here the degree to which these rights attach to groups and/or to individual members of these groups. Dealing with the latter first, the process of agreeing the particular form of wording in Article 27 provides us with some important clues. As Patrick Thornberry explains, from an initial proposal that 'linguistic minorities shall not be denied the right ... to use their own language' the final wording of Article 27 was arrived at as follows:

> The [UN] Sub-Commission preferred that 'persons belonging to minorities' should replace 'minorities' because minorities were not subjects of law and 'persons belonging to minorities' could easily be defined in legal terms. On the other hand, it was decided to include 'in community with other members of their group' after 'shall not be denied' in order to recognise group identity in some form. (1991a: 149)

The tension evident here between individual and group ascription is reflected in the question of who exactly can claim rights under Article 27. This question has been tackled on two fronts. First, following the precedent set by the earlier minority treaties, 'minorities' in Article 27 have come to be defined strictly in numerical terms. A minority is defined as a group who share in common a culture, a religion and/or a language and who constitute less than 50 per cent of a *state's* population. Thus a minority may be numerically dominant in a particular province (as, for example, are the Québécois in Québec and the Catalans in Catalonia) but may still be classified as a minority within the nation-state. Second, any person may claim to be a member of a linguistic minority group on the basis of self-ascription. However, to benefit from Article 27 they must also demonstrate that some *concrete* tie exists between themselves and the minority group (cf. the limits of ethnicity discussed in Chapter 1). In relation to a minority language, this would require a real and objective tie with that language. It would not be sufficient, for example, to be a member of an ethnic group that is known to speak a particular language but which the individual does not. Nor are particular languages, and the rights associated with them, tied to specific ethnic groups since more than one ethnic group may speak the same language. Determining that an

individual belongs to a particular linguistic minority is thus not an issue of establishing some type of legal or political category, it is principally an objective determination based on some concrete link between an individual and a linguistic community (de Varennes, 1996a).

The definition of what constitutes a linguistic minority for the purposes of Article 27 is important for another reason. It determines whether the rights to minority language and education are tolerance- or promotion-oriented rights. Two opposing schools of thought are clearly evident here. Following the influential review of the scope of Article 27 by Capotorti (1979), some commentators, including myself (see Thornberry, 1991a, 1991b; Tollefson, 1991; Skutnabb-Kangas & Phillipson, 1995; May, 1997), have argued that while the words 'shall not be denied' could be read as imposing no obligation on a state to take positive action to protect those rights, an alternative and equally compelling view 'is that to recognise a right to use a minority language implies an obligation that the right be made effective' (Hastings, 1988: 19). On this basis, it has been argued that Article 27 can be said to encompass a promotion-orientation to language rights, with attendant state support, rather than the more limited tolerance-oriented right that a solely negative duty implies. This promotion-oriented perspective on language rights has also been reinforced by the (1987) **Universal Declaration of Linguistic Rights**, adopted in Recife, Brazil by the *Association Internationale pour le developpement de la Communication Interculturelle* (AIMAV), a UNESCO agency (see Fishman, 1991). AIMAV argued that *explicit* legal guarantees be provided for the linguistic rights of individuals and groups, and called on the United Nations to endorse this position.

These arguments concerning language rights can also be linked directly to education. For example, Article 2(b) of the (1960) **Convention Against Discrimination in Education** specifically provides for the establishment or maintenance, for linguistic reasons, of separate schools, provided attendance is optional and the education is up to national standards. Moreover, Article 5 of this Convention recognises the *essential* right of minorities to carry on their own educational activities and, in so doing, to use *or teach* in their own language. It subsequently qualifies this right, somewhat contradictorily, by making it conditional on a state's existing educational policies, and by ensuring it does not prejudice national sovereignty and the ability of

minorities to participate in national life. However, the right to minority language education can nevertheless be established (Hastings, 1988).

The question remains though -- to what extent should minority language and education be funded by the state, if at all? Promotion-oriented rights suggest they should but also necessarily impose limits on who is eligible. Capotorti's (1979) review, for example, was predicated on the understanding that Article 27 applied solely to national minorities -- immigrants, migrant workers, refugees and non-citizens were excluded. In contrast, tolerance-oriented rights imply no such obligation on the state. While necessarily more limited, such rights may at least have the advantage of being able to apply to a wider range of minority groups. And this brings us to the opposing school of thought on Article 27. De Varennes (1996a) argues that Capotorti's interpretation of a more active obligation by the state on behalf of national minorities, and the subsequent commentary which has endorsed this position, does not reflect the actual intentions of Article 27. Indeed, Capotorti admitted as much at the time of his review. In effect, he set aside what the drafters originally meant because of his concern that a negative duty was not sufficient to protect minority language and education rights. In hindsight, Capotorti's pessimism may have been misplaced. After all, the minorities treaties had already established the long-standing principle of *private* language and education for minorities, without any hindrance from the state. Indeed, where sufficient numbers warranted, there was also a recognition that some form of state-funded minority education could be established. As de Varennes concludes: 'Article 27 thus appears to be part of a long-established and continuous legal continuum that the rights of linguistic minorities to use their language amongst themselves must necessarily include the right to establish, manage and operate their own educational institutions where their language is used as the medium of instruction to the extent deemed to be appropriate by the minority itself' (1996a: 158).

Needless to say, the debates on the merits of Article 27 as an instrument for promotion-oriented rights remain ongoing. Be that as it may, we can at least conclude that Article 27 sanctions a clear baseline for tolerance-oriented language and education rights. In this respect, Article 27 allows for the *possibility* of Stage 5 minority language education policy and a Level 3 minority response, as discussed above, for *all* minorities within the nation-state. This level of protection

for minority language and education rights applies to all minority groups on the basis of the strict numerical interpretation of minorities within international law. As such, protection would be extended to include indigenous and immigrant minorities, as well as the established minorities who are more usually the beneficiaries of such measures (cf. Skutnabb-Kangas & Phillipson, 1995). Indeed, where a minority has sufficient numbers, there remains some additional scope for state-funded language education, although given the emphases of Article 27 this decision remains at the discretion of the nation-states themselves. Which brings us to the central problem of Article 27 and, indeed, most international law in this area. In short, much of the implementation of such measures is still dependent on what nation-states *deem appropriate*.[17] The result is thus left to the vicissitudes of internal national politics where the provision of minority rights is viewed principally as one of political largesse rather than a fundamental question of human rights. More often than not, this results in the adoption of the bare minimum level of rights required (and sometimes not even that).

Notwithstanding this difficulty, the notion of a more promotion-oriented view of minority language and education does appear to be gaining some ground, at least for national minorities. The (1993) **United Nations Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples**, for example, states in Article 15 that 'all indigenous peoples have ... the right to establish and control their educational systems and institutions providing education in their own languages, in a manner appropriate to their cultural methods of teaching and learning' (see also Chapter 3). Likewise, the (1993) **European Charter for Regional and Minority Languages** provides a sliding scale of educational provision for national and regional minority language groups. This provision ranges from a minimal entitlement for smaller groups -- pre-school provision only, for example -- through to more generous rights for larger minority groups such as primary and secondary language education. Again, however, nation-states have discretion in what they provide, both on the basis of local considerations and the size of the group concerned.

Developments in international law then are at once both encouraging and disappointing. The principle of separate minority recognition in language and education is legally enshrined at least as a minimal tolerance-oriented right -- that is, when restricted to the private domain. However more liberal interpretations of tolerance-oriented rights (involving some state support where

numbers warrant), and certainly more promotion-oriented rights, remain largely dependent on the largesse of individual nation-states in their interpretation of international (and national) law with respect to minorities. Having said that, there is undoubtedly increasing pressure from minority groups themselves for greater recognition of separate language and education entitlements and, where numbers warrant, for some form of state recognition and funding with respect to these. In this regard, while there may be no watertight legal guarantees to state-funded minority language education, there *is* concomitantly an increasing recognition within international and national law that significant minorities within the nation-state have a *reasonable* expectation to some form of state support (de Varennes, 1996a; see also Chapter 4). In other words, while it would be unreasonable for nation-states to be required to fund language and education services for all minorities, it is increasingly accepted that where a language is spoken by a significant number within the nation-state, it would also be unreasonable not to provide some level of state services and activity in that language. In addition, there are strong arguments for extending the strict numerical definition of minorities within international law, on which this notion of reasonableness is based, to include also the particular claims of *national* minorities (irrespective of number). As de Varennes observes of indigenous peoples, for example, although his argument can be extended here to all national minorities:

> Indigenous peoples, in particular, may have a strong argument that they should receive state services such as education in their primary language, beyond what a strictly 'numerical' criterion would perhaps normally warrant. In the case of indigenous peoples [and national minorities more generally], the state may have a *greater* duty to respect their wishes in view of the nature of the relationship between the two, and of the duties and obligations involved. (1996a: 97-98; my emphasis)

The claims of national minorities here are based, as we have seen in Chapters 1 and 2, on their historical rights as ethnies. They also gain credence from the wider political developments in relation to national and indigenous minorities discussed in Chapter 3. Given this, such arguments are increasingly having to be addressed by nation-states in some form or another. This is both a moral and a political choice for nation-states since the long-held practice of making no accommodations to minority demands is not so readily defensible in today's social and political climate. Ignoring such demands is also unlikely to quell or abate the question of minority rights, as it might once have done. Indeed, it is much more likely to escalate them. Under these circumstances, 'any policy favouring a single language to the exclusion of all others can be

extremely risky ... because it is then a factor promoting division rather than unification. Instead of integration, an ill-advised and inappropriate state language policy may have the opposite effect and cause a levée de bouclier' (de Varennes, 1996a: 91). The potential for unrest as a result of such a policy will be demonstrated in and through the arguments of the 'English Only' movement in the USA, discussed below.

The crux of majority opinion

Before turning to this, one further issue needs to be addressed. The ongoing potential for controversy surrounding the question of minority rights returns us to a key feature of these debates, their essentially contested nature. Minority rights will always be controversial, it seems, no matter how valid are the arguments in its favour. For example, ongoing ambivalence about -- and, at times, outright opposition to -- 'separate' minority language education initiatives remain prominent, principally (but by no means exclusively) from majority group members. As Churchill has observed, this is because responding to 'the needs of linguistic and cultural groups outside the majority group ... often poses a serious threat to the status quo both of school practice and public attitudes to education' (1986: 33). More sceptically, Edwards comments:

> The brutal fact is that most 'big' language speakers in most societies remain unconvinced of either the immediate need or the philosophical desirability of officially-supported cultural and linguistic programmes for their small-language neighbours. Some among the minority also share this doubt and it is, in many instances, a minority within a minority who actively endorse the use of schools as instruments of social engineering. (1994: 195-196).

Setting aside the rather obvious point which seems to escape Edwards -- namely, that the *exclusion* of minority languages within education is just as much a process of social engineering as its promotion -- the issue of majority opinion remains a crucial one for minority language education initiatives. In effect, the long-term success of such initiatives may only be achieved (or be achievable) if at least some degree of favourable majority opinion is secured.[18] On this basis, what is needed is a greater degree of 'tolerability' (Grin, 1995) on the part of wider public opinion towards specific minority initiatives or, more positively, a climate of 'socially enlightened self-interest' (Secada & Lightfoot, 1993). This may be achieved in one of two ways. One potential avenue would be to point out that in this age of increasing globalisation, and with the burgeoning

spread of English as the world language, the question of retaining cultural and linguistic distinctiveness is increasingly becoming an issue for national majority groups as well as for minorities. This is evidenced in the European Union, for example, where its Parliament adopted in December, 1990 the 'principle of complete multilingualism ... consistent with the respect which is owed to the dignity of all languages which reflect and express the cultures of the different peoples who make up the [EU]' (cited in Fishman, 1995: 49). The central principle involved here is the recognition of state languages as a symbolic reflection of the people who speak it (see Chapter 4). It does not necessarily entail ethnolinguistic equality -- English and French still dominate the operations of the European Union -- but it is consistent with the notion of greater ethnolinguistic democracy discussed above. What is pertinent for our purposes is that this principle can be applied equally to *intra*-state languages as to *inter*-state languages. If the Netherlands can argue that Dutch has a right to be represented as a working language of the EU then, by implication, Frisian has a right to be represented as a working language of the Netherlands. After all, it is clearly a national minority language which is predominantly spoken in the area of Friesland in the Netherlands (Fishman, 1995). In this way, the language rights of national majorities and minorities can be usefully allied while, at the same time, highlighting the inconsistencies between current inter-state and intra-state language policies.

Another key avenue to pursue in relation to minority language and education rights is the issue of social justice. While important, it is not enough to argue simply for the merits of cultural and linguistic diversity, if only because this seldom addresses the terms on which such diversity is recognised. As multiculturalist approaches have found out to their cost, recognising diversity is all very well but this in itself does little, if anything, to change hegemonic power relations (see May, 1994). Moreover, as Edwards has already pointed out, it is highly unlikely that majority group members will accept minority rights on the basis of self interest alone. What is needed in addition then is some belief that the majority, or Staatsvolk (see Chapter 2), has an *obligation of justice* to accept such rights (Kymlicka, 1995a). It is my view here that the historical disadvantages faced by minority groups, and/or the rights of national minorities as ethnies, constitute a strong basis for such an obligation.

That said, one should be under no illusion that establishing the validity of minority rights remains a formidable task. As I have also consistently argued, the process of recognising minority rights contests the hegemonic construction of the nation-state and, by implication, the place of the majority ethnic group, or dominant ethnie within it. By definition, this will engender opposition.[19] Minority language education is particularly contentious in this regard because it may necessitate changes, within a given nation-state, to the balance of wider power relations between ethnic groups and the languages they speak. Thus, if significant progress is to be made, the common understanding of the nation-state, deriving from political nationalism, needs to be radically reconceptualised or reimagined. A very few nation-states have already undergone this process, or are presently embarking on such a course, although not without at times considerable difficulty. The remainder though continue to be welded to the 'philosophical matrix of the nation-state' discussed in Chapters 2 and 3. For this to change, much still needs to be accomplished. Education *can* play a key role here in promoting more pluralistic and plurilingual aims but it needs to be stressed again that it cannot in itself achieve such change. As Churchill concludes:

> In some cases, the educational response to minorities is in advance of public opinion to a certain extent, but the politicised nature of relations between ethnolinguistic groups and their surrounding societies sets strict limits on how far educational systems can go in responding to minority needs. The root issue is how far societies outside the education system are willing to modify their views of the roles of linguistic and cultural minorities within their countries. Educational systems cannot respond to minority needs unless societies are [also] prepared to respond to those needs. (1986: 163)

This caveat, and the related importance of overcoming adverse majority (and, at times, minority) opinion, are both borne out starkly in the example that I now want to discuss in some detail: the 'English Only' movement in the USA.

Nativism reborn? The English Only movement

I want to begin this section on the so-called Official English movement -- or, as I prefer to term it, the English Only movement[20] -- with two revealing vignettes. The first concerns the New York State constitutional convention in 1916 where, during a debate on an English literacy requirement for voting, a proponent of the measure traced the connection between the English language and democratic values back to the Magna Carta: 'You have got to learn our language [English]

because that is the vehicle of the thought that has been handed down from the men in whose breasts first burned the fire of freedom' (cited in Baron, 1990: 59). Irrespective of the merits of these sentiments (and there are not many), the key point to be made here is that the Magna Carta was actually written in Latin, not English. As I discussed in Chapter 4, English did not assume any prominence in Britain until the fifteenth century.[21]

The second example is far more recent. It concerns a 1995 court case in Amarillo, Texas where a judge ordered a mother not to speak Spanish to her child at home on the grounds that this was equivalent to a form of 'child abuse':

> If she starts [school] with the other children and cannot even speak the language that the teachers and others speak, and she's a full-blooded American citizen, you're abusing that child.... Now get this straight: you start speaking English to that child, because if she doesn't do good in school, then I can remove her because it's not in her best interests to be ignorant. (cited in de Varennes, 1996a: 165-166)

The only ignorance demonstrated here appears to be the judge's. As de Varennes observes, the reasoning behind the judgement is bizarre, to say the least. However, what is most concerning is that it obviously never occurred to the judge that it may have been the state's school system which was 'abusive' for not meeting adequately the linguistic and educational needs of its large Spanish-speaking population. Instead, he simply places the blame on the parent -- and, by extension, the child -- for their 'willful' failure to assimilate.

These examples usefully highlight four significant aspects of the English Only movement. The first is the historical inaccuracy which characterises many of their arguments about the role of English -- and, by implication, other languages -- within the United States. The second is the explicit link that is made between a lack of English language facility and subsequent educational failure, along with a related misrepresentation of bilingual education. The third is the inherent nativism of much English Only rhetoric; language is used, in effect, as a convenient proxy for maintaining racialised distinctions in the USA. And the fourth is the assumption that speaking English is a unifying force while multilingualism is by definition destructive of national unity, an assumption we have already seen expressed by Schlesinger in Chapter 3. Each of these

characteristics is highly problematic and, as such, bears closer examination. Before doing so, however, let me briefly sketch the origins of the English Only movement in its current form.

The genesis of a movement

In April 1981, Senator Hayakawa of California proposed an English Language Amendment (ELA) to the Constitution of the United States which would make English, for the first time, an official rather than a de facto national language. In his initiating speech, the senator gave the following reasons for his ELA (see Marshall, 1986: 23):

- 'a common language can unify; separate languages can fracture and fragment a society';
- learning English is the major task of each immigrant[22]
- only by learning English can an immigrant fully 'participate in our democracy'

Setting aside for the moment the fact that Hayakawa ignores national minority language speakers entirely, his principal concern in making English the official language of the USA was to help clarify the 'confusing signals' being sent to immigrant groups over the preceding decade. Such signals included the provision of bilingual (voting) ballots which he considered 'contradictory' and 'logically conflicting' with the requirements of naturalised citizens to 'read, write and speak' English. Group maintenance approaches to bilingual education were also regarded as 'being dishonest with linguistic minority groups'. Accordingly, he was determined that only transitional forms of bilingual education should be allowed, if that, in order to 'end the false promise being made to new immigrants that English is unnecessary to them'.

The themes expressed by Hayakawa at the beginning of the 1980s were to spawn a movement. While his ELA failed, the publicity that it garnered led Hayakawa to join forces with Dr John Tanton to establish the organisation 'US English' in 1983. US English is not the only organisation of its type ('English First' is another) but it is certainly the most prominent, having grown rapidly in both number and profile from the time of its inception.[23] During the 1980s, a further five ELAs were tabled under the auspices of the English Only movement, a pattern that has continued into the 1990s. In 1996, for example, another variant of the ELA -- the English Language Empowerment Act -- was tabled to Congress. To date, none of these proposals has

been successful, largely due to the care and caution with which constitutional amendments are treated (see Marshall, 1986). However, the English Only movement has continued to lobby vigorously for such an amendment at the federal level while also increasingly focusing on changing state level language policies (Nunberg, 1989; Ruiz, 1990). In this latter regard, they have been far more successful, with 23 states and 40 cities having adopted English as their official language over the last decade (*The Observer*: 4 August, 1996).[24] Under the auspices of the English Only movement, the process of amending state-level language policy in favour of English began with California's Proposition 63 in 1986. This measure was overwhelmingly endorsed by 73 per cent to 27 per cent, including a large percentage of the Hispanic vote.

In summary, the key objectives of the English Only movement, which have remained constant since its inception, are to: 1) adopt a constitutional amendment establishing English as the official language of the United States; 2) repeal laws mandating multilingual ballots and voting materials; 3) restrict federal funding of bilingual education and, if possible, eliminate all forms of group maintenance bilingual education, and; 4) strengthen enforcement of English language civic and immigration requirements for naturalisation (Tarver, 1994). It should be stressed that these concerns are not particularly new in themselves. The primacy of English, and the links with nativist concerns about immigration, were clearly evident in the 'Americanisation Movement' at the time of the First World War (Higham, 1963; see also Baron, 1990; Piatt, 1990; Crawford, 1989, 1992a, 1992b). Indeed, the above example of the New York State constitutional convention in 1916 suggests as much. However, what is distinct about the present English Only movement is its national profile and organisation (previous debates about language were usually confined to local or state arenas) and, relatedly, the increasingly wide support that it seems to have garnered among the American public (Padilla, 1991). Much of the success of the English Only movement here has been in its ability to articulate forcefully a particular view of the USA as a resolutely monolingual, English-speaking country, currently threatened by the (recent) rise of multilingualism. This multilingualism is also linked implicitly, and sometimes explicitly, with the growing number of Spanish-speaking Hispanic communities within the USA. The often alarmist rhetoric promulgated by the movement is thus endemically racist, as I will argue below. Here I want to explore further the historical amnesia which attends so much of this rhetoric. As we saw Ernest Renan observe in Chapter 2, 'forgetting, I would even go so far as to say historical

error, is a crucial factor in the creation of a nation' (1990: 11). The nationalist myth making of the English Only movement certainly bears this out.

Historical amnesia: The 'forgotten' languages of the USA

The English Only movement makes three principal claims in relation to the language history of the USA. The first is that the USA is a monolingual, English-speaking country *and always has been*. The second is that the English language is a central and indispensable symbol of American national identity; a view, moreover, that has been consistently supported by historical language policy and practice. The third is that English is under serious threat for the first time as a result of the recent rise of bilingual voting and bilingual educational developments. Each of these propositions is fundamentally misplaced.

First, it is clear that English is, and has been historically the dominant language in the USA. This point is not in doubt. However, to extrapolate from this the myth of English *monolingualism* is another story entirely. And story it is, for the USA is not and never has been a monolingual country. Indeed, multilingualism has been a feature of US society since the colonial times of the eighteenth century (Kloss, 1977), a feature which should not surprise us given the USA's status as the largest immigrant country of them all. In American colonies between 1750 and 1850, non-English-speaking European settlers made up one quarter of the white population and Dutch (New York), Swedish (Delaware) and German (Pennsylvania) were widely spoken. Native Americans, and their languages, were still numerous and widespread at this time (see below). And Black Americans -- mostly slaves, and with their many African languages -- numbered more than one fifth of the total population (Shell, 1993).[25] Moreover, outside of the early colonies, Spanish and French language speakers predominated. Many of these language speakers were eventually incorporated into the United States as it expanded. For example, the (1803) **Louisiana Purchase** saw this territory, which included a majority of French speakers, acquired from France. Likewise, the (1848) **Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo** saw Mexico cede nearly half of its predominantly Spanish-speaking territory to the US, including areas of present day New Mexico, Texas, Arizona, Colorado and California.

To take just one example of the historical language diversity apparent in the United States, the case of Native American languages bears closer examination. When the Spanish first arrived on the North American continent,[26] it is estimated that at least 500 Native American languages were spoken (Leap, 1981). The subsequent impact of European colonisation on Native Americans -- along with its usual corollaries of introduced diseases, land dispossession, and genocide -- were to change all that. By 1920, the Native American population reached a nadir of 400,000, having fallen from an estimated 30-40 million at time of contact (see McKay & Wong, 1988). An educational policy over this period of actively repressing Native American languages, and replacing them with English, also contributed significantly to the related decline and extinction of many Native American languages.[27] Notwithstanding this sorry history, Native American languages are still spoken today in the USA, although they are seldom commented upon. In the 1990 census, 1,878,275 people identified as Native Americans of whom 331,600 over the age of five years reported speaking a Native American language. Altogether, 26 such languages were identified in the 1990 census as having at least 1000 speakers (Ricento, 1996).

So much for the myth of a monolingual USA. But what of the pivotal role of English in US society, and the language policies and practices which have supposedly *consistently* supported this? Again, all is not as it seems. There are actually two clear countervailing tensions apparent historically in the USA's approach to language policy and planning. On the one hand, there has certainly been a clear drive towards English linguistic uniformity at various times in the USA's history. This drive has been characterised most often by a prominent advocacy of the role of English as a central organising symbol of American identity. In this context, much has been made of John Jay's assertion at the time of America's independence 'that Providence has been pleased to give this one connected country, to one united people; a people descended from the same ancestors, *speaking the same language*, professing the same religion' (cited in Shell, 1993: 103; my emphasis). Likewise, Roosevelt's famous appeal 'The Children of the Crucible' in 1917 is often invoked: 'we have room for but one language here, and this is the English language, for we intend to see that the crucible turns our people out as Americans, of American nationality, and not as dwellers in a polyglot boarding house' (cited in Edwards, 1994: 166).[28] Relatedly, there has been a strong emphasis historically in American federal policy on fostering English as the language of administration, education and the legislature, a feature the English Only movement are only too

willing to point out. In effect, from the time of the Louisiana Purchase, English has been promoted as the language of government, voting and the courts, often in the face of strong local opposition. English has also been the recognised language of instruction in schools since the Constitution of 1868 (Hernández-Chávez, 1995). The example of the trenchant assimilationist language and education policies directed towards Native Americans would also seem to bear out the general significance attributed to English in the educational domain.

On the other hand, there have also been significant examples where minority language rights -- albeit limited ones -- have been specifically accommodated. These examples have simply been ignored by the English Only movement (as they were by Roosevelt before them) but they cannot just be wished away, much as some might want them to be. The historical language context of the USA is thus far more complex than English Only advocates would care to admit. For a start, one of the principal reasons that the English Only movement places such store in a constitutional amendment is because of the *deliberate* ambiguity of the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution in relation to the role of English in US society. Although the documents were written in English, neither the Declaration of Independence nor the Constitution specified an official language for the United States. This was not an oversight, as the English Only movement argues, but a planned political strategy (Heath, 1977, 1981). Underpinning this decision of the Founding Fathers was the centrality of the principle of individual choice, exemplified in the notion of free speech, and the related adoption of a laissez-faire language policy, deriving from the British model, which eschewed the legislative formality of granting 'official status' to English (see Marshall, 1986; Nunberg, 1992). Coupled with the widespread multilingualism described above, 'the intellectual climate of the times, which depended upon communication across language groups ... supported maximum flexibility in language use' (Heath, 1977: 270).

This 'flexibility of language use' was also reflected in the well-established practice of granting limited minority language rights to (some) minority language speakers in the USA. The territory of Louisiana is a case in point. When Louisiana was annexed from France to the US in 1803, the then President, Jefferson, initially made few accommodations to the territory's Francophone majority. His first act, in fact, was to appoint a territorial governor who spoke no French and who proposed that English be the official language of the local government (Leibowitz, 1969).

In the face of strong opposition, this policy was subsequently modified. After Louisiana joined the Union in 1812, Louisiana's laws and other public documents were printed in French, and the courts and legislature operated bilingually. These concessions, along with the right to bilingual schooling, survived in Louisiana law until 1921 (Crawford, 1992a). However, despite the relatively liberal language policy adopted over this time, the eventual demise of French as a public language was seldom in any doubt (Ricento, 1996).

The German-speaking minority in the USA was also accorded a measure of minority language protection, both prior and subsequent to the country's declared independence in 1776. Indeed, the strength of the German language in Pennsylvania led the essayist and publisher Benjamin Franklin to complain bitterly in 1750: 'Why should *Pennsylvania*, founded by the *English*, become a colony of *Aliens*, who will shortly be so numerous as to Germanise us instead of our Anglifying them, and will never adopt our Language or Customs...' (cited in Crawford, 1992a: 37).[29] Official proclamations were published in German until 1794 and at least 32 German language newspapers were published between 1732 and 1800 (Crawford, 1992b). While the process of anglicisation and assimilation had reduced the influence of German in public life by 1815, the language remained a strong, unofficial presence throughout the nineteenth century, both in Pennsylvania and elsewhere. The ongoing strength of the German language was attributable here largely to a new influx of German migrants, beginning in the 1820s, who settled in cities like St Louis, Milwaukee and Cincinnati as well as in the rural heartlands (Daniels, 1991). The German language dominated cultural and educational institutions in these areas and resulted in the widespread establishment of German language schools, both private *and* public. Beginning in 1839, a number of states passed laws allowing German as the language of instruction in public schools, where numbers warranted, a clear tolerance-oriented language right (Dicker, 1996).

The growing acceptance of German language education may have continued well into the twentieth century had it not been for two events. From the 1880s, state legislation was passed in several states mandating English as the only language of public (and even private) education. These clearly restrictionist policies were directed principally against German language schools and formed part of a wider anti-immigration 'Americanisation movement' that emerged at this time (Crawford, 1989; Baron, 1990; Piatt, 1990). Although many of these laws were subsequently

rescinded by the courts, the deleterious effects on German bilingual schooling were reinforced by the subsequent anti-German hysteria surrounding the First World War. The most famous case of language restrictionism at this time occurred in Nebraska. A 1913 state law required public schools to provide instruction in any European language if 50 or more parents requested it; German was the only language ever requested. In 1918 the law was repealed on the basis that it was pro-German and thus un-American. The legislation that replaced it went so far as to prohibit any public or private school teacher from teaching a subject in a foreign language or, indeed, from teaching a foreign language *as a subject* (Dicker, 1996). The severity of the approach is not dissimilar to those adopted in totalitarian regimes such as Franco's Spain. The new law was overturned in the Supreme Court in 1923 in the *Meyer v. Nebraska* case (see below). However, by then, the damage was done. By the 1930s, bilingual instruction of any type in German had all but disappeared in the United States, while the study of German as a foreign language had fallen from 24 per cent of secondary school students nationally in 1915 to less than one per cent in 1922 (Crawford, 1989).

One further example of the formal recognition of minority language rights can be explored with regard to the use of Spanish in the state of New Mexico. Along with Hawai'i, New Mexico is one of two US states which are officially bilingual; a feature of US society seldom acknowledged by the English Only movement. Like Hawai'i's recognition of the indigenous Hawai'ian language, the official bilingualism in New Mexico acknowledges that Spanish is the language of an historical ethnie not (simply) an immigrant language. When the area was ceded to the United States by Mexico at the end of the Mexican-American war, via the (1848) **Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo**, over half its population were Spanish-speaking. As with the incorporation of French speakers in Louisiana before it, local language use was at first ignored. However, Spanish soon came to play a more prominent role within the territory when the US Congress in 1853 authorised the New Mexico Assembly to hire translators and interpreters to conduct its affairs. Subsequent funding was provided in 1884 for the translation and publication of the Assembly's proceedings into Spanish (Marshall, 1986) and a school law passed in that year permitted either Spanish or English as the language of instruction (Hernández-Chávez, 1995). With the eventual granting of statehood in 1912,[30] these provisions were further formalised in New Mexico's constitution. All laws could be published in both English and Spanish on a 20 year 'trial basis' and thereafter 'as

the legislature may provide'. Given the relatively hostile climate towards minority languages at that time in the USA (see above), the ensuing decades saw the gradual ascendancy of English. Nonetheless, provisions for training teachers in both languages were established for the purposes of better serving Spanish-speaking pupils. Likewise, guarantees were provided to ensure that Spanish-speaking children were not discriminated against or segregated in schools. State statutes also called for the use of Spanish in a wide range of governmental activities, including elections, the posting of legal notices and bilingual/multicultural education (Dicker, 1996). In this last respect, the state's (1978) **Bilingual-Multicultural Act** specifically endorsed group maintenance approaches to bilingual education and has facilitated the ongoing formal presence of Spanish within New Mexico's schools.[31] Needless to say, as a result Spanish is still widely spoken in New Mexico, *alongside* English, in a wide range of language domains.

Before examining the English Only movement's third claim in relation to the language history of the United States -- that bilingual practices such as these threaten for the first time the ascendancy of English in the US -- I want to refer briefly to two key Supreme Court cases in this century which also support some accommodation of minority rights. The first has already been mentioned, *Meyer v. Nebraska* (1923), which challenged the restrictionist language policies adopted by Nebraska at the end of the First World War -- one of many states to do so at the time. The Supreme Court ruled in this case that the state *was* able to restrict the language of instruction to English in state-funded schools but could not do so for private schools. The Court based its argument on the due process clause of the 14th Amendment which protects certain substantive individual liberties from restrictive state policies.[32] Since language is not specifically mentioned in this clause, an important precedent was thus established with regard to the protection of private minority language education.[33] That said, the judgement was also clearly sympathetic to the general tenor of the state language policy in question, with its strong emphasis on the centrality of English: 'Perhaps it would be highly advantageous if all had ready understanding of our ordinary speech, but this cannot be coerced by methods which conflict with the Constitution -- a desirable end cannot be promoted by prohibited means' (cited in Marshall, 1986: 15). Thus, the decision upholds only the most minimal interpretation of tolerance-oriented language rights, although this in itself remains an important guarantee in the US context.

Another landmark decision was *Lau v. Nichols* (1974) where the Supreme Court ruled in a case brought by Chinese-American parents that the English-only education policy in the San Francisco Unified School district effectively excluded Chinese-speaking children from meaningful participation in the education system. The Court concluded that this constituted a violation of equality of treatment under the (1965) **Civil Rights Act**: 'Under these state-imposed standards there is no equality of treatment merely by providing students with the same facilities, textbooks, teachers, and curriculum; for students who do not understand English are effectively foreclosed from any meaningful education' (cited in de Varennes, 1996a: 197). The decision was interpreted by proponents and opponents alike as at least tacit endorsement of bilingual education. However, the Court specifically refrained from ordering any particular educational remedy. As Macías observes, 'it is tempting to say that somehow the *Lau* decision created some [minority] language rights ... it did not. The plaintiffs sought no specific remedy [from] the School District and the Court demanded none' (1979: 92). In effect, the court did not make it a legal requirement for schools to provide bilingual education but simply ruled on the illegality of excluding minority language students from such programmes.[34] While still limited, this position nonetheless extends *Meyer v. Nebraska* considerably. *Lau* at least allows for the *possibility* of some state-funded provision of bilingual education even if the non-specificity of the decision has meant that the standards of compliance associated with it remain somewhat varied (see Feinberg, 1990).

There is clearly then a precedent in both law and state policy and practice for a limited recognition of minority language and education rights in the USA. But this might appear to confirm the fear expressed by the English Only movement that such concessions, along with the provision of bilingual voting ballots, threaten the ascendancy of English in the USA (see, for example, Bikales, 1986: 84-85). Not so. If it is not already apparent by now, such an assertion is simply nonsense. Linguistic shift *from* minority languages *to* English -- what Gorlach (1986) has described as 'reduced multilingualism' -- is the dominant pattern in the USA. In this regard, less than four per cent of the population are actually non-English speakers (Amastae, 1990). According to the 1990 census, 80 per cent of those over the age of five for whom English is not a first language speak English 'well' or 'very well' (Ricento, 1996). Immigrants are actually currently shifting to English at a faster rate than was true of European immigrants at the turn of the century (Baron, 1990). Indeed, 75 per cent of all Hispanic immigrants -- who cause the most 'concern' for English Only

advocates -- speak English frequently each day (Veltman, 1983, 1988). The only distinction of Hispanic communities to this general pattern of language shift is that it takes perhaps one further generation to occur fully -- that is, four as opposed to two or three -- given the continued influx of monolingual Spanish speakers (Fishman, 1992). As Veltman sensibly concludes, the only languages that are threatened in the USA are languages *other than* English.

Misrepresenting bilingual education

The historical fictions perpetuated by the English Only movement in relation to minority language policy and practice are thus plain to see. However, it does not end there. A similar approach is adopted in arguing about the link between English language facility and subsequent educational achievement. Not only this, English Only advocates also proceed to *actively* misrepresent the educational (and psychological) merits of bilingual education; an approach which has been aptly described by Cummins (1995) as a deliberate 'discourse of disinformation'. This dual strategy can now be examined.

A key tenet of much English Only rhetoric is that English is essential for social mobility in US society, or rather, that a lack of English *consigns* one inevitably to the social and economic margins. As Linda Chávez, who was the President of US English from 1987 until her resignation the following year (see below), has argued: 'Hispanics who learn English will be able to avail themselves of opportunities. Those who do not will be relegated to second class citizenship' (cited in Crawford 1992c: 172). We have also seen this argument expressed by Schlesinger in Chapter 3 in relation to the 'ghettoisation' of minorities. There is certainly a measure of truth in the claim that learning standard English in the USA is an important prerequisite for participating in the social and economic 'mainstream'. Moreover, this conception is not the sole preserve of conservative commentators (see Macedo, 1994; McLaren, 1995; May, 1994, 1998b). Donaldo Macedo, a trenchant critic of English Only, has argued, following Gramsci, that bilingual 'educators should understand the value of mastering the standard English language of the wider society. It is through the full appropriation of the standard English language that linguistic-minority students find themselves linguistically empowered to engage in dialogue with various sectors of the wider society' (1994: 128). However, where the intellectual dishonesty of the English Only movement becomes apparent, and where critics like Macedo and myself would beg

to differ, is in the two allied claims that are then made: 1) that a mastery of English is *the* key determinant in effecting the social and economic 'betterment' of marginalised minority language speakers, and; 2) that the best means of achieving such mastery is via English-only educational policies.

Guy Wright, a prominent media supporter of English Only policies, argued in a 1983 editorial in the *San Francisco Examiner* that 'the individual who fails to learn English is condemned to semi-citizenship, condemned to low pay, condemned to remain in the ghetto' (cited in Secada & Lightfoot, 1993: 47). What this argument conveniently overlooks is the central question of the wider *structural* disadvantages facing minority language speakers. Indeed, on this question, English Only advocates are almost wholly silent. Mastery of English, while important, is only *one* variable in the equation (see Chapter 4). After all, African Americans have been speaking English for two hundred years and yet many still find themselves relegated to urban ghettos (Macedo, 1994). Likewise, English is almost as inoperative with respect to Hispanic social mobility as it is with respect to black social mobility. 25 per cent of Hispanics currently live at or below the poverty line, a rate that is at least twice as high as the proportion of Hispanics who are not English-speaking (Fishman, 1992). As Macedo concludes:

> It would be more socially constructive and beneficial if the zeal that propels the US English movement to spread the 'English only' gospel were diverted toward the struggle to end violent racism, to alleviate the causes of poverty, homelessness, and family breakdown, among other social ills that characterise the lived experience of minorities in the United States. If these social issues are not dealt with appropriately, it is naive to think that the acquisition of the English language alone will, somehow, magically eclipse the raw and cruel injustices and oppression perpetrated against the dispossessed class of minorities in the United States. (1994: 128; see also Kozol, 1991).

As for sustaining the merits of an English-only educational approach, this is only achieved by a deliberate misrepresentation of, and polemical attack on bilingual education. The strategy adopted here by the English Only movement is effected on two key fronts. First, English Only advocates imply that, given sufficient motivation, anyone can master English in an English-only environment, a position which is usually tied to the related lament that bilingual education has replaced the beloved 'sink or swim' approach (see Imhoff, 1990; Porter, 1990). In effect, the argument is that 'children of normal intelligence' are sure to learn English if they are exposed to

it. As Donahue (1985) argues, this position conveniently blames the victim and, in so doing, masks a deeply racist attitude to non-English speakers.[35] We need only recall the judge's reasoning in the Amarillo, Texas case to confirm this. Second, the English Only movement continues to argue on this basis that bilingual education disadvantages minority children both educationally and socially. The position adopted here stands in sharp contrast to the bulk of academic research on the topic which points strongly to the attested social and educational merits of learning in one's first language and to the particular benefits of maintenance bilingual programmes. Such research began with UNESCO's (1953) unequivocal endorsement of 'mother-tongue teaching' and has been consistently reinforced since (see Genesee, 1987; Corson, 1993; Baker, 1996 for useful summaries; see also my discussion earlier in the chapter). Given this, the only way that the English Only movement can sustain its position is by deliberately ignoring these widely attested conclusions. As Cummins (1995) observes, drawing on Chomsky (1987), the 'threat of the good example' must be neutralised. This is achieved by the use of a limited number of deeply flawed US government sponsored research studies which cast (some) doubt on bilingual education. To explore these studies further, and their inherent limitations, it is necessary to sketch briefly the political background which led to their commissioning.

Much of the concern expressed by English Only advocates about the emergence of bilingual education relates to its apparent endorsement in the (1968) **Bilingual Education Act**. The Act was actually an extension (Title VII) of an earlier one -- the (1965) **Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA)** -- established by Lyndon Johnson in his 'war against poverty' programme. In this respect, both its remit and underlying philosophy were directed at rectifying the poor educational performance 'of limited English-speaking ability' students. These students were also equated, more broadly, with the economically disadvantaged. Critics like Hayakawa argued that the **Bilingual Education Act** thus facilitated the development of not only transitional bilingual programmes but also group maintenance bilingual approaches, depending on how one interpreted its rather vague remit. In fact, there is a convincing argument that this was not the case. Initially, these broad provisions did allow for the establishment of federally funded group maintenance programmes, developments that were reflected in the 1974 reauthorisation of the Act. However, with the increasing political hostility towards group maintenance bilingual education over the course of the 1980s, allied with the Reagan presidency of the time, the

emphases increasingly shifted to transitional and English-only programmes. By the time of the 1988 reauthorisation of the Act, these views had become so firmly entrenched that advocates of bilingual education were having to fight to defend even transitional programmes. In this respect, the vagueness of the Act's remit has actually militated against, rather than fostered the extension of bilingual education initiatives (Moran, 1990; Secada & Lightfoot, 1993). The implicit deficit approach underlying what remit there is within the Act also lends itself far more easily to a subtractive view of bilingualism and bilingual education than to an enrichment perspective. Add to this a pattern of consistent under-funding for what was to begin with only a modest grant-in-aid programme anyway, and it is not hard to see that the Act's influence on group-maintenance bilingualism is far less than is often claimed by its opponents.

Part of the success in neutering what little impact the **Bilingual Education Act** might have had is related to the English Only movement's mobilisation of two high profile federally funded reports critical of bilingual education. The first of these, the American Institute for Research's (AIR) evaluation of bilingual education programmes, was commissioned by the United States Office of Education and published in 1978. It provided an overview of federally funded bilingual programmes operating at the time and found that such programmes had no significant impact on educational achievement in English, although they did enhance native-like proficiency. It furthermore suggested that pupils were being kept in transitional bilingual programmes longer than necessary, thus contributing to the segregation of such students from 'mainstream' classes (Moran, 1990). Despite significant criticism of its methodology (see below), these findings dealt a considerable blow to bilingual education advocates and led Congress in 1978 to begin the process of shifting the remit of the **Bilingual Education Act** towards a more English-only approach.

The conclusions of the AIR study were seemingly replicated by a second piece of federally commissioned research by Baker & de Kanter (1981, 1983) who reviewed the literature and likewise concluded that bilingual education was not advancing the English language skills and academic achievements of minority language students. In short, Baker & de Kanter argued that students had no clear advantage over those in English-only programmes. Given the increasingly sceptical political climate of the time, this research generated enormous publicity and exerted even

more influence on subsequent federal policy. However, as Crawford (1989) observes, while the Baker & de Kanter (1983) report is easily the most quoted federal pronouncement on bilingual education, it is probably the most criticised as well. As with its predecessor, much of this criticism had to do with the methodology that was employed. For example, as with the AIR study, Baker & de Kanter specifically rejected the use of data gathered through students' first languages. They also failed to account for the fact that two thirds of the comparison group in English-only education programmes *had previously been in bilingual programmes* where, presumably, they had benefited from first language instruction (Crawford, 1992a). Moreover, in failing to differentiate between transitional and maintenance bilingual programmes in their analysis, the somewhat lesser educational effectiveness of the former, which constituted the majority of the programmes under review, inevitably subsumed the better educational results of the latter (Cummins, 1995). Overall, the inadequacy of Baker & de Kanter's findings has been confirmed by Willig's (1985, 1987) subsequent meta-analyses of their data. Willig controlled for 183 variables that they had failed to take into account. She found, as a result, small to moderate differences in favour of bilingual education, even when these were predominantly transitional programmes.

Willig's conclusions, which confirm what is elsewhere widely acknowledged, are also replicated in the most recent federally funded bilingual research. In the largest study yet, Ramírez et al. (1991) compared English-only programmes with transitional and group maintenance bilingual programmes, following 2,300 Spanish-speaking students over four years. The findings clearly supported bilingual education and found that the greatest growth in mathematics, English language skills and English reading was particularly evident among students in late-exit [group maintenance] bilingual programmes where students had been taught predominantly in Spanish. By implication, the Ramírez study also confirmed another feature which is widely corroborated by other research on bilingual education, that minority language students who receive most of their education in English rather than their first language are *more* likely to fall behind and drop out of school.[36] What is so interesting here is that this research has generated far less interest and had far less impact on subsequent federal policy than its two predecessors. As Ricento observes of this, in spite of an impressive amount of both qualitative and quantitative research now

available on the merits of bilingual education, 'the public debate (to the extent that there is one) [in the USA] tends to focus on perceptions and not on facts' (1996: 142).

The English Only movement thus continues to insist in the face of consistent published research to the contrary that English-only programmes are the best educational approach to adopt for minority language students. In so doing, it uses to great effect the few high profile but methodologically suspect studies which appear to support its case. This would seem to amount to little more than cynical (although highly successful) political manipulation, an assertion that is confirmed when one looks at the movement's failure to fund the English-only programmes for minority students that it so vociferously advocates. In this respect, English Only is clearly found wanting. Many of the public who supported the establishment of official state-level English policies logically assumed that a principal concern of the legislation was to expand the opportunities for immigrants to learn English. However, logical or not, this was the case. While US English spent lavishly to get these measures on the ballot, in 1988 it declined to support legislation creating a modestly funded federal programme for adult learners of English (Crawford, 1992c). As a result of public criticism at the time, US English did make some subsequent effort to fund similar ventures, but these efforts have remained largely desultory and continue to constitute only the barest minimum of their total funding efforts. The attitude adopted here appears to be that English language programmes should be the sole responsibility of Spanish-speaking volunteers! Guy Wright, who we have already encountered, wrote somewhat wistfully along these lines in his media column in 1986, suggesting that a grassroots volunteer movement was by far the best solution since 'the legislature will balk when it realises how much it would cost to hire enough credentialed teachers and professional administrators to cope with the waiting lists for English classes'. Taking the latter route was also not necessary in his view since 'the immigrant doesn't need to learn perfect English ... [only] survival English'. Accordingly, 'volunteers will need some guidance from the state. But not too much. A simple briefing and a handbook that set out the lessons should do' (cited in Tollefson, 1991: 124). The sentiments expressed here are clear enough and illustrate well the underlying racism and indifference towards minority language speakers that are evident in so much of English Only rhetoric (see below). As James Crawford concludes:

One thing is clear. Rather than promote English proficiency, 99 per cent of the organisation's efforts go toward restricting the use of other languages. Certainly there is nothing in Official English legislation to help anyone learn English. On the other hand, there is much to penalise those who have yet to do so.... English Only is a label that has stuck, despite the protests of US English, because it accurately sums up the group's logic: That people will speak English only if they are forced to. That the crutch of bilingual education must be yanked away or newcomers will be permanently handicapped. That immigrants are too lazy or dim-witted to accept 'the primacy of English' on their own. (1992c: 176)

The return of the nativist

The nativism that informs the English Only movement should by now be readily apparent. After all, if US English is not actually concerned with extending opportunities to minority language speakers to learn English, there must be another, more sinister agenda at work. In this respect, it is interesting to note that all previous movements which advocated English-only policies did so as part of a wider nativist and anti-immigrationist agenda. The current English Only movement, despite its disavowals, is no exception to this trend -- in effect, it provides us with a modern variant of the Americanisation Movement which swept the country around the turn of the century. The links that the organisation US English has with anti-immigrationist groups would appear to confirm this. The co-founder of US English, John Tanton, was also previously the founder of a smaller anti-immigration organisation, 'Federation for American Immigration Reform' (FAIR), as well as being a former President of a similar organisation, 'Zero Population Growth'.[37]

The principal concern of Tanton, and other anti-immigrationists involved in the English Only movement, is the rapidly rising Hispanic population in the United States -- what Tanton has termed 'the Latin onslaught' on the USA.[38] These views were exposed when an internal memorandum written by Tanton in 1986 was made public two years later. The racist content of the memorandum resulted in his resignation. In it, he discusses a range of cultural threats posed by 'Spanish-speaking immigrants', including a lack of involvement in public affairs, Roman Catholicism, low 'educability', high school-dropout rates and 'high fertility' (Crawford, 1992c)[39] A number of notable public supporters of the organisation also resigned at the time because of the anti-Hispanic and anti-Catholic sentiments expressed, including Linda Chávez, the then President of US English.

Despite this setback, US English has continued to garner increasingly wide support. And this is where the present English Only movement differs from its predecessors. In short, it cannot *simply* be a nativist movement -- or, rather, it cannot just be a simple (transparent) nativist movement -- since, one would expect, it would not have generated the broad following that it has. This would appear to be confirmed by the extent of the movement's appeal to many minority language speakers themselves, as we saw previously with the success of California's Proposition 63. Indeed, its prominent minority supporters have been regularly paraded by the movement as the epitome of the 'good alien' (Tarver, 1994); the success stories of immigration and the embodiment of the American dream. These have included Hayakawa himself -- although, as Donahue (1985) points out, he actually came from British Columbia -- Gerda Bikales, and Linda Chávez.

How is the movement able to generate this wide appeal, among both majority and minority language speakers? One way it does so is by *inverting* the usual immigration and language axis. Where previous movements concentrated primarily on concerns over immigration, from which arose (subsequent) language policies, the English Only movement attempts the reverse, thus making it far more politically palatable. In short, it concentrates almost solely on the status of the English language in the USA as a convenient proxy for a more overtly racial politics. The approach adopted here is similar to the 'new racism' which substitutes (at least ostensibly) culturalist arguments about 'race' for biological ones (see Barker, 1981; Donald & Rattansi, 1992; Small, 1994; Gillborn, 1995). Deutsch has observed that 'language is an automatic signalling system, second only to race, in identifying targets for privilege or discrimination' (1975: 7; see also Chapter 4). James Crawford argues, along more specific lines:

> The English Only movement, an outgrowth of the immigration-restrictionist lobby, has skilfully manipulated language as a symbol of national unity and ethnic divisiveness. Early in this century, those who sought to exclude other races [sic] and cultures invoked claims of Anglo-Saxon superiority. But in the 1980s, explicit racial loyalties are no longer acceptable in political discourse. Language loyalties, on the other hand, remain largely devoid of associations with social injustice. While race is [supposedly] immutable, immigrants can and often do exchange their mother tongue for another. And so, for those who resent the presence of Hispanics and Asians, language politics has become a convenient surrogate for racial politics. (1989: 14)[40]

The 'curse' of multilingualism

Which brings us to the fourth and final dimension of the English Only movement that I want to examine here, its argument that multilingualism and minority language rights are inherently destabilising to the nation-state. As we saw in Chapter 3, this is a view that is widely shared by both liberal and conservative commentators. Given its common sense assumptions, it also garners considerable support from among the wider public, providing another reason for the English Only movement's wide appeal. Thus, Kathryn Bricker, former executive director of US English, can assert:

> Language is so much a part of our lives that it can be a great tool either for unity or disunity. And we are getting close to the point where we have a challenge to the common language that we share.... We are basically at a crossroads. We can reaffirm our need for a common language, or we can slowly go down the road of division along language lines. (cited in Secada & Lightfoot, 1993: 46)

Other assertions are even more apocalyptic -- emphasising the potential nightmares of separatism and civil strife apparent in prominent 'ethnic conflicts' elsewhere in the world. Gary Imhoff, for example, baldly states that 'language diversity has been a major cause of [international] conflict.... Any honest student of the sociology of language should admit that multilingual societies have been less united and internally peaceful than single-language societies' (1987: 40). Likewise, Hayakawa has argued:

> For the first time in our history, our nation [sic] is faced with the possibility of the kind of linguistic division that has torn apart Canada in recent years; that has been a major feature of the unhappy history of Belgium, split into speakers of French and Flemish; that is at this very moment a bloody division between the Sinhalese and Tamil populations of Sri Lanka. (cited in Nunberg, 1992: 492)

However, as I have already indicated in the preceding chapter, the position painted here is simply wrong -- both in its historical and comparative dimensions. Historically, the principal cause of most language-based conflicts has been the *denial* of legitimate minority language rights rather than their recognition. This is true of Canada, Belgium and Sri Lanka.[41] Relatedly, the comparisons drawn between the USA and these examples are also misplaced and misleading. In Canada and Belgium, minority language claims centre on the rights of historical ethnies who are formally recognised, at least ostensibly, in the bicultural and bilingual frameworks of the countries

concerned. The question is thus not about the eventual linguistic assimilation of these minority language speakers, and the best way(s) this might be achieved, as in the USA. Rather, it concerns how separate language recognition as befits their status as ethnies can be achieved, and how past injustices which have militated against such recognition can be rectified (see Taylor, 1992; Coulombe, 1995). Although there are also historical ethnies within the USA, notably Native Americans and some Spanish speakers, the principal concerns of the language debates there remain focused on new minorities. Likewise, the erosion and infringement of existing *constitutional* minority language rights, leading to the threat of conflict and secession, has no precedent in the USA, not even with the **Louisiana Purchase** or the **Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo** (Magnet, 1990).

Contrasting Québec

These distinctions can be highlighted further by a closer examination of the language debates in Québec, along with their broader impact on Canada. Francophones in Québec at the time of the 1990 census constituted a clear majority (83 per cent) in the province, and a considerable minority (23 per cent) throughout the whole of Canada (Forbes, 1993). Along with the historical status of Francophones as one of the two colonial charter groups of Canada, these numbers might suggest a measure of cultural and linguistic security for French. Not so. The history of Francophones in Canada conforms broadly to the experiences of minority language speakers elsewhere. Since the defeat of the French in Québec in 1759, and with its subsequent incorporation into the Canadian Confederation in 1867, Francophones have clearly been the minority partner in Canadian institutional life. In short, they have been subject to the political, cultural, and economic dominance of English-speakers (Anglophones) throughout Canada and, until recently, in Québec itself. However, it is true to say that Francophones, at least in Québec, have also consistently achieved, and been able to maintain a considerable degree of institutional autonomy (C. Williams, 1994). Initially, this was the result of the relative isolation of Québec; an isolation that was due to its predominantly rural outlook and its Catholicism. Thus, during this time, Québécois identity was defined primarily by its rural and religious associations.

However, with the emergence of the 'Quiet Revolution' in the 1950 and 1960s -- which saw the transformation of Québec into a modern western economy -- the role of the church faded rapidly and language came to replace it as the key indicator of Québécois identity. The latter development was reaffirmed by two important commissions at that time. The *Parent Commission* of 1966 recommended that the major responsibility of the provincial government was to protect the French language, regulate its use, encourage its improvement, and ensure the fullest possible development of the culture it expressed (Mallea, 1989). The *Laurendeau-Dunton Commission*, which first reported in 1967, found that the wider principle of French/English language equality enshrined in the Confederation could only realistically be achieved within Québec, let alone elsewhere in Canada, when the marked economic and educational disparities between Francophones and Anglophones were addressed. In Québec, for example, the Catholic church had historically discouraged Francophones from involvement in the business sector. This had resulted in a cultural division of labour in which an Anglicised elite dominated the economy, and where English had accordingly become inextricably associated with social mobility. French was further threatened by a declining birth rate among the Francophone population, by increased emigration to other provinces, and by an increasing pattern of new minorities in Québec choosing to send their children to English-speaking schools. These immediate concerns were also framed within a wider scepticism towards the Canadian federal government's bilingual policy which seemed to be doing little to redress the decline of French throughout Canada. Indeed, given the predominance of English elsewhere in Canada, and in prestigious institutional domains within Québec, only an active promotion-oriented language policy in favour of French could redress the balance. This was the conclusion of the *Laurendeau-Dunton Commission* since, in its view, 'the life of the French-Canadian culture necessarily implies the life of the French language' (cited in Coulombe, 1995: 75).

As a result of this increasing focus on language as the core of Québécois identity, a range of significant language legislation actively promoting French was enacted in the 1970s. These legislative developments were also facilitated by the rise of the nationalist Parti Québécois to provincial government for the first time in 1976. The most prominent of the language laws passed at this time, Bill 101 (*Charte de la langue Française*, 1977), has also been the most controversial.

The Bill aimed to address the historical cultural division of labour in Québec by formalising French in economic, educational and political domains. As the Bill's architect, Camille Laurin, argued:

> The Québec we wish to build will be essentially French. The fact that the majority of its population is French will be clearly visible -- at work, in communications and in the countryside. It will also be a country in which the traditional balance of power will be altered, especially in regard to the economy ... this will accompany, symbolise and support a *reconquest* by the French-speaking majority in Québec of that control of the economy that we ought to have. (Laurin, 1977; cited in C. Williams, 1994: 196; my emphasis)

Specifically, the Bill entailed that all children, except those whose parents had themselves been taught in English *in Québec*, attend Francophone schools -- requiring, in effect, all new minorities, and other Canadians, to be educated in French. All commercial signs were to be solely in French. And all businesses with over 50 employees had to undertake 'francisation' programmes so as to ensure the right of any Quebecker to be able to work in French, in both the public and private sector. Needless to say, the Bill's requirements generated considerable opposition, particularly from the Anglophone minority in Québec and the Anglophone majority elsewhere in Canada. Subsequently, aspects of Bill 101 have been ruled unconstitutional. The educational restrictions were deemed by the Canadian Supreme Court in 1984 to contravene Clause 23 of the (1982) **Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms**, protecting the rights of minority language speakers. The provincial government was able to disregard this ruling, however, by using the 'notwithstanding clause' of Canada's constitution, arguing that Bill 101 was in the best interests of Québec's distinct character (Lemco, 1992). The commercial signage restrictions were also deemed discriminatory by the Supreme Court in the *Ford v. Québec* (1988) case. The general scepticism in Canada towards the arguments employed in defence of Bill 101 was also to result in the eventual failure of the (1987) **Meech Lake Accord**. The Accord had attempted to reconcile Québec's aspirations as a 'distinct society' with the federalism of the Canadian state as represented by the **Canadian Charter of Rights**. However, it lapsed when 3 provinces failed to sign it over concerns about the 'distinct society' clause (see C. Williams, 1994: 210-212). The Accord's failure has had ongoing ramifications for the increasingly fraught question of Québec's relationship to Canada, fuelling calls among Québec nationalists for independence, and resulting in the 1995 referendum on independence which was only very narrowly lost.

In fairness to the English Only movement, the language laws of Québec are far from unproblematic, certainly. However, it is surely ironic that the most problematic aspects of these language policies -- and certainly, the most criticised -- are those which most closely reflect the majoritarian tendencies of the English Only movement itself. The Québec language laws have largely achieved their intention of raising the public profile of French within Québec. In effect, the previously marginalised status of French within the economy and within education has been reversed.[42] But they have done so apparently at the expense of certain individual freedoms with regard to language choice.[43]

Even here though the comparison is somewhat strained since the Québec laws are not as exclusionary as they might at first appear. For example, aboriginal peoples in Québec are also accorded distinct language rights on the basis that they are also historical ethnies. The architect of Bill 101, Laurin, admitted as much when observing: 'the Amerindians and the Inuit are the only ones who ... can consider themselves as peoples separate from the totality of Québécois and in consequence [can] insist on special treatment under the law' (cited in Coulombe, 1995: 119). Similarly, the intent of the legislation is not to curb the use of minority languages themselves, as is the case with English Only. Rather, it argues for the use of the *majority* French language *within Québec* in all public domains. This constitutes a central part of the wider political question raised by Francophones' *minority* position within Canada and is entirely consistent with the granting of promotion-oriented rights in international law to minority language speakers, *where numbers warrant*. In this respect, the questions raised here are inevitably related to the broader issue of the degree to which Francophone speakers in Québec (and elsewhere in Canada) can maintain their *autonomy*, and the language and cultural rights attendant on this, as a legitimate part of the historical power-sharing agreement with Anglophone Canadians. Any ongoing discontents concern the failure adequately to ensure these protections.

It should thus be clear that the example of Québec bears little actual relation to the alarmist claims invoked by English Only advocates, both in substance and effect. While clearly not without its tensions, it should be stressed again that where these do arise, they relate principally to the denial rather than the recognition of minority language claims. Such a conclusion also points to a second fundamental weakness of the English Only position on multilingualism. If this contra-indicated

position is actually the case, then far from ensuring national unity, restrictionist language policies are much more likely to precipitate *disunity*. In short, attempting to enforce language homogeneity is far more likely to foster disunity than to ameliorate it. Indeed, of all possible scenarios, this one is likely to be the most divisive, the most contentious and fractious (Donahue, 1985). As Donahue proceeds to argue: 'The final irony of [the English Only] approach to the matter of language use is that by ... aligning itself with a theory which holds that all ethnic intergroup behaviour is inevitably conflict producing, [it] forecloses itself from the possibility of unifying American society' (1985: 107).

In contrast, a 'language competent society' (Padilla, 1991) -- where all minority language speakers are able to learn English, while also retaining their first language -- is far more likely to result in both social mobility for minority speakers and a more flexible and less contentious national language policy overall.[44] As Marshall & Gonzalez conclude, 'it is not multilingualism itself that is disruptive, but denying a group that speaks a different language from participating in greater social mobility' (1990: 33). Given the distinctions that I have consistently drawn between national and ethnic minority groups, one can also add here the historical claims of ethnies which, while they may incorporate issues of social mobility, are not principally dependent upon them.

A question of democracy

Which brings me to my final point. Why does the English Only movement persist in peddling its position in the face of seemingly insurmountable evidence to the contrary? 'Why', as Fishman despairingly asks, 'are facts so useless in this discussion?' (1992: 167). The answer returns us to the wider social, economic and political context within which all debates on minority language and education are embedded. The principal motivation which underlies the rationale of so much of the English Only movement is to ensure that the dominant group, or Staatsvolk, maintains political, social and economic control of the civic realm of the United States. After all, what else could explain the deliberate amnesia about minority language rights in the USA, the spurious association of multilingualism with conflict and fragmentation, and the rejection of the educational approach -- group maintenance bilingualism -- that has been widely attested as most likely to

benefit minority language students? Jim Cummins candidly observes of this last feature that such empowerment pedagogy will continue to be resisted simply because empowered people are more difficult to exploit: 'if minority groups develop the confidence in their own identity [which includes valuing their language and culture] and the knowledge and critical awareness to articulate their rights, then they become resistant to exploitation at the hands of the dominant group' (1995: 160).

I am not suggesting, by this, some kind of grand conspiracy theory, although conspiratorial (anti-immigrationist) elements do clearly exist within the English Only movement. Rather, I wish to highlight that the question of minority rights is not about a neutral, disinterested state responding to the claims of vociferous, 'politically motivated' minorities. It is about a *contest* in which *all* players are culturally and politically *situated* and one in which much is at stake on all sides. Specifically, it is a contest for recognition, for resources, and for justice, fairness and equity. As such, it is perhaps not surprising that many within the dominant ethnie are unwilling to renegotiate the terms of agreement which have served them so well in the past. However, do so they must. Otherwise, the greatest fear of many opponents of minority language and education rights will be realised; the eventual break-up of the nation-state that they are so intent on defending. This is simply because national and ethnic minority groups are increasingly unwilling to settle for the degree of marginalisation and cultural and language evisceration which have historically characterised their incorporation into modern nation-states. As I have argued in Chapter 2, many of these groups are not actually seeking independent statehood -- the sine qua non of political nationalism -- but they *are* seeking greater *ethnocultural* and *ethnolinguistic democracy*.

The litmus test facing the USA and so many other nation-states today is their capacity to move from political democracy to this wider recognition and incorporation of cultural and linguistic democratic rights. Such change involves *reimagining* the nation-state and the role of minority languages and cultures within it. It means balancing the at times countervailing demands of individual and group rights. And it requires broadening the conception of what constitutes *social, cultural and linguistic capital*, and how these may be defined and used in the private and public realms. At stake here are questions of individual and collective social mobility. Also at stake, however, are the wider questions of minority inclusion within, and exclusion from the nation-state,

and the historical power relations upon which these are predicated. Accordingly, no one is suggesting that reimagining the nation-state along these lines will be an uncontested and unproblematic task -- or, indeed, a panacea once accomplished. But if the obstacles are complex and daunting, and the implications of a reconstituted nation-state remain uncertain, the possibilities that inhere in such a task -- for *both* minorities *and* majorities -- are nonetheless significant enough to warrant a serious attempt. The stakes are high but the potential rewards are even more so. Just how high -- in both respects -- can be demonstrated by the in-depth case study of Wales which follows.

Notes -- Chapter 5

1. A similar situation presently exists in Turkey in relation to the 15 million Kurdish minority. In March, 1997 secret Turkish interior ministry documents were made public which stated: 'administrative and legal measures should be taken against those attempting to propagate the Kurdish language' (*The Guardian*: March 29, 1997).

2. While there are inevitably many intra- as well as inter-group differences, a *general pattern* of differential status and achievement is clearly apparent among many minority groups. In short, minorities tend to be *over-represented* in unfavourable social and educational indices in comparison to majority group members. As Churchill observes:

> policy making about the education of minorities must cope with an overriding fact: *almost every jurisdiction in the industrialized world is failing adequately to meet the educational needs of a significant number of members of linguistic and cultural minorities .... Measured against the criterion of ensuring linguistic and/or cultural survival in the long term, the shortfall is much more serious...* (1986: 8; emphasis in original).

3. As Howe argues: 'The principle of equal educational opportunity can only be realized for cultural minorities by rendering educational opportunities worth wanting, and rendering educational opportunities worth wanting requires that minorities not be required to give up their identities in order to enjoy them' (1992: 469).

4. Secada & Lightfoot (1993) observe, for example, that the purported trade-off between minority cultures and languages and access to opportunity is increasingly being seen (and rejected) as uneven by minority groups: give up your language and culture and you *might* have opportunity. When the latter is not forthcoming, communal anger has developed in response to prior generations being duped by this promise.

5. Research on 'family status' has included examination of the family environment, child-rearing practices, and linguistic repertoires used in working-class and ethnic minority homes. Particular interest was expressed in the supposedly poor language development of children from these family environments as explained by one, or a combination, of the above variables. The debates and counter-debates over these issues, particularly in sociolinguistics, are well documented (see Valencia, 1997 for a useful review). However, whatever variables were used, the starting premise was invariably one of cultural and linguistic *deficit* in relation to majority group 'norms'.

6. For a fuller discussion of multiculturalism, and its limitations see May (1994, 1998c).

7. It is now widely recognised that bilinguals mature earlier than monolinguals in acquiring skills for linguistic abstraction, are superior to monolinguals on divergent thinking tasks and in their analytical orientation to language, and demonstrate greater social sensitivity than monolinguals in situations requiring verbal communication (see Corson, 1993; Romaine, 1995; Baker, 1996).

8. The territorial language principle ensures that particular languages are given official status within particular regional areas of the nation-state. However, it cannot necessarily ensure that these languages are equally, or even adequately supported. Thus, in Switzerland there remain

significant infra-structural differences between the most widely spoken language, German, and the least widely spoken, Romansch. So much so, in fact, that this has led to a recent overhaul of Swiss language policy to provide more support for Romansch (Rossinelli, 1989; Switzerland, 1989; Grin, 1995). Questions of flexibility also arise in relation to territorial language policies. While most Swiss citizens are multilingual, the Swiss cantonal structure, on which the territorial language principle is based, is not. In effect, most Swiss cantons stick rigidly to their rule of one official language per territory (Churchill, 1986).

9. Belgium differs from Switzerland in that linguistic conflict between its two principal language groups -- the French and Dutch -- has been a prominent feature since the inception of the Belgian state in 1830. However, much of this had to do with the de facto supremacy of French and the concomitant marginalising of Dutch throughout its history, despite the fact that Dutch speakers were a numerical majority. This ongoing conflict led eventually to the adoption of linguistic legislation in 1962-1963 which enshrined the territorial principle in Belgium, thus ensuring equal linguistic status for Dutch speakers. This legislation divided the country into three administrative regions: Wallonia and Flanders which are subject to strict monolingualism (Dutch to the north and French to the south), and the capital, Brussels, which is officially bilingual. However, even in Brussels the French/Dutch linguistic infrastructure is quite separate, extending to the workplace as well as to the more common domains of administration and education. In short, this means that in the whole country there are only monolingual educational institutions, while administration is also monolingual, even in multilingual regions. That said, it is also clear that the territorial principle adopted in Belgium has contributed significantly to its socio-political and economic stability by ensuring the maintenance of group language rights (Baetens Beardsmore, 1980; Nelde, 1997).

10. Canada adopts the personality language principle, where numbers warrant, in relation to French speakers outside of Québec. Within Québec, however, the territorial language principle operates (see below).

11. India is not included in Churchill's study, being beyond its purview of OECD countries. Nonetheless, it provides an excellent example of the numerical language principle. The **Constitution of India** (Article 350A) directs every state, and every local authority within that state, to provide 'adequate' educational facilities for instruction in the first language of linguistic minorities, at least at primary (elementary) school level. This is in addition to the division of India's states along largely linguistic lines. These political divisions result in local linguistic communities having control over their public schools and other educational institutions. This, in turn, ensures that the primary language of the area is used as a medium of instruction in state schools (de Varennes, 1996a).

12. A parallel perspective of these various stages can be drawn from Ruiz's (1984, 1990) well known categorisation of language policy orientations: *language-as-problem* (Stages 1-4) where the targets of language policy are construed as a social problem to be identified, eradicated, alleviated, or in some other way resolved; *language-as-right* (Stage 5) which confronts the assimilationist tendencies of dominant language communities with arguments about the legal, moral and natural right to local identity; and *language-as-resource* (Stage 6) where language, and the communities which speak them, are viewed as a social resource.

13. Jim Cummins asserts for example, that 'widespread school failure does not occur in minority groups that are positively oriented towards both their own and the dominant culture, that do not perceive themselves as inferior to the dominant group, and that are not alienated from their own cultural values' (1986: 22; see also Ferdman, 1990).

14. Maureen Stone, an African-Caribbean educator, argued that multicultural education was far too preoccupied with affirming social and cultural *identity*. This led to the stressing of affective goals (self expression, self fulfilment etc.) rather than core competencies (such as reading and writing) and did little to change the life *chances* of African-Caribbean children in British society. In response to both the continuing educational failure and the resulting high levels of unemployment faced by their children, African-Caribbean parents withdrew their support from multicultural programmes and established supplementary schools which concentrated on 'traditional' skills. As Maureen Stone concluded, pluralism devoid of academic rigour is no substitute for equality (see also Burtonwood, 1986). These criticisms have also been echoed from more radical perspectives. However, the solutions offered are considerably different since they advocate a more cogent form of multiculturalism -- one that combines a pedagogy of social access with cultural and linguistic difference -- rather than its abdication (see May, 1994, 1998c).

15. Macías distinguishes between two broadly comparable sets of rights: the right to freedom from discrimination on the basis of language, and the right to use your language(s) in the activities of communal life (1979: 88-89).

16. As we saw in Chapter 3, this has not proved to be the case. Indeed, the United Nations itself has admitted as much in recent times: The *Human Rights Fact Sheet on Minorities* (No. 18, March 1992: 1) states, for example: 'the setting of standards which create additional rights and make special arrangements for persons belonging to minorities and for the minorities as *groups* -- although a stated goal of the United Nations for more than 40 years -- has made slow progress'.

17. The UN's (1992) **Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities** provides a similar example. Here, the promotion and protection of the rights of persons belonging to minorities is recognised as contributing to the political and social stability of the states in which they live (Preamble). In this vein, the Declaration goes somewhat further than Article 27 by replacing 'shall not be denied' with the more positive 'have the right to' and by adding that these rights apply 'in private and in public, freely and without any form of discrimination' (Article, 2.1). However, the actual article which deals with minority language education (Article 4.3) qualifies this generally positive intent considerably: 'States *should* take *appropriate* measures so that, *wherever possible*, persons belonging to minorities have *adequate* opportunities to learn their mother tongue *or* to have instruction in their mother tongue' (see Skutnabb Kangas & Phillipson, 1995: 97).

18. Churchill, in his OECD study, certainly admits as much when he observes that 'public support seems more important than the objectives of educators or of the minority group members themselves' (1986: 63).

19. The potential for outright opposition to minority rights has already been discussed to some extent in Chapter 3 and will be explored further in the ensuing case study of Wales. However, a contemporary example of such opposition which may bear brief comment here is the racist rhetoric directed principally against Aboriginal peoples (Koori) and Asian immigrants that has

emerged in recent years in Australia (see *The Guardian*: June 18, 1997; G2, p.4). Fronted by Pauline Hanson, who was elected in 1996 as MP for Oxley in rural Queensland (she is described as the Oxley-moron by her opponents), this view has gained considerable public support in Australia. Despite being deselected from the Liberal (conservative) party for her outspoken views prior to the election, she gained selection as an independent candidate and has since started her own 'One Nation' party. Much of her rhetoric is predicated on the 'equal treatment for all' principle and the related idea that Koori, (Asian) immigrants, and other minorities receive special treatment and benefits that are not available to 'ordinary' Australians. This forms the basis of her excoriating attack on these minority groups, while completely ignoring, for example, that the life expectancy and chronic health problems of Koori compare unfavourably with many developing countries; a consequence, moreover, that can be traced directly to their long-standing colonial exploitation. The result has been to put in jeopardy the recent gains made by the Mabo Decision in 1992 concerning Aboriginal Land Title (see Chapter 3). Likewise, Asian migration and wider links with Asia have been detrimentally affected. The thin veneer of racism that underlies much of her position has also been weakly repudiated by the current conservative government and brings into serious question the policy of multiculturalism and multilingualism fostered in Australia over the last two decades (see Lo Bianco, 1987; Ozolins, 1993; Herriman, 1996; Kalantzis & Cope, 1998; Clyne, 1998).

20. 'Official English movement' is the preferred designation adopted by its proponents in the USA. However, opponents use the phrase 'English Only movement' in order to highlight the exclusionary linguistic (and political and social) motives behind the movement. These motives will be highlighted in what follows.

21. A far more recent, although perhaps apocryphal example of this kind of historically inadequate thinking is the story told of the US congressman who argued on a talkback show that 'if English was good enough for Jesus, it's good enough for me'.

22. In the English Only debates in the USA, the term 'immigrant' is consistently used to describe (all) minority ethnic groups. This is problematic on two counts: 1) it elides ethnic and national minority groups; 2) the nomenclature employed ties in with a broader anti-immigrationist stance. I will explore both of these dimensions more fully below. Meanwhile, despite significant reservations about the term -- I prefer 'new minorities', or 'urban ethnic minorities' (see Chapter 2) -- I use it in the following discussion in keeping with the debates.

23. In 1983, US English reported having 300 members, in 1984, 35,000 (Marshall, 1986). By 1994, its numbers had grown to some 400,000 members (Edwards, 1994). Over the course of this time, the organisation has also attracted to its ranks many well know public figures.

24. These statutes and amendments vary considerably from state to state. However, all are concerned to declare English as the official language of the state and most are concerned with ensuring that English is the only language of government activity (see Adams & Brink, 1990).

25. The exigencies of the slave trade meant that Africans from widely different geographical areas, ethnic affiliations, and language groups were transported to the USA. Upon arrival, slaveholders deliberately and actively separated any Africans from the same tribal or family groups in order to destroy any remaining potential for communication and thus reduce the possibility of insurrection (Thompson, 1987).

26. The Spanish were the first of the colonial powers to establish a permanent presence in North America, discovering Florida in 1513 (see Conklin & Lourie, 1983).

27. As a federal commissioner of Indian Affairs, J. D. C. Atkins, observed in his annual report for 1887: 'schools should be established, which [Native American] children should be required to attend, [and where] their barbarous *dialects* should be blotted out and the English *language* substituted' (reprinted in Crawford, 1992b: 48; my emphases). Note here, the deliberate relegation of Native American language varieties to mere 'dialects' in contradistinction to the English 'language', along with all this implies about language hierarchy (see the discussion on language and dialects in Chapter 4). Although the Bureau of Indian Affairs formally rescinded this assimilationist education policy in 1934, punishment for native language use in schools continued through to the 1950s (Crawford, 1989). Interestingly, this assimilationist approach -- which, along with fostering language loss, has not served the educational needs of Native American students at all well -- stands in sharp contrast to a Cherokee educational initiative implemented prior to this policy. This self managed policy, based on first language principles, achieved a 90 per cent literacy rate in Cherokee *as well as* 'a higher English literacy level than the white populations of either Texas or Arkansas' (Crawford, 1989: 25; see also Fuchs & Havighurst, 1972; Szasz, 1974).

28. It is important to point out here that like Hayakawa's more recent English Only arguments, Roosevelt's notion of the American crucible assumes that *all* Americans are willing immigrants. This completely ignores the subjected status of African Americans, and the various national minorities -- including Native Americans and Puerto Ricans -- who have been incorporated by conquest into the United States (see Chapter 2; see also below).

29. There is some suggestion that Franklin's increasingly trenchant views on multilingualism were linked to his bitterness over a business failure in publishing. In the 1730s Franklin did not seem at all averse to multilingualism, teaching himself French, German, Italian, Spanish and Latin. He also launched the first *German* language newspaper in North America, the *Philadelphische Zeitung*. However, this venture failed and a 'better qualified German printer' cornered the German book market. It was from this time that Franklin's writings about American 'foreign' language speakers took its sharply xenophobic turn (Shell, 1993).

30. Because New Mexico comprised predominantly 'mexicanas' (a term of self-identification among the Spanish-speaking population) and was also poor, it had to wait some 64 years for statehood. Statehood was only granted after 50 previously unsuccessful petitions to Congress (Hernández-Chávez, 1995).

31. This applies predominantly to Spanish, as one might expect. However, the recognition of other minority language groups, including Native Americans, is also included (see Marshall, 1986: 43).

32. The relevant part of the Fourteenth Amendment reads: 'No states shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens; *nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law*; nor deny any person within its jurisdiction to equal protection of laws' (my emphasis).

33. It should be pointed out, however, that because language is not specifically mentioned in the 14th Amendment some subsequent Supreme Court decisions have simply refused to address the issue of language discrimination. In *Garcia v. Spun Steak* (1993), for example, a claim of discrimination on the grounds that the employer prohibited Spanish speakers from speaking privately in Spanish to each other while at work was unsuccessful. This was because the Court declined to examine the principal point raised by the Spanish-speaking workers: that is, if some employees have the privilege of conversing with others privately at work in their primary language, they should not be denied the same privilege (see de Varennes, 1996a: 116).

34. The judgement states: 'No specific remedy is urged upon us. Teaching English to the students of Chinese ancestry who do not speak the language is one choice. Giving instructions to this group in Chinese is another. There may be others. Petitioners ask only that the Board of Education be directed to apply its expertise to the problem and rectify the situation' (cited in Crawford, 1989: 36).

35. Comparisons can be drawn here with the use of 'intelligence tests' to screen immigrants to the USA in the early part of this century. These supposedly 'objective' measures of intelligence took no account of the disadvantages faced by those who had to answer the tests in a language unfamiliar to them (see Gould, 1981).

36. It is important to note here that the English-only programmes used for comparison in the Ramírez study were not typical to the extent that while the teachers taught in English, they nonetheless understood Spanish. This suggests that in the far more common situation where the teacher does not understand the students' first language, the trends described here are likely to be further accentuated.

37. See Jaimes & Churchill (1988) for an extended discussion of these links.

38. Spanish speakers currently number 17 million in the USA and US census forecasts suggest that by the year 2005 Hispanic Americans will surpass Black Americans as the largest minority. It is further suggested that by the year 2050 Hispanic communities will have increased from 10.7 per cent of the total population to 25 per cent, outnumbering the combined total of African Americans, Asian Americans and Native Americans. This will coincide with a concomitant decline in the number of white Americans (*The Guardian*: 31 March, 1997) It is this population growth which is the real concern of many English Only advocates.

39. Among a range of questions raised in relation to these concerns were: 'Perhaps this is the first instance in which those with their pants up are going to get caught with their pants down'. 'Will the present [white] majority peaceably hand over its political power to a group that is simply more fertile?' 'As whites see their power and control over their lives declining, will they simply go quietly into the night? Or will there be an explosion?' (cited in Crawford, 1992c: 173).

40. The argument that English Only may appeal to racist beliefs is supported by a study by Huddy & Sears (1990). The authors examined the attitudes of white Americans towards bilingual education and found that opposition was strongest among those who looked down on minority groups, particularly immigrants, and who opposed any federal support for them. In addition, these attitudes were most strongly represented in areas with a high Hispanic population (see also MacKaye, 1990).

41. Like Belgium (see n. 9) and Québec (see below), the conflict in Sri Lanka between the Sinhalese majority (comprising 75 per cent of the population) and the Lankan Tamils (who comprise 12.5 per cent of the remaining Tamil-speaking population) was precipitated by, but not limited to the language question. In 1956, eight years after independence, Sinhala was made the sole official language, replacing English. This language law created much discontent among Tamil speakers who, with limited access to land, had previously looked to the civil service for employment. With the implementation of the official language law, this option was increasingly foreclosed to them also. Moreover, the language measure was the first of many that restricted the rights and opportunities of Tamil speakers. The subsequent Tamil independence movement, which emerged formally in 1973, thus draws its grievances from this wider background of the apparent denial of minority Tamil aspirations by the majority Sinhalese (see Fishman & Solano, 1989).

42. French now features as both a functional and legitimate language in commerce and industry (C. Williams, 1994) while there is a pattern of increasing enrolment in French language schools, even by those eligible for English language education (Coulombe, 1995).

43. However, for an erudite defence of these language policies, see Coulombe (1995).

44. This position is exemplified by 'English Plus', a movement set up to counter the English Only vanguard. English Plus is equally concerned with fostering the acquisition of English, and wider social mobility, among minority language speakers. However, it does so by promoting the clear educational merits of bilingual education as the best means of achieving this end (see Combs, 1992).

Chapter 6

A DISUNITED KINGDOM? THE WELSH IN BRITAIN

> The Welsh, as a people, were born disinherited.
> (G.A. Williams, 1985: 45)

On September 18, 1997 the Welsh electorate voted in a national referendum in favour of a devolved Welsh Assembly. The result constitutes an unprecedented development in the history of Wales. For the first time since the (1536) **Act of Union**, Wales -- or Cymru, to give it its Welsh name -- will have a formalised degree of self government, however limited, within the British state. Or, as a pro-devolution campaigner observed of the result at the time, 'for the first time ever we've had a Welsh decision to stick up for ourselves' (*The Guardian*, 20 September, 1997: 8).

But only just, since the vote for devolution was achieved by the narrowest of margins. Of the 51.3 per cent of the electorate who actually voted[1] -- 559,419 voted for a Welsh Assembly and 552, 698 against (50.3 per cent to 49.7 per cent), a majority of less than 6,000. Indeed, the contest was so close that it came to hinge on the result from the last of the 22 Welsh counties[2] to declare, Carmarthenshire. This predominantly Welsh-speaking area in west Wales voted in favour in sufficient numbers to allow the 'yes campaign' which, until that time had been trailing, to win through at the last. Even so, the final 'yes vote' comprised only 25.2 per cent of the total electorate in Wales -- a point that opponents were subsequently to point out repeatedly -- although the referendum had always rested on the premise of a simple majority. Moreover, clear regional differences were evident between the more anglicised east and north-east of Wales

bordering England, whose counties voted no, and the more Welsh-speaking west and north-west of Wales who, allied with the Labour heartlands in the southern Welsh valleys, voted yes (see Appendix a). Monmouthshire, on the south-eastern border of England, for example, voted 68 per cent to 32 per cent against an Assembly, in stark contrast to Carmarthenshire and Gwynedd to the west, which voted 65 per cent and 64 per cent, respectively, for an Assembly (*Financial Times*, 21 September, 1997: 8). As many media commentators observed at the time, Wales seemed a nation divided.

The degree of surprise surrounding the closeness of the Welsh vote, voiced by these same commentators, was at one level understandable. After all, the referendum had been instigated by the newly elected Labour government in Britain as part of a wider package of constitutional reform, devolving power to the constituent nations and regions of Britain. The constitutional reform programme had been widely trailed and had formed a central feature of the Labour party's election policy in May of that year. In that election, Labour had won an unprecedented 179 seat majority over their main rivals, the British Conservative Party, decisively ending the latter's eighteen previous uninterrupted years in power. Such was the scale of Labour's victory that in Wales -- admittedly, a traditional Labour stronghold anyway -- the Tories had lost all their parliamentary seats. This, in itself, should have augured well for a comfortable endorsement of devolution in Wales for what, after all, was a central Labour policy. And if this was somehow not enough, as many pro-devolutionists indeed feared (see below), the example of Scotland should also have acted as a strong precedent. Just the week before,[3] the Scottish electorate in a parallel referendum for a fully fledged Scottish Parliament, had delivered a decisive vote in favour of devolution at 74.3 per cent to 25.7 per cent.[4] Given that 60.1 per cent of the Scottish electorate voted in the referendum this also constituted an endorsement by 45 per cent of the total electorate.

And yet at another level, the closeness of the vote, or the fact that Welsh devolution succeeded at all, was not so surprising. Objections were consistently raised in the campaign, for example, about the inadequacies of the Welsh devolution package itself. In contrast to Scotland's 129 seat Parliament -- with its ability to enact primary legislation and vary taxes -- the Welsh were only to have a 60 seat Assembly, with all that the difference in nomenclature implies. The Welsh Assembly, to be elected in May 1999, will assume responsibility for the administrative powers

currently exercised by the Welsh Secretary of the British government in Westminster, London -- a not insignificant development since it involves direct control of an annual budget presently estimated at £7 billion. However, it will also have no legislative and tax varying powers beyond the enactment of secondary legislation. 'Welsh devolution is essentially the Home Rule sideshow' as Roy Hattersley accurately observed in a national newspaper at the time (*The Observer*, 24 August, 1997, p.18). This clear disparity between the Scottish and Welsh devolution proposals led to the criticism, effectively employed by the anti-devolution campaign in Wales, that the Welsh Assembly would be a 'mere talking shop', and thus an expensive and unnecessary economic and administrative burden. This charge could never have been made successfully against the proposed Scottish Parliament.

The disparity between the Scottish and Welsh devolution proposals also points to another, more crucial reason for the close result of the 1997 Devolution Referendum in Wales. Historically, there has always been a much greater ambivalence in Wales towards self government than in Scotland -- ironically, most notably in the Labour Party itself, the dominant political party in Wales since early this century. Indeed, this is graphically illustrated by the result of the only other instance of a Devolution Referendum -- in 1979, under the previous Labour government. At that time, the Welsh electorate convincingly rejected devolution, by over four to one, voting 956,000 to 243,000 (46.5 per cent to 11.8 per cent) against an elected Welsh Assembly. Even Gwynedd, the most Welsh-speaking county, voted two to one against. Moreover, the most notable feature of the campaign was the vociferous opposition to devolution, led by Neil Kinnock, mounted from within the Welsh Labour party. Like Aneurin Bevan before him, Kinnock argued passionately that the best interests of Wales lay in *British* (as opposed to Welsh) socialism. In contrast, the parallel Scottish Referendum saw a narrow vote in favour (52 per cent) although at only 33 per cent of the total electorate this still fell short of the 40 per cent threshold required for change at the time.

I will return in more detail to the 1979 referendum in due course. Suffice it to say, that the greater ambivalence towards devolution per se in Wales was also clearly reflected in the 1997 referendum. Again, some Welsh Labour MPs publicly opposed devolution, although not to the same extent as in 1979. Moreover, in the campaign, and in the government's white paper itself, *A Voice for Wales* (Stationery Office, 1997a), almost no mention was made of Welsh national

identity as a basis for supporting devolution. Instead, the stress was placed on the economic and administrative benefits of devolution and its proposed effect in redressing 'the democratic deficit' in Wales -- the latter a legacy of the raft of unelected, Tory dominated 'quangos'[5] which had been established during the long tenure of the previous Conservative government (Adonis, 1997; Freedland, 1997; A. Thomas, 1997). *Scotland's Parliament* (Stationery Office, 1997b), the equivalent white paper for Scotland, was markedly different in this respect. As with the Scottish referendum campaign more broadly, the case for devolution was underpinned at all times by the question of Scottish national identity -- framed principally in relation to Scotland's claim to historical nationhood -- and the political rights attendant on it (*The Times Higher*, 12 September, 1997: 7). Concomitantly, the charge that devolution would lead inexorably to the 'breakup of Britain' had little purchase in the Scottish campaign, in contrast to Wales where this fear was more effectively mobilised by anti-devolutionists.

What lies behind these clear differences between Wales and Scotland -- with respect both to enthusiasm for devolution itself, and to the status and powers ascribed to their respective legislative bodies? To answer these questions we need to examine the historical antecedents which have shaped the Welsh political and cultural context and its relationship to the British state. Two key features stand out here. The first is the long history of Wales' institutional incorporation within Britain. The second is the vexed and at times vexatious question of Welsh national identity itself and, in particular, the role of the Welsh language within it. It is these two issues, and their complex interconnections, which constitute the principal focus of this chapter.

English/British identity

Before proceeding further, however, some caveats are in order. As we saw in Chapter 2, one problem which often occurs in any discussion of British history is the conflation of the notions of British and English identities. *British* identity is really a *state* identity since Britain is actually a *multinational* state comprising England, Scotland and Wales.[6] In effect, 'British' describes the legal institutional framework, and the specific political allegiances, that bind together the constituent nations of the British state, along with the autochthonous and immigrant peoples living within them (Miller, 1995). However, the concept of Britishness has often come to be equated with, and represented by an English *national* identity, the latter usually culturally defined -- or,

rather, a *particular* class-based notion of English national identity, reflecting the social and cultural mores of the English elite (R. Williams, 1985). This process of elision has its origins in the historical dominance of England -- particularly London and south-east England -- in the construction of the British state, and the related position of the English ruling class as a dominant ethnie. Consequently, much of British history has tended to concern itself with the expansion of the *English* state and its assumption of power over the other peoples of the British Isles (Davies, 1989). Relatedly, British identity has often been constructed in such a way as to exclude or devalue Welsh, Scottish or Irish national identities, as well as those ethnic minorities which do not 'fit' the culturally prescribed form of Englishness (Crick, 1991, 1995; Miller, 1995; Miles, 1996). In the process, English national identity becomes a form of banal nationalism (Billig, 1995); a nationalism which recognises all others but its own. The Welsh nationalist and poet, R.S. Thomas, observes rather acidly to this end: 'Although they deny it, [the English] are among the most nationalistic people in the world. But I imagine it is largely unconscious. That is their strength' (1992: 31-32). Having a national identity does not necessarily imply having a *sense* of national identity (Mason, 1995), particularly for members of the dominant ethnie (see Chapter 2).

British 'national' history

The tendency to assume the homogeneity of Britain, as represented by England and the English, can be taken a step further. Not only does British identity comprise a range of national identities, these latter identities are themselves cross-cut by extensive internal variations. In this respect, there has been a prominent tendency in recent British history, as elsewhere, to superimpose nineteenth century conceptions of nationhood *retrospectively* on the constituent areas of England, Scotland, and Wales. As Hugh Kearney observes of this in his excellent historical account of the British Isles:

> For much of the twentieth century, indeed, within the British Isles, history has been taught and written along national lines, and hence tied, often unconsciously, to national ideologies and nation-building.... The concept of 'nation' provided modern historians with a convenient framework around which to organise their materials but a price had to be paid. What became later national boundaries were extended backwards into a past where they had little or no relevance, with the consequence that earlier tribal or pre-national societies were lost to sight. (1989: 3, 4)

Kearney proceeds to argue that the respective 'national' histories of England, Scotland, and Wales[7] are thus best understood in terms of 'cultures' and 'sub cultures'. On this basis, 'what seem to be "national" units dissolve into a number of distinctive cultures with their own perceptions of the past, of social status ... of religion and of many other aspects of life' (1989: 10). Linda Colley (1992), in the other outstanding account of British history in recent times, makes exactly the same point. As she observes, Welshness, Scottishness, and Englishness remain powerful divides within Britain but regionalisms and localisms have also exerted considerable influence over time. Indeed, the notion of 'Britain' itself only arose, somewhat uneasily, out of the (1707) **Act of Union** between Scotland and the by then already incorporated 'England and Wales' (see below). As such, she argues, it was inevitably superimposed on much older allegiances. I will proceed to explore in particular relation to Wales what some of these, at times, countervailing allegiances comprised. Suffice it to say at this point that these arguments bear close similarity to the discussions on the ethnic origins of nationalism, outlined in Chapter 2. In effect, the formation of modern nations and nation-states rests on the prior appropriation and incorporation of pre-modern ethnic identities, or ethnies (R. Jenkins, 1995; Smith, 1995a). Britain, and the nations which comprise it, are no exception to this process.

English imperialism

The unproblematic assertion of 'national' identity in Britain may thus have been brought into question by recent revisionist historians. What is not in dispute, however, is the dominance of England within the British state -- more specifically, the south-east of England. Britain may well be a multinational state but historically the metropolitan centre in and around London was immensely powerful and it had a limited territory to overwhelm (Evans, 1989a). This is well illustrated by the four major regions which could lay claim historically to a separate cultural identity from the metropolitan core: Cornwall, Wales, the north of England and Scotland. Of these, Scotland is distinguished from the other three by its relatively late incorporation into the British state and by the related fact that it already had by then a well-established capitalist class and a separate institutional framework (Nairn, 1981; McCrone, 1992). Consequently, this meant that Scottish culture did not have to carry the primary burden of maintaining a separate Scottish (national) identity (Davies, 1989; Osmond, 1989).

The other three regions, however, were incorporated within the British state much earlier -- their subjugation largely completed by the end of the sixteenth century (Bulpitt, 1983; Bartlett, 1993). Wales, the only one of these latter regions to subsequently attain nationhood, had been brought to heel in the late thirteenth century by the Norman king, Edward 1 (1239-1307). In 1282, Edward mounted a successful campaign against the still independent Welsh kingdoms of Gwynedd and Deheubarth which saw the death in battle of the last Welsh prince, Llywelyn ap Gruffydd. The defeat of these Welsh kingdoms by Edward was to accelerate a process of colonisation which had begun in south Wales as early as the eleventh century.[8] The influx of English settlers which had accompanied it had led to the occupation of most of the best land in Wales by the Normans and their tenants; the distinction being formalised by the terms 'Englishry' (good land) and 'Welshry' (poorer land). As Kearney observes, by the end of the fourteenth century, 'colonial society was delineated more clearly in Wales than anywhere else in the British Isles' (1989: 93). The only time that this inexorable process of colonisation was to be interrupted came through the brief uprising in 1400 of Owain Glyndŵr. His revolt was to be eventually defeated in 1408, although not before the first -- and, until 1997, the only -- Welsh 'parliament' had been established, at Machynlleth. The colonising of Wales was officially confirmed by its incorporation within Britain during the reign of the Tudor king, Henry VIII (1491-1547), via the (1536) **Act of Union**. Wales was not to be regarded again as a distinct region, let alone a nation, until the nineteenth century.

However, the ongoing process of colonisation -- or nationalisation -- to which Wales and the other peripheral regions of Great Britain were subject was not a uniform one. On the one hand, there was clearly a strong emphasis on political incorporation and an allied process of cultural homogenisation; the latter, as I have already discussed, based on a metropolitan conception of Englishness. Thus, in Wales, only a few distinct Welsh institutions survived the **Act of Union** -- the most prominent being the Courts of Great Sessions, eventually abolished, amid much local protest, in 1830. Likewise, the ruling elite within Wales, the landed gentry, increasingly adopted the language and customs of their English counterparts, in contrast to the vast majority of the peasant population who remained Welsh-speaking (Morgan, 1995). In this sense, the historical development of 'Britain' -- and the peripheries within it -- conforms to the central tenets of modern nationalist theory in its construction of the culturally homogenous nation-state.

On the other hand, much of this nationalisation remained uneven and incomplete, thus allowing the retention of separate 'national' and/or regional identities and cultural forms beyond the centre. As Robert Miles argues, specifically in relation to Scotland and Wales: 'Because nationalisation has failed to eliminate distinct national identities and cultural forms, and has been unable to construct a rational, unified political structure, things are often different in the peripheries of [Britain], although rarely absolutely different' (1996: 236). In short, the process of political incorporation in Britain, while centralising power in London and England, has also granted varying degrees of political autonomy and cultural distinctiveness to the 'nations' so incorporated (see also Kellas, 1991; McCrone, 1992). The Welsh language -- still spoken by a majority in Wales until the early part of this century -- provides a clear example of the latter here. Its remarkable resilience -- having survived against considerable odds and in the face of consistent negative attribution -- will be explored more fully below.

Internal colonialism

Meanwhile, staying with the notions of core and periphery for a moment, it is worth returning to Hechter's (1975) model of 'internal colonialism', first introduced in Chapter 2. Hechter's central argument was that British capitalist development, allied principally to the industrial revolution of the nineteenth century, produced a set of 'internal colonies' in Scotland, Wales and Ireland -- the so called 'Celtic fringe' -- in much the same way that it had created external colonisation elsewhere. The economic exploitation of these internal colonies resulted in economic dependency on the core, lower levels of prosperity, and a stratified 'cultural division of labour' where ethnic differences were superimposed on class lines. By this, Hechter sought to explain the rise of nationalist movements in the Celtic fringe in the nineteenth century, arguing that the mobilisation of such movements occurred because of economic inequalities that were also expressed at the cultural level. As a result, the economic disadvantages faced by the periphery were attributed to its cultural distinctiveness; an attribution, moreover, that was made both from outside, and *within* the periphery itself. While many within the periphery thus shed their cultural distinctiveness in the pursuit of social mobility, others -- usually the intellectual elite -- attempted to revalue the culture and language by using it as a basis for nationalist expression.

This model provides us with a useful addendum to the previous discussion of colonialism within Britain. However, its inadequacies have also been well documented. Theoretically, it has been criticised for its inability to account for wide internal variations within the periphery (C. Williams, 1982) and, more seriously perhaps, for those ethnonational movements which have arisen in areas of relative economic prosperity (see Chapter 1). Historically, the notion of internal colonialism in the Celtic fringe of Britain has also been contested. Applied to Wales, for example, the notion of an internal colony simply does not fit well, at least in relation to nineteenth century industrialisation. As I discussed briefly in Chapter 2, the centrality of Wales -- specifically, south Wales -- to the industrial revolution in Britain militates against a simplistic notion of economic exploitation. Wales was no mere economic satellite of an imperial core based in London. Quite the reverse, in fact. From 1840 to 1926 it constituted the industrial heartland of the British export economy, first through iron and then through coal. As a result, it was the only area in Britain that experienced significant *in-migration* in the late nineteenth century. Concomitantly, it was least affected by the rural economic crisis of the 1880s which resulted in mass emigration from elsewhere in Britain to countries like the USA (G.A. Williams, 1982, 1985).[9]

The rise of nationalism in Wales in the nineteenth century cannot thus be explained in solely economic terms. As Nairn succinctly concludes, Hechter's analysis 'may be effective ideology but it rests on rather poor history' (1981: 201-202). In this regard, the theory of internal colonialism can also be criticised for its tendency towards historical teleology. In similar vein to the critique of Gellner's theory of nationalism (see Chapter 2), its preoccupation with the industrial revolution considerably understates the longer historical patterns of economic and social inequality that have existed in Britain (cf. the 'Englishries' and 'Welshries').

The forgotten nation

With this background in mind, I want now to examine the Welsh context in more specific detail. Of all the United Kingdom's constituent members (which, along with the nations of Britain, includes Northern Ireland), Wales is the one most often overlooked. The difficulties in Northern Ireland have dominated the British political landscape in this century, as did previously the concerns of Ireland as a whole. The vexed question of 'Irish Home Rule', for example, preoccupied much of nineteenth century Westminster politics and was only finally resolved with

the secession of the Irish Free State (now the Irish Republic) in 1922. Scotland, as we have seen, enjoyed a far greater degree of institutional autonomy, and therefore maintained a considerably higher profile within both British politics and the corpus of British history itself. And England, of course, has been the dominant partner -- or simply, dominant -- for much of the modern history of the British state.

Which leaves Wales; unremarked and, to many, unremarkable.[10] As Kenneth Morgan, the noted Welsh historian, poignantly observes in an essay written in 1971 on the origins of Welsh nationalism:

> 'For Wales -- see England'. This notorious directive in the early editions of the *Encyclopaedia Britannica* crystallises all the emotion, the humiliation, and the patronising indifference which helped to launch the national movement in Wales. (1995: 197)

That these attitudes still remain today is clearly illustrated by the controversial English literary critic and columnist, A.N. Wilson. Writing in the London daily paper *The Evening Standard* in 1994, he comments disparagingly on the cultural contribution of the Welsh (or lack thereof) to British life:

> The Welsh have never made any significant contribution to any branch of knowledge, culture or entertainment. Choral singing -- usually flat -- seems to be their only artistic achievement. They have no architecture, no gastronomic tradition and, since the Middle Ages, no literature worthy of the name. Even their religion, Calvinistic Methodism, is boring. (cited in Moss, 1994: 26)

The misplaced attempt at humour aside, Wilson's comments are simply wrong. The one thing, above all else, that *has* distinguished the Welsh from their other British partners has been their cultural distinctiveness; most significantly, their language (see below). The fault lies not so much with a lack of Welsh cultural expression, as Wilson suggests, but with the failure historically to recognise and accord value to it. I will deal with the notion of cultural value in due course. Meanwhile, a key reason for the failure to recognise the contribution of Wales, and Welsh culture, to wider British life resides in its long history of *political* incorporation within the British state.

The institutional incorporation of Wales

The degree of Welsh political incorporation into the British state is clearly illustrated by the administrative term 'England and Wales' which is employed to describe a wide range of shared institutions and programmes. It is also exemplified by the fact that Wales was the last of all the nations constituting the United Kingdom to be recognised as such. Until the mid-nineteenth century, the UK was regarded for formal purposes as comprising only three nations -- England, Scotland and Ireland. There simply was no 'Welsh question' in British politics comparable to the question of Irish Home Rule, for example. Indeed, the reiterated litany of Westminster politicians was that 'there was no such place as Wales' (Morgan, 1995).[11] As a long regarded 'non-historic nation', Wales was simply not seen as having a necessary, sufficient or legitimate claim to independent statehood. To this end, Frederic Engels -- whose views on non-historic nations we have already encountered in Chapter 1 -- avers:

> The Highland Gaels and the Welsh are undoubtedly of different nationalities to what the English are, although nobody will give to these remnants of people long gone the title of nations [nation-states].... [To do so would mean] the Welsh and Manxmen, if they desired it, would have an equal right to independent political existence, absurd though it be, with the English! The whole thing is absurdity. ([1866]; cited in Fishman, 1989e: 14).

Setting aside the clearly pejorative tone of Engels' assertions, there is some basis for this view. After all, as I have already discussed, Wales was brought increasingly into the ambit of English rule from the time of Edward 1. The subsequent colonisation of Wales in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, via the Englishries and Welshries, led to the area's increasing anglicisation, at least in an economic sense. South and east Wales, in particular, were drawn into a close relationship with the English economy – trading with Bristol and Devon, and supplying wool and cattle for English markets (Kearney, 1989). Relatedly, while much of Wales continued to speak Welsh – a language spoken since the sixth century and for which written records exist from the eighth century[12] -- Welsh/English bilingualism became an increasing feature in these areas (P. Jenkins, 1992). These developments were the prelude to the area's formal incorporation within the British state in the sixteenth century. The (1536) **Act of Union**, and the related act of 1542, firmly situated Wales within the political, legal and administrative jurisdiction of the British Crown and Parliament.[13]

As a result of these acts, the Norman empire in Wales, which had been in existence since the late eleventh century, was brought to an end. The Marcher Lordships, which had been established by the Normans to act as a geographical buffer between England and the interior of Wales, and which had developed a considerable degree of power and autonomy, were subsumed within the English shire system. The Welsh legal code -- which dated back to its founder, Hywel Dda, in the tenth century -- was abolished and replaced by English common law. The Welsh language was proscribed from the courts, and from all official domains, in favour of English. And finally, virtually all separate Welsh institutions were eliminated -- the only exceptions being a Council for Wales which survived until 1689 and the Court of Sessions, mentioned previously, which was eventually abolished in 1830.[14]

The instructions of the **Act of Union** directly affected only a small number of Welsh elite -- those who held or sought property or position. However, with the dismantling of any separate institutional focus, the establishment of a political norm soon became a powerful social norm as well (Butt Philip, 1975). As we saw Iris Young observe in Chapter 3, if particular groups 'have greater economic, political or social power, their group related experiences, points of view, or cultural assumptions will tend to become the norm, biasing the standards or procedures of achievement and inclusion that govern social, political and economic institutions' (1993: 133). This describes well the English/Welsh relationship. In effect, the Welsh elite became assimilated into the English class and political system -- eventually adopting both the latter's mores and language (C. Williams, 1982). Concomitantly, Welsh language and culture -- still strongly evident among the peasantry (Y Werin) -- were deemed of little value, both by the Welsh elite themselves and by the English political system to which they were increasingly beholden. As Morgan concludes: 'Wales continued to be regarded as a remote tribal backwater, economically backward, adhering obstinately to its antique language in the face of the "march of intellect"' (1995: 198).

It was not until the rise of religious Nonconformity[15] in the early half of the nineteenth century, and the industrialisation of Wales in the latter half, that this state of affairs was to change significantly. These two developments provided the basis for a new Welsh national (and nationalist) movement -- a movement whose characteristics I will explore more fully below. For the purposes of this present discussion, it is enough to point out that an important consequence of the rise of nineteenth century nationalism in Wales was the *re-establishment* of separate Welsh

institutions and legislative measures. These were primarily cultural, religious and educational -- reflecting the particular emphases of the nationalist movement of the time. Nonetheless, they proved to be something of a watershed, providing a nascent institutional framework from which an alternative interpretation of Welsh history eventually emerged (Davies, 1989). Legislation specific to Wales along these lines included the (1881) **Welsh Sunday Closing Act**, the (1888) **Local Government Act** and the (1889) **Welsh Intermediate Education Act**.[16] More significantly perhaps, a range of national institutions were created over this period, including: the University of Wales (1883), the Board of Education, a national library and a national museum (all 1907), and a Department of Agriculture (1912).

Despite these advances, the basic political and social organisation of Wales remained largely indistinguishable from England's. For example, it was not until 1956 that a Welsh capital (Cardiff) was officially designated. Indeed, it was only after the Second World War that a specifically Welsh institutional framework was to emerge. As Charlotte Aull Davies (1989) argues, this development was tied principally to the expansion of the British welfare system which saw many government departments reorganised on a regional basis. In most cases, Wales came to be treated as a single administrative unit, resulting in the steady growth of Welsh bureaucracy and, for the first time, a coordinated degree of economic planning in Wales. Easily the most prominent of the newly emergent organisations was the Welsh Office, established in 1964 and headed by a Welsh Secretary of State. As long ago as the unsuccessful (1892) **National Institutions (Wales) Bill**, Welsh nationalists had campaigned for a Welsh Secretary with comparable powers to that of the Scottish Office, established in 1886. Questions were again asked by individual MPs at Westminster in 1928 and 1930 about the possibility of a Secretary of State for Wales but these generated little enthusiasm (Butt Philip, 1975). It was not until the 1950s, that this idea was given serious consideration by the London-based political elite. While the then Conservative government turned down a recommendation in 1957 from the advisory Council for Wales for a Welsh Office, Harold Wilson's Labour government was finally to accede to such a request in 1964. Even here though, the Labour government initially envisaged the role of the Welsh Office as a largely symbolic one since its own political interests continued to be resolutely British and centralist (G.A. Williams, 1985). As Davies summarises it:

> ...the Labour government initially stressed that the position was created primarily out of respect for Welsh national sentiment and as a recognition of Welsh nationhood. This reflected Labour's intention to limit the office to a symbolic role, confining the secretary's powers to general oversight of government policies in Wales. However, once established, the office gradually began to aggrandise power. (1989: 87)

The gradual enlargement of the Welsh Office's administrative responsibilities led, in turn, to the introduction of a range of legislative measures specific to Wales and, in particular, the Welsh language (Williams & Raybould, 1991). Building on the precedent of the (1942) **Welsh Courts Act** which had finally revoked the language provisions of the **Act of Union**, these included: the (1967) **Welsh Language Act**, offering 'equal validity' for English and Welsh in Wales; the (1988) **Education Reform Act** which incorporated a specifically Welsh (and Welsh language) dimension into the newly established National Curriculum of England and Wales; and the (1993) **Welsh Language Act** which extended the 1967 Act considerably in its support for Welsh in the public domain. Thus, after centuries of proscription and neglect, the institutional infrastructure administered by the Welsh Office came to be increasingly identified with the re-emergence of the Welsh language into the public or civic realm (see Chapter 7).

It must be said though that these developments were also to some extent the result of the strong political pressure exerted by the Welsh language movement in the 1960s and 1970s. This movement coalesced around Cymdeithas yr Iaith Gymraeg (the Welsh Language Society) which had been established in the wake of Saunders Lewis' famous BBC Wales radio broadcast in 1962. In this broadcast -- entitled 'Tynged yr Iaith' (The Fate of the Language) -- Lewis had outlined the parlous state of the Welsh language and the need to defend it from encroaching anglicisation. The subsequent advocacy of the Welsh language by Cymdeithas yr Iaith Gymraeg -- often through direct action -- contributed to the establishment of Welsh-medium language schools, Welsh language media (notably, the Welsh language television channel, Sianel Pedwar Cymru [S4C]), the Welsh Language Board, and to an increasing demand for public services available in Welsh. The initial reaction to the direct action campaigns of the language movement was widely negative, and the electoral support for Welsh nationalism with which it was closely associated remained minimal (see below). Nonetheless, the pressure exerted was also ironically a significant influence in forging a new institutional identity based, to some extent at least, on the Welsh language.

Welsh nationalism

I will return in more detail to the nascent institutionalisation of the Welsh language in the following chapter. Here, I want to concentrate on the principal features of Welsh nationalism and its complex, and at times contradictory relationship to Welsh language and identity. Much of this complexity resides in the relationship of Welsh nationalism to the long political incorporation of Wales within Britain. On the one hand, it can be argued that *political* incorporation has actually facilitated the *cultural* distinctiveness of the Welsh -- principally, through the maintenance of their language and cultural traditions. Richard Jenkins (1991) argues, for example, that Welsh incorporation within the British state may have actually *created* the social and economic space within which the Welsh language and culture could survive. The Welsh language may have been formally proscribed from the civic realm from the time of the (1536) **Act of Union**, and may have been regarded, along with its culture, as antediluvian (see below). However, it was not viewed as a threat to the state. In contrast, the far more problematic (and contested) political incorporation of Scotland and Ireland -- and, relatedly, the close association of Gaelic language and culture in these areas with Catholicism -- may have contributed to the more rapid and widespread decline of these latter features within the (Protestant) British state.

Cultural nationalism

On the other hand, the degree of political incorporation within the British state has both limited the political ambitions of Welsh nationalism and fractured its constituency -- features which, as the 1997 Devolution Referendum demonstrates, are still clearly evident today. As a result, Welsh nationalism has had little influence on British politics as a whole and only marginally more on the Welsh people themselves. The long political incorporation of Wales also helps to explain why Welsh nationalism has come to be described as a form of *cultural* nationalism (see Chapter 2). In effect, Welsh nationalism has sought its legitimacy primarily in 'cultural continuity' and collective memory (C. Williams, 1994), notably via the promotion (and, at times, invention) of Welsh cultural traditions, and in the importance placed on the Welsh language. While I argued in Chapter 2 that these culturalist emphases need not necessarily result in a nostalgic and romantic form of nationalism, it appears in the Welsh context -- at least *historically* -- to have done so. This is particularly evident in the antiquarian preoccupations of eighteenth century Welsh

nationalists and in the influence of religious Nonconformity on their nineteenth and twentieth century successors.

This Welsh national (and nationalist) movement began in the late eighteenth century in, of all places, London. It was principally London-based Welsh intellectuals who invented -- or, rather, *re*-invented -- an historic Welsh tradition at this time via their involvement in the Welsh Societies of Cymmrodorion and Gwyneddigion, established in 1751 and 1771 respectively. Most notable among this group was Edward Williams, more commonly known by his bardic name 'Iolo Morgannwg'. He was responsible in 1789 for reviving the Eisteddfodau -- cultural gatherings which featured poetic and musical competitions, last seen in the sixteenth century -- as an annual celebration of Welsh culture and tradition. He was also responsible for creating the gorsedd -- Order of Bards -- whose elaborate, mystical and *invented* druidic ceremonies were added to the Eisteddfodau in 1819 and continue to the present day (Mayo, 1979).

Despite the more obvious attempts at invention, most notably associated with Iolo Morgannwg, this group of intellectuals did foster a distinctive scholarship of Welsh history and literature, albeit of a highly romanticised kind. This was, for them, the first step in constructing a sense of Welsh national identity (R. Williams, 1985). In so doing, they came to highlight what I discussed in Chapter 1 as the central features of an historical ethnie: a collective proper name, a myth of common ancestry, shared historical memories, one or more differentiating elements of common culture, an association with a specific 'homeland', and a collective sense of solidarity. To this end, they placed great emphasis on the distinctive contribution of the Welsh to British history as a whole, something hitherto largely ignored.[17] Also central to their project of establishing a distinctive Welsh identity was the valorisation of a strong pastoral dimension, fostered principally through bardic literature that dated back to the eighth century, and encapsulated particularly by the Welsh-speaking rural areas of mid and north Wales. In addition, the historic influence of the Welsh language was emphasised as perhaps the most salient distinguishing feature between the Welsh and the English -- a key boundary marker (see Chapter 4).[18] To this picture was added in the nineteenth century the rapid rise of religious Nonconformity in Wales which came to be employed as a further distinguishing feature of Welsh identity. The historical antiquarians of the eighteenth century were thus replaced by a Nonconformist intelligentsia in the nineteenth century but not much else was to change (Morgan, 1995). Meanwhile, the characteristics of the rapidly

expanding industrial south of Wales -- both far more heavily anglicised and far more *British* in orientation -- was ignored (Davies, 1989; Evans, 1989b). This is a problematic feature of Welsh nationalism to which we will regularly return.

The almost exclusively culturalist emphases evident in Welsh nationalism were also the inevitable result of the long ascendancy of the British state in Wales. The *legitimacy* of the state was seldom questioned by Welsh nationalists; in stark contrast, for example, to those in Ireland (see R. Jenkins, 1991). In short, nineteenth century Welsh nationalism had no significant constitutional aspirations in relation to Wales (Evans, 1989b). When it came to the question of Wales' role in the United Kingdom, the principal object of Welsh national (and nationalist) leaders was equality within the UK, not severance from it (Butt Philip, 1975). As such, the ambitions of nineteenth century Welsh nationalists were -- as we have already seen -- largely limited to the quest for separate legislation, and some institutions, which represented their particular cultural, linguistic and religious characteristics and concerns. Principal among these was the quest for religious disestablishment from the state Anglican church; a formal recognition, in effect, of Welsh Nonconformity. These broadly culturalist aims were reinforced by the close association of Welsh nationalism with its primary political expression in the British Liberal Party. Most leading Welsh nationalists of the day were also British Liberals -- David Lloyd George, who later became British Prime Minister, being the most prominent. This association, which created Liberal Nonconformist Wales as its fiefdom, was to enjoy a political hegemony from 1880 to 1922 (E. Williams, 1989).

Cymru Fydd

The question of self government, let alone independent statehood for Wales thus received little attention in the nineteenth century, and generated even less enthusiasm. The only prominent advocacy of Welsh Home Rule (self government) during this period in fact came from the brief, and ultimately unsuccessful attempt to establish the nationalist party Cymru Fydd (Young Wales). Founded after the Irish Home Rule crisis of 1886 by Welsh exiles living in London and Liverpool, it was alone in arguing for a measure of Welsh separation from the British state. Cymru Fydd, although part of the wider Liberal political movement, promised to transform Welsh Liberalism into a united nationalist movement under the twin banners of 'Home Rule' and 'Disestablishment' (C. Williams, 1982). Its leader, Tom Ellis, was elected to Parliament in 1886 and Lloyd George first entered Parliament as a Home Ruler in 1890, before returning to mainstream Liberalism.

However, both the tenure and influence of Cymru Fydd were to be short lived. Effectively, the movement collapsed in 1895 as a result of a dispute between Lloyd George, whose power base was in north Wales, and the south Wales liberals, led by D.A. Thomas. The latter's principal concerns centred on the fear that any move to national self government would result in the industrial counties of south Wales being unfairly dominated by rural mid and north Wales (Davies, 1989); a concern, as it happens, which was well founded.

Indeed, the demise of Cymru Fydd can in fact be explained largely by its preoccupation with rural mid and north Wales. Like Welsh nationalism more broadly, Cymru Fydd was almost entirely consumed by the problems of the rural counties and seemed uninterested in the problems facing industrial Wales (Kearney, 1989). By this time, for example, the industrialised areas of Wales were already beginning to experience the economic downturn that would become a crisis after the First World War. The failure of Cymru Fydd to address adequately these concerns was also a harbinger for the wider demise of Welsh nationalism in the guise of Liberal Nonconformity. As the fortunes of British Liberalism went into rapid decline at the end of the nineteenth century so too did those of Welsh nationalism with which it had been so closely associated. Disestablishment may have been eventually achieved in 1920 but, by then, it had far less resonance than in the previous century. Meanwhile, the Welsh Labour Party -- with its constituency principally in the industrial south of Wales, and with its emphasis on *British* (as opposed to Welsh) working-class interests -- was already in the ascendancy. Committed specifically to an 'international' socialism, it regarded Welsh nationalism as little more than a nostalgic, bourgeois illusion, irrelevant to the struggles of the working-class that by now made up so much of the Welsh population (Morgan, 1995).

Plaid Cymru

An emphasis on greater self government was not to reappear in Welsh nationalism until 1925, with the establishment by Saunders Lewis of the Welsh Nationalist Party, Plaid Cymru (The Party of Wales). Even here though, the initial concerns of Plaid Cymru were again primarily cultural rather than political. Like its nineteenth century predecessors, the nationalism of Plaid Cymru was predominantly intellectual and moral in outlook, and socially conservative (Butt Philip, 1975). Its model was once again a Welsh-speaking Liberal Nonconformist nationalist identity; its principal concerns were the Welsh language, Welsh identity and Christianity in Wales; and its

principal constituency was still rural mid and north Wales (C. Williams, 1982; E. Williams, 1989). While it subsequently came to endorse and actively promote the notion of Welsh self government, self government was primarily conceived not as an end in itself but as a means of strengthening (this particular form of) Welsh identity. Indeed, it was not until 1932 that self-government in its own right became part of the Blaid's official platform. The original aims of Plaid Cymru in 1925 were solely to do with the Welsh language. These included: 'keeping Wales Welsh-speaking ... by a) making the Welsh language the *only* official language of Wales ... b) making the Welsh language a medium of education in Wales from the elementary school through to the university' (cited in Williams, 1982: 148; my emphasis). As Butt Philip observes of this: 'A Welsh nation-state is conceivable without a Welsh language but Saunders Lewis and his sympathisers were Nationalists because they believed the survival of the Welsh language was inconceivable without a Welsh nation-state' (1975: 16).

Plaid Cymru was successful in attracting support from a wide range of Welsh intellectuals but little else (Morgan, 1981). The majority of the Welsh electorate had by now moved its allegiance to Labour and were, relatedly, much preoccupied with improving their socio-economic position within the wider British state; a concern made more imperative through the economic decline of the industrialised south of Wales from the 1920s onwards. To counter this, Saunders Lewis, who was president of Plaid Cymru from 1926-1939, placed great emphasis on creating an awareness of Wales' historic nationhood, believing that this would result in increased popular support. It did not. Indeed, it was not until 1966 that Plaid Cymru was to have its first elected MP in Wales when his successor as president, Gwynfor Evans, won the Carmarthen seat. As Davies comments: 'Plaid Cymru's emphasis over several decades on educating the people of Wales in their country's history produced few active nationalists and no popular support' (1989: 32). Much of this also had to do with the rapid decline of both Welsh Nonconformity and the Welsh language over the course of this century. For many within Wales, the Welsh identity being promoted by Plaid Cymru seemed increasingly irrelevant in the modern world. More pertinently, it seemed increasingly irrelevant in much of Wales itself. The once strong Welsh-speaking heartland (y fro Gymraeg) was retreating in the face of English into the western and northern rural margins. Meanwhile, the already largely anglicised south and east were increasingly looking to England and Britain for its own sense of collective identity (see below).

Given this, Plaid Cymru began moving in the 1970s to a broadly socialist position in an attempt to offer a more effective alternative to the Labour Party political hegemony in Wales. This change of direction was sanctioned by the revision of the Blaid's constitution in 1981 where the aim of 'self government for Wales' was amended to establishing 'a democratic Welsh socialist state' (Davies, 1989). It was further entrenched by the election of the socialist, Dafydd Elis Thomas, as president in 1984. Consequently, in the last decade or so, Plaid Cymru has shed many of its prior associations with a narrow language-based nationalism. Before his subsequent move to the House of Lords in 1993, Elis-Thomas was instrumental in accomplishing this central change in direction. He placed particular emphasis on an inclusive notion of Welsh *citizenship* as the basis of the Blaid's new political platform, although one that respected the language and cultural traditions of Wales. For Elis-Thomas, being Welsh was now no longer a question of nationality, language, or even birth. It was a status achievable by anyone who claimed the right and who acknowledged, in so doing, the general cultural distinctiveness of the country (Borland et al., 1992).

As a result of these changes, Plaid Cymru did manage to draw to it some of the new working class disaffected with the ideology of Labourism (Adamson, 1991). But, for all that, Plaid Cymru has continued to remain a marginal player in Welsh politics. Much of this can be explained by its ongoing association, at least in the public mind, with a particular language-based conception of Welsh identity, despite the party's recent attempts at reinvention. In particular, the Welsh language movement which emerged in the 1960s-1970s around Cymdeithas yr Iaith Gymraeg (the Welsh Language Society), and its policy of direct action on behalf of the language, had negative electoral consequences for Plaid Cymru (Balsom et al., 1982). Consequently, there are still only four Plaid Cymru MPs in the current British Parliament, elected in May 1997, all representing constituencies in west and north-west Wales. Its support remains strong in these particular constituencies but it still lacks widespread electoral appeal throughout Wales as a whole. In contrast, the Scottish Nationalist Party -- the equivalent political party in Scotland -- while also a minor political party, is seen as having more consistent and widespread electoral support.[19]

The 1979 devolution referendum

It was this general scepticism towards political nationalism (and its cultural antecedents) in Wales that was to culminate in the decisive rejection of Welsh devolution in the 1979 referendum. Like

its 1997 counterpart, one reason for this was that Welsh devolution was very much an afterthought -- and seen to be as such -- to the question of Scottish devolution at the time. For example, the (1976) **Devolution Bill** proposed by the Labour government as the basis for the 1979 referendum drew back from the full implications of the (1973) *Kilbrandon Commission Report* on Scottish and Welsh Home Rule on which it had originally been based. The *Kilbrandon Commission* had actually recommended full legislative powers for both Scottish and Welsh Assemblies, along with considerable fiscal freedom. However, the Devolution Bill, while proposing elected assemblies for both Scotland and Wales, differentiated between the two. The Welsh Assembly was to have only executive functions, whereas the Scottish Assembly was to be granted legislative powers (Davies, 1989).

This distinction was made by the then Labour government ostensibly on the basis of the institutional, legal and historical differences between the two nations. A more cynical interpretation is that it was due to the stronger support for nationalism in Scotland and the greater likelihood of an anti-devolution vote in Wales (C. Williams, 1982). In this respect, not much has changed. However, a key difference in 1979 was that the Devolution Referendum had been instigated in the dying days of an exhausted Labour government -- racked with internal division and soon to be comprehensively defeated by the Conservatives under Margaret Thatcher. This did not augur well for its success. Neither did its associations with the culturalist and language emphases of Welsh nationalism, represented by the political activities of Plaid Cymru and the direct action tactics in support of the Welsh language carried out by Cymdeithas yr Iaith Gymraeg (see below).

The question of Welsh nationalism and its potential divisiveness *within* Wales, while still evident in 1997, also loomed much larger in the public consciousness of the late 1970s. Indeed, the debates of 1979 occurred in a political climate which was consumed by the perceived links between devolution and Welsh nationalism, and the potential consequences that might ensue from these. For many in the south and east of Wales, there was the fear that a Welsh Assembly would be dominated by Welsh nationalists -- this was certainly the principal concern of the block of (south) Welsh Labour MPs, led by Neil Kinnock and Leo Abse, opposing devolution. In effect, the group contended that a Welsh Assembly would be 'a sellout to nationalism' and the first step onto the 'slippery slope to separatism' (Davies, 1989), and argued instead for the primacy of

British class-based interests.[20] As Gwyn Williams comments, this group 'played largely on the fears of the Welsh language and (rather oddly) of corruption, fears of being taken over by north Walian Welsh speakers with double-barrelled names, [and] fears of losing hold on Britain' (1985: 294). Ironically, many in the Welsh-speaking heartland of Wales, y fro Gymraeg, voted against devolution because of the opposite fear -- that any subsequent Assembly would be dominated by the interests of the more populous industrialised and anglicised south (Osmond, 1989). When these two trends combined, the overwhelming defeat of Welsh devolution became inevitable -- confirming, it seemed, the principal allegiance of the Welsh electorate to *British* interests (G.A. Williams, 1985). As Balsom et al. conclude in a survey of public attitudes in Wales at the time: 'There is almost a complete lack of political will for self-determination' (1982: 19; see also Butt Philip, 1975: 125-129).

The result of the 1979 Devolution Referendum was to reiterate, in their starkest form, long demonstrated tensions surrounding the question of Welsh identity -- tensions which echo still, although with somewhat less resonance. Incorporation within the British state may well have contributed to the retention over time of Welsh language and culture, and to the related historical predominance of cultural nationalism. However, it also contributed significantly to a countervailing anglicisation -- particularly in south and east Wales -- and thus to alternative, equally powerful conceptions of Welsh identity. Allied to long-standing regional distinctions within Wales (see below), the resulting disjuncture between language and identity explains the limited impact of Welsh nationalism, and the even more limited enthusiasm for self determination. As Gwyn Williams drily observed: 'the long and dismal history of indifference and contempt towards English-speaking Welsh people which had been a disturbing feature of Welsh nationalism and much language-focused Welsh national feeling ... [duly reaped] its dragon's teeth of harvest [in the 1979 Referendum]' (1985: 291). And much more besides. It is to these issues of language and identity in Wales that I now want to turn.

The problem of Welsh identity

The political influence, or lack thereof, of Welsh nationalism points to the wider question of collective identity in Wales. In short, what does it mean to be Welsh? There is no easy answer to this question since Welsh identity is cross-cut with numerous internal divisions. Raymond

Williams argues, for example, that Welsh culture 'is the complex of forced and acquired discontinuities: a broken series of radical shifts, within which we have to mark not only certain social and linguistic continuities but many acts of self definition by negation, by alternation and by contrast' (1985: 23). Remembering also Kearney's observation that 'what seem to be "national" units [may] dissolve into a number of distinctive cultures...' (1989: 10), we can begin to explore the various sub-cultures evident in Wales which contribute to, and at times compete against a wider sense of corporate identity.

Dealing with the latter first, it might be considered surprising that a distinct (and distinctive) collective identity has survived at all. After all, other once culturally distinct areas in the British Isles such as Cornwall and the North of England have long come to think of themselves as British, if not English. And yet, against the odds, a Welsh identity -- or, more accurately, Welsh identit*ies* -- have survived over time, albeit in markedly modified forms. Moreover, these local Welsh identities -- although not always easily reconciled -- have nonetheless sufficient corporate purchase to allow us now to talk of a Welsh *national* identity. Industrial Wales may have far more in common with the neighbouring English counties that comprise the West Midlands than with the rural north and north-west of Wales, yet those who live there still think of themselves principally as *Welsh* (Crick, 1995).

A key part of the ongoing maintenance of a distinct Welsh national identity here lies in its, at times, uneasy relationship with its English counterpart -- a relationship at once both symbiotic and oppositional. Linda Colley (1992) argues in her excellent historical account, *Britons*, that British identity was formed principally in contradistinction to the French. Much the same can be said of Welsh identity in relation to the English. As Fiona Bowie observes, 'the English are an essential ingredient in Welsh identity, not in making the people what they are, but in providing a symbol of what they are not. It is in opposition to Englishness that Welshness is defined' (1993: 190). Likewise, Butt Philip argues that it is the 'contrast with the English culture that gives the Welsh and their culture their dynamism' (1975: 41). In this respect, a distinct Welsh identity can be traced as far back as 597 AD when Bede commented on the sense of difference between the Welsh and Anglo Saxons at the time of Augustine's coming to Britain (Morgan, 1995). Such differences were also to provide a constant theme for Welsh poetry and prose from the sixth

century on, centring predominantly on Welsh language and culture (see G.A. Williams, 1985); a distinguishing feature later enthusiastically employed, as we have seen, by Welsh nationalists.

But this is also to oversimplify since contrasting identities within what has now come to be known as Wales also have long historical precedent. The most notable of these is the distinction between the north and south of Wales, already alluded to at various points in this account. While much of this distinction has come to be represented by the contrast between an industrialised, anglicised south and a still rural, Welsh-speaking north, the differences between these regions actually go back much further. Kearney (1989) argues, for example, that linguistic differences and political allegiances had divided different areas of Wales since the sixth century. At this time, the Kingdom of Gwynedd in north-west Wales looked to the Celtic influences of northern Britain for its origins while the Kingdoms of Powys in mid-Wales, and Gwent and Dyfed in the south looked elsewhere to Mercia, southern England, and Ireland, respectively. The different political and cultural sub-cultures that this inevitably produced were again highlighted in the failure of the ninth century king of Gwynedd, Rhodri the Great, and the tenth century king of Dyfed, Hywel Dda (from whom came the Welsh legal code) to unify the various kingdoms of 'Wales'.

By the time of the Norman conquest the regional differences evident in Wales had coalesced into four major political units -- Gwynedd in the north-west, Deheubarth in the south-west, Morganwg in the south and south-east and Powys in the east. These distinct regional sub-cultures remained clearly in evidence up to the incorporation of Wales within Britain, and well beyond. They help to explain the genesis of eighteenth century Welsh nationalism in London, for example, since local identities still remained dominant at that time in Wales itself. More significantly, they have laid the basis of the geographical, cultural and linguistic divisions so clearly evident still in contemporary Wales. It is to these ongoing divisions that I now want to turn.

The case of three Wales

Given this historical background, it is not surprising that the issue of Welsh identity has been a particularly contested one. This point is exemplified linguistically by the fact that Welsh has at least three words for 'identity', the most common of which, 'hunaniaeth', dates back to the eighteenth century. There is not one but many ways of being Welsh and not all are

complementary (Bowie, 1993). In this respect, the north/south divide continues to dominate any discussion of what constitutes 'Welshness'. However, following Balsom et al. (1982; see also Balsom, 1985), it is perhaps more accurate to identify *three* broad regional variations which have laid the basis for differing contemporary conceptions of Welshness. Divided by geography, language and history, these three areas comprise y fro Gymraeg (the Welsh-speaking heartland in west and north-west Wales), Welsh Wales (the industrial valleys of south Wales), and British Wales (south and east Wales).[21]

Y fro Gymraeg

Y fro Gymraeg, as its name suggests, is largely linguistically defined. The term was first employed by Bowen (1959) to describe areas where over 80 per cent of the inhabitants spoke Welsh; a benchmark subsequently reduced to 70 per cent (Bowen & Carter, 1974). Even under this adjusted criterion, the areas that can still be designated as part of y fro Gymraeg are predominantly confined to the rural west and north-west of Wales -- in particular, the counties of Anglesey, Gwynedd, Ceredigion, and Carmarthenshire (Pembrokeshire, in the far south-west, has been historically far more heavily anglicised). Indeed, the key feature of y fro Gymraeg has been its rapid diminution and increasing fragmentation over the course of this century; a reflection, in turn, of the wider decline of Welsh speakers over the same period (see Chapter 7). Relatedly, while local authorities within y fro Gymraeg remain at the forefront of Welsh language maintenance -- in Gwynedd, for example, 61 per cent of its population could still speak Welsh at the time of the last census in 1991 -- there are now a greater number of actual Welsh speakers in and around the capital, Cardiff, in the south-east (Aitchison & Carter, 1994). Much of the recent resurgence of Welsh has likewise occurred in the more anglicised areas of Wales; a result of the nascent Welsh institutional framework discussed earlier and to which I will return in more detail in the following chapter.

The fragmentation of y fro Gymraeg began in the nineteenth century, however, with the impact of the industrialisation of south Wales on its own largely rural economy. During this period, wage labour remained relatively uncommon in the Welsh-speaking western and northern counties of Wales. The social structure was not too dissimilar to the Irish Gaeltacht, with its division into lle mawr (large farms), lle bach (small farms) and pobol tai bach (cottagers: literally, people of the little houses). As such, it remained a heavily localised economy and society (Kearney, 1989). Y

fro Gymraeg did contribute briefly to the industrial revolution, via slate quarrying in the north-west, but this was quickly eclipsed by the burgeoning iron and coal industries in the southern valleys. As a result, the Welsh-speaking heartland experienced extensive emigration to the south from the mid 1800s onwards, accounting eventually for up to three quarters of the existing Welsh population at that time (G.A. Williams, 1985). Many of these emigrants subsequently became anglicised (although not immediately; see below), thus creating linguistic as well as socio-economic distinctions between the two regions.

Large in-migration of English speakers to rural west and north Wales in more recent times has led to y fro Gymraeg's own inexorable anglicisation. Nonetheless, Balsom et al.'s (1982) analysis found that the area still retains a strong sense of Welsh identity, while continuing to equate this identity inextricably with the Welsh language. For many in y fro Gymraeg, to be fully Welsh one must be a Welsh speaker. This connection is illustrated by the common practice of classifying all non-Welsh speakers -- including second language learners, and those who come from anglicised areas of Wales -- as 'Sais' ('English'). In effect, 'Welsh' and 'English' are used as ciphers for 'insider' and 'outsider' -- a linguistic Offa's Dyke.[22] The usual question asked in Gwynedd, for example, is not 'Are you Welsh?' (Cymro/Cymraes 'dach chi?) but 'Are you Welsh-speaking?' (Cymraeg 'dach chi?), the latter, until recently, automatically implying the former (Bowie, 1993).

Given the long political and linguistic history of the area, its historical association with Welsh cultural nationalism, and the increasing threat of anglicisation to the Welsh language, this view of non-Welsh speakers is perhaps not surprising (see N. Thomas, 1992). However, its exclusionary overtones have been widely criticised (see D. Smith, 1984; G.A. Williams, 1985; Osmond, 1989; Borland, et al., 1992). The historian, Gwyn Williams, is particularly disparaging of this process of labelling people as in some sense unwelsh or 'di Gymraeg' (Welshless), regarding it as demeaning, unwarranted and adversarial. The result, he concludes rather gloomily in his history of Wales, is a schizophrenia at the heart of Welsh identity which 'threatens to extinguish not simply a Welsh nation but a Welsh people itself as an historic entity' (1985: 236).

The industrial valleys

For Williams, and other like-minded critics (see D. Smith, 1984), the valleys of south Wales provide an equally valid form of Welsh identity. The valleys were the core of the industrial

revolution in nineteenth century Wales and the core of Labour's electoral stronghold in the twentieth. Since the 1920s, however, the area has experienced considerable economic decline, subsequent emigration and, unlike rural Wales, little in-migration. As I have already discussed, the economic difficulties encountered over this period also convinced many living in the valleys of the merits of British socialism over Welsh nationalism; an allegiance which remains strong to the present day. In effect, the politics of class became more important in south Wales than the politics of ethnicity, religion, or language (Kearney, 1989; Adamson, 1991).

With regard to language, much of the industrialised area of Wales remained predominantly Welsh-speaking, at least initially, given that most migration to the area in the nineteenth century was internal to Wales. In this sense, the linguistic contrast between the south and north of Wales is often historically overstated. Indeed, B. Thomas (1959, 1987) contends that the Welsh language was actually *saved* in the nineteenth century by industrialisation. While this position understates the impact that migration had on the demographic base of y fro Gymraeg (C. Williams, 1990), it is nonetheless widely accepted. Gwyn Williams, for example, argues along similar lines that the internal, rural-urban migration in Wales meant that the Welsh, unlike their Gaelic neighbours, the Scots and Irish, did not have to abandon the language by seeking employment elsewhere, notably in the new world (1985: 180; see also Morgan, 1981: 7). Certainly, Welsh continued to be the language of the coalfield, the workplace, the home, the chapels, and of social life generally, in the early years of industrialisation in the south Wales' valleys (Davies, 1990).

However, as the demand for workers increased, so too did the number of English immigrants to the valleys. Until the early part of this century, many of these were simply assimilated into Welsh-speaking communities but their increasing number soon became such that it was no longer necessary for them to learn Welsh. The anglicisation of the area inevitably followed although it was initially uneven, spreading first from the eastern valleys nearest England. It was only in the wake of the subsequent economic decline in the 1920s and 1930s, and the mass emigration from the industrial valleys which ensued, that Welsh was more widely abandoned by those who remained there. This occurred principally because of the assumption that a knowledge of English might be a more useful basis for social mobility (see below).

These trends have meant that the industrial valleys are now predominantly English-speaking as a result. In Blaenau Gwent, for example, the most eastern of the valley areas, only 2.3 per cent of the population could still speak Welsh at the time of the 1991 census. In the adjacent Merthyr Tydfil and Rhondda areas, the percentages were 7.5 and 8.2 respectively (Aitchison & Carter, 1994). And yet, for all that, the people of the valleys remain identifiably Welsh. Remembering Fishman's analysis of the link between language and identity (see Chapter 4), it may be a *different* kind of Welshness from those who continue to speak Welsh but it is no less strongly felt. Moreover, traces of the Welsh language clearly remain in the cadences and vocabulary of Welsh English ('Wenglish'; see Coupland, 1990); what Griffith (1950) describes, in terms not dissimilar to Bourdieu, as a form of 'accumulated capital'.[23] Raymond Williams likewise observes that the Welsh language 'remains critical to cultural identity ... even in many of those to whom it is now lost and marginal' (1985: 21).

That said, the English language Welsh identity of the valleys is far from unproblematic. A direct link between Welsh language and Welsh identity is firmly rejected by many of these Anglo-Welsh, as they have come to be known. However, even the many who contest this historical association do not necessarily wish to diminish the status of the Welsh language as such (Aitchison & Carter, 1994). In addition, there are also few who would not admit that if a fluent knowledge of Welsh could be acquired quickly and without difficulty they would welcome the opportunity to speak the language and, crucially, would feel more Welsh because of it (Bowie, 1993; see also Giles & Taylor, 1978; Khleif, 1978). In this latter respect, there is an awareness that the Welsh language as the principal medium of the literature, history and mythology of the country has contributed significantly to a separate sense of collective identity. More crucially perhaps, it has acted historically as a key boundary marker, or 'symbolic border guard' (Armstrong, 1982), in distinguishing the Welsh from the English. Its loss therefore inevitably involves a loss of heritage while also blurring the line between the Anglo- Welsh and their English neighbours. As Bowie observes, these difficulties, and the ambivalences to which they give rise, are poignantly reflected in the Welsh and English names for the nation itself:

> To the outsider or the native English speaker the people are 'Welsh', derived from the Anglo-Saxon word *wealth*, 'foreigner'. To the Welsh speaker they are *Cymry*, the 'kinsfolk' who inhabit not the 'land of strangers' (Wales) but 'the land of fellow countrymen/women' (Cymru). English speakers can only describe themselves as 'foreigners'. (1993: 186).

The result is that while south Wales is very conscious of itself as an industrial society, its sense of its own distinctive place in the world, and of what it means to be Welsh, remain underdeveloped (Evans, 1989b; Osmond, 1989). It may no longer relate easily to the traditional, Welsh-speaking milieu of y fro Gymraeg, and it may reject outright the claim that Welsh speakers are the only true Welsh. But it is also an identity which remains firmly rooted in the language and traditions which it has only recently discarded. The Anglo-Welsh are currently in a position where they have experienced the loss of the traditional language-identity link but have yet to articulate with confidence their own anglicised variant.

British Wales

And then there is the third area of Wales, broadly identified by Balsom et al. (1982) as 'British Wales'. Linked directly to England by arterial transport routes,[24] British Wales comprises the southern coastal belt (in which lie the port cities of Swansea, Cardiff and Newport), the northern coastal belt, and the east and north-east counties bordering on England. The majority of the population in British Wales tends currently to be involved in expanding state, educational or service industries, in multinational companies based in Wales, or have moved there for lifestyle reasons, usually from England (Day, 1989; Osmond, 1989; Symonds, 1990). The population is also significant for its majority of monolingual English speakers. In the old county of Gwent (encompassing Monmouthshire and Newport), only 2.4 per cent of the population were able to speak Welsh at the time of the 1991 census (Aitchison & Carter, 1994). This feature is not surprising, given that the areas comprising British Wales have been subject historically to the greatest amount of English in-migration and subsequent anglicisation. The displacement of Welsh by English near the English border and in the southern coastal strip, for example, was evident from 1750 onwards (C. Williams, 1990; see also below).[25] In this sense, British Wales is not dissimilar to the southern valleys. However, unlike the latter, the degree of anglicisation has been such that this broadly defined area tends now to reject a specifically Welsh identity in favour of a British one.[26] This is evidenced in particular by the active opposition to the maintenance and extension of the Welsh language. In Monmouthshire, for example, vehement opposition from English-speaking parents to the teaching of Welsh in schools has meant that the majority of schools in the area have had no formal Welsh component until quite recently (see Chapter 7). Such attitudes suggest that a central aim in adopting a specific British/English identity is to marginalise the Welsh-speaking minority and to deny, in so doing, any sense of a distinct Welsh

identity at all. The question 'What use/value is Welsh?' is the most common refrain adopted here in relation to the language.

Language and identity in Wales

Of course, the broad categories described above are both overstated and oversimplified (cf. Glyn Williams, 1994). Allegiances and identifications at both the individual and collective level are neither as straightforward nor as consistent as the above designations suggest. Moreover, like many discussions of Welsh identity, the designations employed do not account adequately for the contributions of women and ethnic minorities to Wales. Women are still largely absent from the dominant symbolic representations of Welsh identity, enshrined as these are in the masculinist historical conceptions of both rural, non-conformist Wales *and* the industrialised southern valleys (Aaron et al., 1995, Betts, 1996; see also Yuval-Davis, 1997). Ethnic minorities are likewise seldom acknowledged (see Bourne, 1989; Tarrow, 1992; Charlotte Williams, 1995, 1997). Predominantly of South Asian ancestry,[27] such minorities currently comprise 1.3 per cent of the population (OPCS, 1991). The majority live in Cardiff (where they constitute 6 per cent of the local population) and Swansea in the south, and Bangor in the north.

I will return to the educational implications of these omissions more fully in the next chapter. Suffice it to say at this point that the above analysis, whatever its limitations, at least points to the elusiveness of a coherent notion of Welshness, or 'Cymreictod', (a term which carries a much fuller meaning in Welsh than in English; see Bowie, 1993). Rather, there are many conflicting and interlocking definitions of Welsh identity which actively compete for symbolic space and public recognition (Bowie, 1993; Glyn Williams, 1994). Crucially, many of these competing definitions of Welshness are inextricably tied to the relationship between language and identity. As Fiona Bowie concludes:

> For the 80 per cent of the population of [Wales] for whom Welsh is a foreign language any definition of Welshness which gives priority to the Welsh language poses a potential threat to their own sense of identity. The vexed question of the extent to which the Welsh language can be taken as the prime mediator of Welshness and chief criterion of nationhood, reveals deep and unresolved tensions at the heart of Welsh identity. (1993: 169).

There are historical reasons for this ambivalence, most notably to do with the widespread anglicisation of many areas of Wales. This process of anglicisation -- by which the Welsh people became increasingly assimilated into an English-dominated cultural and ideological system (C. Williams, 1990) -- was most often embarked on in the name of modernity and with the aspiration of long term social mobility. However, the benefits attached to this process have been less, and the costs greater, than perhaps many expected.

The anglicisation of Wales

As should already be clear by now, the anglicisation of Wales has been a prominent feature of the nation's history. In this respect, the Welsh nationalist R.S. Thomas despondently observes about the English language: 'this is the major language, spoken by hundreds of millions of people with enormous resources devoted to it, that our small, bullied and embattled nation is called upon to maintain itself in the face of. And that is the way of it' (1992: 15; see also N. Thomas, 1992).

Although not entirely, since it is not the *spread* of English which has been crucial in anglicising Wales, at least not up until this century. After all, Wales remained 90 per cent Welsh-speaking in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries (P. Jenkins, 1992) and as late as 1880, three out of four Welsh people still spoke the Welsh language by choice (Morgan, 1981).[28] Rather, it has been the *diminution* of the *status* of Welsh and its *restriction* to private, low status language *domains* which has proved to be more debilitating historically. In short, the rapid language loss which has occurred this century with regard to Welsh is to a large extent the product of the much longer historical devaluation and restriction of Welsh in formal domains (cf. Chapter 4).

This latter process began as early as the Norman colonisation of Wales in the late eleventh century. During that time, the prestige languages were Latin and French and to speak a local vernacular language such as Welsh was seen as a mark of bondage (Kearney, 1989). Consequently, Latin and French quickly acquired the status of formal languages of administration and documentation in Wales, a mantle which English would subsequently assume by the fourteenth century. This marked the first significant restriction of Welsh within formal language domains -- domains which had previously been represented, for example, by the customary law of Hywel Dda. With the emasculation of legal and administrative systems in Welsh, such as they

were, only the literary tradition remained as a formal linguistic indicator of Welshness (Aitchison & Carter, 1994).

The exclusion of Welsh from the public realm was formalised by the (1536) **Act of Union**. The language provisions outlined in the Act made English the sole language of government. In so doing, the Act was unequivocal about the status (or lack thereof) of the Welsh language, viewing it as a key obstacle to successful incorporation of the new dominion within Britain:

> ... because the people of the same Dominion (Wales) have and do daily use a speech nothing like or consonant to the natural mother tongue used within this Realm (England).... to reduce them to perfect order notice, and knowledge of the laws of this, his Realm... and *utterly to extirpate all and singular the sinister usages and customs differing from the same* ... bringing all the citizens of this Realm to amiable concord and unity.... From henceforth, no person or persons that use the Welsh speech or language shall have or enjoy any manor, office or fees ... unless he or they use and exercise the speech or language of English. (Henry VIII, Acts of Incorporation of Wales with England, 1536; cited in Williams & Raybould, 1991: 2, my emphasis)

The effect of the Act was to exclude Welsh from the public realm for the next four centuries. Or, as Gwyn Williams observes, 'Welsh ceased to be an official language and had to retreat into the kitchen' (1985: 121). Concomitantly, English came to be seen as the language of preferment (D. Edwards, 1993). The only formal arena where the Welsh language continued to be recognised -- that is, beyond the private and low status domain of the family -- was the church. Ironically, this was because Henry VIII's successor, Elizabeth I, had authorised a Welsh translation of the Bible in 1563.[29] The translation which was to emerge subsequently in 1588 became the 'sheet-anchor' (G.A. Williams, 1985) of the language. Crucially, it allowed Welsh to remain a standardised literary language, with the *capacity* to be used in any domain (even if it was not so used). Despite its ongoing lowly regarded status (see below), the literary standard provided by the 1588 translation prevented the language from diverging into mutually incomprehensible dialects and/or atrophying altogether (Morgan, 1981). The significance of the translation also helps to explain the subsequent close association of the Welsh language with religion and, from that, of religious education (Glanmor Williams, 1979).[30]

That said, the Welsh language continued to face considerable opposition and consistent negative attribution as a perceived low status language. While Wales remained predominantly Welsh-

speaking up until this century, the Welsh landed gentry were the first to adopt English as first an additional, and then a substitute language. This pattern was well established by the eighteenth century (P. Jenkins, 1992). Concomitantly, the use of Welsh was invariably equated with backwardness and inferiority (Morgan, 1995; Miles, 1996). This pejorative view of the Welsh language (not to mention, the Welsh themselves) is ably demonstrated by William Richards, in his *Wallography* of 1682:

> The Native Gibberish is usually prattled throughout the whole of Taphydome, except in their Market Towns, whose inhabitants being a little raised, and (as it were) puffl up into Bubbles, above the ordinary scum, do begin to despise it.... 'Tis usually cashier'd out of Gentlemen's Houses ... the Lingua will be Englishd out of Wales. (cited in Aitchison & Carter, 1994: 27).

These sentiments continued to be echoed in succeeding centuries. In 1866, *The Times* newspaper thundered that 'The Welsh language is the curse of Wales' (Mayo, 1979). Likewise, the nineteenth century English educationalist and literary critic, Matthew Arnold, while paying tribute to the Welsh literary classics in his *Study of Celtic Literature*, could also state:

> The fusion of all the inhabitants of these islands into one homogenous, English-speaking whole, the breaking down of barriers between us, the swallowing up of provincial nationalities, is a consummation to which the natural course of things irresistibly tends. It is a necessity of what is called modern civilisation.... *The sooner the Welsh language disappears as an instrument of the practical, political, social life of Wales, the better; the better for England, the better for Wales itself.* (cited in Griffith, 1950: 71; my emphasis).

Similar views on the Welsh language were also clearly apparent in an influential nineteenth century review of the state of education in Wales. Published in 1847 as *Reports of the Commissioners of Enquiry into the State of Education in Wales*, it has since come to be known as 'Brad y Lyfrau Gleision' (The Treachery of the Blue Books). The Reports were compiled by three young English and Oxford educated lawyers and their terms of reference were to conduct 'an inquiry ... into the state of education in ... Wales, especially into the means afforded to the labouring classes of acquiring a knowledge of the English language' (cited in Jones, 1997: 14-15). To this end, they made some well-merited criticisms of the limited and variable educational provision of the church-based schools in Wales at that time (Morgan, 1995; Jones, 1997). However, they also proceeded to include an excoriating wider attack on Welsh language and culture as the principal explanation for these inadequacies. Indeed, all the social, cultural and economic disadvantages the three

commissioners saw in Wales were, in one way or another, attributed to the language: 'His language keeps him under the hatches, being one in which he can neither acquire nor communicate the necessary information'. They concluded: 'The Welsh language is a vast drawback to Wales, and a manifold barrier to the moral progress and commercial prosperity of the people.... It dissevers the people from intercourse which would greatly advance their civilisation, and bars the access of improving knowledge to their minds' (cited in Evans, 1978: 14).

Not surprisingly, the Reports caused an uproar in Wales and are credited with giving considerable momentum to the Welsh nationalist movement of the day (G.A. Williams, 1985; Morgan, 1995). Their publication also led to successful campaigns for improving educational provision in Wales -- via the (1889) **Welsh Intermediate Act**, for example -- and to the eventual establishment of the University of Wales (Jones, 1997). However, the longer term effects of the Reports -- on the Welsh language, in particular -- were largely deleterious. Most significantly, they provided the intellectual background and rationale for the (1870) **Education Act**. This Act, which established the joint state elementary system in England and Wales, formally excluded Welsh from the pedagogy and practice of Welsh schools. This, in turn, led to the notorious practice of the 'Welsh Not', where a wooden halter was placed over the shoulders of children heard speaking Welsh in school. The last child to be wearing the halter at the end of the day was caned.

The subsequent valorisation of English within state education -- and, concomitantly, the specific proscription of Welsh -- continued well into this century. It has only been in the last 50 years that Welsh has effectively re-emerged as a school language, a development I will examine in more detail in the following chapter. In this respect, the educational policy of Welsh language proscription was itself merely a reflection of the wider, long-established hierarchising of English over Welsh, along with the accompanying belief that in the English language lay the route to social and economic mobility. The seventeenth century views of William Richards above are testimony enough to this. However, a monolingual English educational policy was also to entrench the view among many that the very *retention* of Welsh itself was actively *dis*advantageous. Thus, where previously Welsh monolingualism and de facto bilingualism had been the norm, English monolingualism was increasingly to replace them both. Many Welsh-speaking parents, for example, while continuing to speak Welsh among themselves, stopped speaking it to their children. This practice was particularly evident in the southern valleys during

the inter-war period (1918-1945) of economic decline and, with the reinforcement of monolingual English education, helps to explain the area's current wide anglicisation (Davies, 1990; C. Williams, 1990). The result at the individual level, as for so many other minority language speakers (cf. Chapters 4 & 5), was a generational loss of the language. As Gwyn Thomas poignantly observes of this process: 'My father and mother were Welsh-speaking, yet I did not exchange a word in that language with them. The death of Welsh ran through our family like a geographical fault' (quoted in Osmond, 1988: 149). This vignette also illustrates writ large the rapid decline of Welsh over the course of this century (see Chapter 7).

To many this decline was viewed as a positive trend -- English was perceived as the language of progress, equality, opportunity, the media and mass entertainment (C. Williams, 1990). Even today, the practice of unfavourably comparing the utility and status of Welsh to English remains commonplace. One contemporary example can be found in the assertions of the Welsh sociologist, Christie Davies:

> English became a world language ... as part of a spontaneous order emerging from the free interaction of individuals and corporations. Men and women have voluntarily learned to speak English because there are gains to them as individuals that stem from the world's dominant patterns of spontaneous interactions. The ancestors of today's Welsh people shifted from speaking Welsh to speaking English, not because of external political pressure, but in order to take advantage of economic and educational opportunities. English and Welsh are, in a quite objective sense, not equal languages. Welsh people who become fluent in English gain enormously, whereas English people learning Welsh gain very little. (1997: 42)

Davies' comments bring us up to date with this particular perception of the Welsh language. Their facility and fatuousness aside, his views stand well within the long tradition of negative attribution towards Welsh that I have briefly outlined here. To this end, I do not want to deconstruct his, or the preceding arguments further. I have already dealt at length in previous chapters with the misconceptions and misrepresentations within them as they relate to minority languages in general: notably, the unquestioned primacy of an homogenous, unilingual nation-state, the equation of majority languages -- particularly, English -- with modernity, progress, and social mobility, and the notion of 'free', 'spontaneous' language choice. What I do want to highlight again briefly here is the process of symbolic violence, as described by Bourdieu (see Chapter 4), which has occurred historically in relation to Cymraeg -- the Welsh language. In

effect, the English language came to be seen by the Welsh as a form of cultural and linguistic capital, an escape from primitivism, and a demonstration of having embraced the 'modern' way of life (Miles, 1996). Concomitantly, a Welsh linguistic habitus was increasingly regarded as having little cultural, social and economic value. As Bourdieu argues, to understand the nature of symbolic violence, it is crucial to see that it presupposes a kind of active complicity, or implicit consent, on the part of those subjected to it. This is clearly the case historically in Wales where Welsh speakers themselves came to 'collaborate in the destruction of their [own] instruments of expression' (Bourdieu, 1991: 49).

This is not to apportion blame in any way. After all, as Joshua Fishman has argued, the choice facing minority language speakers like the Welsh has often been presented as an intractable one: 'either to reman loyal to their traditions and to remain socially disadvantaged (consigning their own children to such disadvantage as well), on the one hand; or, on the other hand, to abandon their distinctive practices and traditions, at least in large part, and, thereby, to improve their own and their children's lots in life via cultural suicide' (1991: 60; see Chapter 4). R.S. Thomas echoes this analysis, in relation to class, when he observes: 'A Welshman or woman was faced with a partial choice. He could, by remaining loyal to his or her native speech, be dubbed a member of an inferior class, or by assiduously imitating the English upper class could be admitted to it, generally at the expense of Welsh' (1992: 13). Given the long historical vitiation of Welsh, that so many adopted this latter option is perhaps not surprising. What *is* surprising is that it took so long for them to do so, and that despite it all, Welsh remains a living language, still spoken today as a language of everyday life by 20 per cent of the Welsh population. Moreover, in the 1991 census, this decline has for the first time this century been, if not reversed, at least abated (Aitchison & Carter, 1994). This encouraging counter-trend is related to the influence of Welsh-medium education, and the wider institutionalisation of Welsh of which it is a part, that I will discuss in the next chapter.

Before examining these issues, however, I want to turn finally in this chapter to the key contribution of the Welsh language movement in bringing both about. As I discussed earlier, the political impact of Welsh nationalism has been largely negligible and the language movement with which it has been closely associated has also faced considerable opposition. In particular, the latter's policy of non-violent direct action on behalf of the Welsh language has proved extremely

controversial. Nonetheless, without such action, it is not likely that the present nascent renaissance of the Welsh language, and its increasing institutionalisation within the civic realm, could have been achieved.

The Welsh language movement

The Welsh language movement had its genesis in a radio broadcast by Saunders Lewis, 'Tynged yr Iaith' (The Fate of the Language). The lecture was delivered in Welsh by Lewis on 13 February, 1962, nearly 20 years after he had given up the leadership of Plaid Cymru and subsequently retired from public life. In it, Lewis stressed that the Welsh language was facing extinction. In so doing, he reversed his earlier position which had formed the basis of his establishment of Plaid Cymru; namely, that only self-government could save the Welsh language:

> In my opinion, if any kind of self-government for Wales were obtained before the Welsh language was acknowledged and used as an official language in local authority and state administration in the Welsh-speaking areas of the country, then the language would never achieve official status at all, and its demise would be quicker than it will be under English rule. (cited in Davies, 1989: 45).

In this respect, the speech was directed primarily at Plaid Cymru since Lewis had increasingly come to see the futility of the Blaid's efforts to gain electoral representation, let alone have a political impact in Wales and Britain (Davies, 1973). In contrast, he issued a direct call to arms on behalf of the Welsh language which by then he saw as the only political issue with which nationalists should be concerned. This call included a campaign of direct action and civil disobedience as a means of winning official recognition for the Welsh language in Wales. Ironically, his views were to have little impact on the organisation and activities of Plaid Cymru itself. However, they did lead a number of disaffected Plaid Cymru members to establish Cymdeithas yr Iaith Gymraeg (The Welsh Language Society) later that year, an organisation dedicated to just such a campaign on behalf of the language. Its specific aims were to 'attain official status for the Welsh language equal with that of English within Wales', and to see that the Welsh language could and would be used by public bodies throughout Wales (Butt Philip, 1975).

Cymdeithas yr Iaith Gymraeg was not the only nationalist protest group to be established at this time but it was by far the most prominent. There were a number of small activist organisations,

also established in the 1960s, whose concerns were wider than language and who engaged in violent forms of protest action along the lines of the IRA. The Free Wales Army and Mudiad Amddiffyn Cymru (The Movement for the Defence of Wales) were two such organisations, although they had limited impact and even less support, and their tenure was consequently short lived (see Butt Philip, 1975: 263-268). There have also been other language-based pressure groups which have been formed subsequently to Cymdeithas. One such group, Adfer (Reconstruct), advocated throughout the 1970s what amounted to a territorial language policy (cf. Chapter 5). It argued that the 'real' Wales could be equated only with y fro Gymraeg and that, as such, this area should be officially recognised and delineated as a monoglot Welsh-speaking area. Again, however, this group gained little public support. The already widespread interspersion of Welsh and English by this time -- even within y fro Gymraeg, let alone beyond it -- militated against a simplistic notion of territorial monolingualism in Wales (C. Williams, 1982, 1987, 1994). In addition, the basis of Adfer's conception of Welshness as comprising only those who were Welsh-*speaking* was viewed as exclusionary (Denney, 1991; Borland, et al., 1992).

But if other nationalists groups struggled to make an impact, Cymdeithas yr Iaith Gymraeg did not. One reason for this was Cymdeithas' commitment to *non-violent* direct action. Like Plaid Cymru, Cymdeithas rejected the use of violence both on pragmatic grounds, as a likely obstruction to the movement's goals, and on moral grounds, reflecting the strong thread of Christian pacifism which has always existed within Welsh nationalism (R. Jenkins, 1991). This allowed the organisation to mount high-profile campaigns of civil disobedience on behalf of the language which drew to the group a wide range of committed, often young student activists. The first of these campaigns, advocating court summonses in Welsh, resulted in a sit-down demonstration on Trefechan Bridge on the edge of Aberystwyth in February, 1963. No arrests were made on that day but subsequent campaigns were to see numerous Cymdeithas members arrested, and some imprisoned. The first Cymdeithas member was imprisoned in 1966, for example, for protesting the lack of motor vehicle tax forms in Welsh (Davies, 1989; Harrison, 1997).

These initial campaigns, while controversial, were to have an immediate effect. Shortly after the Trefechan Bridge demonstration the Hughes-Parry Committee was convened by the British government to review the status of the Welsh language. It reported back in 1965 and its

recommendations led directly to the (1967) **Welsh Language Act**, granting Welsh 'equal validity' with English in the courts and in the provision of statutory forms. It must be stressed that this Act did not make the notion of equal validity effective as of right -- there was no mechanism, for example, to compel state agencies to enforce the principle. Nor did its effect reach beyond the clearly delineated and limited areas mentioned above. As Glyn Williams (1987) observes, the Act was more a 'policy of containment' by the British government than a positive development in its own right. Nonetheless, the Act constituted a significant concession to the use of Welsh in the public domain, and was due in no small part to the protest activities of Cymdeithas (Butt Philip, 1975; Davies, 1989, 1990; A. Thomas, 1997).

The Act did not assuage the Welsh language movement, however, particularly given its limited remit. Thus, in 1969 Cymdeithas began a new high profile campaign against English language road signs in Wales, although only after first unsuccessfully petitioning the Welsh Office to establish bilingual road signs (Butt Philip, 1975). This campaign initially involved painting out English language road signs and later involved removing them completely. Along with the opposition of Cymdeithas to the Investiture of the Prince of Wales at Caernarfon Castle in 1969 -- primarily, because he could not speak Welsh -- this produced significant publicity and resulted in a considerable number of arrests (Davies, 1973). Again, however, the campaign proved successful in achieving its aims. In 1972, the Bowen Committee Report, drawing on the 1967 Act as precedent, recommended bilingual road signs throughout Wales, with Welsh given priority. The report constituted a complete victory for Cymdeithas yr Iaith (Davies, 1989).

And it was to be one of many. During the 1970s and 1980s, Cymdeithas campaigns focused on establishing and entrenching a bilingual base for the provision of public services in Wales (C. Williams, 1994). One such campaign centred on the demand for greater representation of the Welsh language in the media.[31] This involved numerous protests throughout the 1970s, notably against BBC Wales, and culminated in the establishment of a Welsh language channel, Sianel Pedwar Cymru (S4C), in 1982. Having said that, the establishment of S4C also had much to do with the threat by the then leader of Plaid Cymru, Gwynfor Evans, to fast to the death if permission for the channel was not granted.[32] Despite initial scepticism (see J. Edwards, 1985), the subsequent influence of S4C -- which currently broadcasts over 30 hours a week in Welsh, including children's viewing and peak evening slots -- has been particularly significant in raising

the status of the Welsh language (G. Awbery, 1987; D. Edwards, 1993). If print capitalism was the motor of the rise of vernacular languages in an earlier epoch (Anderson, 1991; see Chapter 2), then the influence of the technological media is today's equivalent. S4C thus not only provides a media language service for the approximately 600,000 Welsh speakers in Wales but also visibly promotes and 'normalises' the presence of the Welsh language throughout Wales. In so doing, it acts as a bridge between the two linguistic communities (C. Williams, 1994). In this respect, the control of the media constitutes a significant stage in the process of reversing minority language shift (Fishman, 1991); a point that Cymdeithas was quick to grasp.[33]

Also prominent throughout the 1970s and 1980s was a campaign against the proliferation of 'second homes' in Wales (see Bollom, 1978). To this end, Cymdeithas campaigned against the practice of non-local people buying second homes in traditionally rural, Welsh-speaking areas. The arguments employed against this practice were both economic and cultural. The practice increased local housing prices and thus precluded local buyers from entering the housing market. Together with rural unemployment, the emigration which ensued resulted in a loss to the area of Welsh speakers and thus its further decline (R. Jenkins, 1991).[34] The lack of affordable housing also remains an ongoing concern of Cymdeithas and has led to a more recent campaign aimed at influencing local authority housing policies to give precedence to local buyers (Cymdeithas yr Iaith Gymraeg, 1992).[35] Another recent, and high profile campaign has centred on advocacy of a new Language Act with far more extensive powers than its 1967 predecessor. This was accomplished with the passing into law of the (1993) **Welsh Language Act** -- a development I will examine more fully in the next chapter -- although, as we shall see there, even this Act still has its limitations.

The Welsh language movement over the last four decades has thus proved to be enormously successful in its stated aims of raising the profile of the language, and promoting its institutionalisation in the public domain (Davies, 1990; A. Thomas, 1997). So much so, in fact, that the scale and intensity of its activities in the 1990s have diminished in direct relation to the extent of the gains that have been made on behalf of the language. Earlier, in the 1980s, it led the now late Gwyn Williams -- himself, no great fan of a language-based Welsh identity -- to conclude:

> The consequences have been extraordinary. In response to a militant campaign whose hunger has been insatiable, the British state, ruling a largely indifferent or hostile Welsh population, has in a manner which has few parallels outside the [former] Soviet Union, countenanced and indeed subsidised Welsh cultural nationalism. *Wales in now officially, visibly and audibly a bilingual country.* The equal status of Welsh is nearing achievement. Whole Welsh language structures, serviced by an effective training and supply apparatus, exist in education, administrative life and the media. The issue of the Welsh language, in many fields of Welsh action, blots out all other political considerations. (1985: 292-293; my emphasis)

This return of the Welsh language to the civic realm, after four centuries of proscription, has been reinforced even further since Williams made his observations over a decade ago. A Welsh Language Board (Bwrdd yr Iaith Gymraeg) has since been established and is becoming an increasingly influential arbiter of the language in the public domain. This is closely allied to its central role as the key government agency charged with implementing the provisions of the new (1993) **Welsh Language Act**. The implementation of a new **National Curriculum for England and Wales** in 1988 has also recognised for the first time a distinct Welsh school curriculum, and the specific role of Welsh as a school language. And a burgeoning Welsh-medium education movement has seen the continuing rise, in both provision and popularity, of Welsh-medium schools in Wales. These crucial developments, their implications, and the responses to them, are the focus of the following two chapters.

Notes -- Chapter 6

1. The electorate at the time of the referendum amounted to 2.2 million people. However, the total population of Wales is currently estimated at 2.8 million, one fifth of whom are born outside of Wales, principally in England (Aitchison & Carter, 1994).

2. The 22 counties are detailed in Appendix a. Prior to the reorganisation of local government in 1996, Wales comprised 8 much larger counties -- Gwynedd (incorporating Anglesey and Conwy), Dyfed (incorporating Ceredigion and Pembrokeshire), South, Mid and West Glamorgan (incorporating the south coast, the southern valleys, and Cardiff), Gwent (incorporating Monmouthshire and Newport), Powys, and Clwyd (incorporating Wrexham, Flintshire and Denbighshire).

3. The staggering of the referenda one week apart was in fact deliberate. Holding the referendum a week earlier in Scotland -- where a 'yes vote' was expected -- was seen as a way of providing momentum for a similar outcome in Wales.

4. There were actually two votes cast in the Scottish Referendum, one for the Scottish Parliament itself and a second to determine whether it should have tax-varying powers. The latter question, while not gaining quite as much support, was still convincingly passed by 63.5 per cent to 36.5 per cent *(The Guardian*, 13 September, 1997: 1).

5. An acronym for 'quasi autonomous non-government organisations'. At their height, there were 1600 board members appointed to these organisations in Wales covering such areas as health, housing, economic development, the arts, broadcasting, education, and so on. All appointments were made directly by the Welsh Secretary of State, hence the dominance of Tory place men and women in the Conservative years. One of the Labour government's key arguments in promoting the Welsh Assembly was for the dismantling of these unelected bodies in favour of a democratically elected (and accountable) Assembly. This also accorded more broadly with their drive to decentralise power and bring it 'closer to the people'.

6. 'Great Britain' can be differentiated here from the 'United Kingdom' which also includes Northern Ireland. Prior to the secession of the Irish Free State in 1922, the whole of Ireland was regarded as part of the UK.

7. Kearney also includes Ireland in his discussion since his concern is with the UK as a whole.

8. The Normans had gained control of south Wales by the end of the eleventh century as part of their general ascendancy in Britain at that time. They had been less successful with the northern Welsh kingdoms, however, and had thus been content with 'indirect rule', tolerating the autonomy of Welsh princes as long as they did not openly constitute a threat. It was only with Edward's successful campaign some two centuries later that the independence of these kingdoms was finally brought to an end (Kearney, 1989).

9. The one notable exception in this period is the emigration in 1865 of a group of Welsh settlers to the Chubut valley in Patagonia in Argentina, led by the Revd. Michael Daniel Jones. Nationalist rather than economic considerations were the prime consideration of the group's exodus, however. Their aim was to establish a pure Homeland, a 'gwladfa', there. Indeed, the

settlers made exclusive use of Welsh in education and government until the 1930s, when Argentina enforced Spanish upon the community for official purposes. As a result, Welsh gradually fell into decline from that time (see Jones, 1988).

10. Apart from the efforts of Welsh historians themselves -- most notably, in recent times, Gwyn Williams (1985) and Kenneth Morgan (1995) -- Wales has been disproportionately under-represented in accounts of British history. Most, as Kearney (1989) and Crick (1991, 1995) point out, have been preoccupied historically with England. However, even those which have attempted a more inclusive perspective do not always give Wales its due. Only Kearney's (1989) excellent revisionist account provides some semblance of balance here. Even Linda Colley's (1992) acclaimed history is predominantly concerned with the role of Scotland in the construction of Britain.

11. It can be argued that the British ruling class did not formally recognise the existence of a distinct Welsh nation prior to 1886. Even then, this recognition had its origins elsewhere, being precipitated by the Irish crisis of 1885-1886. In the wake of the Irish crisis, Gladstone -- the British Prime Minister at the time -- was led to re-examine his assumptions and publicly recognise Welsh nationality for the first time (E. Williams, 1989).

12. Welsh emerged in the sixth century when the Brythonic branch of Celtic began to separate into distinct languages. While the first written records date back to the eight century, it was not until the Middle Welsh period (1150-1400) that a standardised language began to develop; the result, principally, of bardic writings (V. Edwards, 1991).

13. The **Act of Union** is widely regarded as a pivotal event in Welsh history and I see no reason to dissent from this view. However, for an alternative perspective, see Glanmor Williams (1987).

14. For useful historical summaries, see G.A. Williams (1985), Kearney (1989), Jenkins (1992).

15. Religious Nonconformity in Wales was based on evangelical Protestantism and its principal expression was the culture of the chapel. Calvinistic Methodism was the most prominent of these groups although Independents and Baptists were also significant. The influence of Nonconformism was felt extensively in both industrial and rural areas of Wales and was increasingly contrasted with the established state Anglican church (see Glanmor Williams, 1979).

16. These three acts all strengthened a distinct Welsh identity within Britain. The **Welsh Sunday Closing Act** reflected the strength of Nonconformity in Wales by enforcing the closure of public houses on Sunday. The **Local Government Act** created new county councils for Wales, thus formalising a cohesive administrative identity, while the **Intermediate Act** likewise created a network of Welsh 'county schools' (see Morgan, 1995).

17. Much was made, for example, of the Welsh ancestry of Henry Tudor (Henry VII, 1457-1509) and the use of this ancestry to support his rather tenuous claim to the British Crown after his defeat of Richard III at Bosworth Field (Kearney, 1989).

18. Having said that, the Welsh nationalists themselves did not necessarily see any particular value for its ongoing use in the present, nor did they make any serious effort to protect the language against increasing anglicisation. Their interest in the language was largely confined to promoting its study as a romantic and esoteric pursuit (Davies, 1989).

19. While only winning 6 parliamentary seats out of 72 in Scotland in the 1997 British General Election, the Scottish Nationalist Party won 22 per cent of the popular vote in Scotland. In so doing, it polled better than both the (British) Liberal Democrat and Conservative parties (the latter gained only 18 per cent of the popular vote and lost all its seats in Scotland). In a newly established Scottish Parliament it is likely that the Scottish Nationalists will thus form the official opposition to a Labour/Liberal Democrat ruling alliance *(The Guardian*, 13 September, 1997: 4).

20. In 1979, Neil Kinnock argued in the British commons: The emancipation of the class which I have come here to represent can best be achieved in a single nation and in a single economic unit' -- one uniting 'the combined strength of working class people throughout the United Kingdom' (cited in Adonis, 1997: 23).

21. Balsom et al.'s (1982) study of Welsh national identity was based on an electoral survey conducted in the late 1970s. The three broad distinctions in relation to national identity that ensued from the study were clearly regionally based, a feature that Balsom (1985) develops more explicitly in his 'three Wales' model. However, Balsom (and his collaborators) would also be the first to admit that all three identifications can be found throughout Wales and may constitute a significant minority in other areas (see also n.26).

22. Offa's Dyke was built at the end of the eighth century by Offa, the king of Mercia, to establish a defensive border between his kingdom and those of the Welsh. While it no longer acts as an actual border, it has come to symbolise in popular expression the geographical separation of England and Wales (Aitchison & Carter, 1994).

23. Writing some 50 years ago, Wyn Griffith's description of the relationship between the Anglo-Welsh and Welsh-speaking Welsh has clear resonances with Bourdieu's notion of habitus:

> those who have not the [Welsh] language are in effect living on accumulated capital: they are sharing a way of life whose fundamentals were established for them. They are drawing upon sources of which they may but dimly be aware, but even they would not be exactly as they are now were it not for the generations before them who contributed to the fund upon which both they and their Welsh-speaking neighbours draw. (1950: 65)

24. It is important to note the influence of transport links in contributing to the regional variations evident in Wales. All major links run east/west, between England and Wales, and it is still reasonably difficult to travel north/south since this involves having to negotiate the Welsh mountains. As such, it is perhaps not surprising that northern and southern Wales have maintained an historical distance from each other and that the eastern areas of Wales should be so anglicised (C. Williams, 1982, 1990).

25. Williams also notes that in the nineteenth century industrialisation of south Wales, English-speaking migrants would tend to settle in the ports of Cardiff, Swansea, Newport and the like, while Welsh-speaking migrants from elsewhere in Wales were more likely to settle in the industrial valleys.

26. Balsom et al. (1982) are quick to point out that these 'British identifiers' maintain a substantial presence throughout Wales (at 38 per cent). They can be found in y fro Gymraeg (26 per cent) and in the valleys (34 per cent). However, they are most prominent in the lower south of Wales (46 per cent) and in the east and north east (49 per cent).

27. That said, Cardiff also has one of the longest established African-Caribbean communities in the UK, located in Butetown (more commonly known as Tiger Bay; see Charlotte Williams, 1995). The African-Caribbean population has been associated with this area since the last century and many now identify specifically as 'Black-Welsh' (see, for example, Sinclair, 1993).

28. This compared dramatically with the ten per cent in Scotland who still spoke Gaelic by the late nineteenth century (P. Jenkins, 1992).

29. While the authorisation of the Welsh translation of the Bible might appear contrary in intent to the preceding **Act of Union** it was not actually so. As with its predecessor, the principal reason for the concession had to do with facilitating integration of the Welsh into Britain (Williams & Raybould, 1991). More pertinently, the authorisation was *not* an endorsement of the Welsh language but was, again, specifically assimilationist in intent. The provisions for the authorisation state clearly that its purpose was 'such as do not understand the said Language [Welsh] may be conferring both Tongues together, the sooner attain to the Knowledge of the English Tongue' (cited in Jones, 1997: 15). In this it was to some extent successful, since bilingualism became an increasing feature of life in Wales from this time. However, that it also had the effect of maintaining the Welsh language in the face of English was something not countenanced by its proposers.

30. The most prominent example of the latter was perhaps the circulating schools of Griffith Jones, established in the mid-eighteenth century. While primarily aimed at Christian evangelism, the schools -- comprising itinerant teachers and based on a simple Biblical curriculum -- were enormously successful in promoting literacy in Welsh. By 1771, the year of Griffith Jones death, it has been estimated that at least 200,000 -- half the population of Wales at that time -- had attended the schools (Aitchison & Carter, 1994). As a result, by the end of the century a majority of the adult population had probably become literate in Welsh (G.A. Williams, 1985).

31. It should be noted that concerns over the media had long exercised Welsh nationalists. Plaid Cymru was active in campaigning for greater Welsh language representation when broadcasting services to Wales were first established in the 1920s (see Morgan, 1981).

32. In the run-up to the 1979 election, the Labour Government had acceded to a Welsh language television channel being established. However, when the Conservatives under Margaret Thatcher won the election, they revoked the commitment. Gwynfor Evans, who had been in Parliament since 1966 for Plaid Cymru and had only just lost his seat of Carmarthen in the election, vowed that unless the Conservatives changed their position within six months, he would fast to the death. Realising the potential public relations damage that such an incident could create for a newly elected government, Thatcher reversed her decision. This was to be one of the few, if only times she would do so in her subsequent 12 year reign as British Prime Minister.

33. In addition to S4C, Radio Cymru (the BBC Welsh language service) has been broadcasting since 1977, with currently over 60 hours a week of Welsh language broadcasts. While there are no Welsh language daily newspapers, national weekly, and local monthly newspapers in Welsh (papurau bro) are also widely available (V. Edwards, 1991). That said, media in Wales continues to be far more widely represented by its English language variants (see R. Jones, 1997).

34. The Cymdeithas campaign involved occupying second homes and disrupting auctions of such properties (Davies, 1989). However, a separate, more militant group, Meibion Glyndŵr (The

Sons of Glyndŵr), emerged in the 1980s and proceeded to conduct a fire-bombing campaign on such homes (R. Jenkins, 1991). Meibion Glyndŵr's actions have since largely abated, however, and its more peripheral influence can be equated with the other fringe nationalist groups that I discussed briefly above.

35. This campaign -- called 'Wales is not for sale' -- has argued both that priority be given to local people and that Welsh language considerations be taken into consideration in planning matters. In response to criticism that the campaign is racist, Cymdeithas have countered by arguing that 1) local people include both Welsh and non-Welsh speakers, and 2) that a language consideration is not racist since anyone can learn the language (Interview, Welsh Language Society, Aberystwyth, January 1995). I will explore the link between language and racism more fully in Chapter 8.

Chapter 7

BUILDING A BILINGUAL STATE: POLICY AND PRACTICE

We were a people, and are so yet.
When we have finished quarrelling for crumbs
Under the table, or gnawing the bones
Of a dead culture, we will arise,
Armed, but not in the old way.

From 'Welsh History' (R.S. Thomas, 1955).

What we are presently seeing in Wales -- slowly, tentatively -- is the emergence of a bilingual state. This development is not based on some nostalgic, romanticised notion of Welsh identity, as in earlier conceptions of Welsh cultural nationalism, but on the *re*valuing of the Welsh language within a modern, urban context. Accordingly, the current position in Wales can be increasingly equated with Stage 6 (*Language Equality*) of Churchill's minority language policy typology where a national minority language is both legitimated and institutionalised within a wide range of formal language domains (see Chapter 5). In the case of Wales, this is not being pursued on the basis of a territorial language principle (as in Switzerland or Belgium, for example) -- given that y fro Gymraeg (the Welsh-speaking heartland) has increasingly withered and fragmented -- but via the personality principle, allowing *individuals* the right to exercise full choice in their personal use of Welsh in any language domain (cf. the arguments on individual and collective rights in Chapter 3). This also means that Wales is increasingly moving towards Level 4 (*Multilingual Co-existence Phase*) in Churchill's parallel typology of responses to language policies. Welsh language and educational rights are becoming legally and practically enshrined on the basis of the principle of ethnolinguistic democracy (Fishman, 1995; cf. Chapter 5). That

said, these rights are still primarily located within the public sector domain at present. If the 'normalisation' of the Welsh language is to occur fully, as Colin Williams (1994) describes it, one final development required will be the extension of these public sector rights into the private and commercial sector. At present, the latter still tend to reinforce the hegemony of English.

This chapter aims to explore the constituent elements which have led to this process of Welsh language legitimation and institutionalisation. In particular, I want to examine the influence of the (1993) **Welsh Language Act** and the (1988) **Education Reform Act**. The pivotal role of Welsh-medium education will also be highlighted. In the following chapter, I will explore attitudes and responses to these developments among a cohort of 494 teacher trainees in four Welsh tertiary institutions. Drawing on language attitude research, and supplemented by fifty individual interviews, I will highlight the implications of these attitudes, and the views underpinning them, for the growing institutionalisation and normalisation of bilingualism in Wales. This allies with Colin Williams' observation that:

> one of the critical features to be addressed ... in constructing a fully functional bilingual social order, is the social psychological ramification of language choice..... social context and inter-group perception may be just as important as the creation of opportunity and legislative right in encouraging the normalization of bilingual services. (1995:70)

But more on this later. Meanwhile, I want to begin here with a brief overview of recent language trends in Wales with regard to Welsh.

Language trends

Wales can be presently described as a linguistically plural society characterised by a monolingual (English-speaking) majority and a bilingual (Welsh/English-speaking) minority (C. Williams, 1995).[1] This has not always been the case. As I discussed in the previous chapter, as late as 1880, the preferred language of three out of four Welsh people was Welsh (Morgan, 1981). This was all to change over the course of this century, however. Since 1911, inter-censal decline has been the most prominent feature of census evidence on the Welsh language (Aitchison & Carter, 1994; C. Williams, 1990, 1994, 1995).[2] Most prominently, the percentage of the population able to speak Welsh had diminished from 43.5 per cent in 1911 (977,400 Welsh speakers) to only 18.7

per cent at the time of the 1991 census (590,600 Welsh speakers) -- a loss of 24.8 per cent. Not only that, Welsh monolinguals -- who, in 1911, still constituted 8.5 per cent of the population (190,300 speakers) -- have now all but disappeared. Put simply, virtually all Welsh speakers today are bilingual in English as well.

However, the 1991 census has also revealed some important, albeit nascent counter-trends. First, for the first time in nearly a century, the 1981-1991 intercensal period saw a *reduction* in the decline of Welsh speakers. While language loss continued to occur between the intercensal period 1981-1991, the decrease was only 1.4 per cent compared with 6.3 per cent for the previous intercensal period. As Colin Williams comments, 'this is a welcome arrest in the ... pattern of decline and should be seen as the turning of the tide [as well as the] beginning [of] significant long-term shifts in the distribution and structure of the Welsh-speaking population' (1994: 136).

In this latter regard, a second key feature of recent language trends has been the growing urban base of the Welsh language. The traditional Welsh-speaking areas within y fro Gymraeg continue to decline but still remain proportionately the strongholds of the language -- accounting for 55 per cent of all Welsh speakers. However, the majority of Welsh speakers, in absolute terms, are now to be found in urban and sub-urban areas. Most notable among these is the capital city, Cardiff, which has become the administrative centre for the Welsh language. The growing urbanisation of the Welsh language thus highlights the significance of the institutionalisation of Welsh, particularly in the public sector where the ability to speak Welsh is viewed increasingly as a form of linguistic and cultural capital. To this end, Aitchison & Carter observe that while the long demonstrated detraction of the language is still extant, 'it is by no means as powerful as it was, and there is [now] a widespread awareness of the advantages of a knowledge of Welsh, especially in public employment' (1994: 115). These developments also present us with a central irony, since the decline of the traditional Welsh-speaking heartland, so long associated with the fate of the language, is continuing apace *at the same time as* the language is being regenerated in urban contexts. This fascinating dualism between a declining heartland and a resurgent periphery constitutes the present core of contemporary Welsh life (C. Williams, 1995).[3]

Third, the most rapid growth in the Welsh language can be found in the 3-15 year age group which saw an increase between 1981-1991 of 6.7 per cent -- rising from 17.7 per cent to 24.4 per cent. When compared with the continuing (albeit diminishing) *overall* decline in the Welsh language, this strong counter-trend becomes even more significant (Edwards, 1993). The burgeoning use of the Welsh language in this age group -- which now constitutes 22 per cent of the Welsh-speaking population -- is largely attributable to the influence of Welsh-medium education, particularly in the anglicised areas of south and north-east Wales where it has been widely promoted in recent times (see below). Accordingly, many of these speakers are second language learners of Welsh, a feature that is increasingly evident in the adult population as well, where language courses for adult learners are growing in popularity.[4]

The emergence of these counter-trends from the 1991 census is also reiterated, and enhanced, by a more recent, non-census-based social survey of 19,000 households conducted by the Welsh Office (1993). This survey actually estimated a higher percentage of Welsh speakers in the total population at 21.5 per cent; the difference between this and the census figures (at 18.7 per cent) being attributable perhaps to the tendency of many Welsh speakers to under-report their ability in the language to the census (Williams & Raybould, 1991). Of this group, 55.7 per cent (representing 12 per cent of the total population) spoke Welsh as their first language, although there were considerable differences between age groups. Thus, while the 3-15 year age group had the greatest percentage of fluent speakers, at 32.4 per cent, it also had the least percentage of first language speakers, at 27 per cent. Again, both these features point to the significant influence of Welsh-medium education which I will explore more fully below.

The Welsh Office Survey also examined actual language use of Welsh. On the basis of self assessment, 368,000 (13.4 per cent of the total population) indicated that they were fluent in Welsh. A further 94,900 (3.5 per cent) described themselves as being able to speak quite a lot of Welsh, while 467,300 (17 per cent) said they spoke some Welsh. This indicates that a total of 930,200 (34 per cent of the total population) were able to speak at least some Welsh, with 462,900 (17 per cent of the total population) fluent in Welsh or able to speak Welsh with a considerable degree of proficiency. These figures are significantly higher than the normally cited Welsh-speaking population of 600,000 and may prove a more useful guide to the potential

number of Welsh speakers who might avail themselves of Welsh language public services in Wales (C. Williams, 1995).

There are some caveats to be made here. One is that the dominance of the public sector, at least to date, in fostering the renaissance of the Welsh language may tie it too closely to a particular, class-based bilingual elite -- as, for example, happened historically in Ireland (see Chapter 4). Another is the potential backlash that such an association may generate among English speakers. Indeed, this is already evident in charges of 'reverse discrimination', and even 'racism', at recruitment policies which give preference to bilinguals within the public sector (cf. Chapter 8). A third caveat has to do with the efficacy of Welsh-medium education. While it has proved crucial in promoting Welsh/English bilingualism, especially in the anglicised areas of Wales, it does not ensure that those for whom Welsh is principally a school language will continue to speak the language in other social contexts (Baker, 1992; Jones, 1995; C. Williams, 1994, 1995).

I will return to each of these concerns in due course. Meanwhile, it is still possible to state that the prospects for the Welsh language itself, and the possibilities of successfully developing a bilingual Welsh state, have never looked better. A recent national survey on attitudes to the language, for example, found widespread support across Wales (71 per cent) for the use of Welsh. Similarly strong support (75 per cent) was found for making Welsh co-equal in status with English in Wales, while almost nine out of ten (88 per cent) agreed that the Welsh language is something to be proud of (NOP, 1995). This remarkable turn around in the fortunes of the Welsh language, and for the prospects of state bilingualism, are underpinned by recent legislation in Wales -- notably, the (1993) **Welsh Language Act** and the (1988) **Education Reform Act** -- and by the rapid expansion, and widely acknowledged success, of Welsh-medium education. It is to these specific developments that I now want to turn.

The Welsh Language Act

Colin Williams has argued, in relation to Wales, that 'if a fully functional bilingual society [is to be achieved], where choice and opportunity are the twin pillars of *individual* language rights, then clearly that possibility has to be constructed through both the promotional and regulatory powers

of the state' (1994: 162; my emphasis). This analysis accords closely with the notion of group-differentiated rights, discussed in Chapter 3, and the related argument that such rights (including the right to use a language) may be exercised by individuals (Kymlicka, 1995). It also accords with the notion of promotion-oriented language rights (Kloss, 1977), discussed in Chapter 5. Promotion-oriented rights involve public authorities in trying to promote a minority language by having it used in a wide range of public institutions -- legislative, administrative and educational. A significant step in establishing such rights in Wales occurred in October 1993, when a new **Welsh Language Act (Mesur yr Iaith Gymraeg)** passed into law. The Act replaced its more limited 1967 predecessor and repealed all previous legislation to do with the Welsh language, including the original Acts of Union. The new Act's genesis, under the then Conservative government, was the result of a more sympathetic approach to Wales and the Welsh language by the British government in general (A. Thomas, 1997), and of the cumulative influence of the Welsh language lobby in particular (see Chapter 6). While still limited in some respects, as we shall see, it nonetheless clearly reflects the significant advances made on behalf of the Welsh language in recent times.

In the Act, Welsh is treated for the first time as having 'a basis of equality' with English within Wales although it qualifies this equality as being that which is appropriate within the circumstances and 'reasonably practicable'. To this end, the new Act provides for the right to use Welsh in courts, given suitable notice, and also states that public documents in Welsh should carry the same legal weight as those in English. However, perhaps its most significant feature is the *statutory* recognition provided to Bwrdd yr Iaith Gymraeg (the Welsh Language Board). Bwrdd yr Iaith had originally been established in July 1988, although merely as an advisory body on the language, with little status and power. In this respect, it was not too dissimilar initially to its Irish equivalent, Bord na Gaeilge (Irish Language Board; see Chapter 4). Under the Act's aegis, however, Bwrdd yr Iaith is now authorised not only to promote and facilitate the use of the Welsh language but also to *ensure* its adoption within the public sector. The latter is to be achieved via formal language schemes provided by public organisations to the Board. These schemes are to specify the measures each organisation aims to take in order to provide effective bilingual public services in Wales.[5] Again, there is the caveat invoked that such bilingual services will be provided 'so far as is both appropriate in the circumstances and reasonably practical'. However, as the

subsequent Draft Guidelines for implementation of the Act outline, it is Bwrdd yr Iaith, crucially, not the organisations, which determines the parameters of reasonableness and practicality: 'It will not be acceptable for those preparing schemes to adopt a highly subjective and restricted view of what is appropriate in their circumstances or reasonably practicable' (Welsh Language Board, 1995: 6). Likewise, the Draft Guidelines stipulate that organisations should not rely on the *current* demand for services in Welsh as a basis for their schemes, on the premise that once more effective bilingual services become available so too will demand increase:

> It is acknowledged that, in the past, many Welsh speakers turned to English in dealing with public organisations because they were not certain what services were available in Welsh. Some were also concerned that using Welsh could lead to delay or a lower standard of service.[6] Therefore, *whatever their experience to date*, organisations should plan for an increase in demand and respond accordingly. (1995: 5; my emphasis)

The end result envisaged for each organisation is that public service provision through Welsh should be a natural, integral part of the planning and delivery of that service. For this to occur, a sufficient number of Welsh-speaking staff is required, particularly in regional areas where the number of Welsh speakers from which to draw has been traditionally low. This, in turn, will require the active recruitment of Welsh-speaking staff. As the Guidelines again state: 'Organisations may need to adopt positive action strategies which publicise the fact that job applications from Welsh speakers are welcomed. This will reflect the fact that Welsh will increasingly be a regular part of public life -- especially as organisations implement the requirements of the Welsh Language Act through their individual Welsh language schemes' (1995: 24). Moreover, in the context of the language schemes, if an organisation concludes that it cannot reasonably meet its obligations under the Act without having Welsh speakers in certain posts 'then, as a general rule, appointing persons able to speak Welsh to these posts will be justifiable' (1995: 24).

As one might perhaps expect, this position is not entirely uncontroversial. Indeed, the question of whether a knowledge of Welsh can be stipulated as a requirement of employment has faced a number of legal challenges in Wales. In one prominent case in 1985, *Jones v. Gwynedd County Council*, Gwynedd county council was taken to court by two disgruntled English-speaking applicants when they failed to secure a council position working with senior citizens (many of

whom were Welsh-speaking). They argued that the Welsh language requirement for the position was discriminatory under the British (1976) **Race Relations Act**. The initial Industrial Tribunal upheld the complaint on the basis that Welsh speakers formed a 'sub-ethnic' group -- thus suggesting that differentiation on the basis of ethnicity had occurred. However, this was later overturned on appeal. In this latter ruling (in 1986) it was concluded that language differences within an ethnic group were not applicable under the **Race Relations Act**.[7]

The Welsh Language Board Draft Guidelines also specifically adopt this position, stating that 'distinguishing between Welsh people on the grounds of their ability or inability to speak Welsh does not .. amount to racial discrimination' (1995: 24). The Guidelines further assert that 'under the law of the European Union, it will not be discriminatory to insist that a post-holder should be able to speak a specific language if linguistic knowledge is required to fulfil the duties of the post' (1995: 24). In other words, language qualifications in the labour market are no more or less restrictive than other professional qualifications required for specific forms of employment and are entirely applicable, and defensible, when bilingualism and/or multilingualism are a functional necessity. Levelling charges of 'racism' with regard to such language requirements can thus be seen as a manifestation of narrow monolingualism rather than a legitimate argument (Glyn Williams, 1994).

In this respect, it should also be noted that stipulating certain Welsh language requirements merely accords with the widely accepted principle that employees should have an adequate knowledge of the official or common language(s) of the state (cf. Chapter 4). Furthermore, the basis of these requirements can be fundamentally distinguished from the discriminatory tenets of organisations like the US English Only Movement, for example (see Chapter 5). The obvious point of distinction here is that the requirements of the **Welsh Language Act** aim to effect *bilingualism* not monolingualism. English is not realistically threatened in Wales whereas a minority language such as Welsh clearly is. Without some formal protection and promotion for Welsh, English would inevitably come to dominate all facets of Welsh life *at the expense of* Welsh; indeed, it very nearly did so, and may do so still. Relatedly, such requirements are not concerned with *penalising* someone for speaking English (or any other language for that matter), in contrast to the intent of English Only policies which specifically pitch one language against another. Rather, the Act can

be considered a measure of 'external protection' -- an attempt to put the Welsh language on a more equal footing with English -- rather than a measure of 'internal restriction' which unduly limits the individual rights of English speakers per se (Kymlicka, 1995a; see my discussion of this distinction in Chapter 3).

That said, there remain limitations in the scope of the **Welsh Language Act** and in the related remit of Bwrdd yr Iaith. For example, in contrast to two equivalent private members bills on the Welsh language, tabled unsuccessfully to the British parliament in the 1980s, the Act does not accord official status to Welsh. This omission, along with the various caveats evident in the Act, suggest that the status of the Welsh language remains subsidiary to English. Conspicuously, the Welsh Language Board's remit also does not extend to the private business sector -- unlike in Québec, for example (see Chapter 5). This means that businesses may, if they choose, remain largely untouched by Welsh language requirements. While many are beginning to respond positively to such requirements, often as the result of local pressure,[8] the opposition to the mandatory use of Welsh by industry and business on grounds of practicality and profitability remains strong and consistent (Aitchison & Carter, 1994). Moreover, even in the state sector, the Board only has the right to investigate organisations which fail demonstrably to meet the requirements outlined under the Act and, subsequently, to *recommend* remedial action.[9] There is also no general clause which *guarantees* an individual the right to use the Welsh language in their interactions with any public body, or to insist on a Welsh-medium education for their children.

Nonetheless, the significance of the **Welsh Language Act** and the functions of Bwrdd yr Iaith Gymraeg should not be underestimated. As Colin Williams argues, 'the reconstituted Welsh Language Board looks set to become the most critical government agency yet in the social history of Wales' (1995: 65). In effect, Bwrdd yr Iaith is in the vanguard of a new approach to language planning in Wales. Attention has shifted away from the old, increasingly sterile debates about the threat that anglicisation poses to the Welsh language -- as seen historically in the position of Saunders Lewis and in debates about the preservation of y fro Gymraeg (see Chapter 6). Instead, support for the Welsh language is becoming deeply imbued in the process of state socialisation itself (C. Williams, 1995). The result is that language policy in Wales now centres increasingly

on the relegitimation of Welsh in a specifically *bilingual* context. Bilingualism is no longer viewed negatively -- as the prelude to the inexorable loss of the Welsh language --but as a positive dimension of contemporary Welsh life.[10] To this end also, the language focus in Wales has broadened beyond the needs and interests of Welsh speakers, with the exclusive overtones that this preoccupation necessarily suggests, to include a more systematic recognition of the needs of second language learners and non-Welsh speakers. Williams concludes that the increasing professionalisation, or institutionalisation of the Welsh language 'has severed the intimate link between language promotion and the nationalist programme and offers a more promising basis for Welsh development precisely because it has been embraced by a wide spectrum of public and political agencies in Wales' (1994: 142).

Welsh-medium education

This more inclusive approach to Welsh language planning is also clearly evident in the rapid growth of, and associated burgeoning support for Welsh-medium education -- that is, an education where pupils are taught *wholly* or *partly* through the medium of Welsh.[11] For example, the greatest growth of Welsh-medium education -- and, by extension, of Welsh speakers -- has occurred in the historically anglicised areas of Wales. Thus, Welsh-medium education has been crucial in providing an expanding base of Welsh-speakers in these anglicised areas and, more broadly, in contributing to the abatement of the long history of Welsh language decline. The increasingly widespread support for Welsh-medium education -- among both English- and Welsh-speaking parents, many of whom are middle-class -- also has much to do with the *educational* success of the movement (Lyon & Ellis, 1991; Packer & Campbell, 1993). In short, Welsh-medium education has shown that academic success and the retention of a minority language are not incompatible aims (cf. Chapter 5). In so doing, it has also demonstrated more broadly how the legitimation and institutionalisation of Welsh can be successfully achieved within the public or civic realm. While there remain limits to its influence, as we shall see, Welsh-medium education has for these reasons provided the bedrock for the nascent bilingual Welsh state.

The genesis of Welsh-medium education -- which Colin Baker (1990) has described as a 'gentle revolution' -- is most often associated with the establishment of the first Welsh-speaking primary

school, Ysgol Lluest, in Aberystwyth in 1939. The opening of this small, private school -- a seemingly insignificant event at the time -- was to presage a fundamental shift in educational practice in Wales. Prior to this development, Welsh education had been dominated for nearly a century by the conclusions of the Blue Books in 1847 on the manifold disadvantages of the Welsh language (see Chapter 6). These conclusions had provided the intellectual basis for the subsequent establishment of state schooling in 'England and Wales' which, via the (1870) **Education Act**, had seen English enforced as the sole language of instruction in Welsh schools. Welsh was granted the status of a special subject in the 1880s, and eventually a class subject (although taught through English!), but the impact of the Welsh language on the curriculum of Welsh schools remained negligible.

The result was an educational system in Wales which was largely indistinguishable from that in England (Jones, 1997). Not only that, it was a system which actively promoted a view of Welsh as a low status language and, relatedly, a social and educational disadvantage. As Jones notes elsewhere, in the years following the (1889) **Intermediate Education Act** Welsh was widely regarded by educational professionals 'as an inferior language -- and certainly an unnecessary one: it was of no help in "getting on" ... [a] low status irrelevancy' (1982: 18). The broad educational approach adopted was thus starkly assimilationist in both intent and practice and can be equated directly with the first two stages of Churchill's typology of minority language education policy (see Chapter 5).

That said, there had been some notable exceptions to the assimilationism of this period; exceptions which were to act as important antecedents to the eventual development of Welsh-medium education. The first of these was closely related to the establishment of the Welsh Department of the Board of Education in 1907 and, in particular, the influence of its first Chief Inspector of Schools, Owen M. Edwards. Edwards, a successful academic in his own right, who had as a child suffered the indignities of the 'Welsh Not', campaigned actively for a greater role for the Welsh language in schools. His advocacy was motivated principally by a desire to see the curriculum in schools more closely reflect the local Welsh (and Welsh-speaking) communities. While his own idea of what constituted Welshness allied closely with the romanticised, rural conception of the cultural nationalists of the day, his voice was nonetheless an important one. But it was also, at

that time at least, a rather solitary one -- the notion of upward social mobility through the acquisition of English continued to be strongly held by parents, and the wider educational administration. As such, his efforts to promote the language and to integrate schools and their communities more closely came to nothing (Jones, 1997).

It was not until the publication of the Welsh Department of the Board of Education's report *Y Gymraeg mewn Adysg a Bywyd* (*Welsh in Education and Life*) in 1927, seven years after Edwards death, that the role of the Welsh language in schools was once again raised. The Report was a formal milestone in the development of Welsh-medium education (Baker, 1990). On the basis of its survey of 135 secondary schools in Wales, none of which employed Welsh as the everyday language of the school, the report specifically argued for a more distinctly *Welsh* school curriculum, within which the Welsh language would enjoy a significantly enhanced role:

> Unless ... Welsh acquires an honoured, or even a predominant part in the education of our boys and girls, it will fall in the general estimate, to a position below anything that may be called a national culture. (1927: 188; cited in Baker, 1990: 80)

To this end, the Report urged that educational policies should more closely reflect the fact that both Welsh and English were, for different groups of children, first languages; that the child's first language should be the sole medium of instruction in the early years of schooling; and that the second language should be gradually introduced. The Report also specifically argued the case for establishing 'centrally situated schools set apart as Welsh schools' in anglicised areas of Wales (Evans, 1978). While these recommendations were to provide the specific rationale for the subsequent development of Welsh-medium education after the Second World War (Morgan, 1981; see below), its immediate influence and effect, like Edwards' efforts before it, were minimal. Indeed, as discussed in the previous chapter, the period 1921-1939 saw for the first time a widespread generational loss of Welsh; the result of both parental rejection of the language and a still largely unresponsive school system (C. Williams, 1995).

It is against this background then that the first Welsh-speaking primary school in Aberystwyth was established -- a venture so small initially, that its first pupils amounted to only seven in number. The parents of the school's first pupils were mostly staff from the local university whose attachment to Welsh led them to this experiment of educating their children through the medium

of a language untested in formal education (Edwards, 1993). Despite initial scorn from Welsh and non-Welsh speakers alike, the school soon proved an academic success -- the result of both active support from middle-class parents and a dedicated teaching staff. Consequently, it began to attract pupils from English-speaking as well as Welsh-speaking homes. However, its parlous financial position was not secured until its eventual adoption by the local authority in 1951. By then, the success of the Aberystwyth venture had already led to the development of state-funded Ysgolion Cymraeg (Welsh-medium schools) elsewhere in Wales -- the first being opened in Llanelli (in Carmarthenshire) in 1947. As Charlotte Davies argues, the Aberystwyth school's 'primary contribution to the postwar development of the Welsh schools movement was to demonstrate the feasibility of Welsh-medium education and, through the support given it by middle-class parents, to help dispel fears that children in such a school might be retarded in general academic growth' (1989: 52).

With the advent of the (1944) **Education Act**, the locus of Welsh-medium education shifted to the anglicised areas of Wales where, surprisingly perhaps, it was to stay. The Act did not address language of instruction as such but did direct local authorities to establish schools in their areas which accorded with the wishes of parents. As a result of just such parental pressure, Welsh-medium schools were established in 1948 in Cardiff, and in Llandudno in the anglicised north-east of Wales. At the same time, the local authority of Flintshire, which incorporated Llandudno, established a policy to open an ysgol Gymraeg within travelling distance of every home. This led, in turn, to a call for similar provision at the secondary level. It was once again to be in anglicised areas of Wales that such developments took hold -- Flintshire pioneered the first Welsh-medium secondary school in 1956 at Rhyl on the north coast.

Within the space of two decades, a century's proscription of Welsh language from schools, and its more widespread derogation, had begun to be turned on its head. Moreover, Welsh-medium schools, while initially established to serve the needs of Welsh-speaking children, particularly in non-Welsh-speaking areas, were increasingly attracting children from English-speaking homes.[12] The leadership given by the Welsh-speaking professional middle class, and the high academic standards associated with the movement, were proving to be a compelling combination. The initial predominance of Welsh-medium education in anglicised areas also provided a Welsh-based

educational infrastructure which effectively bridged, for the first time, the two linguistic communities in Wales (Davies, 1989). Indeed, it was only *after* Welsh-medium schools had become well established in anglicised areas of Wales that they began to be established more widely in Welsh-speaking areas where English still predominated in schools.[13] This development illustrates, writ large, how the anglicised periphery in Wales has come to be in the forefront of the Welsh language renaissance.

Throughout this initial period, a number of key pressure groups were also instrumental in generating and maintaining this broad-based support for Welsh-medium education. One such group can be traced back to the initial school at Aberystwyth itself, since Ifan ab Owen Edwards (the son of Owen M. Edwards), who was the driving force behind the school's establishment, was also the founder (in 1922) of Urdd Gobaith Cymru -- the Welsh League of Youth. This organisation was a non-political movement which aimed to promote Welsh among young people (the 16-25 age group) via a range of social, cultural and educational activities. So popular did it prove that by 1934 Urdd could boast 50,000 members (G.A. Williams, 1985). Not only that, Urdd also established itself as an effective pressure group for the Welsh language, arguing for the publication of more Welsh language books and magazines for example, and actively promoting first the establishment and then the extension of Welsh-medium education (Morgan, 1981).

The Urdd's natural constituency was in Welsh-speaking areas of Wales. However, it was also to provide the impetus for the subsequent establishment of the Welsh Schools Movement in the early 1960s (Butt Philip, 1975). The principal aim of this latter group was to promote the expansion of Welsh-medium schools in the anglicised areas of Wales -- a process which, as we have seen, was by then already well under way. However, the interests of Welsh-medium schools in both anglicised and Welsh-speaking areas were united when the organisation became Rhieni dros Addysg Gymraeg (Parents for Welsh-medium Education) in 1984 (Williams & Raybould, 1991). A parallel organisation, Mudiad Ysgolion Meithrin (The Welsh Nursery Schools Association), was also an important influence in promoting Welsh in the pre-school sector. This voluntary organisation was founded in 1971, although the first cylchoedd meithrin (nursery groups) were actually established soon after the first ysgolion Cymraeg -- one example being at Maesteg in 1948 (PDAG, 1993a). Mudiad Ysgolion Meithrin's principal role has been to organise these

nursery schools and pre-school playgroups into a cohesive national network. Its primary aims, in so doing, have been to develop social and linguistic skills in Welsh for children from Welsh-speaking backgrounds, and to introduce Welsh to those from non-Welsh-speaking backgrounds, prior to their arrival in Welsh-medium primary schools (Williams & Raybould, 1991).

The cumulative result of these various organisations' efforts and advocacy has been to secure Welsh-medium education as an established, and prominent, feature of contemporary Welsh life. Indeed, the actual growth of Welsh-medium education, particularly in recent years, can be regarded as nothing short of spectacular. Cylchoedd meithrin (nursery groups), for example, have seen a growth throughout Wales from a base of 67 in 1971 to 617 in 1992. In 1992, these groups reached over 10,000 children, 60 per cent of whom came from non-Welsh-speaking backgrounds (PDAG, 1993a). Similarly, in 1993 there were 538 Welsh-medium primary schools, constituting 33.3 per cent of the total number of primary schools in Wales and 19.8 per cent of the total primary school population (PDAG, 1993b).[14] Moreover, the majority of pupils being educated in these Welsh-medium schools (59 per cent) actually spoke English at home (PDAG, 1994). A similar story is evident in secondary education where 58 secondary schools (25.5 per cent of the total number of secondary schools) are designated as Welsh-medium schools (PDAG, 1993b). Welsh medium education is also increasingly available at tertiary level, albeit still in a limited capacity. A range of traditional university subjects can be taken in Welsh at the University of Wales at Aberystwyth and Bangor.[15] There is also special provision for training teachers through the medium of Welsh at Trinity College, Carmarthen and Coleg Normal in Bangor (the latter having amalgamated with the University of Wales at Bangor in 1997).

Perhaps just as significant as the rapid growth of Welsh-medium education, however, has been the concomitant establishment of a distinct institutional framework to service and support such schools. One of the most important of the Welsh organisations within this structure was the Welsh Joint Education Committee (WJEC), established in 1948 under the (1944) **Education Act**. The primary responsibility of the WJEC was to prepare course syllabi and set examinations for schools in Wales. As a result, it faced increasing demands for materials and examinations in Welsh arising from the expansion of Welsh-medium schools.[16] These demands led, in turn, to the establishment in 1964 of a permanent Committee for Wales within the British Schools Council,

the only sub-committee on the Council based on a geographical area rather than a subject or age group (Davies, 1989). A further crucial development occurred in 1970 when responsibility for the Welsh Department of Education was shifted from the Department of Education and Science in London to the Welsh Office in Cardiff.

This trend towards a distinct Welsh educational infrastructure was also reinforced in 1986 when the WJEC created Pwyllgor Datblygu Addysg Gymraeg (PDAG), the Development Board for Welsh Education. PDAG was given specific responsibility for coordinating developments in Welsh-medium education, advising government on language policy, identifying further development and research needs, and providing a general forum for discussing Welsh language education policies (Edwards, 1993; C. Williams, 1994). In effect, PDAG acted as both a campaigning body and a forum for Welsh medium education (Interview, Bill Raybould 16 March, 1994), and a highly effective one at that. However, it was eventually disbanded in 1994, with its functions being appropriated by the reconstituted Bwrdd yr Iaith Gymraeg (Welsh Language Board) and the newly formed Awdurdod Cwricwlwm ac Asesu Cymru (ACAC), the Curriculum and Assessment Authority for Wales. Considerable concern was expressed at the time about the demise of PDAG on the basis that the move appeared to diminish the importance of Welsh-medium education (PDAG, 1993c; C. Williams, 1994). However, the expanded role of Bwrdd yr Iaith -- which encompasses responsibility for education -- should prove an adequate enough replacement. The concomitant establishment of the National Curriculum in Wales, which I will discuss in the next section, should also ensure the central ongoing role of Welsh-medium education within the Welsh school system.

What we have thus seen established in Wales is, at the very least, a Stage 5 (*Private Use Language Maintenance*) approach to minority language education with regard to Welsh. The rapid growth of Welsh-medium education over the last 50 years, and its associated infrastructure, have resulted in the promotion of Welsh within education via a group maintenance approach to bilingualism. However, there remain limits to both the influence and efficacy of Welsh-medium education. One limitation was raised at a more general level in Chapter 4 -- that is, the extent to which education can influence wider language use. While education *is* a key element of any attempt to reverse minority language shift, it can only do so much. This is evidenced in Wales by

the fact that while the rapid growth of Welsh-medium education has clearly had a mitigating effect on Welsh language decline, it has not been able to halt, let alone reverse this decline as yet. Part of this can also be explained by the largely piecemeal development of Welsh-medium education which has resulted in considerable variation of provision from region to region (Rawkins, 1979, 1987).[17] Add to this the fact that even now Welsh-medium education only reaches approximately 20 per cent of the school population and it is not hard to see the limits of its reach and influence. In short, the majority of children in Wales are still educated through the medium of English, a point that should not be forgotten.

For those pupils from English-speaking homes who learn Welsh through school, and even for first language speakers of Welsh, there is the additional question of whether they will continue to use the language once they have left school. Numerous language attitude surveys in Wales (Sharp et al., 1973; Lewis, 1975; Baker, 1985, 1992), and wider sociolinguistic research (Gardner & Lambert, 1972; Edwards, 1985; Fishman, 1991; Harley, 1993), suggest that education by itself is not enough to maintain minority language use. This is particularly so for Welsh-medium schools in anglicised areas. Such schools may well have contributed to the creation of a new generation of Welsh speakers in the post-war period. However, they also epitomise the fragmentation of the wider bilingual community within Wales since these schools often provide the only significant domain where a predominantly Welsh-medium milieu can be experienced (C. Williams, 1995).

The increasing institutionalisation of Welsh in the public domain is a key here to providing more opportunities and incentives to maintain the use of Welsh after school. However, even this has limitations. The institutionalisation of Welsh does not extend as yet to the corporate sector and, along with the genesis of Welsh-medium education, it also tends to reinforce the perception that a knowledge and use of Welsh is a peculiarly middle-class preoccupation. The latter perception arises to some extent from the close historical association of the middle-classes with Welsh-medium education (see above). This association is further reflected in the growing development of a bilingual elite within the public sector -- a Welsh 'taffia' as it is sometimes called.[18] To this end, Colin Williams cautions that because the growth in the educational sector has outpaced concomitant developments in the world of work and social interaction:

> we are faced with a generation of bilingual school leavers who have been socialised into believing that their bilingualism is prized by a society, which on examination turns out to be a rather narrowly constructed, middle-class public sector society, which rewards its own as purveyors of information and knowledge. There are clear class implications in the development of an administrative bureaucracy which is both the principal agency for change and the principal net beneficiary of [such] change. (1994: 168)

Williams suggests that there may be no other way forward but nonetheless argues that too great a reliance on the public sector may be detrimental to the language in the long term. As such, much of the present advocacy of Welsh language planning is directed towards extending the use of Welsh into other domains (Aitchison & Carter, 1994; C. Williams, 1994, 1995; Jones, 1995; see also Baker, 1992). The central premise of this new approach is encapsulated by Williams: 'although great strides have been made ... within the "Welsh schools" system, we now need to refocus our central goal as language planners from *bilingual education in Wales* to *education for a bilingual Wales*' (1994: 143).

One other observation on the limits of Welsh-medium education relates to the educational implications for ethnic minorities within Wales. While the formal development of Welsh/English bilingual education is no bar *necessarily* to the recognition and use of other minority languages within Welsh education, such languages have to date received little formal recognition. In this respect, Wales is not much different to England in its marginalisation of community language education (Bourne, 1989; Verma et al., 1998) and what little of such education there actually is continues to operate largely outside of the formal Welsh school system (Tarrow, 1992). Indeed, even at the ostensibly more superficial level of multiculturalism, there has been little formal progress made in establishing a consciously multicultural curriculum in Wales. Norma Tarrow argues, for example, that the major barrier to implementing effective multicultural policies 'is the widely held belief that there is little representation in Wales of groups other than English, Welsh and long-standing assimilated ethnic minorities' (1992: 502). As I have already discussed, this position is indicative of the wider invisibility of ethnic minorities within Wales (cf. Charlotte Williams, 1995). It may also well accord with the variety of approaches to minority language education adopted towards different minority groups within nation-states (see Chapter 5). But it remains, nonetheless, a serious omission and I will return again to it in more detail, in Chapter 9.

While much of the educational interest in Wales has centred then on Welsh-medium education, these caveats point to the need for an educational approach with concerns that are broader than just language. Crucially, this is also now beginning to occur in Wales, principally as a result of the (1988) **Education Reform Act** and its subsequent impact on the organisational and curricular development of Welsh education.

The Education Reform Act

For all the significance of developments relating to Welsh-medium education, what remained lacking was a *formal* distinction between the English and Welsh education systems. Welsh-medium education may have established a significant niche for itself, and generated a related educational bureaucracy. However, distinct educational provision in Wales was still primarily dependent on internal advocacy from parents and educationalists and, more crucially, external largesse from the British government (Jones, 1997). In this respect, the control and direction of Welsh education continued to reflect the wider incorporation of Wales within a British state dominated by England (see Chapter 6). The (1988) **Education Reform Act** was to change all this, albeit accidentally.

The Act, a centrepiece of the Conservative Thatcher administration, established a **National (sic) Curriculum for England and Wales**.[19] The deliberate qualification in the title of the 'National' Curriculum is important here. Like all previous major educational reform affecting 'England and Wales', the whole thrust of the Act was actually concerned with the needs of the English (national) curriculum (Jones, 1997). Ironically, as it turns out, this is perhaps where it has been least successful. The New Right ideology underpinning the Act -- an unwieldy combination of laissez faire economics and social conservatism -- led on the one hand to an emphasis on the increased marketisation and commodification of education and, on the other hand, to the promotion of a centralised, highly prescriptive, 'traditional' curriculum. This dual emphasis, and its sometimes conflicting demands, resulted in both considerable controversy about, and active opposition to the subsequent implementation of the National Curriculum within England (see Ball, 1990; Flude & Hammer, 1990; Lingard et al., 1993).

In marked contrast, the Act has been received in Wales with considerably more enthusiasm. Many of its more controversial New Right elements have simply not been pursued within Wales, thus avoiding the controversies apparent in England, while debates about curriculum content have also proved less problematic (Daugherty, 1993; Reynolds, 1994; see below). More crucially, the Act has achieved what no other previous major legislation had come near to doing -- the establishment of a Welsh education system *in its own right*. That this development was not envisaged by its original proponents makes the end result even more remarkable.

In short, the 1988 Act has accomplished a fundamental transformation of Welsh education within the last decade. This is most evident in the curriculum where the Welsh language is now not only formally recognised as a principal language of instruction within Welsh-medium schools, but also as a *national* language that should be taught *as of right* to *all* pupils within Wales. Despite recommendations from previous educational reports along these lines, including both the (1927) *Welsh in Education and Life* and the (1967) *Primary Education in Wales* (commonly known as the Gittins Report),[20] little actual progress had been made prior to the Act in this latter regard.

The formal recognition of Welsh throughout all schools in Wales occurred because at the time of the drafting of the National Curriculum in the mid-1980s there were a sufficient number of Welsh-medium schools to ensure that the government of the day could not define the core language component of the National Curriculum (at least in Wales) as solely English. Conceding that Welsh was now the language of instruction and initial study for a significant minority of schools in Wales meant that Welsh had to be recognised as a 'core subject' in these schools under the Act (Williams & Raybould, 1991). Following from this, Welsh has also been given the status of a 'foundation subject' within all other schools in Wales, to be *compulsorily* studied by all non-Welsh-speaking children as a subject (National Language Forum, 1991). As an official report on the place of Welsh within the National Curriculum summarised it at the time: 'Our objective is to ensure that non-Welsh-speaking pupils in Wales, by the end of their compulsory schooling at 16, will have had the opportunity to learn sufficient Welsh to enable them to use it in their everyday life and to feel part of a bilingual society' (cited in Edwards, 1993: 264).

There remain ongoing concerns about whether there will be a sufficient number of teachers and resources to staff and support such a wide ranging language-based programme (Williams &

Raybould, 1991; PDAG, 1993c). The requirement that Welsh be studied to Stage 4 of the National Curriculum -- that is, up to GCSE level at 16 years -- has also since been downgraded to Stage 3 (14 years); the result of an amendment to the Act in 1993. The latter legislation can be regarded as yet another example where the needs of the English curriculum have detrimentally affected Wales (Jones, 1997), since the amendment was itself a response to an official review, headed by Sir Ron Dearing, on the many difficulties encountered in the original implementation of the National Curriculum *in England*. Nonetheless, the key feature of the Education Reform Act, at least with regard to the language, remains intact -- for the first time, Welsh has been established as a compulsory element of the curriculum within all schools in Wales. In contrast, the earlier advances of Welsh-medium education, important though they were, remained dependent on sufficient local parental demand and/or the beneficence of individual local head-teachers for their successful enactment (Rawkins, 1979, 1987; Baker, 1995).

The formal elevation of Welsh as both a core and foundation subject within the National Curriculum is all the more surprising given that so much of the political rhetoric surrounding the Act centred on 'parental choice'. One might thus have expected this principle to have continued to frame the delivery of Welsh within schools in Wales, particularly given that parental choice was such a prominent feature historically in relation to Welsh-medium education. Such an outcome, however, would have proved problematic in the longer term for the consistent provision of a Welsh language education. While the notion of parental choice has clearly worked to the advantage of Welsh-medium education in the past, it has also long worked to its detriment. Some parents in anglicised areas of Wales, for example, have consistently rejected the validity and value of learning Welsh -- a position which meant that until the Act's implementation some schools did not include Welsh in their curriculum in any form. Indeed, in 1987-1988, just prior to the Act, Welsh was still absent form the education of one out of three (32.4 per cent) of all primary age pupils (PDAG, 1993b).

A general antipathy to Welsh language education has also been prominently reflected in educational pressure groups such as *Education First*, a small but vociferous parent organisation committed to resisting the extension of Welsh language teaching -- both as a subject and a medium of instruction -- within the education system. Such long-standing opposition meant that many proponents of Welsh language education feared that the notion of parental choice, coupled

with the related move under the Act towards devolution of administration and funding to the school level, might have resulted in parents (and thus schools) 'opting out' of any formal Welsh language requirements. This fear has not materialised, given the subsequent direction of the Act. However, opposition to the formalisation of Welsh within the school curriculum on the basis of a curtailment of 'choice' has not abated entirely. Some parents continue to actively oppose the emphasis given to Welsh language education, usually via local campaigns (see, for example, *Times Education Supplement*, 15 December, 1996: 5; *The Western Mail*, 29 April, 1997: 7).

The implications for the Welsh language then of the **Education Reform Act** cannot be overestimated. However, crucially, the influence of the Act, and the National Curriculum to which it has given rise, has not ended there. The advent of the National Curriculum has led to the further administrative differentiation of the Welsh and English education systems, resulting for the first time in all levels of education, from pre-school to university, coming under direct Welsh control (Jones, 1997).[21] Central to these administrative developments was the establishment in 1988 of the Curriculum Council for Wales (CCW) -- which acted as a counterpart to the National Curriculum Council for England (NCC) -- and its successor, Awdurdod Cwricwlwm ac Asesu Cymru (ACAC), the Curriculum and Assessment Authority for Wales, established in 1994. These organisations have been responsible for implementing the National Curriculum as it applies to Wales. In so doing, they have developed a Welsh curriculum that is distinct not only in terms of the role of the Welsh language but also with regard to other key subject areas of the curriculum. Pivotal to the emergence of this broadly articulated *Welsh* curriculum has been the concept of 'Cwricwlwm Cymreig'.

Cwricwlwm Cymreig

What has emerged from the **Education Reform Act** is not simply a curriculum in Welsh but a curriculum for Wales (Jones, 1997).[22] This process was set in motion by the establishment of CCW as part of the Act. Under its influence, the subsequent discussion on what might comprise the curriculum content of the ten designated subjects in the National Curriculum (11 in Wales with the addition of Welsh) diverged significantly from its English counterpart the NCC, both in tenor and substance. Thus, much of the market-driven philosophy and social conservatism underlying debates on the National Curriculum in England was eschewed by CCW and its successor ACAC.

As David Reynolds observed of this at the time: 'What seems to be happening currently in Wales is that an increasing number of audiences and groups in the country are realising that the way to avoid the problems and difficulties generated by the introduction of market-based philosophies in England is to develop a distinctively different set of policies in Wales' (1994: 8).

In addition, while the content of some of the designated subjects in the National Curriculum -- Science, Technology, Mathematics and Physical Education -- were to remain the same for both England and Wales, separate Statutory Orders for Wales were achieved for other subjects -- notably History, Geography, Art and Music. In history, for example, a separate working group for Wales had been convened in the initial consultative process, thus allowing the group to pursue an entirely independent line over the curriculum content for the subject. The result was the development of a distinctly Welsh history within a British and European context for delivery in Welsh schools. While geography did not achieve a separate working group, the final report on the subject nonetheless recommended that Welsh pupils should study Wales as a separate geographical entity rather than merely study their own immediate locality.

This assertion of difference between the English and Welsh versions of the National Curriculum which, admittedly, developed in a somewhat ad hoc way to begin with, was further formalised by a CCW position paper in 1993, *Developing a Curriculum Cymreig*. The starting point of the document was that all pupils in Wales were entitled as of right to a 'Cwricwlwm Cymreig' -- that is, a distinctively Welsh curriculum. While the Welsh language would constitute an important component of such a curriculum, it would not be its sole concern. Rather, Cwricwlwm Cymreig would comprise the following key characteristics: a sense of place and heritage, a sense of belonging, a knowledge of the distinctive contribution of both the Welsh language and Welsh literature to Wales (and Britain), and an awareness of the historical role and influence of religion in Welsh life (CCW, 1993; see also 1994). Given this, it was argued that such an approach would be as relevant to non-Welsh speakers as to Welsh speakers. On this basis, the CCW document proceeded to outline how this curricular approach might be accomplished. While the continued maintenance and development of distinct subject orders under the National Curriculum was seen as critical, so too was an ongoing emphasis on the Welsh language as a visible component of school life, and the promotion, wherever possible, of a broadly whole-school and cross-curricular approach.

The evocation of heritage, place, language, and specific historical and cultural features as constituting key elements of 'Welshness' in Cwricwlwm Cymreig clearly resonate with the central attributes of an ethnie, discussed in Chapter 1. However, such an approach also lays itself open to the charge of cultural nostalgia and to the potential perpetuation of an insular, exclusive 'nationalism'. Having finally freed itself from a conception of Welshness restricted to the language is Wales simply embarking on a recidivist venture in romanticised cultural nationalism, albeit in somewhat different form? This is an important question and one that has been raised in relation to Cwricwlwm Cymreig in general and the Welsh history curriculum in particular (Phillips, 1995a, 1995b, 1996). The historian Robert Phillips, for example, provides a cautious welcome to Cwricwlwm Cymreig but argues that its development must guard against the 'cultural restorationism' apparent in the debates surrounding the National Curriculum in England (Tate, 1994, 1997; see Short & Carrington, 1998 for a useful review). The term 'cultural restorationism' was coined by Stephen Ball (1990, 1993) to describe attempts in England by New Right ideologues to revalorise 'traditional' forms of education in defence of a 'common culture' (cf. Schlesinger's position on US education in Chapter 3). Phillips argues that these reactionary and nostalgic elements are also *potentially* present in Cwricwlwm Cymreig: 'because it is involved in a project in the elevation of a distinctive culture, "Curriculum Cymreig" has many of the features of New Right discourse; potential at least exists for the creation of an inward looking and parochial view of history and the wider curriculum' (1996: 394). However he also concedes that, unlike developments in England, this potential may well be avoided in Wales.

Two principal reasons for this are offered. First, much of the distinctive development of a Welsh curriculum has been *radical* rather than *reactionary*; that is, it has been a countervailing response to Anglocentric cultural restorationism rather than a valorisation of it, as in England (Jones & Lewis, 1995; Jones, 1997). While this does not preclude the development of an insular, introspective Welsh cultural nationalism, the concomitant emphasis on the *situatedness* of Welsh history, particularly within a British and European context, does militate against this occurring. Indeed, Welsh history and the Welsh curriculum more broadly have come to be situated increasingly within a wider European context (Jenkins, 1991; Bowie, 1993). For example, the Welsh History syllabus for the National Curriculum (Welsh Office, 1995) is praised by Philips (1996) precisely for its outward, European focus. In this view, a focus on Wales and Welshness acts as a base from which to understand the world rather than a means by which to delimit it.

Such an approach also accords with the notion of cultural nationalism which, as I discussed in Chapter 2, can be seen as an attempt to modernise the national community *from within* (Hutchinson, 1994). In the process, what constitutes Welshness is valued and/or revalued on one's own terms rather than, as in the past, on terms dictated by others.

Relatedly, there is a conscious attempt within Cwricwlwm Cymreig to emphasise the *dynamic* and *diverse* nature of 'Welshness' within contemporary Wales. This diversity and dynamism is clearly demonstrated in long-standing linguistic and regional differences, as we have seen, and in the ongoing transition from rural, Nonconformist identities to increasingly secular and urban ones within Wales. Conceived in this way, Cwricwlwm Cymreig has the potential to explore the complex, and at times conflictual identities which have resulted from the central Welsh/Anglo-Welsh nexus and how these might be outworked in new forms of contemporary Welsh identity based on a bilingual Wales. In addition, such a curriculum might also move on to address, and redress, the ongoing 'invisibility' of women, and other ethnic minority groups within Wales; exploring, in so doing, the implications of a more self consciously gendered and multicultural Wales.

Responding to change

David Miller, writing on national identity, makes the following observation:

> a national identity helps to locate us in the world; it must tell us who we are, where we have come from, what we have done. It must then involve an essentially historical understanding in which the present generation are seen as heirs to a tradition which they then pass on to their successors. Of course the story is continually being rewritten; each generation revises the past as it comes to terms with the problems of the present. Nonetheless, there is a sense in which the past always constrains the present: present identities are built out of materials that are handed down, not started from scratch. (1995: 165)

Bikhu Parekh argues, along similar lines: 'A community's identity is subject to constant change.... Every community must wrestle with it as best it can, and find ways of reconstituting its identity in a manner that is both deeply sensitive to its history and traditions and fully alive to its present and future needs' (1995b: 267). These positions have a close resonance with my discussion of habitus in Chapter 1. Moreover, they appear to encapsulate what is currently occurring in Wales

as the key emphases in Cwricwlwm Cymreig coincide with those in contemporary Welsh language planning for the development of a formal bilingual state. A bilingual Wales, based on a new set of urban Welsh identities (C. Williams, 1995), offers an alternative both to a narrow language-based conception of Welshness *and* to its opposite, the disavowal of any public role for Welsh within contemporary Wales. The result, as Fiona Bowie outlines, is that

> Wales is increasingly looking out, towards Europe, as well as within, at its own mixed population, its bilingualism, and its cultural roots. I perceive a new confidence and determination by Welsh-speakers, incomers and English-speaking people alike, to forge a Welsh identity which builds on all these disparate groups and experiences. It will be different from the Wales of the imagination and from the Wales of the past, but it will also be distinctively and assertively Welsh. (1993: 191)

However, the process of change is far from unproblematic and antagonisms and prejudices continue to run deep, on both sides of the old divide. Thus the Welsh nationalist R.S. Thomas can still assert that the language is all: 'So where do we go from here? One must make a stand. Hyphenisation is betrayal. Whatever the situation may be in other countries, in Wales we now only have the language to distinguish us. One cannot be too inflexible' (1992: 30). While others, such as John Osmond, argue instead for a 'civic nationalism' where, by implication, the language has at best only a marginal place, if any at all: 'the modern Wales of the 21st century will be one whose territory is more defined by the institutions that govern it than by a separate language' (1989: 89; see also 1994).

Of course, there is no reason why the linguistic and civic dimensions cannot actually be combined. Indeed, this is what the development of a bilingual Wales aims specifically to accomplish (cf. A. Thomas, 1997). But these ongoing frictions point to the contest and conflict which necessarily attach to any such enterprise. Achieving a Welsh bilingual state requires far more than the public, formal acknowledgement of language rights, public services and educational opportunities, important though these are. Rather, as Colin Williams observes, its legitimacy 'will always be subject to fierce debate about a contested social reality, namely the sort of Wales we are constructing together' (1995: 67). It is to this actual debate that I now want to turn.

Notes -- Chapter 7

1. While I adopt this widely accepted formulation of the language situation in Wales here, it needs to be borne in mind that there are also other groups of minority language speakers within Wales. I return to the implications of their 'absence' from such analyses more fully in my discussion of Welsh-medium education below.

2. Unless otherwise specified, the language trends detailed in this chapter are drawn from these sources.

3. It is important to note that there are also a considerable number of Welsh speakers currently living outside Wales, including a large, albeit fragmented Welsh speaking population in London (V. Edwards, 1991).

4. Many adult language courses in Welsh adopt the Wlpan method of teaching, based on the Ulpan immersion approach to teaching Hebrew in Israel. The first Wlpan course was set up in Cardiff in 1973 and was subsequently incorporated within the teaching programmes of the University of Wales, Cardiff. Such has been their popularity that, along with Welsh-medium education, adult language courses now constitute a significant source of second language learners of Welsh. It has been estimated that as many as 10,000 trainees now attend such courses annually, 35 per cent of whom are aged between 26-35 years, with 24.8 per cent aged 36-45 years (Welsh Joint Education Committee, 1992; Edwards, 1993). This growth is also reflected in the 1991 census which records ten per cent of Welsh speakers as having being born outside of Wales, suggesting that many of these are likely to be second language learners.

5. Only the following public bodies are officially included within the Act's remit: local authorities, police and fire authorities, health authorities and trusts, education funding councils, and school and college governing bodies. However, other bodies not formally included -- such as government departments and the new Assembly -- are still strongly expected to prepare language schemes in accordance with the Act.

6. This trend is supported by the recent NOP survey (1995) on attitudes to the Welsh language. The survey found that among Welsh speakers confidence in the use of the language was highest at home, shopping, or out socially, but lower when contacting public services.

7. The public furore surrounding the case also led to the founding of Cefn, an organisation intent on defending the civil rights of Welsh speakers. This organisation formed part of the wider campaign throughout the 1980s for greater recognition of Welsh language rights, leading eventually to the new **Welsh Language Act** (Interview, Dafydd Olwig, January, 1995).

8. One such example centres on the British supermarket chain, Safeways, which opened a new store in Caernarfon in North Wales in October, 1994, a town where 90 per cent of the population speak Welsh. Originally, the store employed a number of non-Welsh speakers and had no bilingual signs. However, as a response to a local campaign boycotting the store, organised by Cefn (see n.7), the manager instigated Welsh language training classes for employees who did not speak Welsh and introduced bilingual signs.

9. At present Bwrdd yr Iaith is accountable directly to the Welsh Secretary of State to whom any such recommendations would be directed. It is likely that the Welsh Assembly will assume this role in due course.

10. Recalling the discussion in Chapter 5, one could say that the notion of additive bilingualism -- where bilingualism is seen as a social and educational advantage -- has increasingly taken hold in Welsh language policy.

11. There is considerable variation within schools broadly designated as Welsh-medium as to the actual extent to which the language is used. Two broad areas of differentiation can be discerned, particularly at the secondary school level. One concerns the number of subjects that are taught through the language which may vary from school to school. The other is that in some schools a subject may be available as an option in both English- and Welsh-medium (Jones, 1995). These latter schools are thus, strictly speaking, closer to a bilingual model of education than a minority language immersion model of education as such. That said, those pupils opting for Welsh-medium in these schools would still experience a *maintenance* approach to bilingual education (see Chapter 5).

12. In 1980, for example, a Welsh-medium school was established in the Rhondda -- one of the first industrial valleys in the south to become anglicised -- which did not have a single child from a Welsh-speaking home. Ysgol Gyfun Rhydfelen, one of the first Welsh-medium secondary schools to be established (in 1962), also had over 90 per cent of its intake from non-Welsh speaking homes (Davies, 1989).

13. Welsh-medium schools in anglicised and in Welsh-speaking areas of Wales were distinguished historically by the terms 'designated bilingual schools' or 'Welsh schools' for the former and 'natural Welsh schools' or 'non-designated bilingual schools' for the latter. Since the (1988) **Education Reform Act**, discussed below, the more inclusive 'Welsh-speaking schools' has been adopted (Jones, 1995).

14. This discrepancy is a consequence of the large numbers of Welsh speakers in small rural schools (PDAG, 1993b).

15. The University of Wales is, as its name suggests, a national university organised along federal lines. It was one of the key national institutions established towards the end of last century (see Chapter 6). There are currently five major university colleges, each with their own charter: Cardiff and Bangor were first established in 1883, Aberystwyth joined them ten years later, Swansea was founded in 1920 while the smallest, Lampeter was established in the 1960s. While there has been some agitation in the past to create a single Welsh-medium university college this has been resisted on the grounds that the rest of the university would be deprived of much of its Welshness (Evans, 1978; V. Edwards, 1991).

16. One example of the WJEC's significance in this regard is its establishment of the Welsh Textbook Scheme. This scheme guaranteed the sale of approved Welsh language texts to all schools in Wales, providing in effect a subsidy for the what would otherwise have been an uneconomic venture for publishers (Baker, 1990).

17. These variations are demonstrated starkly by the differences between the old counties of Gwynedd (incorporating Conwy and Anglesey) and Gwent. Gwynedd, for example, has had a formal language policy since 1975 with the aim of making 'every child in the county thoroughly bilingual'. The policy -- carried on by the new, smaller county -- has seen the creation of reception centres for monolingual English pupils to aid their transition to bilingual classrooms and has required that Welsh is taught as a compulsory subject until the end of the fifth year of secondary school. In contrast, as late as the mid-1980s, less than 2 per cent of primary classes in Gwent provided tuition in Welsh (Baker, 1985, 1990).

18. 'Taffia', seldom a complimentary term, is a combination of 'Maffia' and the river Taff which runs through Cardiff. It is thus principally used to describe the Cardiff-based civil service, many of whom are bilingual speakers.

19. As I discussed in the preceding chapter, the greater institutional autonomy enjoyed by Scotland within Britain is reflected in the fact that it has a separate educational system.

20. The Gittins Report, so named after its chair Professor Charles Gittins, was commissioned in 1967 by the Central Advisory Council for Education (Wales). The Report argued for the early introduction of Welsh as a subject across all Welsh primary schools, and for its extension as a medium of instruction wherever possible (V. Edwards, 1991). These recommendations were an extension of an earlier report, *The Place of Welsh and English in the Schools of Wales*, commissioned by the same agency in 1953.

21. This system is currently administered under the auspices of the Welsh Office. However, with the eventual transfer of responsibility to the Welsh Assembly, the development towards local autonomy will be further enhanced.

22. Unless otherwise indicated, the following summary of the developments surrounding the Welsh National Curriculum is drawn from Gareth Jones' excellent account of the history of Welsh education.

Chapter 8

BUILDING A BILINGUAL STATE: PERCEPTIONS OF PRACTICE

In this chapter, I report on the results of a language attitude survey completed in January 1996 by 494 teacher trainees in four teacher training institutions in Wales.[1] Before doing so, however, it may be useful to outline briefly the key features of 'language attitude research', as it has come to be known, and the degree to which these features are adopted and/or adapted in the ensuing analysis.

Language attitude research

Language attitude research (LAR) has emerged in the last 30-40 years as a particular subset of social psychology (Edwards, 1985). Its principal concerns have been to explore the social psychological ramifications of language choice -- highlighting, in so doing, the interrelationship between language *attitudes*, language *values* and language *use*. To this end, LAR, as with social psychology as a whole, has been preoccupied with the interstices between the 'individual' and the 'social' (Wetherell & Potter, 1992). That is, LAR has been intent on exploring the background factors -- age, sex, ethnicity, language background, language ability, etc. -- which contribute to the *individual's* language choices. Wider social, historical and political factors -- such as the position of a minority language within the nation-state -- have not usually been addressed.

Central to LAR is the concept of 'attitude'. While this remains a contested one in social psychology, we can distinguish between three key components as they affect LAR -- thoughts (cognitive), feelings (affective), and predisposition to act (behavioural) (see Warren & Jahoda,

1973; McGuire, 1985; Ajzen, 1988). The important point here is that these three dimensions may not always correspond. For example, one might express a favourable attitude to Welsh language education, or a belief in its value, while at the same time holding negative feelings towards such education, perhaps as a result of one's own experience of it. Likewise, favourable attitudes to a language do not necessarily translate into active support for, or retention of that language. We saw this clearly demonstrated in the case of Irish in Chapter 4, when a decline in the use of Irish, and active opposition to its retention, were situated alongside a general valuing of the language at a symbolic level (CLAR, 1975).

The latter example also points to a distinction between *levels* of attitude. At a general level, or as a broad principle, one might value a particular minority language. This is clearly reflected for example in the recent NOP (1995) survey conducted in Wales which found that 88 per cent of the 815 respondents agreed with the statement that 'the Welsh language is something to be proud of'. Strong support (75 per cent) was also found for the notion of making Welsh co-equal in status with English in Wales -- a proxy measure, in effect, for formal bilingualism. While these attitudes vary in relation to particular indices such as ethnic identification, region, and whether one can or cannot speak Welsh,[2] they nonetheless indicate strong and broad support for Welsh and, by extension, for a move towards more formal bilingualism in Wales. What this particular survey does not address, however, is that these *general* attitudes may well be negated, or at least modified, by countervailing responses to *particular* social and political manifestations of bilingualism. Language compulsion in education, or the requirement to be bilingual for certain employment positions, may elicit quite different responses from respondents, particularly as these impinge on individual rights, so strongly held in liberal democracies. These more particularistic responses are not solicited by the NOP survey. Thus, this particular survey tells us little, if anything of value about the practical *effects* of, and potential *obstacles* to the actual implementation of Welsh bilingual policy, a point to which I will return.

LAR is also concerned with the actual *use* of a particular language -- including frequency, and domains of use -- and the *motivation* underlying it. The common distinction employed here has been between *integrative* and *instrumental* motivation -- a distinction that was pioneered by Gardner & Lambert (1972; see also Gardner, 1985) in their work on attitudes to second language acquisition. Gardner & Lambert argue that second language learners are motivated *either* by

broadly utilitarian reasons such as employment, income, career, and educational objectives (instrumental), *or* by social, cultural and affiliative reasons -- wanting to identify more closely with a particular language group (integrative). Their conclusions tend to suggest that integrative motives provide a stronger basis for successful language learning. However, other research (see Oller, 1981; Au, 1988) argues that the instrumental/integrative distinction oversimplifies. The distinction may be a convenient a priori conception but it is actually far more difficult to operationalise in practice. This is because integrative and instrumental attitudes are often combined within an individual's motivations for learning a particular language (Baker, 1992).

The dimensions of belief, affect, and action -- coupled with levels of generality, and differing motivations -- suggest that the interrelationship between language attitudes, language value, and language use is a necessarily complex one. Moreover, as the limitations already discussed above suggest, LAR has not alway accounted adequately for these complexities. In this latter regard, previous research in the area has been characterised by the following additional limitations. First, and perhaps surprisingly, LAR has not always drawn effectively on the wider tenets of attitude theory within social psychology. As a result, it has tended to be both atheoretical and piecemeal (for a useful critique here, see Baker, 1992). Second, LAR has had very little to say on attitude *change*, a dominant theme within attitude theory, when clearly this has important implications for the question of minority language shift, and its possible reversal. Third, LAR has been characterised by a predominance of attitude studies to single (minority) languages, as opposed to bilingualism (the two are not the same, although they have often been treated as such). Thus, in Wales for example, there have been numerous studies which have explored attitudes to Welsh in relation to English (see, for example, Jones, 1949, 1950; Sharp et al., 1973; Lewis, 1975, 1981). However, until Colin Baker's (1992) ground-breaking study, none had examined attitudes to English/Welsh bilingualism as a separate phenomenon.[3]

While drawing on some of the standard survey instruments and procedures of LAR, the following analysis attempts to address the various limitations outlined above. To this end, the questionnaire which forms the basis of analysis (see Appendix b) features modified versions of the three language attitude scales developed by Baker (1992).[4] These include a general language attitude scale, a use/value status attitude scale, and a bilingualism attitude scale. As Baker argues, these three scales should be seen as discrete. The first scale attempts to distinguish between *general*

and *specific* attitudes to Welsh, since these are not necessarily congruent. The second scale distinguishes between language *attitude* and *use*. The last scale attempts to measure attitudes to Welsh/English *bilingualism*.

In addition, the questionnaire includes a number of open-ended questions on attitudes to Welsh devolution and independence, the link between the Welsh language and Welsh national identity, the advantages and disadvantages of a bilingual state, and the impact of the compulsory language elements in the Welsh National Curriculum. This is a departure from previous language attitude research and reflects the more qualitative concerns of the study in exploring the *sociological* and *educational* -- as well as the (individual) social-psychological -- ramifications of language attitudes and language choices in Wales. My use of 50 additional semi-structured interviews with both trainees and staff members at these various institutions, as well as teachers, civil servants, and those involved more broadly in the Welsh language movement, also enables a more in-depth exploration of these issues.[5]

Unlike much previous language attitude research then, I am less interested in what follows in exploring the individual/social nexus with regard to language choice. As such, while I do highlight the influence of language ability on particular language attitudes, for reasons which will become apparent below, I do not attempt to explore in detail the broader intersections between language background, language use, gender, and so on. Nor do I attempt a multidimensional analysis, as Baker (1992) has for example, although the data certainly provide the scope for doing both. Rather, I approach the data with one principal objective in mind -- to *situate* attitudes to the Welsh language, to bilingualism, and to the effects and consequences of bilingual policy, within broader sociological and political parameters. Such parameters include the historical méconnaissance (misrecognition) and symbolic violence perpetrated against minority languages such as Welsh, the relationship between the growing legitimation and institutionalisation of Welsh and (a changing) Welsh national identity and, crucially, the tensions that arise at the intersection of group differentiated language rights and individual rights in the promotion of minority language policy. In so doing, I aim to highlight the key strengths and weaknesses of current bilingual policy in Wales, the principal areas of consensus and ongoing conflict in relation to it and, in light of both, the means by which such policy might proceed.

Background factors

These broader sociological concerns also serve to explain why teacher trainees have been chosen as the basis of study. It is *not* because they are representative of the wider population. Indeed, teacher trainees tend to be located in the 18-25 age group and are, more often than not, female. The former trend is an obvious consequence of studenthood, the latter a consequence of the gendered nature of the teaching profession. This is confirmed by the sample with 84 per cent of the cohort between 18-25 years[6] and a 75/25 per cent split between female and male respondents respectively.

Rather, teacher trainees have been chosen because they constitute a key group of prospective public sector workers in Wales. Put simply, on completion of their training, many of them will be instrumental in delivering and shaping a bilingual educational service within Wales. Given that education may play a significant role in reversing minority language shift, their attitudes should thus act as a wider indicator of the potential long-term success (or otherwise) of Welsh bilingual policy. Indeed, if support is not forthcoming from this group -- which should, by implication, be broadly predisposed towards Welsh bilingual policy -- then one might infer that the long-term success of such policy is seriously threatened.

The four teacher training colleges were selected for their geographic spread and for their broad representation of the different social and language contexts of north, south and west Wales (see Chapter 6). These regional differences in social and language context are reflected in the institutional cultures of the respective colleges with regard to the Welsh language. This can be seen, for example, when the highly anglicised Swansea Education Department is compared with the designated bilingual college, Bangor Normal. The education departments at Aberystwyth and at Bangor university colleges are located somewhere between these two positions. While both these departments run Welsh-medium programmes alongside their English language programmes, the wider institutional culture of the university colleges in which they are situated is predominantly anglicised.

The number of questionnaires distributed varied from college to college, depending on the size of the actual programme, the availability of teacher trainees at the time, and/or the capacity of the

colleges to accommodate the time needed for trainees to complete the questionnaire. Thus, 400 questionnaires were distributed at Bangor Normal (300 English language questionnaires, 100 Welsh language questionnaires), 225 at Swansea (200 English, 25 Welsh), 100 at Aberystwyth (75 English, 25 Welsh), and 75 at Bangor University (40 English, 35 Welsh).[7] Of the 800 questionnaires distributed in total, 494 were completed and returned -- a response rate of 61.75 per cent, well within the acceptable range for a survey of this type (Babbie, 1989). Of these actual responses, a clear majority of 56.5 per cent (279 -- 207 English, 72 Welsh) came from Bangor Normal. Swansea comprised 27.5 per cent (136 -- 125 English, 11 Welsh) of the total sample, while Aberystwyth and Bangor University comprised 9.5 per cent (47 -- 39 English, 8 Welsh) and 6.5 per cent (32 -- 11 English, 21 Welsh), respectively. Response rates per institution were as follows: Bangor Normal, 69.8 per cent; Swansea, 60.4 per cent; Aberystwyth, 47 per cent; and Bangor University, 42.6 per cent.[8]

Further to the questions of representation raised above, the marked differences between institutions, in both distribution and response patterns, suggest a degree of caution in interpreting the following results. In effect, the clear dominance of Bangor Normal, the most 'Welsh' of the colleges, *may* skew results in favour of the Welsh language and bilingualism. This appears to be reinforced by a significantly higher proportion of Welsh speakers within the cohort than in the Welsh population as a whole. When asked about their language ability in Welsh, 31.6 per cent (155) describe themselves as fluent Welsh speakers, with 8.4 per cent (41) indicating that they spoke 'much Welsh' -- a combined 'Welsh-speaking' total of 40 per cent (196). The remaining 60 per cent -- still a significant majority -- are divided between the 30 per cent (147) who can speak no Welsh and the 30 per cent (147) who indicate they can only speak a 'little Welsh'. The influence of Bangor Normal is clearly apparent here since 131 out of the 196 Welsh-speaking sub-group -- that is, 66.8 per cent of all those who identified as Welsh speakers -- come from this institution. That said, Bangor Normal also contributes 50 per cent of the non-Welsh-speaking subgroup (147 out of 294), suggesting that its overall influence on the cohort in favour of Welsh and bilingualism may not be as significant as first indications suggest. The fact that Swansea, the most anglicised of the colleges, also provides 36.1 per cent of the non-Welsh-speaking category may act as a further counter-balance. These patterns are outlined in **Table 7.1** below.[9]

	ABILITY TO SPEAK WELSH				
INSTITUTION	No Welsh	Little Welsh	Much Welsh	Fluent Welsh	Row Total
Swansea	51	55	10	18	134 27.3
Aberystwyth	18	15	3	11	47 9.6
Bangor Normal	74	73	24	107	278 56.7
Bangor University	4	4	4	19	31 6.3
Column Total	147 30.0	147 30.0	41 8.4	155 31.6	490 100.0

Number of Missing Observations: 4

Table 7.1: Crosstabulation of institution with ability to speak Welsh

The proportion of Welsh speakers within the cohort, and the potential future participation of the group in Welsh education,[10] suggest that responses as a whole will tend to favour Welsh language and bilingual measures. However, in other ways the sample is weighted against those who might be predisposed to such measures, both within and beyond education. For example, because teacher trainees in Welsh institutions may come from all over Britain, there is within the cohort a significantly higher percentage of those born outside Wales, notably in England, than in the Welsh population as a whole. Thus, in the cohort, 40.1 per cent (193) were born in England[11] compared to only 25 per cent in the wider population at the time of the 1991 census (Aitchison & Carter, 1994). Indeed, only a bare majority -- 263, or 54.7 per cent -- were actually born in Wales.[12] When this is combined with national affiliation, the following picture emerges, as detailed in **Table 7.2**:

NATIONAL AFFILIATION	COUNTRY OF BIRTH: Wales	England	Ireland/ Scotland	Other	Row Total
Welsh	230	13	1	3	247
	51.4				
English	6	87		2	95
	19.8				
British	14	75	3	4	96
	20.0				
Dual (English/Welsh)	6	5			11
	2.3				
Scottish/Irish	1	2	7		10
	2.1				
Other	6	11	1	4	22
	4.6				
Column Total	263	193	12	13	481
	54.7	40.1	2.5	2.7	100.0

Number of Missing Observations: 13

Table 7.2: Crosstabulation of national affiliation with country of birth

I acknowledge that the use of the identifier 'British' in the above table refers to a state identity rather than a national one (cf. Chapter 2). However, I use it here because it has been so used in previous analyses (see, for example, Balsom et al., 1982; Balsom, 1985) and because it relates directly to the issues of identity discussed in Chapter 6 with regard to 'British Wales'. Indeed, these issues become apparent when national affiliation is compared with length of residence in Wales. As **Table 7.3** makes clear, the vast majority -- 94.3 per cent (233 out of 247) -- of those who identify as Welsh have lived in Wales for over ten years. However, there are also a significant minority of English, and particularly British identifiers who have lived in Wales for a similar period -- at 10.75 per cent (10 out of 93), and 31.3 per cent (30 out of 96) respectively. While the number of those who identify as having a dual Welsh/English identity is considerably smaller, it should also be noted that a clear majority of these -- 72.7 per cent (8 out of 11) -- have also lived in Wales for over 10 years. The total number of those who have lived in Wales for over ten years also amounts to a clear majority at 60.1 per cent of the total sample.

LENGTH OF RESIDENCE IN WALES

NATIONAL AFFILIATION	0-1 year	1-3 years	4-6 years	7-10 years	10+ years	Row Total
Welsh	1	1		12	233	247 51.6
English	29	33	18	3	10	93 19.4
British	22	27	13	4	30	96 20.0
Dual		1	1	1	8	11 2.3
Scottish/ Irish	7	2			1	10 2.1
Other	10	3	2	1	6	22 4.6
Column Total	69 14.4	67 14.0	34 7.1	21 4.4	288 60.1	479 100.0

Number of Missing Observations: 15

Table 7.3: Crosstabulation of national affiliation with length of residence in Wales

To recapitulate, these background factors, taken collectively, suggest that any general trends which might be inferred from the following analysis should be treated circumspectly. The sample clearly does not reflect the wider population of Wales in terms of age, gender, occupational status and percentage of Welsh speakers. Accordingly, the pattern of responses outlined below should not be interpreted as necessarily holding wider currency. That said, the cohort does constitute a key group of prospective public sector employees, many of whom will be responsible for the future delivery and development of bilingual education in Wales. On this basis, their language attitude responses provide a crucial indicator of the likely long-term success of wider Welsh bilingual policy. It is to these responses, and the implications that can be drawn from them, that I now want to turn.

Charting language attitudes

The questionnaire administered to the cohort (see Appendix b) includes within it variants of the three language attitude scales employed by Baker (1992). I will deal with each of these in turn. The first language attitude scale attempts to measure language attitudes to Welsh and to differentiate between *general* and *specific* attitude levels. With regard to the former, 20 items from the attitude scale are deemed to reflect general attitudes to Welsh.[13] This broad grouping is determined principally by the content of particular statements and/or by their similar designation in previous language attitude surveys (see Sharp et al., 1973; Baker, 1992). It also exhibits a high internal reliability factor of .9567 using Cronbach's Alpha, suggesting that the items in this grouping are all measuring the same dimension. However, it is also acknowledged that a latent variable analysis is required to determine whether this is actually so (see Baker, 1992).[14]

The overall response patterns to this particular subset indicate, as did the recent NOP (1995) survey, that there is considerable support for the Welsh language at this general level. Using a five point Likert scale, ranging from 'strongly disagree' to 'strongly agree', the following responses show a clear majority who support -- that is, either agree (A) or strongly agree (SA) with[15] -- these positive general statements about Welsh:

We need to preserve the Welsh language (87.2 per cent)
The rights of people to use Welsh in public life must be protected (81 per cent)
The Welsh language should be maintained because it is a sign of Welsh nationhood (75.4 per cent)
Welsh is a language worth learning (75.3 per cent)
I like hearing Welsh spoken (71.4 per cent)

Likewise, a clear majority oppose -- that is, either disagree (D) or strongly disagree (SD) with -- the following negative statements about Welsh:

It is a waste of time to keep the Welsh language alive (92.1 per cent)
Welsh should be limited to the private domain (family, friends etc.) (84 per cent)
Learning Welsh is unnecessary because Britain is mainly English-speaking (75 per cent)
It is only traditionalists who want to keep the Welsh language alive (73.4 per cent)

Less clear cut, but nonetheless still favourable attitudes towards Welsh are also found for the following statements, outlined in **Table 7.4** below:

Attitudes to Welsh (General)	Support (SA, A)	Neutral (N)	Oppose (SD, D)
Welsh is not relevant to the modern world	11.6 %	24.2 %	64.2 %
I like speaking Welsh	58.3 %	31 %	10.7 %
The government spends too much money on promoting the Welsh language	6.2 %	38.2 %	55.6 %
There should be more Welsh in public life	52.8 %	33.7 %	13.5 %

Table 7.4: General attitudes in support of the Welsh language

Taken collectively, these responses indicate a number of important features. For a start, it is clear that there is widespread support for, and goodwill towards the Welsh language within the cohort. Or, to put it another way, there is a high degree of 'tolerability' towards Welsh (cf. Chapter 4). Welsh is clearly regarded as important and its promotion no longer *appears* linked to a narrow nationalism or traditionalism (although see my discussion of the qualitative data). This augurs well for the future development of Welsh bilingual policy in Wales, a point also made by the NOP (1995) survey in relation to the general population.

More striking perhaps in this regard is the strong support evident for the *principle* of Welsh as a public language in Wales. This is clearly reflected, in particular, in the responses to the two countervailing statements 'The rights of people to use Welsh in public life must be protected', and 'Welsh should be limited to the private domain' (see above). The strong overall support for, and opposition to these respective statements continues even when language ability is taken into consideration. If we take, as a measure of comparison, the broadly Welsh-speaking (fluent and much Welsh) cohort and the non-Welsh-speaking (no and little Welsh) cohort, the following pattern emerges. 93.8 per cent of Welsh speakers are in favour of Welsh language rights in public life, compared with 72.3 per cent of non-Welsh speakers. Likewise, 92.3 per cent of Welsh speakers oppose the limitation of Welsh to the private domain, compared with 78.2 per cent of non-Welsh speakers. While, not unexpectedly, Welsh speakers exhibit stronger support for these items than non-Welsh speakers, majority support among the latter clearly remains considerable.

However, while there is clear support in principle for Welsh language rights in the public domain, the perception of the *current* reality is less favourable. For example, in response to the statement 'Welsh is essential for participating fully in Welsh life', 39.3 per cent are in favour, 27.7 per cent are neutral, and 33 per cent against. More significantly, differences in relation to language ability are apparent here with a significantly higher percentage of Welsh speakers in favour (68.9 per cent) and a higher percentage of non-Welsh speakers against (49 per cent). Likewise, overall responses to the statement 'there are more useful languages to learn than Welsh' divide 38.5 per cent in favour, 28.1 per cent neutral, and 33.4 per cent against. This suggests that the general perception of the wider status and utility of Welsh remains a contested one. It also demonstrates a clear distinction between principle and practice since a far higher majority (75.3 per cent) saw Welsh as a language *worth* learning. A similar pattern also emerges here in relation to language ability, with a considerably higher percentage of Welsh speakers against (61.5 per cent) and a higher percentage of non-Welsh speakers in favour (47.3 per cent).

When language ability is considered, even more marked distinctions emerge with regard to the *future* extension of the Welsh language in the public domain. While 52.8 per cent of the total sample support the statement that 'there should be more Welsh in public life', much of this support is sustained by Welsh speakers, 86.2 per cent of whom are in favour, compared with 30.3 per cent for non-Welsh speakers. Similarly, of the admittedly small number opposed -- 13.5 per cent of the total sample -- only one per cent are Welsh speakers, compared with 22 per cent of non-Welsh speakers. The latter also make up the bulk of the neutral category, with 47.6 per cent compared with 33.7 per cent overall. In short, many non-Welsh speakers appear unconvinced as yet about the future development and extension of a bilingual state in Wales. I will return to this more fully in the ensuing analysis of the qualitative data.

On this basis, we should be cautious in assuming that the battle over Welsh bilingual policy has already been won (an implication drawn by the NOP survey, for example). Far from it. Attitudes in principle do not always translate into attitudes in practice and language ability, as we have seen, remains a pertinent distinguishing factor. This caution is further supported when we examine the subset of responses in this attitude scale which relate to *specific* aspects of bilingual policy. This grouping, which comprises eight items, exhibits an internal reliability factor of .8559, using

Cronbach's Alpha, and reveals a more ambivalent picture with regard to the particular consequences of, and implications for Welsh bilingual policy.[16]

What is apparent from responses to this subset is considerable support for the *opportunity* to learn Welsh (although see below). In relation to schools at least, this 'opportunity' is also seen to involve an element of compulsion. Thus, 83.1 per cent of the sample support the statement that 'Welsh should be taught to all pupils in schools', with only 5.3 per cent against. Likewise, 80 per cent support the statement that 'All schools should provide the opportunity for pupils to learn in Welsh' (i.e., provide Welsh-medium education). However, this support also appears conditional on the provision of a range of learning options since Welsh-medium education as the *only* option was not favoured by the cohort. In this respect, 59.2 per cent oppose the statement 'All pupils in Wales should be taught in Welsh', with 22.9 per cent in support. Language ability is also a factor here, since 50.5 per cent on Welsh speakers support this principle while 78.8 per cent of non-Welsh speakers oppose it.

Even more interesting are a number of countervailing trends in relation to the idea of language compulsion. We have already seen, for example, an apparent endorsement of some element of compulsory language learning in schools, at least if this learning is provided in a variety of forms. However, this is contradicted to a certain extent by a much lower majority of 55.1 per cent who oppose the statement 'Pupils should not be made to learn Welsh', with a concomitantly larger percentage (24.1 per cent) in support. When language ability is added as a factor we again find a clear distinction between Welsh and non-Welsh speakers. A higher percentage of Welsh speakers -- 68.9 per cent -- oppose this statement. Likewise, a lower percentage support it -- 16.6 per cent. For non-Welsh speakers, the reverse applies, with 29 per cent supporting the statement and 45.7 per cent opposing it.

This counter trend is even more apparent in responses to statements about language choice in the wider context. In this regard, 57.1 per cent of the sample support the statement that 'The learning of Welsh should be left to individual choice', 18.7 per cent are neutral, and 24.2 per cent are against. Similarly, 41.8 per cent oppose the statement that 'In-migrants to Wales should learn Welsh', 26.8 per cent are neutral, and 31.4 per cent are in support. When the opposed and neutral

categories are combined in this latter item, those in favour of some element of language compulsion for in-migrants, or even simply an *expectation* that they should learn Welsh, are clearly in the minority.

These more contested responses indicate that the notion of individual choice with regard to language learning continues to exert significant influence, *even among a group that is largely well disposed to a formalised bilingual policy*. More significantly perhaps, clear differences remain between Welsh and non-Welsh speakers, as detailed in **Table 7.5** and **Table 7.6** below. From these we can see clearly that non-Welsh speakers are far more attached to the notion of individual language choice. As **Table 7.5** reveals, 67.8 per cent of non-Welsh speakers support individual choice with regard to Welsh language learning while only 12.3 per cent oppose it. In contrast, the Welsh-speaking sample is far more evenly split at 41 per cent and 42 per cent respectively. This suggests that the principle of language choice remains important for this group as well but, nonetheless, the differences between the two groups remain stark. Starker still, however, are the differences apparent on the question of language requirements for in-migrants to Wales, as detailed in **Table 7.6**. Here, an almost inverse relationship applies, with 60.2 per cent of non-Welsh speakers against, while 61.9 per cent of Welsh speakers are in favour.

The learning of Welsh should be left to individual choice	Language Ability: Non Welsh speaking	Welsh speaking	
Oppose	36 12.3%	82 42%	118 24.2%
Neutral	58 19.9%	33 17%	91 18.7%
Support	198 67.8%	80 41%	278 57.1%
Column Total	292 60%	195 40%	487 100%

Number of Missing Observations: 7

Table 7.5: Crosstabulation of responses to questionnaire item 7 q) by language ability

In-migrants to Wales should learn Welsh	Language Ability: Non Welsh speaking	Welsh speaking	
Oppose	177 60.2%	27 13.9%	204 41.8%
Neutral	84 28.6%	47 24.2%	131 26.8%
Support	33 11.2%	120 61.9%	153 31.4%
Column Total	294 60.2%	194 39.8%	488 100%

Number of Missing Observations: 6

Table 7.6: Crosstabulation of responses to questionnaire item 7 w) by language ability

The contradictions surrounding choice and constraint are also reflected in two final items in this subset. When asked whether 'legislation protecting the Welsh language is necessary, even if it limits the choices of some English speakers in Wales', 48 per cent are in favour, 30.3 per cent are neutral, while 21.6 per cent are against. If the supporting and neutral categories are combined this suggests a strong basis for pursuing such legislation. That said, differences are again apparent with regard to language ability. The broad non-Welsh-speaking category is relatively evenly split – 30.9 per cent are opposed, 35.8 per cent are neutral, and 33.3 per cent are in favour. The broad Welsh-speaking category is far more supportive with only 8.3 per cent against, 22.3 per cent neutral, and 69.4 per cent in favour.

A different response pattern emerges, however, with regard to the question of whether certain jobs should be reserved for, or limited to Welsh-speaking people (that is, to bilingual speakers of English and Welsh). Given that this is a likely result of Welsh language legislation -- particularly in relation to the Welsh Language Board's (1995) Draft Guidelines (see Chapter 7) -- the cohort's overall responses are far more evenly divided, with 41.3 per cent against, 19.4 neutral, and 39.2 in favour. Even more significantly, another almost inverse relationship between Welsh and non-

Welsh speakers occurs here, with 56.8 per cent of non-Welsh speakers opposed and 62.6 per cent of Welsh speakers in favour. These differences are detailed in **Table 7.7** below.

It is right that some jobs are reserved for Welsh-speaking people	Language Ability: Non Welsh speaking	Welsh speaking	
Oppose	167 56.8%	35 17.9%	202 41.4%
Neutral	57 19.4%	38 19.5%	95 19.4%
Support	70 23.8%	122 62.6%	192 39.2%
Column Total	294 60.2%	195 39.8%	489 100%

Number of Missing Observations: 5

Table 7.7: Crosstabulation of responses to questionnaire item 7 v) by language ability

These trends are also broadly reflected in the other two language attitude scales. In the Welsh use language scale, two subsets of items can be distinguished -- one subset of 13 items relating to integrative attitudes to Welsh (internal reliability, .9470), another subset of seven items relating to more instrumental attitudes (internal reliability .8859).[17] With regard to the former, a clear majority considered the following uses of Welsh as important or relatively important:

being involved in Welsh cultural activities (92 per cent)
living in Wales (78.6 per cent)
being accepted in the community (63.2 per cent)
bringing up children (61.5 per cent)

The strong association here with traditional Welsh language domains, such as the family and Welsh cultural activities (eisteddfodau etc.), should not surprise us. However, other traditional domains, notably the church/chapel, fare less well, with a majority of 52.6 per cent of the sample regarding the use of Welsh in this area as unimportant or relatively unimportant. The diminishing importance of Welsh in this long-recognised stronghold would tend to suggest that the traditional conception of a Nonconformist Wales is indeed in the process of being replaced by a more secular

society, as has been noted elsewhere (C. Williams, 1994; cf. Chapter 6).[18] Moreover, the general acknowledgement that Welsh is useful for living in Wales -- although again marked by language ability[19] -- points to the expansion of Welsh into other language domains. This process of expansion, and concomitant modernisation of Welsh, is further supported by 56.1 per cent who regard Welsh as important or relatively important for watching television and an almost even split on the usefulness of Welsh with regard to contemporary popular culture -- with 49.8 per cent of the sample regarding it as important or relatively important. The former may reflect the growing influence of S4C (cf. Chapter 6), while the latter is particularly significant given that this is an area which has hitherto been dominated in Wales, as elsewhere, by the English language (cf. Chapter 4). As a result, it has often been regarded as a principal cause of Welsh language loss (Baker, 1992).[20]

A recognition of the expansion and modernisation of Welsh is also evident in the instrumental subset of responses. For example, a clear majority of respondents regarded the following uses of Welsh as important or relatively important for instrumental purposes:

getting a job in Wales (88.5 per cent)
teaching in schools (75.3 per cent)
getting a job in the public sector (74.8 per cent)
getting a job in industry/commerce/management (59 per cent)

Schools, and the public sector more broadly, are perceived here as the principal source of job opportunities for bilingual speakers in Wales -- a perception that is consonant with the general thrust of bilingual policy in Wales to date. Nonetheless, the acknowledgement (albeit to a lesser degree) of the usefulness of Welsh in industry and commerce is a significant finding, and augurs well for the extension of bilingual policy to these areas.

Other areas where a majority regarded a knowledge of Welsh as important or relatively important include doing tertiary study with 52.6 per cent and, to a lesser extent, having an intellectual discussion with 48.4 per cent. Indeed, only 'success at college' returns a negative instrumental result, with 38.6 per cent. Viewed collectively, these latter responses are perhaps a reflection of the still limited provision of Welsh-medium courses in Welsh higher education. Nonetheless, they should give some cause for concern since higher education institutions, as designated 'public

bodies' under the (1993) **Welsh Language Act**, are charged with preparing and implementing effective policies promoting the use of Welsh in the provision of their services.

In the final language attitude scale, on attitudes to bilingualism, two broad subsets can again be identified. As with the Welsh language attitude scale, these groups are distinguished by their level of generality. Thus, the first group -- comprising 14 items and exhibiting an internal reliability factor of .8704 -- relates to general attitudes toward bilingualism.[21] In line with previous results, responses within this broad grouping suggest strong support at the general level, with a clear majority agreeing or strongly agreeing with the following statements:

Speaking both Welsh and English is an advantage in seeking employment (87.2 per cent)
Both English and Welsh should be important in Wales (83 per cent)
Young children learn to speak Welsh and English at the same time with ease (70.8 per cent)
Knowing Welsh is an intellectual advantage (70.7 per cent)
Speaking two languages is not difficult (62.3 per cent)

Less substantial majorities are also registered in favour of the following: 'I would want my children to speak both English and Welsh' (56.6 per cent); 'it is important to be able to speak English and Welsh' (53.4 per cent); 'being able to write in English and Welsh is important' (51.7 per cent). A clear majority also oppose two countervailing statements: 'children get confused when learning English and Welsh' (65.1 per cent); and 'people only need to know one language' (61.9 per cent). Only three items in this subset do not elicit absolute majorities in favour of bilingualism, as detailed in **Table 7.8** below:

Attitudes to Bilingualism (General)	**Support (SA, A)**	**Neutral (N)**	**Oppose (SD, D)**
I would like to be considered as a speaker of English and Welsh	48.5 %	21.4 %	30.1 %
People who can speak Welsh and English can have a wider social circle than those who speak one language	45.2 %	27 %	27.8 %
All people in Wales should speak English and Welsh	32.2 %	28.2 %	39.6 %

Table 7.8: General attitudes to bilingualism

The response patterns to the item on personal bilingualism reflect to some extent the mixed linguistic ability of the group. Nonetheless, the results remain more positive than the actual 60/40 split of linguistic ability in Welsh would suggest. The idea that bilingualism might extend one's social circle also has some support. However, the idea that all people in Wales should be bilingual elicits the only significant negative response in this subset, with language ability again an important factor. The non-Welsh-speaking cohort divide 56.3 per cent against, 29.7 per cent neutral, 14 per cent in favour. The Welsh-speaking cohort divide along the reverse lines with 14.9 per cent against, 25.8 per cent neutral, and 59.3 per cent in support. The implicit notions of choice and compulsion may also be contributing influences here, given the mixed responses seen previously in the Welsh language attitude scale to its wider implications and consequences.

These at times countervailing trends are also evident in the final subset of 7 items relating to more specific aspects of bilingual policy in Wales.[22] With one exception, this grouping, with an internal reliability factor of .8637, elicits clear majorities in favour of the following bilingual practices:

Road signs in Wales should be in English and Welsh (85 per cent)
All printed forms in Wales should be in English and Welsh (81.3 per cent)
All public services in Wales should be available in both Welsh and English (79.5 per cent)
All jobs should in Wales should be advertised in both English and Welsh (75.4 per cent)
All schools in Wales should teach pupils to speak in both English and Welsh (73.6 per cent)
Children in Wales should learn to read in English and Welsh (71.7 per cent)
The ability to speak and read in English should be a requirement for public sector jobs in Wales (41.2 per cent)

The strong support elicited for these items indicates that most of the battles fought over the last 30 years by the Welsh language movement -- particularly with regard to visible bilingualism and the provision of bilingual services -- have now come to be accepted as the norm. This provides a solid foundation on which to pursue a formal bilingual policy in Wales -- the caveat on the wider generalisability of the language attitudes of this cohort notwithstanding. However, a further qualification may be in order here. The two items relating to schools and children respectively suggest that an element of language compulsion may be deemed acceptable within education (see also below). However, the other items all implicitly retain within them still a strong element of individual language choice. Thus, what is perhaps being endorsed here is the *availability* of bilingual provision, not bilingual provision itself.

This would appear to be confirmed when the one notable exception in this subset is examined. When asked whether 'the ability to speak and read in both English and Welsh should be a requirement for public sector jobs in Wales', only 41.2 per cent are in favour, 25.4 per cent are neutral, and 33.3 per cent are against. This is a slightly more favourable response to the comparable question in the Welsh attitude survey, with 41.2 per cent against and 39.5 in favour there. Nonetheless, the adverse reaction, which clearly runs counter to the widespread support for other specific aspects of bilingual policy, suggests that the notion of a bilingual language requirement at work remains a controversial one. Moreover, differences on the basis of language ability continue to be a prominent factor. The Welsh-speaking cohort divide 69.9 per cent in favour, 19.4 per cent neutral, and 10.7 per cent against. The non-Welsh sample divide somewhat more evenly with 21.5 per cent in favour, 29.7 per cent neutral, and 48.8 per cent against.

In short, the idea of minority language compulsion, even within a bilingual framework, still engenders considerable opposition. This, in turn, leads one to speculate further on the role and influence of individual language rights, and the importance of choice, constraint and opportunity with respect to the development of bilingual policy in Wales. For example, do Welsh and non-Welsh speakers continue to hold different perceptions of the link between the Welsh language and Welsh national identity, as has historically been the case in Wales? To what extent do majority English language speakers conceive of individual choice and language rights as a means by which to opt out of bilingual policy requirements? More broadly, how solid is support among English speakers for bilingual policy in Wales -- given that majority support has been identified as a key factor in the potential success of minority language policy (Churchill, 1986; Grin, 1995; see Chapter 5). Moreover, to what extent does this support remain dependent on an implicit voluntarism beyond the realm of the school? Indeed, is the compulsory language element in Welsh education an ongoing area of contest? And finally, how should bilingual policy proceed in light of these considerations?

While some broad trends have clearly emerged from the preceding analysis, answers to these various questions can only be surmised from the quantitative data. They become far more apparent, however, when the qualitative questionnaire responses and the individual interviews are examined. It is to these that I now want to turn.

Emergent discourses on language and language policy

A number of emergent, and at times competing discourses can be ascertained from the qualitative data. Again, these discourses differ to some extent on the basis of language ability in Welsh. In order to highlight some of the differences which emerge on this basis, the following analysis distinguishes between two broad groupings -- those who answered the open-ended questions in Welsh and those who answered them in English. This broad distinction is by no means an exact match of linguistic ability, as seen in **Table 7.9** below, but it is sufficiently representative to act as a useful means of comparison. Additional material from individual interviews is also included.

ABILITY TO SPEAK WELSH	LANGUAGE OF QUESTIONNAIRE: English (1)	Welsh (2)	Row Total
1 No Welsh	147		147 / 30.0
2 Little Welsh	147		147 / 30.0
3 Much Welsh	37	4	41 / 8.4
4 Fluent Welsh	48	107	155 / 31.6
Column Total	379 / 77.3	111 / 22.7	490 / 100.0

Number of Missing Observations: 4

Table 7.9: Crosstabulation of ability to speak Welsh with language of questionnaire

Language, culture and identity

When asked what was most distinctive about Welsh culture and society, clear differences emerged between the two broad groups. In the Welsh language questionnaires,[23] much emphasis was placed on the unique heritage and traditions of Wales, including its literature and distinctive cultural practices such as the eisteddfod. Also consistently emphasised was the closeness of

Welsh communities which, while viewed positively by Welsh language respondents, may also suggest an ongoing degree of insularity in Welsh-speaking communities (cf. Denney, 1991; Borland et al., 1992; Charlotte Williams, 1995). What comes through most prominently in this particular set of responses, however, is the view that the Welsh language is a central, perhaps *the* central aspect of Welshness. Three key aspects are highlighted here. Its foundational importance to a Welsh identity -- 'the language is the focal point of our culture and society and everything should be done to ensure its survival'. Its role as a language of everyday life -- 'the fact that we have our own language which we can use in both the social and the cultural aspects of our lives'. And its usefulness as a boundary marker -- 'the Welsh language expresses the unique culture and traditions of Wales in a way that no other language could'.

These links between language and identity are reiterated in the responses of this group to the question about whether one needs to speak Welsh to be Welsh. Three broad positions can also be identified here. First, that knowledge of the language is essential to be 'truly Welsh':

> Welsh people who can't speak Welsh consider themselves Welsh but THEY ARE NOT. A person is not Welsh unless he/she can speak Welsh and uses it regularly.

> Being born in Wales does not give a person the right to call themselves Welsh. You must be able to speak Welsh and be aware of Welsh culture.

> A person must have mastered the Welsh language fully before being regarded as Welsh. English people who have learned Welsh but continue to speak English among Welsh people cannot be regarded as Welsh.

> Being able to speak Welsh gives people a closer relationship with Welsh people and their community. Being Welsh means speaking Welsh.

A second, slightly less intransigent position is that while the Welsh language is not the sole criterion of Welshness, without it one cannot be 'completely Welsh':

> It is possible for a person who was born in Wales to be Welsh even if they can't speak the language. However, I believe that for a person to be truly Welsh he/she must have been born in Wales and he/she must be able to speak Welsh.

> I don't think that you must be able to speak Welsh to be regarded as Welsh. However, a person cannot be 100 per cent Welsh without any knowledge of the Welsh language which is such an important part of our culture.

You can't be totally Welsh if you can't speak Welsh. Despite the fact that the people of south Wales are Welsh, they are not completely Welsh because they can't speak the Welsh language.

Being able to speak Welsh is a very important part of being Welsh but I know many people who are very enthusiastic about the Welsh nation and yet they can't speak Welsh. I think that this is a great pity.

I think that it is important to be able to speak Welsh in order to be able to take part in community life. People who can't speak Welsh can be regarded as Welsh but *an important part of their understanding of what it means to be Welsh is missing.* (my emphasis)

Being able to speak Welsh is not essential but I believe that it makes a person completely Welsh.

A third position is also evident -- a knowledge of Welsh is advantageous and/or important but its lack does not *necessarily* make one less Welsh. However, this latter accommodation is also linked with a proviso -- one must still respect the Welsh language.[24]

I think that it is important for any person living in Wales to be able to speak Welsh and communicate through the medium of Welsh. However, there are many people who have lived in Wales all their lives and yet they can't speak Welsh -- as long as these people have respect for Welsh traditions and the culture of the Welsh language I am willing to accept them as Welsh.

No -- it is our feelings and beliefs which make us Welsh. However, enthusiasm towards learning Welsh shows that a person is committed to and respects the nation to which he/she belongs.

Being able to speak Welsh is not essential but it helps. The people from the valleys of south Wales can be regarded as Welsh even though they can't speak Welsh *because many of them wish that they could.* People's attitudes are what make them Welsh. (my emphasis)

A very controversial question! It is not essential for a person to be able to speak Welsh but he/she should respect the language and the people who speak it. These feelings could lead to an eagerness to learn Welsh.

No -- but it is important that Welsh people have respect for Welsh culture and traditions and are willing to take part in Welsh activities. It is also important that they are willing to send their children to Welsh schools.

No -- what makes people Welsh is their respect for Wales, Welsh people, the Welsh language, Welsh culture and Welsh traditions.

Some of these themes are also apparent in individual interviews with staff and trainees. For example, the notion of community is clearly expressed in the following two observations:

> I do believe strongly in fostering the Welsh language.... I do believe that people who move into [a Welsh-speaking] area, it is one of their responsibilities to learn the language, not to expect to be sort of taken into the heart of the community without a willingness to learn the language, to show that you're willing to understand how that language is part of the community. M O'C (Swansea trainee).

> If they've been there for twenty years, they should have learnt the language. They are living in a community, we are Welsh-speaking, to be part of that community.... You've got to approach it that they see the need to learn Welsh, and if they see the need then they'll accept the situation. It is important though isn't it that if you're living in a community that you're part of the community, that you're able to take a full part in that community, anything that's going on. [Otherwise] things will die out. TN (Bangor University staff).

Likewise, the pivotal link between language and identity is stressed, although usually on the basis that it constitutes a 'different kind of Welshness'. As one Welsh-speaking interviewee observes, 'I don't think because we speak Welsh that we're more Welsh than the next person. It's just different' (SE: Swansea trainee). Others reiterate this conception:

> There are things that don't translate and there's certain bits of the Welsh culture which are unique to the language which don't really carry over into the non-Welsh-speaking Welsh identity. Yes, it's given me a far deeper sense of being Welsh and belonging to somewhere. I wouldn't say that you have to speak Welsh to be Welsh, but it's being richer, it's another badge, it's another identity... SB (Swansea trainee).

> Although a lot of non-Welsh-speaking Welsh people would think that we [Welsh speakers] thought that we were much better, I don't think that we [are]. But we've had the opportunity and it's made things, it's given us a much broader outlook on life. It's given us a whole other culture that non-Welsh speakers wouldn't understand. AG (Swansea trainee)

> You can have people who say they are as Welsh as anybody, who don't speak the language but if you don't speak the language you're missing out a lot on Welsh literature and you can translate the legends and the folk tales yes, but they lose something in the re-telling. To get the essence of Welsh, I think you do have to have it at a personal...
>
> **Interviewer**
> A South Walian might say they're just as Welsh...
>
> Oh yes, yes, they do, but sorry if you're that Welsh, you'd go to the trouble of learning it. NG (Bangor Normal trainee)

The responses of Welsh speakers then still closely resemble many of the attributes associated historically with Welsh cultural nationalism. Language is seen by many as the *defining* characteristic of Welshness -- thus excluding non-Welsh speakers, and in some cases even second language learners. This position is consonant with the process of linguistic demarcation often employed by minority group members in the face of a majority culture (Khleif, 1979; see Chapter 4). However, it considerably understates the internal linguistic diversity within Wales, while highlighting at the same time the traditional North/South divide. Concomitant emphases on the role of heritage and culture also tend towards a static conception of Welshness and, interestingly, there is no mention in the Welsh language responses of a multicultural dimension. Having said that, there is some recognition of the need for cultural and linguistic change. As one questionnaire response states, 'in order to secure the future of the Welsh language we should be prepared to adapt to changing times and to create a culture of our own'. Likewise, a Welsh-speaking trainee observes in an interview:

> We have to change the attitudes just to make the language live because if you have Welsh people thinking like that, we absolutely have no future at all for the language. Instead of sitting behind this barrier, and making things, keeping our traditions alive, which is very very important, we've also got to make it the language of everyday life.... It's two different things, and we've got to have life for both. Tradition is great and we do need to keep it alive, but you've got to have the balance right or we're going to stay behind. BA (Bangor University trainee)

However, questions about inclusiveness and exclusiveness, the recognition of Wales' internal linguistic diversity, and a more situated role for the Welsh language, are far more apparent among the English language questionnaire responses. In addition, opposition is actively expressed towards a language-based conception of Welsh identity, particularly with regard to the potential for hostility towards, and/or discrimination against English speakers. Thus, while English language responses also highlight notions of community, heritage and language as key elements of Welsh culture/society, they do so only on a provisional basis:

> The most distinctive feature of Welsh society, in my opinion, is the closeness generally associated with Welsh communities. I do think this is important, but it shouldn't include the exclusion or discrimination of others.

> Welsh culture is unique and has different qualities to other cultures -- It should be preserved. Language is a part of this -- A PART.

> Wales has an identity and character of its own but I do not feel that this hinges any longer on the language element. I consider myself Welsh even though I have only just begun learning the language. Wales has a distinctive history and character of which I feel language is only a small part.

This provisional stance is allied with a scepticism towards the singularity of Welsh culture. Three dimensions are highlighted here. First, the relationship between the historical and contemporary dimensions of Welsh culture is problematised: 'Welsh culture is currently based on historical aspects (coal mines, valleys, choirs) -- the typical stereotyped image -- and now needs to continue in progression to establish modern day aspects of their culture'. Second, a propensity for provincialism and insularity is highlighted. As one respondent sourly observes of the distinctive attributes of Welsh culture: 'insularity, insecurity, dour, miserable and depressed'. And third, the use of Welsh as a boundary marker which *excludes* English speakers is strongly criticised:

> The only feature that distinguishes the Welsh from English is the language, the division between Wales and England is only pronounced in north Wales, much I think to the detriment of Wales. North Wales' people are closed and hostile to the English -- their loss not ours.

> I think the language is very important, but it should be accepted that English speakers *will* come and live in Wales and that they shouldn't *have* to learn Welsh. There should be a compromise between the English and the Welsh to end the hostility.

Issues surrounding the deliberate exclusion of, and active hostility towards English speakers also surface clearly in responses from this group to the question of whether one needs to speak Welsh to be Welsh. Three broad positions can be discerned here. First, there is a direct rejection of the language-identity link, which is deemed to be indicative of a narrow Welsh nationalism:

> Absolutely not, I do not speak Welsh but my sense of nationality is no less than the next Welsh-speaking person, although Welsh Nationalists would disagree.

> No, just because a person can speak fluent Welsh and I cannot does not make them a better Welsh person. What God-given right enables them to call themselves Welsh and consider me to be a lesser version?

> No. I have some knowledge of the Welsh language (i.e., I'm not fluent) but I definitely consider myself to be very much Welsh. But again many Welsh speakers (Nationalists) would disagree and say that you're not Welsh if you can not speak the language!!!

Second, there is an acknowledgement of the usefulness of Welsh, for both integrative and instrumental reasons. However, this acknowledgement is also allied with a perception that the need to learn Welsh arises from a (negative) pressure to do so and/or to avoid discrimination:

> You don't get accepted by the Welsh unless you at least speak it. But you just have to get on whether you speak Welsh or not. You learn to ignore the snide remarks.
>
> No, but in order to be accepted as Welsh, you need to be able to speak Welsh.
>
> Yes, or locals can be offensive and biased.
>
> No but it helps. Many Welsh speakers consider non-Welsh-speaking Welsh people as English which can be a bit offensive.
>
> No, but I find that you are not as easily accepted if you don't speak Welsh.

A third broad position is a rejection of the language-identity link on the basis that the strength and visibility of Welsh varies widely within Wales. This is usually identified on the basis of regional variation (the traditional North/South divide). However, class is also mentioned as a factor:

> It helps in some parts of Wales but isn't essential.
>
> Not necessarily, I can get by but the majority of people speak English anyway and we do all belong on the whole to Great Britain. Welsh is really for the Welsh people to claim their heritage. I have nothing against the language but consideration is needed by Welsh speakers that not everyone can speak their language.
>
> No -- English plays just as important a part in Wales as Welsh does. In south Wales very little Welsh is spoken but its residents are still, in many cases Welsh.
>
> No, it helps you appreciate Wales more and it's identity and is another obvious badge of identity -- but 4/5 of Welsh people don't speak it yet are validly 'Welsh' all the same.
>
> No, many Welsh people do not speak Welsh it is dependent where you live and is still predominantly a middle-class culturally desirable aim.

These responses, taken collectively, suggest that considerable differences remain between the perceptions of Welsh speakers and non-Welsh speakers over the role of the Welsh language within Wales. Of course, the concerns raised about the singularity of Welsh culture and the potential exclusiveness of the language-identity link are not the sole preserve of the latter group. As we have already seen, the modernisation of Welsh language and culture, and its disassociation

from a narrow, language-based Welsh cultural nationalism, are also key concerns of contemporary Welsh language planning and education in Wales, as is the concern that a knowledge of Welsh should not solely be a middle-class phenomenon (cf. Chapter 7). Likewise, charges of insularity and provincialism also reflect long-held biases against minority languages and those that speak them. As I discussed in Chapter 4, this process has resulted in the consistent depiction of the use of minority languages as both antediluvian and exclusive *by definition*. In contrast, the use of majority languages such as English has been regarded unproblematically as indicative of a more modern, inclusive, and cosmopolitan lifestyle. Both the positive and negative dimensions of this general critique of Welsh language maintenance are clearly evident in the following interview observation from a mature student at Bangor -- an English (and English-speaking) in-migrant to Wales whose partner and children are Welsh speakers:

> If you said that everybody in Wales has got to speak Welsh, there are going to be some who won't be able to no matter how hard they try so you're going to exclude them. I don't think that you should have to speak Welsh. What makes somebody Welsh? It certainly isn't tied to language, although that's one of the aspects that people identify with being Welsh. I think that certainly in north Wales and mid Wales where there is a strong Welsh-language presence, they feel quite strongly about language. But if you look at the history of the borders where English and Welsh are spoken ... I don't know if it will actually survive, even if you tried pushing it, making it compulsory to speak Welsh in the schools, making compulsory Welsh for say county councils. I don't know if it will work. I don't know if there's another way of viewing the Welsh language, but I don't think they should force it on people. Voluntary and encouraged, but not penalised for not being able to speak it. Certainly not in going towards Welsh as the primary language that it leaves you at a detriment [in relation] to English, which is really a worldwide language isn't it. MT (Bangor University trainee).

Choice and opportunity

This observation also points to another principal and ongoing area of contention around Welsh bilingual policy, already highlighted in the quantitative responses -- that is, the debate between compulsion and voluntarism with regard to learning Welsh. Again, two distinct, and competing discourses are clearly evident here. On the one hand, being required to learn Welsh, particularly at school, is seen as providing the individual with the *opportunity* to be bilingual. Whether individuals subsequently pursue, or capitalise upon this opportunity is seen as their choice, but without a compulsory language element at some point, no such choice would be available in the first place. On the other hand, there is a strong alternative discourse about individual choice as

a means of *opting out* of Welsh language requirements and an associated assertion of the rights of English speakers in Wales to remain English-speaking.

These countervailing discourses are most apparent in responses to the open-ended questions on the potential advantages and disadvantages of a bilingual Wales, and the more specific role of the National Curriculum in Wales. Moreover, each discourse is again predominantly associated with a particular language cohort. The discourse of opportunity, for example, is far more evident among those who answered the questionnaire in Welsh. In response to the implications of a bilingual Wales, this cohort strongly emphasises the *additional* options that bilingualism gives the individual. As one respondent observes: 'the ability to speak two languages gives people more chances and more choices'. Indeed, in contrast to some of the preceding views about language and identity, bilingualism is seen by some in this group as a safeguard *against* insularity -- both 'broadening personal horizons' and allowing collective communication across linguistic communities. This allies with my argument in Chapter 4 that those who wish to maintain an historically associated language, alongside that of another more dominant language, actually exhibit a greater ability to manage multiple cultural and linguistic identities. More traditional concerns are expressed, however, over the potential further dilution of Welsh as a result of bilingualism: 'English is a powerful language and there is a danger that it could undermine the Welsh language'. It is also pointed out that informal bilingualism allows English speakers to avoid Welsh -- a concern which has some validity, as we shall see below.

The messages from the English language responses to the possibilities and pitfalls of a bilingual Wales are far more mixed. Bilingualism is again seen as a bridge between the two principal linguistic communities in Wales. However, English is also constructed in this scenario as the mitigating and modernising influence -- Welsh may still be important for the purposes of 'identity' but continues to be juxtaposed against modernity:

> A bilingual Wales would keep its own identity and stay in touch with its past whilst playing a part in modern society -- i.e., media, business etc.
>
> Welsh allows Wales to keep a separate identity from England although English seems to be the major language used. *The use of English in Wales keeps Wales modern and up to date with the rest of the world.* (my emphasis)

The Welsh language adds a richness and potential deeper sense of pride and belonging to a culture, but Wales should retain English (and undeniably will) for its economical and social well-being as part of Britain. Only a bilingual Wales can achieve both these advantages.

Being a bilingual country can only be seen as an advantage. Our Welsh allows us the security and the *luxury* of keeping one foot in the past, while English keeps us *sensibly* in the present. (my emphases)

A bilingual Wales means that an important part of Welsh culture is preserved, at the same time as making Wales accessible to English people (and England accessible to the Welsh).

The notion of 'choice' is also a prominent feature of the English language responses to a bilingual Wales. However, it is often framed negatively: 'There is a lack of choice. You should choose to learn Welsh, not be forced into it'. Or, when viewed positively, it is usually regarded as a means by which English speakers can continue to speak English: 'Both languages should be spoken so that English-speaking people can still live in Wales without being excluded from Welsh society'. In addition, while the instrumental advantages of Welsh, particularly with regard to employment, are acknowledged, opposition is expressed to the consequences of such requirements for monolingual English speakers: 'It means that Welsh/English speakers may be seen in a preferential light over English speakers'. More trenchant examples of this position also suggest that bilingual requirements amount to a deliberate policy of exclusion:

> Welsh people who've lived in Wales but cannot speak Welsh are often excluded from jobs if a bilingual policy is in operation.
>
> Bilingualism [with regard to employment] excludes everyone who is not Welsh from even applying. This is an anti-English and a xenophobic attitude that excludes the rights of the mass unemployed from different parts of the country [Britain]. The Welsh are able to apply for English jobs. Advantage for them but disadvantage for others.
>
> A bilingual requirement for public service employment is by no means a fair system, it promotes cultural insularity, is divisive and fails to recognise individual merit. It is, in effect, an expression of the Welsh 'ghetto' mentality that predominates in many levels of society.

These differing discourses around choice, compulsion and opportunity are even more starkly apparent in individual interviews. Welsh speakers consistently stress, for example, the fact that

Welsh is a *national* language and should be treated as such. As one Welsh-speaking trainee argues, in response to a question on whether in-migrants to Wales should learn Welsh:

> I think that the very least they could do is respect the language ... English people come in and not just English people, but people come in and they don't even acknowledge it. They don't even stop to think, now wait a minute there's a different language here, should we make the effort. I think there's a lot of responsibility on Welsh-speaking people's shoulders as well because we make it far too easy for them to, because we turn to English. I think we should insist more that they learn basic conversational Welsh. I think there is a responsibility [to ensure that]. If you went to France, you'd be expected to learn it wouldn't you? When in Rome... AG (Swansea trainee)

In contrast, two English in-migrants, while tacitly accepting that Welsh merits the description of a national language, can still argue against compulsion on the basis of its minority status:

> I don't think you should compel. I feel quite strongly about that... The matter of compulsion of a minority language [is] about statistical significance, about pushing a minority language and making it compulsory. I think it is difficult because you do have a large immigrant English population in the country and that is a problem. I mean you don't identify with the culture in the same way as the national, the indigenous, population does. It's a problem. NN (Swansea staff)

> It's on size, isn't it. If you're looking at a group of half a million, a million people speaking Welsh as opposed to a group of people [who are] French-speaking ... that's a large section of people that can communicate together. English or French have got such a large number of people there, a large number of ideas are generated and can be moved around the community of that nationality of speakers. MT (Bangor University trainee)

Leaving aside the constructed nature of all national languages (see Chapter 4), these attitudes reflect the long-held distinctions that have been consistently drawn between minority and majority language varieties. While the latter have been unproblematically accorded with the 'benefits' of national status, including the unquestioned primacy of the language within education, the former are still largely excluded from such benefits -- or, when they are included, are still viewed pejoratively. The arguments over 'statistical significance' and 'size' employed by these interviewees implicitly suggest this wider distinction. However, the distinction is even more baldly stated by another English-speaking respondent: 'I think there's a sense in which Welsh could so easily be artificially elevated in front of other languages *just because it happens to be the language of this country*' (my emphasis). The inherent contradiction here is obvious since such a statement would be almost unconscionable with regard, say, to the role of English in England.

However one views the constructedness of national languages, drawing a distinction between minority and majority languages on this basis can only be construed as part of the wider historical prejudice exhibited towards minority groups. As I discussed in Chapter 1, the claims of 'non-historic' nations or 'historyless peoples' (Geschichtslosen Völker) have long been ignored on just this basis. This recognition of historical prejudice towards Welsh is directly addressed in the following interview comment by a Welsh-speaking trainee:

> I think lots of people forget that they are in Wales. I think it extends from the fact that it's a minority of people who speak it. I suggest they go back to the last century with the Welsh Not and the history of the English in Wales repressing the language. That's where it stems from. I think that the fact that it's always been knocked back in a way which has set it as a minority language, but the national identity hasn't been dented whatsoever. I think if people try and make comparisons to Welsh and any other language, then they say not many people speak it, it's not used day to day, people are obviously going to think of it as a minority language because it is. Until the day when everybody in Wales [speaks it], until it grows in importance, then it won't ... be more than a minority language. It's a bit like the Catalan in Spain... HE (Bangor University trainee)

Nonetheless, the normalisation of Welsh as a national language remains problematic for many exactly because it requires some element of compulsion. As with the open-ended responses, many Welsh speakers argue in interviews that some element of language compulsion is necessary in order to *provide* real choice and opportunity: 'I think it's essential that we have a bilingual policy because someone like me is being penalised. Even though Welsh is my first language, because I also speak English, I'm being penalised [by being required to speak in English]. I should be given the choice of what language I want to speak, whatever it may be' (ER: Bangor Normal trainee). This is a clear assertion of the 'personality language principle' as applied to minority language use (see Chapter 5). That said, there is also a recognition among Welsh-speaking interviewees of the potential backlash that any notion of compulsion will inevitably elicit from non-Welsh speakers:

> I think if the element of compulsion is overdone then people will react. There's a lot of goodwill towards the Welsh language, but the moment they talk of compulsion then suddenly people feel threatened by it ... so I don't think we should push that at all.... Compulsion is wrong in that it drives people, scares non-Welsh-speaking people and even for Welsh-speaking people it stresses the negative reasons for speaking Welsh. I think that I feel strongly that there should be positive reasons for speaking Welsh, it shouldn't be negative. SB (Swansea trainee)

And so it seems, since monolingual English-speaking interviewees see few redeeming features in a compulsory Welsh language requirement. As with the open-ended responses, opposition to such a requirement is most apparent with regard to employment, where it is viewed as at best discriminatory and at worst racist:

> In most adverts you see at the bottom 'this is a job where a knowledge of Welsh is essential' which is why the advert's in Welsh. It's like in schools where you have to speak Welsh, the curriculum and everything, you have to. I think it is racist isn't it.... You have to speak Welsh to get this job, and then it brings on nationalism and then you start having problems.
>
> **Interviewer**
> Why is it a problem in Wales when it's not a problem in France, for example?
>
> *Because people don't believe that they should learn Welsh.* If you were going for a job in Europe, then you'd make an effort wouldn't you, I hope you would make an effort. But then people think 'Oh why should I learn Welsh, you can only use it in Wales'. EW (Bangor University trainee; my emphasis)

Again, the issue of minority language status appears to be the principal stumbling block for majority language speakers in this particular context. Accordingly, racism and racial exclusion are invoked on the specious grounds that a Welsh requirement inhibits the 'rights' of English language speakers to continue to speak English wherever and to whomever they wish. This is more about the continued assertion of the untrammelled hegemony of English than about anything else, as the following interview exchange makes clear:

> I would have thought it does turn out to be a racial issue if you can prove that a job where you're forced to speak both Welsh and English say doesn't really require that skill.
>
> **Interviewer**
> What about jobs that do require it...
>
> I would have thought that it's a very subjective issue, being able to prove that.... *You're always going to have people that want to speak English.* I would have thought that it's going to be very difficult to prove that lot satisfactorily in law... KC (Bangor University trainee; my emphasis)

Suffice it to say, many Welsh speakers argue that this is exactly why a compulsory language element is required in the first place. The association with racism is also categorically denied:

I think that's nonsense really because if it's a criterion for a job, I'm not going to be employed as a Spanish teacher when I've studied Welsh and they're going to say you have to speak Spanish. If it's the job criteria, then it's needed. AW (Bangor University trainee)

If Welsh is an essential part of the job, well then they should make an effort to satisfy that need. If they were trying for a post as a lorry driver, well they wouldn't try for it if they didn't have a driving licence so, yes they should make an effort to speak the language. It's a requirement of a job, it's something they wouldn't use unless it was necessary to speak Welsh for that post. I wouldn't say it was racist. NG (Bangor Normal trainee)

Others suggest a more conciliatory position, where an empathy for Welsh, and a willingness to learn it, may be regarded as sufficient:

> jobs and positions and opportunities should not be closed to those people who have not had sufficient opportunity for a variety of reasons to equip themselves with the skill and ability to speak Welsh.... the people appointing should be able to assess the receptiveness of somebody, sympathy, empathy, of somebody to the Welsh language and culture. I think the onus should be -- if they want to make that condition -- the onus should be on the employers to make that opportunity available and to make sure that the person they're appointing is going to avail themselves in a wholehearted way of taking that opportunity... DH (Swansea staff)

The latter position -- which places a *dual* responsibility on employer and employee with regard to learning an additional (minority) language -- might avoid the difficulties that were encountered in relation to the deeply unpopular compulsory Irish language requirement for the Irish civil service (see Chapter 4). The widespread provision of language learning courses for public sector employees has also been successfully pursued in Canada, with regard to French (Coulombe, 1995) and, to a lesser extent, in New Zealand with regard to Māori (Waite, 1992).

Be that as it may, these ongoing debates over choice and compulsion highlight that the movement towards a greater recognition of Welsh in the public sector will remain a contested one for some time to come. As I argued in Chapters 4 & 5, this is principally because minority language policies necessitate changes within a given nation-state to the balance of wider power relations between linguistic groups and the languages they speak (Churchill, 1986; Tollefson, 1991). This is so even when, as is the case in Wales, there is general support for such developments. As such, the policy of quiet coercion which seems apparent from the Welsh Language Act guidelines may be the best way to proceed. Certainly, a gradual and graduated approach is more likely to attain

the degree of 'tolerability' (Grin, 1995) needed from majority language speakers to ensure the long term success of any formal bilingual policy in Wales.

Language and education

That such an approach is likely to prove successful in the long term is reinforced, however, by a more ready acceptance from non-Welsh speakers of the compulsory language element now present within Welsh education. This is not to say that the discourses of 'individual choice' and 'opting out' are absent here. In fact, they continues to remain clearly evident. As one respondent observes, 'it should be up to the individual whether they want to learn Welsh', with such choice being assigned in various other open-ended responses either to the parents or the individual pupils themselves. Nonetheless, with regard to education there seems more widespread acceptance of the discourse of opportunity. Part of the explanation for this may lie in the ability of education to bridge the compulsion/choice divide. Thus, many English language respondents are happy to see Welsh as a compulsory element of the primary curriculum, with the proviso that Welsh at secondary level should be optional, or at least treated with greater flexibility.[25] There is also a recognition that the formal inclusion of Welsh within schooling provides children with an *informed* choice later on in life as to its further use and/or usefulness: 'I think it is right that children are required to learn Welsh. This gives them a basic foundation and they can decide for themselves at a later stage whether they want to continue with the language'. However, there is also some evidence of an alternative discourse in relation to multiculturalism. As one respondent observes, 'Throughout Britain children come from a variety of cultures, although I think it is fair for Welsh children to learn through their mother tongue I think that it is unfair that children from Pakistan, India, West Indies etc can't. Why should exceptions be made for Welsh speakers?' I will return to this point, and its implications, in the following chapter.

The idea of compulsion, as one might expect, is more strongly endorsed by Welsh language respondents, with a concomitant diminution of the notion of the secondary school opt out. There is also a wider cognisance of the pivotal role of a compulsory language component in the curriculum as a basis for ensuring the long-term future of the language: 'The demands of the National Curriculum concerning the Welsh language are securing the future of the Welsh language. They are also ensuring that English children have the chance to learn Welsh'.

Additionally, there is stronger advocacy of the primacy of Welsh-medium education over other forms of language learning. Some respondents suggested that this should be the only option available: 'It should be compulsory for every child in Wales to be educated through the medium of Welsh in order to secure the future of the language. It happens in other countries, so why not Wales?' Others were less sure: 'I agree that Welsh should be taught in every school in Wales but I think that the pupils should choose the language through the medium of which they receive most of their education'. Only one Welsh language response questioned the apparent contradiction at the heart of the National Curriculum between choice and compulsion: 'I have mixed feelings about this matter. The present situation secures the continuation of the use of the Welsh language in the classroom. However, the freedom of choice which is (supposed to be) the cornerstone of the National Curriculum is taken away'.

In short, while differences remain within the two language cohorts over the role of the Welsh language within education, there is a greater congruence between the two concerning its overall centrality and importance. Likewise, the discourse of individual choice with regard to the use of Welsh, while still present among non-Welsh speakers (and some Welsh speakers), is mediated by a wider acknowledgement of the need to provide a genuine language choice in the first place. Given the minority status of Welsh, only an element of compulsion can achieve this; a position that is clearly articulated in the following interview comments, both from second language learners of Welsh:

> I think the individual often cannot see the picture in a big enough form to be able to make a properly informed decision about what they are doing and the implications of what they are doing, the decision they're making.... Either they don't have the maturity, or they don't have access to the sort of information and expertise that's necessary ... and as result they may make an individual choice that may not actually be in their own interests. That's why the national curriculum is important -- so that they cannot choose exactly what they wish to learn. The national curriculum is there in that broader interest. DH (Swansea staff)

> I think it should be compulsory from a young age because children are like sponges, they don't really realise what they're learning anyway. If they introduce [Welsh] now they can choose then as they get older, say sixteen or when they leave school, whether they want to go on with Welsh. They don't choose whether they're taught English, they don't choose whether they're taught maths in school, so why should they choose Welsh. It should be introduced just like another subject. SE (Swansea trainee)

Cwricwlwm Cymreig

This more sympathetic stance is also reflected in interview comments on the development of Cwricwlwm Cymreig. In line with the wider discussions on Cwricwlwm Cymreig outlined in the previous chapter, some interviewees were wary of its *potential* for insularity:

> I think [Cwricwlwm Cymreig] needs to be carefully thought out otherwise it can become, be seen as being rather insular, nostalgic possibly, but certainly insular and inward-looking rather than something which is about understanding Welsh within a much bigger context..... I think the Cwricwlwm Cymreig needs to be seen in that [wider] context. What's the role, distinctiveness of Wales and Welshness within the UK, within Europe and within the world. DH (Swansea staff)

However, as this observation acknowledges, there is also considerable scope for the fostering of an outward-looking, dynamic conception of Welshness -- one that, while recognising the significance of its linguistic and cultural antecedents, is neither limited to, nor uncritical of them:

> Cwricwlwm Cymreig starts with the individual, works then to family units, then to the community, then to the council, the country, Europe and then the world. In fact it's an outward spiral. In the past it tended to be a spiral that worked inwards and perhaps didn't reach the centre at all but now at least there is a realisation that they've got to start at their roots and then sort of work outwards, but not just to stay put if you like. MJ (Bangor University trainee)

An advocacy of Cwricwlwm Cymreig along these lines returns us to the discussion in Chapter 2 on the need to recognise the 'cultural-historical' *as well as* the 'legal-political' dimensions of nationhood (Smith, 1995a) -- to recognise, in effect, one's cultural membership, or ethnic habitus, as well as one's citizenship. In so doing, this position rejects the tenets of political nationalism and the 'cosmopolitan alternative' (Waldron, 1995; see Chapter 3), both of which equate modernity and progress only with the latter. These themes, and the implicit critique underlying them, are highlighted well in the following interview observation:

> If I suffered from amnesia and if someone helped me to restore my memory rather than acquiring a new personality, would that be a retrograde step? No, I don't think it would be.... I think that restoring the Welsh tradition will bring back self-esteem to the Welsh people. It is only then that they can begin to look outwards and be able to appreciate the cultures of other people. Usually people who argue along the lines that it would be pandering to nationalism are unaware of the fact that they usually are the biggest nationalists going. What people like that usually will tell you in private is that they look forward to a time when everybody in the whole world can speak English. My God, that will be a terrible day. I think that having one language in the world would be the worst possible scenario. This is what people who argue on those lines are for. *They think*

> *internationalism is the same as uniformity, but it's not.* People forget about the 'inter' bit in the nationalism which to me is a two way process, giving and taking. GWJ (Bangor University staff; my emphasis)

Cultural nationalism reframed

Mention of Europe and the wider nation-state system brings me to the final theme that emerges from the qualitative data -- the question of devolution and/or independent statehood for Wales. A few who answered the Welsh language questionnaires on this topic asserted the need for an independent Wales. However, the vast majority of the remaining Welsh language responses reject this option. Instead, it is the idea of a Welsh assembly which is strongly endorsed -- both for its potential to provide a greater degree of *local autonomy* (cf. Chapter 3) within the wider British state and, concomitantly, for the positive implications that this is likely to have with regard to Welsh language policy: 'A Welsh Assembly would mean that laws would be passed in Wales -- this would give the Welsh language more status. Welsh people would be able to pass laws which were relevant to the needs of the people of Wales'. The potential role of a devolved Wales within the European Union (EU) is also raised: 'It is important that we as a nation can make decisions about our future and the part which Wales will play in the EU'. The role of Wales in Europe is further reiterated in interviews, with a concomitant argument for the diminution of British influence:

> ...at present London, I don't think they really understand what's happening in Wales, so if you have got a Welsh assembly, at least the problems are obvious to all. As part of Europe, I think that must have its advantages not only economically but also from a cultural point of view. The problem we've got [in Britain] I think is that we don't consider ourselves as Europeans, but that is going to change isn't it, the European dimension in the national curriculum for instance is bound to make people more aware. Given that England has been such a dominant feature of the British Isles, if London becomes less important perhaps it is going to improve the situation in Wales. MJ (Bangor University trainee)

> From the middle ages on, [Wales has] always looked towards Europe whereas the Anglo Saxon line has always looked to the shores of this island.... We've always looked towards Europe. I suppose if you're small you've got to look for allies elsewhere. I think it's more than that. It's the tradition.... We've always been far more European in outlook. People like Saunders Lewis and so on were always regarded as European. I think that the day of the nation state is over. As we become part of the united states of Europe, and I'm sure we will, I think that all the regions in Europe will be on an equal footing.... I see nothing wrong in, say the Scots or the Welsh, having the same representation as the Catalans have now within the EC. GWJ (Bangor University staff)

In contrast, the English language responses are far more ambivalent. There is no support for an independent Wales at all. Independence is equated directly with isolationism and nationalism, and is seen as being economically unsustainable. This position is summarised, in its most trenchant form, by the following:

> A waste of money. Too much chance of the welsh 'fundamentalist' minority enforcing their will on the rest of us.
>
> Unnecessary. If a United kingdom is in practice, then why separate areas off? A waste of public finance to set up a dying nation.
>
> A vast and potentially useless idea which will achieve little except yet another level of bureaucratic interference. Welsh independence has no realistic future if one considers the financial and economic consequences.

While there is greater support for a Welsh assembly within the cohort, some of the same caveats are raised in relation to it. Also highlighted is the ongoing importance of the British union, and the potential implication that regional and language differences within Wales might be ignored under devolution to the detriment of English speakers. This more cautious approach is encapsulated by the following, final interview observation:

> I don't think we could survive [economically]. I don't think that we should cut ourselves off either. I do think that we could have greater freedom to make rules which are more suitable in Wales, for instance with the Welsh curriculum where you speak Welsh and have a Welsh element to all the subjects as well. I think we should have a greater say in that. Maybe something like Scotland. No, I wouldn't like to see a Welsh government controlling Wales at all. I'd hate to think what would happen to the English-speaking Welsh people then.... It's this age-old thing about the English. I don't know if they'd be fairly treated. LP (Bangor University trainee)

In short, independent statehood continues to be a peripheral concern for many within Wales. Cultural rather than political nationalism remains the dominant discourse. These comments on independence and devolution also help to illustrate why the 1997 devolution campaign proved to be such a close fought contest (cf. Chapter 6). The fault lines and tensions evident within Wales -- particularly with regard to regional and linguistic variations -- continue to exert considerable influence on the debate. Many English-speaking respondents, in particular, have yet to be convinced that a move to greater local autonomy will result in their interests and concerns being fairly represented.

More broadly, such ongoing tensions have important implications for the long term success of a formal bilingual policy in Wales. In this respect, much has already been accomplished -- as the quantitative analysis makes clear. However, when counter-trends in the quantitative analysis are combined with the qualitative data, a far more mixed and contentious picture emerges. The fears and antagonisms of non-Welsh speakers, and the associated discourses of individual choice and rights, continue to hold considerable purchase, even within a cohort that is broadly committed to bilingual policy. Moreover, many of these reservations and concerns are valid. Pertinent issues raised here include the ongoing articulation of an essentialist, language-based identity by some Welsh speakers. While language often acts as a key boundary marker, or symbolic border guard, for minority groups surrounded by a majority language and culture, it may lead in its extreme forms, as here, to the objectification of ethnicity (see Chapter 1). This, in turn, understates the many internal variations in Wales and has the potential to exclude and discriminate against non-Welsh speakers and/or those who value or demonstrate other forms of 'Welshness'. Indeed, anti-English sentiment (both in the national and language sense) continues to be clearly apparent among the Welsh language cohort and clearly felt by non-Welsh speakers. Likewise, the wider invisibility of other ethnic minority groups in Wales remains a cause for concern (no Welsh language response mentioned ethnic minorities or multiculturalism), as does an ongoing tendency to view Welsh language and culture in static, reified terms. While the framework now exists within Cwricwlwm Cymreig for fostering a more dynamic and self consciously multicultural Wales, the full implications for bilingual policy development have yet to be adequately addressed. Indeed, a debate that is ongoing in Wales at present is the potential impact of Welsh language requirement on ethnic minorities (*The Western Mail*, 13 November, 1997: p.1; see also Charlotte Williams, 1995).

That said, much of this discourse of exclusion, discrimination and racism articulated by non-Welsh speakers needs to be treated with considerable caution. In many instances -- with a bilingual language requirement for employment being one key example -- it relates more to the threat to English language hegemony than to anything else. Concomitantly, the valorisation of English as the language of modernity and 'wider communication' needs to be seen for what it is -- a linguistic proxy for the legitimation of the greater socio-political status of the majority language group (cf. Chapter 4). The latter also suggests that attempts by monolingual English speakers to present themselves as a disadvantaged linguistic 'minority' are largely specious. Indeed, given my

discussion in Chapter 5 of Article 27 of the (1966) **International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights**, English speakers in Wales are clearly not a minority in this sense.[26] Rather, these arguments simply highlight the inevitable opposition that attends minority language policy development, particularly when the process of linguistic accommodation has been perceived historically by the majority (linguistic) group as the sole responsibility of minorities.

And this brings me to my final point. The empirical analysis conducted here highlights, above all, that the legitimation and institutionalisation of minority languages within modern nations will be, and will remain a contested process. In effect, the discourses of choice and opportunity outlined here reflect two distinct views of the world. The former is framed within a wider discourse of orthodox liberalism which has gained a pre-eminent position in western political discourse over the course of this century (see Chapter 3). However, the term 'western' also indicates the implicit ethnocentrism of this position. As I have argued, in elevating the political dimensions of nationhood over the cultural-historical, such a position considerably understates, even ignores, the hegemonic imperatives which underlie the historical development of modern nation-states. In so doing, it also reflects the long-standing derogation of minority languages (and, in many cases, the minority groups who speak them) within both political and academic discourse.

In contrast, the discourse of opportunity argues for the recognition and validation of national minority languages which have been historically marginalised by the hegemonic construction of the nation-state and the associated valorisation of majority language varieties. By this, it is argued, such groups are accorded the cultural and linguistic capital necessary for (re)legitimating and institutionalising their language(s) within the civic realm. However, as we have seen, this process has its own problems -- most notably, the potential for simply replacing one totalising and exclusionary discourse with another. In short, the possibilities of essentialism, reification and social and political closure still haunt the advocacy and implementation of group-differentiated rights for national minorities. Other languages varieties, and alternative forms of identity, must still be recognised as valid within the nation-state, even if they are not accorded the official recognition consonant with national minority status. It is to this ongoing problematic that I want to turn in the final chapter.

Notes -- Chapter 8

1. I outline below my reasons for pursuing this methodological approach -- many of which, I argue, extend considerably previous research in this area. However, I am also aware that there is nothing entirely new under the sun. This was brought home to me upon reading W. Gareth Evans' (1997) account of the first language attitude survey on the Welsh language *in 1885*, which was conducted among elementary school head teachers. Certainly, many of the issues raised in that survey still have resonance today and a comparison makes for fascinating reading.

2. A breakdown along these dimensions reveals that of the five per cent who actually disagreed that 'Welsh is a language to be proud of' (six per cent were neutral) -- most identified as English or British in ethnic identification and lived in the south of Wales. In respect of the question on co-equal status, while 75 per cent agreed overall, only 14 per cent were in strong agreement. The level of agreement was predictably strongest among Welsh speakers (87 per cent), although support among non-Welsh speakers was also substantial (68 per cent). Of those who disagreed, there were relatively large concentrations among those who did not consider themselves to be Welsh (23 per cent), non-Welsh speakers (21 per cent), and those living in the south (21 per cent) (NOP, 1995: 16-17).

3. As Baker argues, adopting this approach also assumes an additive view of bilingualism. In contrast, single language studies have tended to adopt a subtractive view of bilingualism (cf. Chapter 5). In comparing languages in a given context, the latter have assumed that positive consequences for one language (e.g., English) necessarily involved negative consequences for another (e.g., Welsh). While such language competition clearly exists -- indeed, much of my own analysis is predicated on this notion -- the potential for language complementarity is underplayed, as is bilinguals' use of languages in different domains and contexts.

4. The scales are modified in a number of ways. Particular questions used by Baker, which were found in the course of his analysis to have low internal reliability, were excluded. Salient questions were also included from previous language attitude scales used in Wales, notably from Sharp et al. (1973). Since much of the previous research on language attitudes in Wales has concentrated on children and adolescents, including Baker's study, I have also reframed certain questions for an adult context. Finally, a number of additional questions were constructed to reflect my particular interests in attitudes to Welsh bilingual policy and the issues surrounding individual and group differentiated rights.

5. 35 interviews, ranging from a ½ hour to an hour in length, were conducted with individual trainees and staff at Bangor University, Bangor Normal and Swansea at the time that the questionnaire was being distributed (January, 1996). These interviews were non-standardised (Fielding, 1993) but did comprise a number of probes to facilitate discussion around the key issues in which I was interested. All these interviews were taped and subsequently transcribed. The remaining interview material was gathered more informally over the course of 1994-1996 from discussions with educationalists, administrators, teachers, and policy makers in Wales -- predominantly in Gwynedd and Cardiff. Material used from these interviews is drawn from my written notes at the time.

6. Of this broad grouping, 42 per cent were between 18-21 years, and 42 per cent were between 22-25 years. In addition, seven per cent were between 26-29 years, seven per cent were between 30-39 years, and only two per cent were between 40-49 years. This results in a mean age of 23 years, although the range extends from a minimum of 18 years to a maximum of 47 years.

7. Questionnaires were provided in both English and Welsh. The latter was professionally translated for me from the English original by Berwyn Prys Jones (see Appendix c).

8. The varied response rates per institution may be attributable, at least to some extent, to the different approaches adopted by each institution with regard to administering the questionnaire. Bangor Normal and Swansea provided the opportunity to answer (and return) the questionnaire during specified class times -- thus ensuring a good response rate. Aberystwyth and Bangor University handed out questionnaires to trainees to fill in during their own time. Inevitably, the response rate was lower in these cases.

9. All the quantitative analysis discussed here has been generated via SPSS (Statistical Package for the Social Sciences; see Bryman & Cramer, 1997).

10. Of course, there is no means of determining how many in this group will actually proceed to teach or, more significantly for our purposes, proceed to teach *in Wales*. However, an indirect indicator of the latter -- albeit, admittedly, a tenuous one -- can be gauged by the clear majority of the cohort (70.1 per cent) who indicated that they intended to stay in Wales after completion of their training.

11. In addition to those born in England, 2.4 per cent (13) were born in Northern Ireland, the Irish Republic or Scotland, and 2.8 per cent (14) were born outside the British Isles.

12. The regional breakdown for those born in Wales, based on the old county system established in 1974, is as follows: Gwynedd, 17.8 per cent; Clwyd, 13.9 per cent; Dyfed, 7.3 per cent; Glamorgan (including south, west and mid Glamorgan), 14.7 per cent; Gwent, 2.1 per cent; Powys, 1.3 per cent.

13. The general subset comprises the following: 7 a), c), d), e), f), g), h), j), k), l), m), n), r), s), t), v), x), y) z), aa) (see Appendix b).

14. This caveat also applies to the ensuing analyses of the other language attitude scales.

15. I do not generally distinguish in what follows between the categories of 'strongly agree' and 'agree', and 'strongly disagree' and disagree', preferring to talk instead about either broadly positive or negative responses. There are two reasons for this. One is practical -- it simply makes the following analysis more accessible. The second is statistical. Since a Likert scale is not a true interval scale, no conclusions can be drawn about the meaning of distances between scale positions (see Moser, 1968).

16.The subset of specific attitudes to Welsh comprises: 7 b), i), o), p), q), u), w), bb) (see Appendix b).

17. The integrative subset comprises 8 a), b), c), e), g), i), j), l), m), n), o), p), s). The instrumental subset comprises 8 d), f), h), k), q), r), t).

18. The trend to a more secular Wales is reinforced by an analysis of religious affiliation. Only 19 per cent of the cohort identified as Nonconformist (including Methodist, Presbyterian, Independent and Baptist), although 32.2 per cent identified as Anglican, 22.1 per cent as Christian (unspecified) and 11 per cent as Catholic. 41.7 per cent either failed to answer the question, or identified as none, suggesting a significant minority with no religious affiliation. 1.7 per cent identified as Muslim, Jewish or other.

19. While there was strong overall support for this item at 78.6 per cent, 31.3 per cent of the non-Welsh-speaking sample saw Welsh as unimportant or relatively unimportant compared to only 6.7 per cent for the Welsh-speaking sample.

20. The growing association and use of Welsh in the domain of popular culture may be influenced to some extent by the current status of a number of Welsh-speaking rock/pop bands -- in particular, the Manic Street Preachers, Super Furry Animals, and Catatonia. While all these bands began life on the 'indie' circuit, they have gained increasing recognition and a considerable following in recent years -- both in Britain and, with the Manic Street Preachers at least, beyond it as well. Given their prominent use of Welsh, including songs written and performed in Welsh, such bands have provided the language with a social and cachet far removed from the more traditional cultural forms with which it has long been associated (see, for example, *The Guardian* G2, November 11, 1997: 9)

21. This subset comprises 9 a), b), c), d), e), h), j), l), m), q), r), s), t), u).

22. This subset comprises 9 f), g), i), k), n), o), p).

23. Open-ended responses in the Welsh language questionnaires were translated and transcribed for me by a fluent Welsh speaker, Ruth Kelso.

24. This position is consonant with the current stance of Plaid Cymru (see Chapter 6).

25. This pattern may be explained to some extent by the fact that 65.5 per cent (110 out of 168) of those training to be secondary teachers are non-Welsh speakers.

26. As I indicated in Chapter 5, debates about linguistic minority status in relation to Article 27 are ongoing. However, precedent has been set in international law by the 1993 judgement of *Ballantyne, Davidson and McIntyre v. Canada.* Here, an argument that English speakers in Québec constituted a linguistic minority under Article 27 was rejected by the United Nations Human Rights Commission. The commission ruled in effect that 'English-speaking citizens of Canada cannot be considered a linguistic minority' since this is determined by their position within the *state* rather than within particular regions of it (de Varennes, 1996a).

REIMAGINING THE NATION-STATE: ACCOMMODATING MINORITY RIGHTS

> We need a little less pietistic articulation of political principle ... a little more of the principle of political negotiation (Bhabha, 1994: 28)

All collective forms of identity are permeable, fluid and subject to change. They vary in salience depending on the individual, the immediate context, their complex articulation with other identities, and the wider vicissitudes of history. There is certainly nothing inherent about them. Ethnic and national identities are no exception here -- they are as constructed and as contingent as any other. Nonetheless, it is also clear that such identities continue to exert considerable influence, both individually and corporately; ethnic and national identities more than most. This can be explained, I have argued, by the fact that ethnic and national identities are also *at the same time* an *embodied* set of dispositions, or habitus (Bourdieu, 1990a). In this sense, they are not simply representations of some inner psychological state, nor even particular ideologies about the world (Billig, 1995). Rather, they are social, cultural and political *forms of life* -- material ways of being in the modern world.

On this basis, I have also brought into question the central tenets of political nationalism -- most notably, nation-state congruence -- which have resulted in the valorisation of the 'legal-political' dimensions of nationhood (and the inherent individualism underlying these) over the 'cultural-historical'. It has been my argument that this understates the considerable and continuing influence of the latter. Modern nations are not just *political* communities represented in and by

the nation-state and expressed via individual citizenship. They are also *ethnocultural* communities, which may or may not be so represented, and yet which are still shaped by shared myths of origins, and a sense of common history and ways of life. Moreover, it is principally this latter dimension which endows their members with identity and purpose.

When this is recognised, it becomes clearer why ethnic and national affiliations which are not represented in and by the nation-state continue to be a source of identity *and* mobilisation for many minority groups, confounding the 'liberal expectancy' (Fenton, 1998) that they would atrophy in the face of modernity. In this respect, my argument is the reverse of much academic and popular commentary (cf. Chapter 1). It is not the cultural and political expression or mobilisation of (minority) ethnicities and nationalisms which are the cause of so much contemporary mayhem in the modern world, but their *disavowal*. We ignore their ongoing influence and purchase at our peril.

In adopting this position, I stress again that we do not need to abandon the social constructionist consensus on ethnicity and nationalism. Far from it. What we do need to do though is consider critically why the constructedness and contingency of *majoritarian* forms of ethnic and/or national identity should somehow be immune from its purview. In short, what we should be asking ourselves is both *why* some ethnic and/or national identities are legitimated and normalised while other are not, and *how* this process of differentiation is accomplished. This in turn highlights the central importance of power relations, and the means by which these come to be articulated within modern nation-states, particularly between majority and minority groups.

When these questions are asked we begin to realise that ethnicity and nationalism do not simply lurk *out there* -- the sole preserve of 'extremist' nationalists or malcontented ethnic minorities. They inhabit the very structures of the civic societies in which we live. In effect, both the political and administrative structure of the state, and its civil society, are *ethnicised*, although they are not always recognised or acknowledged as such. This lack of recognition -- particularly among, but not limited to majority (ethnic) group members -- attests to the hegemony of the 'philosophical matrix of the nation-state' (Churchill, 1996). As I discussed in Chapters 2 and 3, this matrix is predicated upon the principle of nation-state congruence and the establishment to this end (and

often retrospectively) of a common civic language and culture. The latter is often sustained in turn by the tenets of political liberalism -- notably, individual autonomy, citizenship and universalism. Consequently, the civic realm often comes to be represented as devoid of ethnicity, neutral and common to all -- at least, that is, in modern democratic states.[1] However, as I have consistently argued, it is none of these. Rather, the public sphere of the nation-state represents and is reflective of the *particular* cultural and linguistic habitus of the dominant ethnie, or staatsvolk. These habitus, in turn, are accorded with cultural and linguistic capital while other (minority) habitus specifically are not.

The principal consequence for many minorities -- at both the individual and collective level -- has been the enforced loss of their own ethnic, cultural and linguistic habitus as the necessary price of entry to the civic realm. As we saw Peter McLaren observe in Chapter 3, a prerequisite of 'joining the [national] club' is to become denuded, de-ethnicised (or, rather, *re*-ethnicised) and culturally stripped. There are numerous examples where this act of defenestration has been achieved by state coercion. With regard to language the (1536) **Act of Union**, proscribing Welsh, is an obvious historical example -- as is, more recently, Franco's Spain. However, contemporary examples remain prevalent, with Albanians in Serbia, Tibetans in China, and Kurds in Turkey all currently facing the proscription of their languages by the state. If the US English Only movement has its way, such will also be the case for Hispanic communities in the USA.

However, it is via civil society that this process has been most widely and effectively achieved (although, it must be said, often in conjunction with more coercive measures). Language and education play central roles here. Indeed, the construction of national languages, and their reinforcement via mass education, have become a sine qua non of modern nation-states. These linguistic and educational processes have also linked dominant language varieties inexorably to modernity and progress, while consigning their minority counterparts to the realms of primitivism and stasis. The cultural and linguistic capital ascribed to dominant language varieties also inevitably leads to the view that they are of more value and use in the modern world. Such associations operate on the international stage as well -- with the status of lingua franca currently ascribed to the English language being a reflection of the socio-political dominance of those nation-states (notably the USA) with which it is most closely associated.

It is perhaps not surprising then that many minority group members have come to accept and internalise the view that their own cultural and linguistic habitus have little or no value. This, in turn, leads many to become active participants in the jettisoning of their traditional languages and cultures. Bourdieu (1991) describes this process as one of méconnaissance (misrecognition) -- assuming the greater value accorded the dominant language and culture to be a 'natural' rather than a socially and politically constructed phenomenon. As Bourdieu argues, the resulting 'symbolic violence' which is visited upon particular minority languages and cultures is often sustained by an active complicity, or implicit consent, on the part of those subjected to it.

So how can we change this state of affairs? Not easily is the simple answer. But the example of Wales demonstrates that real progress *can* be made. The nation-state can be reconfigured -- reimagined, in effect -- to accommodate greater cultural and linguistic diversity. Or rather, as Homi Bhabha argues, it can be reimagined in order to accommodate greater cultural and linguistic *difference*. The distinction Bhabha makes is crucial here. The former, most evident in the rhetoric of multiculturalism, treats culture as an *object* of empirical knowledge -- as static, totalised and historically bounded, as something to be valued but not necessarily *lived* (see also May, 1994, 1998b). The latter is the process of the *enunciation* of culture as 'knowledg*able*', as adequate to the construction of systems of cultural identification. This involves a *dynamic* conception of culture -- one that recognises and incorporates the ongoing fluidity and constant change that attends its articulation in the modern world.

A formal recognition of cultural and linguistic difference along these lines is what is presently occurring in Wales. The development of a Welsh bilingual state has involved the legitimation and institutionalisation of Welsh in the public domain -- after centuries of proscription, derogation and neglect -- *alongside English*. It aims to build on, and where necessary transform Welsh language and culture in order more adequately to meet the demands of modernity. However, this process remains a highly contested one, and it is perhaps most virulent at the intersection of group-differentiated and individual rights. As Chapter 8 makes clear, both English and Welsh speakers mobilise such rights, but often to quite different ends. Likewise, claims and counter-claims of disadvantage and discrimination feature prominently.

In light of this, how might we proceed? For a start, by recognising that these issues are never likely to be entirely resolved. More significantly, it is not necessary that they should be. As Bhabha (1994) again observes, an alternative minority discourse amounts to a strategy of intervention which is similar to what the British parliamentary procedure recognises as a supplementary question. A supplementary strategy suggests that *adding 'to' need not be the same as adding 'up'*. In other words, what we may have here in the end are *incommensurable* discourses -- 'abseits designating a form of social contradiction or antagonism that has to be negotiated rather than sublated' (1994: 162). We cannot, and perhaps should not, evacuate tension and conflict from these negotiations since real and substantive differences continue to underlie the various positions involved (Coulombe, 1995).

Indeed, the continuing debates around individual and group-differentiated rights may help to guard against the possibility of, and potential for social and political closure -- of simply substituting one kind of totalising and exclusionary (national) discourse for another. After all, the world is replete with examples of minority groups who, on attaining greater socio-political status for themselves, promptly deny it to others. The tenets of international law with regard to minority groups (see Chapter 3) become crucially important here. With regard to language, for example, three key tenets can be highlighted. The first principle, which is widely accepted, is that it is not unreasonable to expect from national members some knowledge of the common public language(s) of the state. On this basis, it is possible to argue with regard to Wales that Welsh, along with English, constitutes such a language and should be accorded all its benefits.

A second principle is that in order to avoid language discrimination, it is important that where there are a sufficient number of other language speakers, these speakers should be allowed to use that language as part of the exercise of their *individual* rights as citizens. That is, they should have the *opportunity* to use their first language if they so choose (cf. Chapter 8). As de Varennes argues, 'the respect of the language principles of individuals, *where appropriate and reasonable*, flows from a fundamental right and is not some special concession or privileged treatment. Simply put, it is the right to the be treated equally without discrimination, to which everyone is entitled' (1996a: 117; my emphasis).

This principle can be applied to the ongoing promotion of Welsh on the basis of the still significant number of Welsh speakers in Wales. Ostensibly, this can also be applied to English speakers on the same grounds. However, a crucial caveat needs to be added here -- particularly in light of the attitudes expressed by some monolingual English speakers in the previous chapter. The formal promotion of Welsh, as a minority language, does not *preclude* the ongoing use of English, given its majority status. What is being promoted in Wales is not monolingualism in Welsh -- indeed, this is neither politically or practically sustainable -- but Welsh/English *bilingualism*. As such, the claims of language discrimination by English speakers are both misplaced and inapplicable. The English language is not being precluded form the public realm, nor proscribed at the individual level.[2] Far from it, since English continues presently to dominate in Wales. Rather, monolingual speakers of English are being asked to *accommodate* to the ongoing presence of Welsh in Wales and to recognise its status as a national language -- a process which I described in Chapter 5 as 'mutual accommodation'. The assertion of many English speakers to continue to speak *only* English is thus contrary to this principle, not an example of it, since this would inevitably lead to the further erosion of a minority language like Welsh.

The third principle arises directly from the previous one -- how to determine exactly what is 'appropriate and reasonable' with regard to individual language preferences. Here, the distinction between national minority and polyethnic rights (see Chapter 3) becomes crucial. I have argued that only national minorities -- as historical ethnies -- can demand *as of right* formal inclusion of their languages and cultures in the civic realm. However, this need not and should not preclude other ethnic minorities from being allowed *at the very least* to cultivate and pursue unhindered their own historic cultural and linguistic practices in the private domain. In relation to language, this has been articulated by Kloss (1977) as the distinction between promotion-oriented and tolerance-oriented rights. In relation to Churchill's (1986) typology of minority language policy approaches, it is illustrated by the distinction between the maintenance of languages for private use (Stage 5) versus the institutional recognition of languages (Stage 6).

Thus, while continuing to recognise the rights attributable to other minorities, this distinction allows us to avoid the problem of cultural relativism. In short, greater ethnolinguistic *democracy* is not necessarily the same as ethnolinguistic *equality*. It also addresses the question, to which

I have alluded on a number of occasions, of the role of multiculturalism. In this respect, a common argument has been that bicultural/bilingual policies privilege one particular minority group over others and are therefore both disadvantageous and discriminatory towards the latter. In this view, differential treatment of minorities is illiberal -- either all minority groups should be so recognised, or none should be. The current debate on the potential racism of Welsh language policy (see Chapter 8) is an example of this position.

However, this argument can be challenged on a number of grounds. First, as with much discussion of minority rights, no distinction is made here between the differing rights attributable to national and ethnic minorities. National minority rights are thus treated as merely equivalent to the rights of all other competing groups. What is being advocated, in effect, is the applicability of *polyethnic* rights (and only these) to *all* minorities. In the process, and this is my second point, the demands of multiculturalism come to be articulated as an *alternative* to national minority rights -- i.e., as a means of *avoiding* biculturalism/bilingualism. This suggests, in turn, the distinct possibility that the articulation of multiculturalism along these lines is not seriously countenanced by at least some of its proponents. Remembering Bhabha's distinction above, the rhetoric of cultural and linguistic *diversity* is used as a spoiling device against the articulation of cultural and linguistic *difference*. Support for multiculturalism may thus arise less out of a valuing of diversity, and/or a concern for the interests of minority groups, than from a fear of the possible fulfilment of bicultural and bilingual aspirations (May, 1997). Pierre Coulombe makes this point, albeit somewhat more forcefully, in relation to Canada's official French/English bilingualism:

> Those who object to bilingualism often do so because they fear differences and are unable to reconcile themselves with the loss of their hegemony over society. Needless to say, it is an attitude that is not receptive to multiculturalism and the maintaining of differences. There is no way that the cultural imperialists who wrap themselves in the language of moral outrage in denouncing bilingualism will open their arms to multiculturalism.... They will, in other words, profess their tolerance towards a diversity of languages and cultures, so long as that diversity is consigned to the private sphere. Ethnic minorities ought to be cautious when they too oppose official bilingualism, for they may be unwillingly supporting an attitude that will turn against them. (1995: 104)

As such, we should treat the competing claims of multiculturalism with considerable scepticism. But having said that, it is unwise to dismiss multicultural claims out of hand, as Coulombe comes close to doing. Multiculturalism may still have and important, perhaps essential part to play as

an *addition* or *complement* to bicultural/bilingual policy. There is in Wales, for example, some danger that the Welsh/English dialectic is being emphasised to the exclusion of other ethnic and linguistic minority groups in Wales. This is a cause for concern and needs to be addressed in an ongoing manner with regard to Welsh language and education initiatives. The development of formal bilingualism in Wales *must* remain sensitive to, and accommodating of other ethnic minority groups and the languages they speak.

Likewise, there is a continuing necessity to guard against essentialism and reification in the articulation of Welsh cultural and language rights -- features which are still clearly apparent from the empirical data examined in the preceding chapter. Multiculturalism may thus usefully ensure against the objectification of ethnicity and the hardening of ethnic and national boundaries, while contributing at the same time to ongoing debates about a more open, evolving conception of what it means to be Welsh. As Fiona Bowie asserts, 'new definitions of Welshness which can embrace all those who consider themselves to be Welsh [are essential] if any sense of a wider national identity is to be sustained' (1993: 193). Bourdieu argues, more broadly, that one needs here 'to keep together what go together in reality: on the one hand the objective classifications ... and, on the other hand, the practical relation to those classifications, whether acted out or represented, and in particular the individual and collective strategies ... by which agents seek to put these classifications at the service of their material or symbolic interests, or to conserve or transform them' (1991: 227).

And this brings me to my final point. It has been my argument throughout that in order to reimagine the nation-state along more plural and inclusive lines we must first (and somewhat counter-intuitively) acknowledge the cultural-historical dimensions of the ethnic and national identities which comprise it. As Stuart Hall argues, a *positive* conception of ethnicity must begin with 'a recognition that all speak from a particular place, out of a particular history, out of a particular experience, a particular culture, *without being contained by that position*' (1992b: 258; my emphasis). Moreover, if a particular language has played an important part in that historical positioning (and it may well not have), there is no reason why it cannot continue to do so.

However, Hall's qualification points to the second key aspect of my argument -- that the recognition of our cultural and historical *situatedness* should not set the *limits* of ethnicity and nationality, nor act to undermine the legitimacy of other, equally valid forms of identity. This requires a reflective, critical approach to ethnic and national identity -- one that engages with the present *and* the future as well as the past, and one that remains open to competing conceptualisations, diverse identities, and a rich public discourse about controversial issues (Calhoun, 1993b). As Peter McLaren observes, echoing Renan's conception of the 'will to nationhood' (see Chapter 2): 'rather than searching for the origins of our identities as historical agents of struggle, we need to focus more on what we can achieve together. What we might become takes precedence over who we are' (1995: 109). Likewise, Terry Eagleton asserts: 'Any emancipatory politics must begin with the specific ... but must in the same gesture leave it behind. For the freedom to question is not the freedom to be "Irish" or "to be a woman", whatever this might mean, but simply the freedom now enjoyed by certain other groups *to determine their identity as they wish*' (1990: 30; my emphasis).

Such a position recognises the ongoing interspersion of groups, the complex interconnections between ethnic and national identities and other forms of identity, and the ambiguities, tensions, and competing demands that inevitably arise as a result. But even more importantly, it recognises that these can be outworked from *within* rather than determined from *without*. Or, to put it another way, they can be negotiated on one's own terms, rather than the terms set by others as has so often been the case historically for minority groups. The Welsh, along with many other national and ethnic minorities in the modern world, are increasingly settling for nothing less.

Notes -- Chapter 9

1. As I discussed in Chapter 1, there are examples of nation-states where ethnicity is overtly and formally employed as a basis of differentiation -- Nazi Germany, Apartheid South Africa, the former Yugoslavia, Malaysia and Fiji, to name but a few. However, these cannot be regarded as *democratic* states.

2. This stands in contrast to some examples of minority language policy where discrimination against other language speakers can be said to occur. In Latvia and Estonia, for example, the long proscription of their indigenous languages and cultures under Soviet Rule has been replaced by a similar discriminatory policy in their favour. The significant Russian speaking population in these areas are now denied citizenship rights unless they can demonstrate a conversational ability in Latvian or Estonian (see de Varennes, 1996a). This policy clearly runs counter to the principle in international law which sanctions the recognition and use of a minority language where numbers warrant (cf. Chapter 5).

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Aaron, J., Rees, T., Betts, S., Vincentelli, M. (eds.) (1994). *Our Sisters' Land: the changing identities of women in Wales*. Cardiff: University of Wales Press.

Acton, J. (1907). Nationality. In J. Figgis, & R. Lawrence (eds.), *The History of Freedom* (pp. 270-300). London: Macmillan (original, 1862).

Adams, K., & Brink, D. (eds) (1990). *Perspectives on Official English: the campaign for English as the official language of the USA*. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter.

Adamson, D. (1991). *Class, Ideology and Nation: a theory of Welsh nationalism*. Cardiff: University of Wales Press.

Adonis, A. (1997). Hear the new voice from the valleys. *The Observer*, 24 August, 1997: 23.

Aitchison, J., & Carter, H. (1994). *A Geography of the Welsh Language 1961-1991*. Cardiff: University of Wales Press.

Ajzen, I. (1988). *Attitudes, Personality and Behaviour*. Milton Keynes: Open University.

Alba, R. (1990). *Ethnic Identity: the transformation of White America*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Alexandre, P. (1972). *Languages and language in Black Africa*. Evanston: Northwestern University Press.

Alter, P. (1989). *Nationalism*. London: Edward Arnold.

Amastae, J. (1990). Official English and the learning of English. In K. Adams, & D. Brink (eds.), *Perspectives on Official English: the campaign for English as an official language of the USA* (pp. 199-208). Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter.

Anderson, B. (1991). *Imagined Communities: reflections on the origin and spread of nationalism* (rev. ed.). London: Verso.

Anthias, F. (1992). Connecting 'race' and ethnic phenomena. *Sociology* 26, 421-438.

Anthias, F., & Yuval-Davis, N. (1992). *Racialized Boundaries: race, nation, gender, colour and class and the anti-racist struggle*. London: Routledge.

Appel, R. & Muysken, P. (1987). *Language Contact and Bilingualism*. London: Edward Arnold.

Armstrong, J. (1982). *Nations Before Nationalism*. Chapel Hill: University of North California Press.

Au, S. (1988). A critical appraisal of Gardner's social psychological theory of second language (L2) learning. *Language Learning* 38, 75-100.

Awbery, G. (1987). The position of the Welsh language in Wales. In G. Mac Eoin, A. Ahlqvist, & D. ÓhAodha (eds.), *Third International Conference on Minority Languages: Celtic papers* (pp. 1-12). Clevedon: Multilingual Matters.

Babbie, E. (1989). *The Practice of Social Research* (5th ed.). Belmont, Ca.: Wadsworth.

Bactens Beardsmore, H. (1980). Bilingualism in Belgium. *Journal of Multilingual and Multicultural Development* 1, 145-154.

Baker, C. (1985). *Aspects of Bilingualism in Wales*. Clevedon: Multilingual Matters.

Baker, C. (1990). The growth of bilingual education in the secondary schools of Wales. In W.G. Evans (ed.), *Perspectives on a Century of Secondary Education in Wales* (pp. 77-96). Aberystwyth: Centre for Educational Studies.

Baker, C. (1992). *Attitudes and Language*. Clevedon: Multilingual Matters.

Baker, C. (1996). *Foundations of Bilingual Education and Bilingualism* (2nd ed.). Clevedon: Multilingual Matters.

Baker, K., & de Kanter, A. (1981). *Effectiveness of Bilingual Education: a review of the literature*. Washington DC: US Department of Education.

Baker, K., & de Kanter, A. (eds.) (1983). *Bilingual Education: a reappraisal of federal policy*. Lexington, Ma.: Lexington Books.

Bakhtin, M. (1981). *The Dialogic Imagination: four essays*. C. Emerson & M. Holquist (trans.). M. Holquist (ed.). Austin, Tex: University of Texas Press.

Balibar, E. (1991). The nation form: history and ideology. In E. Balibar, & I. Wallerstein (eds.), *Race, Nation, Class: ambiguous identities* (pp. 86-106). London: Verso.

Ball, S. (1990). *Politics and Policy Making in Education*. London: Routledge.

Ball, S. (1993). Education, Majorism and the 'curriculum of the dead'. *Curriculum Studies* 1, 195-214.

Balsom, D. (1985). The three-Wales model. In J. Osmond (ed.), *The National Question Again: Welsh political identity in the 1980s* (pp. 1-17). Llandysul, Dyfed: Gomer Press.

Balsom, D., Madgwick, P., & Van Mechelen, D. (1982). *The Political Consequences of Welsh Identity*. Glasgow: Centre for the Study of Public Policy, University of Strathclyde.

Banton, M. (1977). Rational choice: a theory of race and ethnic relations. *Working Papers on Ethnic Relations* No.8. SSRC Research Unit on Race Relations.

Banton, M. (1980). Ethnic groups and the theory of rational choice. In *Sociological Theories: race and colonialism* (pp. 475-483). Paris: UNESCO.

Banton, M. (1983). *Racial and Ethnic Competition*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Banton, M. (1987). *Racial Theories*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Barker, M. (1981). *The New Racism: conservatives and the ideology of the tribe*. London: Junction.

Barnard, F. (1965). *Herder's Social and Political Thought: from enlightenment to nationalism*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Baron, D. (1990). *The English-Only Question: an official language for America?* New Haven: Yale University Press.

Barth, F. (1969). *Ethnic Groups and Boundaries: the social organization of culture difference*. Boston: Little, Brown & Co.

Barth, F. (1989). The analysis of culture in complex societies. *Ethnos* 54, 120-142.

Bartlett, R. (1993). *The Making of Europe*. Harmondsworth: Penguin.

Bauman, Z. (1973). *Culture as Praxis*. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.

Bentahila, A., & Davies, E. (1993). Language revival: restoration or transformation? *Journal of Multilingual and Multicultural Development* 14, 355-374.

Bentley, G. (1987). Ethnicity and practice. *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 29, 24-55.

Best, G. (1982). *Honour Among Men and Nations: transformations of an idea*. Toronto: Toronto University Press.

Best, G. (ed.) (1988). *The Permanent Revolution: the French Revolution and its legacy*. Chicago: Chicago University Press.

Betts, S. (ed.) (1996). *Our Daughters' Land*. Cardiff: University of Wales Press.

Bhabha, H. (1994). *The Location of Culture*. London: Routledge.

Bikales, G. (1986). Comment: the other side. *International Journal of the Sociology of Language* 60, 77-85.

Billig, M. (1995). *Banal Nationalism*. London: Sage.

Birch, A. (1989). *Nationalism and National Integration*. London: Unwin Hyman.

Bloom, A. (1987). *The Closing of the American Mind: how higher education has failed democracy and impoverished the souls of today's students*. New York: Simon & Schuster.

Bollom, C. (1978). Attitudes towards second homes in Wales. In Glyn Williams (ed.), *Social and Cultural Change in Contemporary Wales* (pp. 49-60). London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.

Borland, J., Fevre, R., & Denney, D. (1992). Nationalism and community in north west Wales. *The Sociological Review* 40, 49-72.

Bourdieu, P. (1977). The economy of linguistic exchanges. *Social Science Information* 16, 645-668.

Bourdieu, P. (1982). *Ce que parler veut dire: l'économie des échanges linguistiques*. Paris: Arthème Fayard.

Bourdieu, P. (1984). *Distinction: a social critique of the judgement of taste*. Cambridge, Ma.: Harvard University Press.

Bourdieu, P. (1990a). *In Other Words: essays towards a reflexive sociology*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Bourdieu, P. (1990b). *The Logic of Practice*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Bourdieu, P. (1991). *Language and Symbolic Power*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Bourdieu, P. & Boltanski, L. (1975). Le fétichisme de la langue. *Actes de la Recherche en Sciences Sociales* 4, 2-23.

Bourdieu, P., & Passeron, J. (1990). *Reproduction in Education, Society and Culture* (2nd ed.). London: Sage Publications.

Bourdieu, P., & Wacquant, L. (1992). *An Invitation to Reflexive Sociology*. Chicago: Chicago University Press.

Bourhis, R. (ed.) (1984). *Conflict and Language Planning in Quebec*. Clevedon: Multilingual Matters.

Bourne, J. (1989). *Moving into the Mainstream*. Windsor: NFER Nelson.

Bowen, E. (1959). Le pays de galles. *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers* 26, 1-23.

Bowen, E., & Carter, H. (1974). Preliminary observations of the Welsh language at the 1971 census. *Geographical Journal* 140, 432-440.

Bowie, F. (1993). Wales from within: conflicting interpretations of Welsh identity. In S. Macdonald (ed.), *Inside European Identities: ethnography in Western Europe* (pp. 167-193). Oxford: Berg Publishers.

Bowman, G. (1994). Xenophobia, fantasy and the nation: the logic of ethnic violence in the former Yugoslavia. In V. Goddard, J. Llobera, & C. Shore (eds.), *The Anthropology of Europe* (pp. 143-171). Oxford: Berg.

Brah, A. (1992). Difference, diversity and differentiation. In J. Donald, & A. Rattansi (eds.), *'Race', Culture and Difference* (pp. 126-145). London: Sage.

Brasil. (1996). *Constituição da República Federativa do Brasil (CF/88)*. São Paulo: Editora Revista dos Tribunais.

Brass, P. (ed.) (1985). *Ethnic Groups and the State*. London: Croom Helm.

Brenzinger, M. (1997). Language contact and language displacement. In F. Coulmas (ed.), *The Handbook of Sociolinguistics* (pp. 273-284). Oxford: Blackwell.

Breuilly, J. (1993). *Nationalism and the State* (2nd ed.). Manchester: Manchester University Press.

Bryman, A., & Cramer, D. (1997). *Quantitative Data Analysis with SPSS for Windows*. London: Routledge.

Bullivant, B. (1981). *The Pluralist Dilemma in Education: six case studies*. Sydney: Allen & Unwin.

Bulpitt, J. (1983). *Territory and Power in the United Kingdom: an interpretation*. Manchester: Manchester University Press.

Burtonwood, N. (1986). *The Culture Concept in Educational Studies*. Windsor: NFER-Nelson.

Burtonwood, N. (1996). Culture, identity and the curriculum. *Educational Review* 48, 227-235.

Butt Philip, A. (1975). *The Welsh Question: nationalism in Welsh politics, 1945-1970*. Cardiff: University of Wales Press.

Byram, M. (1986). Schools and ethnolinguistic minorities. *Journal of Multilingual and Multicultural Development* 7, 97-106.

Calhoun, C. (1993a). Nationalism and ethnicity. *Annual Review of Sociology* 19, 211-239.

Calhoun, C. (1993b). Nationalism and civil society: democracy, diversity and self-determination. *International Sociology* 8, 387-411.

Calhoun, C., LiPuma, E., & Postone, M. (eds.) (1993). *Bourdieu: critical perspectives*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Calvet, L-J. (1974). *Linguistique et Colonialisme: petite traité de glottophagie*. Paris: Payot.

Cannadine, D. (1983). The context, performance and meaning of ritual: the British monarchy and the 'invention of tradition' c. 1820-1977. In E. Hobsbawm, & T. Ranger (eds.), *The Invention of Tradition* (pp.101-164). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Capotorti, F. (1979). *Study on the Rights of Persons Belonging to Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities.* New York: United Nations.

Chapman, M., McDonald, M., & Tonkin, E. (1989). Introduction: history and social anthropology. In E. Tonkin, M. McDonald, & M. Chapman (eds.), *History and Ethnicity* (pp. 1-21). London: Routledge.

Chevannes, F., & Reeves, M. (1987). The black voluntary school movement: definition, context and prospects. In B. Troyna (ed.), *Racial Inequality in Education* (pp. 147-169). London: Tavistock.

Chomsky, N. (1987). *On Power and Ideology: the Managua lectures.* Boston: South End Press.

Churchill, S. (1986). *The Education of Linguistic and Cultural Minorities in the OECD Countries.* Clevedon: Multilingual Matters.

Churchill, S. (1996). The decline of the nation-state and the education of national minorities. *International Review of Education* 42, 265-290.

CLAR (Committee on Irish Language Attitudes Research). (1975). *Report.* Dublin: Stationery Office.

Claude, I. (1955). *National Minorities: an international problem.* Cambridge, Ma.: Harvard University Press.

Clyne, M. (1990). *Community Languages: the Australian experience.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Clyne, M. (1997). Multilingualism. In F. Coulmas (ed.), *The Handbook of Sociolinguistics* (pp. 301-314). London: Blackwell.

Clyne, M. (1998). Managing language diversity and second language programs in Australia. *Current Issues in Language and Society* (forthcoming).

Cohen, A. (1974). *Two-dimensional Man.* London: Tavistock.

Colley, L. (1992). *Britons: forging the nation 1707-1837.* London: Pimlico.

Combs, M. (1992). English Plus: responding to English Only. In J. Crawford (ed.), *Language Loyalties: a source book on the Official English controversy* (pp. 216-224). Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Conklin, N., & Lourie, M. (1983). *Host of Tongues: language communities in the United States.* New York: Free Press.

Connor, W. (1978). A nation is a nation, is a state, is an ethnic group, is a ... *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 1, 377-400.

Connor, W. (1991). From tribe to nation? *History of European Ideas* 13, 5-18.

Connor, W. (1993). Beyond reason: the nature of the ethnonational bond. *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 16, 374-389.

Cornell, S. (1988). *The Return of the Native: American Indian political resurgence.* New York: Oxford University Press.

Corson, D. (1993). *Language, Minority Education and Gender: linking social justice and power.* Clevedon: Multilingual Matters.

Coulombe, P. (1995). *Language Rights in French Canada.* New York: Peter Lang.

Coulmas, F. (1992). *Language and Society*. Oxford: Blackwell.

Coupland, N. (ed.) (1990). *English in Wales: diversity, conflict and change*. Clevedon: Multilingual Matters.

Crawford, J. (1989). *Bilingual Education: history, politics, theory and practice*. Trenton, NJ.: Crane Publishing Co.

Crawford, J. (1992a). *Hold your Tongue: bilingualism and the politics of 'English Only'*. Reading Ma.: Addison-Wesley.

Crawford, J. (ed.) (1992b). *Language Loyalties: a source book on the Official English controversy*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Crawford, J. (1992c). What's behind Official English? In J. Crawford (ed.), *Language Loyalties: a source book on the Official English controversy* (pp. 171-177). Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Crawford, J. (1994). Endangered Native American languages: what is to be done and why? *Journal of Navajo Education* 11 (3), 3-11.

Crick, B. (1989). An Englishman considers his passport. In N. Evans (ed.), *National Identity in the British Isles* (pp. 23-34). Harlech: Coleg Harlech.

Crick, B. (ed.) (1991). *National Identities and the Constitution*. Oxford: Blackwell.

Crick, B. (1995). The sense of identity of the indigenous British. *New Community* 21, 167-182.

Crystal, D. (1997a). *English as a Global Language*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Crystal, D. (1997b). *The Cambridge Encyclopedia of Language* (2nd ed.). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Cummins, J. (1986). Empowering minority students: a framework for intervention. *Harvard Educational Review* 56, 18-36.

Cummins, J. (1995). The discourse of disinformation: the debate on bilingual education and language rights in the United States. In T. Skutnabb-Kangas, & R. Phillipson (eds.), *Linguistic Human Rights: overcoming linguistic discrimination* (pp. 159-177). Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter.

Cummins, J., & Swain, M. (1986). *Bilingualism in Education*. Harlow: Longman.

Curriculum Council for Wales (1993). *Advisory Paper 18: developing a Curriculum Cymreig*. Cardiff: Curriculum Council for Wales.

Curriculum Council for Wales (1994). *Teacher Support Programme: developing a whole-school approach to a Curriculum Cymreig*. Cardiff: Curriculum Council for Wales.

Cymdeithas yr Iaith Gymraeg (1992). *The Property Act Handbook*. Aberystwyth: Cymdeithas yr Iaith Gymraeg.

Daniels, R. (1991). *Coming to America: a history of immigration and ethnicity in American life*. New York: Harper Perennial.

Daugherty, R. (1993). Why policies must be made in Wales. *The Times Educational Supplement*, 22 October, 1993: 18.

Davies, A. (1996). Ironising the myth of linguicism. *Journal of Multilingual and Multicultural Development* 17, 485-496.

Davies, C. (1973). Cymdeithas yr Iaith Gymraeg. In M. Stephens (ed.), *The Welsh Language Today* (pp. 248-263). Llandysul, Dyfed: Gomer Press.

Davies, Charlotte. (1989). *Welsh Nationalism in the Twentieth Century: the ethnic option and the modern state*. London: Praeger.

Davies, Charlotte. (1990). Language and national identity. In R. Jenkins, & A. Edwards (eds.), *One Step Forward? South and east Wales towards the year 2000* (pp. 36-45). Llandysul, Dyfed: Gomer Press.

Davies, Christie. (1997). Minority language and social division: linguistic dead-ends, linguistic time bombs and the policies of subversion. In G. Frost (ed.) *Loyalty Misplaced: misdirected virtue and social disintegration* (pp. 39-47). London: The Social Affairs Unit.

Day, G. (1989). 'A million on the move'? Population change and rural Wales. *Contemporary Wales* 3, 137-159.

Day, R. (1985). The ultimate inequality: linguistic genocide. In N. Wolfson, & J. Manes (eds.), *Language of Inequality* (pp. 163-181). Berlin: Mouton.

de Tocqueville, A. (1956). *Democracy in America*. New York: New American Library (original, 1835).

Denison, N. (1977). Language death or language suicide? In W. Dressler, & R. Wodak-Leodolter (eds.), Language death. *International Journal of the Sociology of Language* 12, 13-22.

Dench, G. (1986). *Minorities in the Open Society: prisoners of ambivalence*. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.

Denney, D. (1991). The social construction of nationalism: racism and conflict in Wales. *Contemporary Wales* 4, 149-165.

DES (Department of Education and Science). (1985). *Education For All: report of the committee of inquiry into the education of children from ethnic minority groups* (The Swann Report). London: HMSO.

Deutsch, K. (1966). *Nationalism and Social Communication: an inquiry into the foundations of nationality*. Cambridge, Ma.: MIT Press.

Deutsch, K. (1975). The political significance of linguistic conflicts. In J-G. Savard, & R. Vigneault (eds.), *Les états multilingues: problèmes et solutions* (pp. 7-28). Laval, Québec: Les Presses de L'université Laval.

de Varennes, F. (1996a). *Language, Minorities and Human Rights*. The Hague: Kluwer Law.

de Varennes, F. (1996b). Minority aspirations and the revival of indigenous peoples. *International Review of Education* 42, 309-325.

Dicker, S. (1996). *Languages in America*. Clevedon: Multilingual Matters.

Di Maggio, P. (1979). Review essay on Pierre Bourdieu. *American Journal of Sociology* 84, 1460-1474.

Donahue, T. (1985). 'U.S. English': its life and works. *Journal of the Sociology of Language* 56, 99-112.

Donald, J., & Rattansi, A. (eds.) (1992). *'Race', Culture and Difference*. London: Sage.

Dorian, N. (1981). *Language Death*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press

Dorian, N. (1982). Language loss and maintenance in language contact situations. In R. Lambert, & B. Freed (eds.), *The Loss of Language Skills* (pp. 44-59). Rowley, Ma.: Newbury House.

D'Souza, D. (1991). *Illiberal Education: the politics of race and sex on campus*. New York: Free Press.

Dworkin, R. (1978). Liberalism. In S. Hampshire (ed.), *Public and Private Morality* (pp. 113-143). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Dwyer, T. (1980). *Eamon de Valera*. Dublin: Gill & Macmillan.

Eagleton, T. (1990). *Nationalism, Colonialism and Literature*. Minneapolis, Mn.: University of Minnesota Press.

Eastman, C. (1984). Language, ethnic identity and change. In J. Edwards (ed.), *Linguistic Minorities, Policies and Pluralism* (pp. 259-276). London: Academic Press.

Eastman, C. (1991). The political and sociolinguistic status of language planning in Africa. In D. Marshall (ed.), *Language Planning: focusschrift in honour of Joshua A. Fishman* (pp. 131-151). Amsterdam: John Benjamins.

Edwards, D. (1993). Education and Welsh language planning. *Language, Culture and Curriculum* 6, 257-273.

Edwards, J. (1984). Language, diversity and identity. In J. Edwards (ed.), *Linguistic Minorities, Policies and Pluralism* (pp. 277-310). London: Academic Press.

Edwards, J. (1985). *Language, Society and Identity*. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

Edwards, J. (1994). *Multilingualism*. London: Routledge.

Edwards, V. (1991). The Welsh speech community. In S. Alladina, & V. Edwards (eds.), *Multilingualism in the British Isles*. Vol. 1. (pp. 107-125). London: Longman.

Eller, J. & Coughlan, R. (1993). The poverty of primordialism: the demystification of ethnic attachments. *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 16, 183-201.

Enloe, C. (1973). *Ethnic Conflict and Political Development*. Boston: Little, Brown & Co.

Eriksen, T. (1992). *Us and Them in Modern Societies: ethnicity and nationalism in Trinidad, Mauritius and beyond*. Oslo: Scandinavian University Press.

Eriksen, T. (1993). *Ethnicity and Nationalism: anthropological perspectives*. London: Pluto Press.

Evans, E. (1978). Welsh (Cymraeg). In C. James (ed.), *The Older Mother Tongues of the United Kingdom* (pp. 5-35). London: Centre for Information on Language Teaching and Research.

Evans, N. (1989a). Introduction: identity and Integration in the British Isles. In N. Evans (ed.), *National Identity in the British Isles* (pp.6-22). Harlech, Gwynedd: Coleg Harlech.

Evans, N. (1989b). Gogs, cardis and hwntws: regions, nation and state in Wales, 1840-1940. In N. Evans (ed.), *National Identity in the British Isles* (pp.60-72). Harlech, Gwynedd: Coleg Harlech.

Evans, W. (1997). 'Why try to resuscitate it'? A Victorian questionnaire on the Welsh language. *Planet* 125, 84-89.

Fardon, R. (1987). African ethnogenesis: limits to the comparability of ethnic phenomena. In L. Holy (ed.), *Comparative Anthropology* (pp. 168-188). Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

Featherstone, M. (1991). *Consumer Culture and Postmodernism*. London: Sage.

Featherstone, M. (1995). *Undoing Culture: globalization, postmodernism and identity*. London: Sage.

Feinberg, R. (1990). Bilingual education in the United States: a summary of Lau compliance requirements. *Language, Culture and Curriculum* 3, 141-152.

Fenton, S. (1998). *Ethnicity*. London: Macmillan.

Fenton, S., & May, S. (eds.) (1998). *The Shaping of Ethnonational Identities: ethnicity and nation in comparative perspective*. London: Macmillan.

Ferdman, B. (1990). Literacy and cultural identity. *Harvard Educational Review* 60, 181-204.

Fichte, J. (1968). *Addresses to the German Nation.* New York: Harper & Row (original, 1807).

Fielding, N. (1993). Qualitative interviewing. In N. Gilbert (ed.), *Researching Social Life* (pp. 135-153). London: Sage.

Figueroa, P. (1991). *Education and the Social Construction of 'Race'*. London: Routledge.

Fishman, J. (1989a). Language and ethnicity. In J. Fishman, *Language and Ethnicity in Minority Sociolinguistic Perspective* (pp. 23-65). Clevedon: Multilingual Matters.

Fishman, J. (1989b). Language and nationalism: two integrative essays. Part 1. The nature of nationalism. In J. Fishman, *Language and Ethnicity in Minority Sociolinguistic Perspective* (pp. 97-175). Clevedon: Multilingual Matters.

Fishman, J. (1989c). Language and nationalism: two integrative essays. Part 2. The impact of nationalism on language planning. In J. Fishman, *Language and Ethnicity in Minority Sociolinguistic Perspective* (pp. 269-367). Clevedon: Multilingual Matters.

Fishman, J. (1989d). Whorfianism of the third kind: ethnolinguistic diversity as a worldwide societal asset. In J. Fishman, *Language and Ethnicity in Minority Sociolinguistic Perspective* (pp. 564-579). Clevedon: Multilingual Matters.

Fishman, J. (1989e). Language, ethnicity and racism. In J. Fishman, *Language and Ethnicity in Minority Sociolinguistic Perspective* (pp. 9-22). Clevedon: Multilingual Matters.

Fishman, J. (1991). *Reversing Language Shift: theoretical and empirical foundations of assistance to threatened languages.* Clevedon: Multilingual Matters.

Fishman, J. (1992). The displaced anxieties of Anglo-Americans. In J. Crawford (ed.), *Language Loyalties: a source book on the Official English controversy* (pp. 165-170). Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Fishman, J. (1995). On the limits of ethnolinguistic democracy. In T. Skutnabb-Kangas, & R. Phillipson (eds.), *Linguistic Human Rights: overcoming linguistic discrimination* (pp. 49-61). Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter.

Fishman, J. (1997). Language and ethnicity: the view from within. In F. Coulmas (ed.), *The Handbook of Sociolinguistics* (pp. 327-343). London: Blackwell.

Fishman, J., & Solano, F. (1989). Cross polity perspective on the importance of linguistic heterogeneity as a 'contributing factor' in civil strife. In J. Fishman, *Language and Ethnicity in Minority Sociolinguistic Perspective* (pp. 605-626). Clevedon: Multilingual Matters.

Flaitz, J. (1988). *The Ideology of English: French perceptions f English as a world language.* Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter.

Flude, M., & Hammer, M. (eds.). (1990). *The Education Reform Act, 1988: its origins and implications.* London: Falmer Press.

Forbes, H. (1993). Canada: from bilingualism to multiculturalism. In L. Diamond, & M. Plattner (eds.), *Nationalism, Ethnic Conflict and Democracy* (pp. 86-101). Baltimore, Ma.: John Hopkins Press.

Freedland, J. (1997). A kinder, more gentle nationalism for Wales. *The Guardian*, 8 September, 1997: 7.

Frost, G. (ed.) (1997). *Loyalty Misplaced: misdirected virtue and social disintegration.* London: The Social Affairs Unit.

Fuchs, E., & Havighurst, R. (1972). *To Live on this Earth: American Indian education.* Garden City, NJ.: Anchor Books.

Furnivall, J. (1948). *Colonial Policy and Practice: a comparative study of Burma and Netherlands India*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Gans, H. (1979). Symbolic ethnicity: the future of ethnic groups and cultures in America. *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 2, 1-20.

Gardner, R. (1985). *Social Psychology and Second Language Learning*. London: Edward Arnold.

Gardner, R., & Lambert, W. (1972). *Attitudes and Motivation in Second-Language Learning*. Rowley, Ma.: Newbury House.

Geertz, C. (1963). The integrative revolution: primordial sentiments and civil politics in new states. In C. Geertz (ed.), *Old Societies and New States: the quest for modernity in Asia and Africa* (pp. 105-157). New York: Free Press.

Geertz, C. (1973). *The Interpretation of Cultures*. New York: Basic Books.

Gellner, E. (1964). *Thought and Change*. London: Weidenfeld & Nicholson.

Gellner, E. (1983). *Nations and Nationalism: new perspectives on the past*. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

Gellner, E. (1987). *Culture, Identity and Politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Gellner, E. (1993). Nationalism. In W. Outhwaite, & T. Bottomore (eds.), *Blackwell Dictionary of Twentieth-Century Social Thought* (pp. 409-411). Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

Genesee, F. (1987). *Learning through Two Languages: studies of Immersion and bilingual education*. Cambridge, Ma.: Newbury House.

Gibson, M., & Ogbu, J. (eds.) (1991). *Minority Status and Schooling: a comparative study of immigrant and involuntary minorities*. New York: Garland Publishing.

Giddens, A. (1984). *The Nation State and Violence*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Gilbert, R. (1987). The concept of social practice and modes of ideology critique in schools. *Discourse* 7, 37-54.

Giles, H., Bourhis, R., & Taylor, D. (1977). Towards a theory of language in ethnic group relations. In H. Giles (ed.), *Language, Ethnicity and Intergroup Relations* (pp. 307-348). London: Academic Press.

Giles, H., & Taylor, D. (1978). National identity in south Wales: some preliminary data. In Glyn Williams (ed.), *Social and Cultural Change in Contemporary Wales* (pp. 133-142). London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.

Gillborn, D. (1995). *Racism and Antiracism in Real Schools*. Buckingham: Open University Press.

Gilroy, P. (1987). *There Ain't No Black in the Union Jack*. London: Hutchinson.

Gilroy, P. (1990). One nation under a groove: the cultural politics of 'race' and racism in Britain. In D. Goldberg (ed.), *Anatomy of Racism* (pp. 263-282). Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Gilroy, P. (1993) *Small Acts: thoughts on the politics of black cultures*. London: Serpent's Tail.

Glazer, N. (1975). *Affirmative Discrimination: ethnic inequality and public policy*. New York: Basic Books.

Glazer, N. (1983). *Ethnic Dilemmas: 1964-1982*. Cambridge, Ma.: Harvard University Press.

Glazer, N., & Moynihan, D. (1975). *Ethnicity: theory and experience*. Cambridge, Ma.: Harvard University Press.

Gleason, P. (1984). Pluralism and assimilation: a conceptual history. In J. Edwards (ed.), *Linguistic Minorities, Policies and Pluralism* (pp. 221-257). London: Academic Press.

Glenny, M. (1993). *The Fall of Yugoslavia: the third Balkan war* (rev. ed.). London: Penguin.

Goldberg, D. (1993). *Racist Culture: philosophy and the politics of meaning*. Cambridge, Ma.: Blackwell.

Goldberg, D. (1994). *Multiculturalism: a critical reader*. Cambridge, Ma.: Blackwell.

Gordon, M. (1978). *Human Nature, Class and Ethnicity*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Gordon, M. (1981). Models of pluralism: the new American dilemma. *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 454, 178-188.

Gorlach, M. (1986). Comment. *International Journal of the Sociology of Language* 60, 97-103.

Goulbourne, H. (1991a). *Ethnicity and Nationalism in Post-Imperial Britain*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Goulbourne, H. (1991b). Varieties of pluralism: the notion of a post-imperial Britain. *New Community* 17, 211-227.

Gould, S. (1981) *The Mismeasure of Man*. London: Penguin.

Graddol, D., Leith, D., & Swann, J. (eds.) (1996). *English history, diversity and change*. London: Routledge.

Gramsci, A. (1971). *Selections from the Prison Notebooks*. Q. Hoare & G. Nowell-Smith (eds.). London: Lawrence & Wishart.

Greenfeld, L. (1992). *Nationalism: five roads to modernity*. Cambridge, Ma.: Harvard University Press.

Grenoble, L., & Whaley, L. (1996). Endangered languages: current issues and future prospects. *International Journal of the Sociology of Language* 118, 209-223.

Griffith, W. (1950). *The Welsh*. Harmondsworth: Penguin.

Grin, F. (1995). Combining immigrant and autochthonous language rights: a territorial approach to multilingualism. In T. Skutnabb-Kangas, & R. Phillipson (eds.), *Linguistic Human Rights: overcoming linguistic discrimination* (pp. 31-48). Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter.

Grosjean, F. (1982). *Life with Two Languages: an introduction to bilingualism*. Cambridge, Ma.: Harvard University Press.

Guibernau, M. (1996). *Nationalisms: the nation-state and nationalism in the twentieth century*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Gurr, T. (1993). *Minorities at Risk: a global view of ethnopolitical conflicts*. Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace Press.

Hagendoorn, L. (1993). Ethnic categorization and outgroup exclusion: cultural values and social stereotypes in the construction of ethnic hierarchies. *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 16, 26-51.

Hall, J. (1993). Nationalisms: classified and explained. *Daedalus* 122, 3, 1-28.

Hall, S. (1992a). The questions of cultural identity. In S. Hall, D. Held, & T. McGrew (eds.), *Modernity and its Futures* (pp. 274-325). Cambridge: Polity Press.

Hall, S. (1992b). New ethnicities. In J. Donald & A. Rattansi (eds.), *'Race', Culture and Difference* (pp. 252-259). London: Sage.

Halle, L. (1962). *Men and Nations*. Princeton, NJ.: Princeton University Press.

Handelman, D. (1977). The organization of ethnicity. *Ethnic Groups* 1, 187-200.

Handler, R. (1988). *Nationalism and the Politics of Culture in Quebec*. Madison: Wisconsin University Press.

Hanson, A. (1989). The making of Maori: culture invention and its logic. *American Anthropologist* 91, 890-902.

Harker, R. (1984). On reproduction, habitus and education. *British Journal of Sociology of Education* 5, 117-127.

Harker, R. (1990). Bourdieu: education and reproduction. In R. Harker, C. Mahar, & C. Wilkes (eds.), *An Introduction to the Work of Pierre Bourdieu: the practice of theory* (pp. 86-108). London: Macmillan.

Harker, R., Mahar, C., & Wilkes, C. (eds.) (1990). *An Introduction to the Work of Pierre Bourdieu: the practice of theory*. London: Macmillan.

Harker, R., & May, S. (1993). Code and habitus: comparing the accounts of Bernstein and Bourdieu. *British Journal of Sociology of Education* 14, 169-178.

Harker, R., & McConnochie, K. (1985). *Education as Cultural Artifact: studies in Māori and Aboriginal education*. Palmerston North: Dunmore Press.

Harley, B. (1993). After immersion: maintaining the momentum. *Journal of Multilingual and Multicultural Development* 15, 229-244.

Harris, R. (1981). *The Language Myth*. London: Duckworth.

Harrison, G. (1997). Language and politics, interests and constituencies: the career of the Council for the Welsh Language. *Journal of Multilingual and Multicultural Development* 18, 182-192.

Harvey, D. (1989). *The Condition of Postmodernity*. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

Hastings, W. (1988). *The Right to an Education in Māori: the case from international law*. Wellington: University of Victoria Press.

Haugen, E. (1966). Dialect, language, nation. *American Anthropologist* 68, 922-935.

Heath, S. (1977). Language and politics in the United States. In M. Saville-Troike (ed.), *Linguistics and Anthropology: Georgetown University round table on language and linguistics* (pp 267-296). Washington DC: Georgetown University Press.

Heath, S. (1981). English in our language heritage. In C. Ferguson, & S. Heath (eds.), *Language in the U.S.A.* (pp. 6-20). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Hechter, M. (1975). *Internal Colonialism: the Celtic fringe in British national development, 1536-1966*. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.

Hechter, M. (1986). Rational choice theory and the study of race and ethnic relations. In J. Rex, & D. Mason (eds.), *Theories of Race and Race Relations* (pp. 264-279). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Hechter, M. (1987). *Principles of Group Solidarity*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Hechter, M., Friedman, D., & Appelbaum, M. (1982). A theory of ethnic collective action. *International Migration Review* 16, 412-434.

Heller, M. (1987). The role of language in the formation of ethnic identity. In J. Phinney, & M. Rotheram (eds.), *Children's Ethnic Socialisation: Pluralism and development* (pp. 180-200). Newbury Park, Ca.: Sage.

Herder, J. (1969). *On Social and Political Culture*. F. Barnard (ed.). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Hernández-Chávez, E. (1995). Language policy in the United States: a history of cultural genocide. In T. Skutnabb-Kangas, & R. Phillipson (eds.), *Linguistic Human Rights: overcoming linguistic discrimination* (pp. 141-158). Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter.

Herriman, M. (1996). Language policy in Australia. In M. Herriman & B. Burnaby (eds.), *Language Policies in English-Dominant Countries* (pp. 35-61). Clevedon: Multilingual Matters.

Higham, J. (1963). *Strangers in the Land: patterns of American nativism, 1860-1925*. New York: Atheneum.

Hill, J. (1978). Language death, language contact, and language evolution. In W. McCormack, & S. Wurm (eds.), *Approaches to Language: anthropological issues* (pp. 45-78). The Hague: Mouton.

Hindley R. (1990) *The Death of the Irish Language: a qualified obituary*. London: Routledge.

Hirsch, E. (1987). *Cultural Literacy: what every American needs to know*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin.

Hobhouse, L. (1928). *Social Evolution and Political Theory*. New York: Columbia University Press.

Hobsbawm, E. (1990). *Nations and Nationalism since 1780*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Hobsbawm, E. (1992). Ethnicity and nationalism in Europe today. *Anthropology Today* 8, 3-8.

Hobsbawm, E., & Ranger, T. (eds.) (1983). *The Invention of Tradition*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Hoffman, E. (1989). *Lost in Translation: a life in a new language*. New York: E.P. Dutton.

Honeyford, R. (1988). *Integration or Disintegration?: towards a non-racist society*. London: The Claridge Press.

Hornberger, N. (1997). Language policy, language education, and language rights: indigenous, immigrant, and international perspectives. Plenary presented to American Association for Applied Linguistics Conference, Orlando, March.

Horowitz, D. (1985). *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*. Berkeley, Ca.: University of California Press.

Howe, K. (1992). Liberal democracy, equal opportunity, and the challenge of multiculturalism. *American Educational Research Journal* 29, 455-470.

Hroch, M. (1985). *Social Preconditions of National Revival in Europe*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Huddy, L., & Sears, J. (1990). Qualified public support for bilingual education: some policy implications. *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 505 (March), 119-134.

Hughes, R. (1993). *Culture of Complaint: the fraying of America*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Hutchinson, J. (1987). *The Dynamics of Cultural Nationalism: the Gaelic revival and the creation of the Irish nation state*. London: Allen & Unwin.

Hutchinson, J. (1994). *Modern Nationalism*. London: Fontana.

Imhoff, G. (1987). Partisans of language. *English Today* 11, 37-40.

Imhoff, G. (1990). The position of U.S. English on bilingual education. *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 505 (March), 48-61.

Isaacs, H. (1975). *Idols of the Tribe: group identity and political change*. New York: Harper & Row.

Isajiw, W. (1980). Definitions of ethnicity. In J. Goldstein & R. Bienvenue (eds.), *Ethnicity and Ethnic Relations in Canada* (pp. 5-17). Toronto: Butterworth.

Jaimes, M., & Churchill, W. (1988). Behind the rhetoric: 'English Only' as counterinsurgency warfare. *Issues in Radical Therapy* 13, 1-2: 42-50.

Jamieson, F. (1991). *Postmodernism, or the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism*. London: Sage.

Jenkins, P. (1992). *A History of Modern Wales, 1536-1990*. London: Longman.

Jenkins, R. (1986). Social anthropological models of inter-ethnic relations. In J. Rex, & D. Mason (eds.), *Theories of Race and Race Relations* (pp. 170-186). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Jenkins, R. (1991). Violence, language and politics: nationalism in Northern Ireland and Wales. *North Atlantic Studies* 3, 31-40.

Jenkins, R. (1992). *Pierre Bourdieu*. London: Routledge.

Jenkins, R. (1994). Rethinking ethnicity: identity, categorization and power. *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 17, 197-223.

Jenkins, R. (1995). Nations and nationalisms: towards more open models. *Nations and Nationalism* 1, 369-390.

Jenkins, R. (1996). 'Us' and 'them': ethnicity, racism and ideology. In R. Barot (ed.), *The Racism Problematic: contemporary sociological debates on race and ethnicity* (pp. 69-88). Lampeter: Edward Mellen Press.

Jespersen, O. (1968). *Growth and Structure of the English Language*. Toronto: Collier-Macmillan (original, 1938).

Johnson, D. (1993). The making of the French nation. In M. Teich, & R. Porter (eds.), *The National Question in Europe in Historical Context* (pp. 35-62). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Jones, B., & Lewis, I. (1995). A Curriculum Cymreig. *Journal of Welsh Education* 4 (2), 22-35.

Jones, B. M. (1995). Schools and speech communities in a bilingual setting. In B. M. Jones & P. A. Singh Ghuman (eds.), *Bilingualism, Education and Identity* (pp. 79-107). Cardiff: University of Wales Press.

Jones, G. (1982). *Controls and Conflicts in Welsh Secondary Education -- 1889-1944*. Cardiff: University of Wales Press.

Jones, G. (1997). *The Education of a Nation*. Cardiff: University of Wales Press.

Jones, R. (1988). Language variation and social stratification in progress: linguistic change in progress. In M. Ball (ed.), *The Use of Welsh* (pp. 289-306). Clevedon: Multilingual Matters.

Jones, R. (1997). Election aftermath: 2. *Agenda: The Journal of the Institute of Welsh Affairs* Summer 1997, 10-12.

Jones, W. (1949). Attitude towards Welsh as a second language. A preliminary investigation. *British Journal of Educational Psychology* 19 (1), 44-52.

Jones, W. (1950). Attitude towards Welsh as a second language. A further investigation. *British Journal of Educational Psychology* 20 (2), 117-132.

Kachru, B. (ed.) (1982). *The Other Tongue: English across cultures*. Urbana, Ill.: University of Illinois Press.

Kachru, B. (1986). *The Alchemy of English: the spread, functions and models of non-native Englishes*. Oxford: Pergamon Press.

Kachru, B. (1990). World Englishes and applied linguistics. *World Englishes* 9, 3-20.

Kalantzis, M., & Cope, B. (1998). Pedagogy after pluralism: how multicultural education can reconstitute the mainstream. In S. May (ed.), *Critical Multiculturalism: rethinking multicultural and antiracist education*. London: Falmer Press (in press).

Kay, G. (1993). Ethnicity, the cosmos and plonomic development, with special reference to Central Africa. Mimeo.

Kearney, H. (1989). *The British Isles: a history of four nations*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Kedourie, E. (1960). *Nationalism*. London: Hutchinson.

Kellas, J. (1991). *The Politics of Nationalism and Identity*. London: Macmillan.

Khleif, B. (1978). Ethnic awakening in the first world: the case of Wales. In Glyn Williams (ed.), *Social and Cultural Change in Contemporary Wales* (pp. 102-119). London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.

Khleif, B. (1979). Insiders, outsiders and renegades: towards a classification of ethnolinguistic labels. In H. Giles, & B. Saint-Jacques (eds.), *Language and Ethnic Relations* (pp. 159-172). Oxford: Pergamon Press.

Kingsbury, B. (1989). The Treaty of Waitangi: some international law aspects. In I. Kawharu (ed.), *Waitangi: Maori and Pakeha perspectives of the Treaty of Waitangi* (pp. 121- 157). Auckland: Oxford University Press.

Kivosto, P. (ed.) (1989). *The Ethnic Enigma: the salience of ethnicity for European-origin groups*. Philadelphia: The Balch Institute Press.

Kloss, H. (1977). *The American Bilingual Tradition*. Rowley, Ma.: Newbury House.

Kohn, H. (1961). *The Idea of Nationalism: a study in its origins and background*. New York. Macmillan.

Kohn, M. (1995). *The Race Gallery: the return of racial science*. London: Jonathan Cape.

Kozol, J. (1991). *Savage Inequalities: children in America's schools*. New York: Harper Perennial.

Krauss, M. (1992). The world's languages in crisis. *Language* 68, 4-10.

Kymlicka, W. (1989). *Liberalism, Community and Culture*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Kymlicka, W. (1995a). *Multicultural Citizenship: a liberal theory of minority rights*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Kymlicka, W. (1995b). Introduction. In W. Kymlicka (ed.), *The Rights of Minority Cultures* (pp. 1-27). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Lamy, M-N. (1996). Franglais. In D. Graddol, D. Leith, & J. Swann (eds.), *English history, diversity and change* (pp. 32-36). London: Routledge.

Leap, W. (1981). American Indian languages. In C. Ferguson, & S. Heath (eds.), *Language in the U.S.A.* (pp.116-144). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Leibowitz, A. (1969). English literacy: legal sanction and discrimination. *Notre Dame Lawyer* 45, 7-66.

Leith, D., & Graddol, D. (1996). Modernity and English as a national language. In D. Graddol, D. Leith, & J. Swann (eds.), *English history, diversity and change* (pp. 136-179). London: Routledge.

Lemco, J. (1992). Québec's 'distinctive character' and the question of minority rights. In J. Crawford (ed.), *Language Loyalties: a source book on the Official English controversy* (pp. 423-433). Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Lewis, E. (1975). Attitude to language among bilingual children and adults in Wales. *International Journal of the Sociology of Language* 4, 103-121.

Lewis, E. (1981). *Bilingualism and Bilingual Education* Oxford: Pergamon.

Lieberson, S. (1985). Unhyphenated whites in the United States. *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 8, 159-180.

Lingard, B., Knight, J., & Porter, P. (eds.). (1993). *Schooling Reform for Hard Times*. London: Falmer Press.

Lo Bianco, J. (1987). *National Policy on Languages*. Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service.

Lyon, J., & Ellis, N. (1991). Parental attitudes towards the Welsh language. *Journal of Multilingual and Multicultural Development*, 12, 239-251.

Macedo, D. (1994). *Literacies of Power: what Americans are not allowed to know*. Boulder Col.: Westview Press.

Macías, R. (1979). Language choice and human rights in the United States. In J. Alatis, & G. Tucker (eds.), *Language in Public Life: Georgetown University round table on language and linguistics* (pp. 86-101). Washington DC: Georgetown University Press.

MacKaye, S. (1990). California Proposition 63: language attitudes reflected in the public debate. *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 505 (March), 135-146.

Mackey, W. (1991). Language diversity, language policy and the sovereign state. *History of European Ideas* 13, 51-61.

MacLachlan, C. (1988). *Spain's Empire in the New World: the role of ideas in institutional and social change*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Magnet, J. (1990). Canadian perspectives on Official English. In K. Adams, & D. Brink (eds.), *Perspectives on Official English: the campaign for English as an official language of the USA* (pp. 53-61). Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter.

Mallea, J. (1989). *Schooling in Plural Canada*. Clevedon: Multilingual Matters.

Mare, G. (1993). *Ethnicity and Politics in South Africa*. London: Zed Books.

Margalit, A., & Raz, J. (1995). National self-determination. In W. Kymlicka (ed.), *The Rights of Minority Cultures* (pp. 79-92). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Marshall, D. (1986). The question of an official language: language rights and the English Language Amendment. *International Journal of the Sociology of Language* 60, 7-75.

Marshall, D., & Gonzalez, R. (1990). Una lingua, una patria?: is monolingualism beneficial or harmful to a nation's unity? In K. Adams, & D. Brink (eds.), *Perspectives on Official English: the campaign for English as an official language of the USA* (pp. 29-51). Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter.

Marx, K., & Engels, F. (1976a). *Marx and Engels Collected Works*. London: Lawrence & Wishart.

Marx, K., & Engels, F. (1976b). *Basic Writings on Politics and Philosophy*. L. Feuer (ed.). Glasgow: Collins.

Mason, A. (1995). The state, national identity and distributive justice. *New Community* 21, 241-254.

May, S. (1994). *Making Multicultural Education Work*. Clevedon: Multilingual Matters.

May, S. (1995). Deconstructing traditional discourses of schooling: an example of school reform. *Language and Education* 9, 1-29.

May, S. (1997). Indigenous language rights and education. In J. Lynch, C. Modgil, & S. Modgil (eds.) *Education and Development: tradition and Innovation* Vol. 1. (pp. 149-171). London: Cassell.

May, S. (1998a). Critical Ethnography. In N. Hornberger (ed). *Encyclopedia of Language and Education*. Vol. 8. (D. Corson, General Editor). Dordrecht: Kluwer (forthcoming).

May, S. (1998b). A culturally relevant education: ghettoization or empowerment? In S. May (ed.), *Critical Multiculturalism: rethinking multicultural and antiracist education*. London: Falmer Press.

May, S. (ed.) (1998c). *Critical Multiculturalism: rethinking multicultural and antiracist education*. London: Falmer Press.

Mayo, P. (1979). *The Roots of Identity: three national movements in contemporary European politics*. London: Allen Lane.

Mazrui, A. (1975). *The Political Sociology of the English Language: an African perspective*. The Hague: Mouton.

McCrone, D. (1992). *Understanding Scotland: the sociology of a stateless nation*. London: Routledge.

McCrum, R., Cran, W., & MacNeil, R. (1986). *The Story of English*. London: Faber & Faber.

McGuire, W. (1985). Attitudes and attitude change. In G. Lindzey, & E. Aronson (eds.), *Handbook of Social Psychology* (3rd ed.) Vol. 2. (pp. 233-346). New York: Random House.

McKay, S., & Wong, S. (1988). *Language Diversity: problem or resource*. Boston: Heinle & Heinle.

McLaren, P. (1995). *Critical Pedagogy and Predatory Culture*. New York: Routledge.

Melucci, A. (1989). *Nomads in the Present*. London: Hutchinson Radius.

Mey, J. (1985). *Whose Language? A study in linguistic pragmatics*. Amsterdam: John Benjamins.

Michelet, J. (1946). *The People*. C. Cooks (trans.). London: Longman (original, 1846).

Miles, R. (1989). *Racism*. London: Routledge.

Miles, R. (1993). *Racism After 'Race Relations'*. London: Routledge.

Miles, R. (1996). Racism and nationalism in the United Kingdom: a view from the periphery. In R. Barot (ed.), *The Racism Problematic: Contemporary sociological debates on race and ethnicity* (pp. 231-255). Lampeter: Edward Mellen Press.

Mill, J. (1972). *Considerations on Representative Government*. H. Acton (ed.). London: J. M Dent (original, 1861).

Miller, D. (1995). Reflections on British national identity. *New Community* 21, 153-166.

Miller, H. & Miller, K. (1996). Language policy and identity: the case of Catalonia. *International Studies in Sociology of Education* 6, 113-128.

Minority Rights Group (1990). *World Directory of Minorities*. London: Longman.

Modood, T. (1992). *Not Easy Being British: colour, culture and citizenship*. Stoke-on-Trent: Runnymede Trust & Trentham Books.

Modood, T. (1997). Culture and identity. In T. Modood, R. Berthoud, J. Lakey, J. Nazroo, P. Smith, S. Virdee, & S. Beishon, *Ethnic Minorities in Britain: diversity and disadvantage* (pp. 290-338). London: Policy Studies Institute.

Moerman, M. (1965). Who are the Lue: ethnic identification in a complex civilization. *American Anthropologist* 67, 1215-1229.

Moerman, M. (1974). Accomplishing ethnicity. In R. Turner (ed.), *Ethnomethodology* (pp. 54-68). New York: Penguin Education.

Moore, M. (1991). Liberalism and the ideal of the good life. *The Review of Politics* 53, 687-688.

Moran, R. (1990). Language and the law in the classroom: bilingual education and the Official English initiative. In K. Adams, & D. Brink (eds.), *Perspectives on Official English: the campaign for English as an official language of the USA* (pp. 285-292). Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter.

Morgan, K. (1981). *Rebirth of a Nation: Wales 1880-1980.* Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Morgan, K. (1995). Welsh nationalism: the historical background. In K. Morgan, *Modern Wales: politics, places and people* (pp. 197-213). Cardiff: University of Wales Press.

Moser, C. (1968). *Survey Methods in Social Investigation.* London: Heinemann Educational.

Moss, S. (1994). Lost for words. *The Guardian Weekend*, 30 July, 1994: 26-30.

Mulgan, R. (1989). *Maori, Pakeha and Democracy.* Auckland: Oxford University Press.

Nagel, J. (1994). Constructing ethnicity: creating and recreating ethnic identity and culture. *Social Problems* 41, 152-176.

Nairn, T. (1981). *The Break-up of Britain: crisis and neo-nationalism* (rev. ed.). London: Verso.

Nash, M. (1989). *The Cauldron of Ethnicity in the Modern World.* Chicago: Chicago University Press.

National Language Forum (1991). *Language Strategy -- 1991-2001.* Caernarfon: National Language Forum.

Naysmith, J. (1987). English as imperialism? *Language Issues* 1, (2), 3-5.

Ndebele, N. (1987). The English language and social change in South Africa. *The English Academy Review* 4, 1-16.

Nelde, P. (1997). Language conflict. In F. Coulmas (ed.), *The Handbook of Sociolinguistics* (pp. 285-300). London: Blackwell.

Nelde, P., Strubell, M., & Williams, G. (1996). *Euromosaic: the production and reproduction of the minority language groups in the European Union.* Luxembourg. Office for Official Publications of the European Communities.

Ngũgĩ wa Thiong'o. (1985). The language of African literature. *New Left Review* 150 (March/April), 109-127.

Nielsson, G. (1985). States and 'nation-groups': a global taxonomy. In E. Tiryakian, & R. Rugowski (eds.), *New Nationalisms of the Developed West: towards explanations* (pp. 27-56). Boston: Allen & Unwin.

Nieto, S. (1995). From brown heroes and holidays to assimilationist agendas: reconsidering the critiques of multicultural education. In C. Sleeter, & P. McLaren (eds.), *Multicultural Education, Critical Pedagogy, and the Politics of Difference* (pp. 191-220) Albany: SUNY Press.

Nieto, S. (1996). *Affirming Diversity: the sociopolitical context of multicultural education* (2nd ed.). New York: Longman.

Nimni, E. (1995). Marx, Engels, and the national question. In W. Kymlicka (ed.), *The Rights of Minority Cultures* (pp. 57-75). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

NOP (1995). *Public Attitudes to the Welsh Language.* London: NOP Social and Political.

Nunberg, G. (1989). Linguists and the official language movement. *Language* 65, 579-587.

Nunberg, G. (1992). Afterword: the official language movement: reimagining America. In J. Crawford (ed.), *Language Loyalties: a source book on the Official English controversy* (pp. 479-494). Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

O'Brien, J. (1986). Towards a reconstruction of ethnicity. Capitalist expansion and cultural dynamics in Sudan. *American Anthropologist* 88, 898-906.

O'Brien, O. (1993). Good to be French? Conflicts of identity in North Catalonia. In S. Macdonald (ed.), *Inside European Identities: ethnography in Western Europe* (pp. 98-117). Oxford: Berg Publishers.

O'Cinneide, M., Keane, M., & Cawley, M. (1985). Industrialisation and linguistic change among Gaelic-speaking communities in the West of Ireland. *Language Problems and Language Planning* 9, 3-16.

Ó Ciosáin, S. (1988). Language planning and Irish. *Language, Culture and Curriculum* 1, 263-279.

Ó Gadhra, N. (1988). Irish government policy and political development of the Gaeltacht. *Language, Culture and Curriculum* 1, 251-261.

Ogbu, J. (1987). Variability in minority school performance: a problem in search of an explanation. *Anthropology and Education Quarterly* 18, 312-334.

Oller, J. (1981). Research on the measurement of affective variables: some remaining questions. In R. Anderson (ed.), *New Dimensions in L2 Acquisition Research* (pp. 14-27). Rowley, Ma.: Newbury House.

Omi, M., & Winant, H. (1986). *Racial Formation in the United States: from the 1960s to the 1980s*. New York: Routledge & Kegan Paul.

Ó Murchú, M. (1988). Diglossia and interlanguage contact in Ireland. *Language, Culture and Curriculum* 1, 243-249.

Oommen, T. (1994). State, nation, and ethnie: the processual linkages. In P. Ratcliffe (ed.), *'Race', Ethnicity and Nation: international perspectives on social conflict* (pp. 26-46). London: UCL Press.

OPCS (1991). *Office of Population Censuses and Statistics*. London: HMSO.

Ó Riagáin, P. (1988a). Bilingualism in Ireland 1793-1983: an overview of national sociolinguistic surveys. *International Journal of the Sociology of Language* 70, 29-51.

Ó Riagáin, P. (1988b). Introduction. *International Journal of the Sociology of Language* 70, 5-9.

Osmond, J. (1988). *The Divided Kingdom*. London: Constable.

Osmond, J. (1989). The modernisation of Wales. In N. Evans (ed.), *National Identity in the British Isles* (pp.73-89). Harlech, Gwynedd: Coleg Harlech.

Osmond, J. (ed.) (1994). *A Parliament for Wales*. Llandysul: Gomer Press.

Ozolins, U. (1993). *The Politics of Language in Australia*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Packer, A., & Campbell, C. (1993). The reasons for parental choice of Welsh-medium education. Paper presented to the *Fifth International Conference on Minority Languages*, University of Wales, Cardiff, July 1993.

Padilla, A. (1991). English only vs. bilingual education: ensuring a language-competent society. *Journal of Education* 173, 38-51.

Padilla, F. (1985). *Latino Ethnic Consciousness: the case of Mexican Americans and Puerto Ricans in Chicago*. Notre Dame: Notre Dame Press.

Parekh, B. (1995a). Introduction. *New Community* 21, 147-151.

Parekh. B. (1995b). The concept of national identity. *New Community* 21, 255-268.

Pattanayak, D. (1969). *Aspects of Applied Linguistics*. London: Asia Publishing House.

PDAG (1993a). *Welsh and the Early Years*. Cardiff: PDAG.

PDAG (1993b). *Welsh Language Education*. Cardiff: PDAG.

PDAG (1993c). *Welsh Medium Resources: future funding needs*. Cardiff: PDAG

PDAG (1994). *Development of Welsh Medium Education -- 1977-1992*. Cardiff: PDAG.

Pearson, D. (1990). *A Dream Deferred: the origins of ethnic conflict in New Zealand*. Wellington: Allen & Unwin.

Pennycook, A. (1994). *The Cultural Politics of English as an International Language*. Harlow: Longman.

Penrose, J. (1995). Essential constructions? The 'cultural bases' of nationalist movements. *Nations and Nationalism* 1, 391-417.

Phillips, A. (1995). Democracy and difference: some problems for feminist theory. In W. Kymlicka (ed.), *The Rights of Minority Cultures* (pp. 288-299). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Phillips, R. (1995a). The creation of history in the National Curriculum in England and Wales: some implications of cultural restorationism for cultural identity and national awareness. Paper presented to the *European Conference on Educational Research*, University of Bath, September 1995.

Phillips, R. (1995b). Welsh history is on the march. *The Times Educational Supplement*, 27 October, 1995.

Phillips, R. (1996). History teaching, cultural restorationism and national identity in England and Wales. *Curriculum Studies* 4, 385-399.

Phillipson, R. (1992). *Linguistic Imperialism*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Phillipson, R. (1997). Realities and myths of linguistic imperialism. *Journal of Multilingual and Multicultural Development* 18, 238-248.

Phillipson, R., & Skutnabb-Kangas, T. (1994). English, panacea or pandemic? *Sociolinguistica* 8, 73-87.

Piatt, B. (1990). *Only English? Law and language policy in the United States*. Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press.

Porter, J. (1965). *The Vertical Mosaic*. Toronto: Toronto University Press.

Porter, J. (1972). Dilemmas and contradictions of a multi-ethnic society. *Transactions of the Royal Society of Canada* 10, 193-205.

Porter, J. (1975). Ethnic pluralism in Canadian perspective. In N. Glazer & D. Moynihan (eds.), *Ethnicity: theory and experience* (pp. 267-304). Cambridge, Ma.: Harvard University Press.

Porter, R. (1990). *Forked Tongue: the politics of bilingual education*. New York: Basic Books.

Quiniou-Tempereau, R. (1988). *The Breton Language in Primary Education in Brittany, France*. Leeuwarden, the Netherlands: Fryske Akodemy.

Quirk, R. (1981). International communication and the concept of nuclear English. In L. Smith (ed.), *English for Cross-cultural Communication* (pp. 151-165). London: Macmillan.

Quirk, R. (1985). The English language in a global context. In R. Quirk, & H. Widdowson (eds.), *English in the World* (pp. 1-6). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Ramírez, J., Yuen, S., & Ramey D. (1991). *Final Report: longitudinal study of structured English immersion strategy, early-exit and late-exit transitional bilingual education programs for language-minority children.* San Mateo, Ca.: Aguirre International.

Ravitch, D. (1992). Diversity in education. *Dialogue* 95, 39-47.

Rawkins, P. (1979). *The Implementation of Language Policy in the Schools of Wales*. Centre for the Study of Public Policy, University of Strathclyde.

Rawkins, P. (1987). The politics of benign neglect: education, public policy, and the mediation of linguistic conflict in Wales. *International Journal of the Sociology of Language* 66, 27-48.

Rawls, J. (1985). Justice as fairness: political not metaphysical. *Philosophy and Public Affairs* 14, 223-251.

Reay, D. (1995a). 'They employ cleaners to do that': habitus in the primary classroom. *British Journal of Sociology of Education* 16, 353-371.

Reay, D. (1995b). Using habitus to look at 'race' and class in primary school classrooms. In M. Griffiths & B. Troyna (eds.), *Antiracism, Culture and Social Justice in Education* (pp. 115-132). Stoke-on Trent: Trentham Books.

Renan, E. (1990). *What is a Nation*? In H. Bhabha (ed.), *Nation and Narration* (pp. 8-22). London: Routledge (original, 1882).

Rex, J. (1973). *Race, Colonialism and the City*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Rex, J. (1991). *Ethnic Identity and Ethnic Mobilisation in Britain*. Coventry: Centre for Research in Ethnic Relations, University of Warwick.

Rex, J., & Mason, D. (eds.) (1986). *Theories of Race and Race Relations*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Reynolds, D. (1994). Education in Wales 1978-1994: from problems to policies? In W. Bellin, J. Osmond, & D. Reynolds (eds.), *Towards an Educational Policy in Wales* (pp. 4-10). Cardiff: The Institute of Welsh Affairs.

Ricento, T. (1996). Language policy in the United States. In M. Herriman & B. Burnaby (eds.), *Language Policies in English-Dominant Countries* (pp. 122-158). Clevedon: Multilingual Matters.

Robertson, R. (1992). *Globalization: social theory and global culture*. London: Sage.

Robbins, D. (1991).*The Work of Pierre Bourdieu: recognizing society*. Milton Keynes: Open University Press.

Rodriguez. R. (1983). *Hunger of Memory*. Bantam: New York.

Rodriguez, R. (1993). *Days of Obligation: an argument with my Mexican father*. Penguin: London.

Roediger, D. (1991). *The Wages of Whiteness: race and the making of the American working class*. London: Verso.

Rokkan, S., & Urwin, D. (1983). *Economy, Territory, Identity*. London: Sage.

Romaine, S. (1989). *Bilingualism* (2nd ed.). Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

Roosens, E. (1989). *Creating Ethnicity: the process of ethnogenesis*. London: Sage.

Rorty, R. (1991). *Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth: philosophical papers I*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Rossinelli, M. (1989). La question linguistique en Suisse. Bilan critique et nouvelles perspectives juridiques. *Revue de Droit Suisse* 108, 163-193.

Rothschild, J. (1981). *Ethnopolitics: a conceptual framework*. New York: Columbia University Press.

Ruiz, R. (1984). Orientations in language planning. *NABE Journal* 8 (2), 15-34.

Ruiz, R. (1990). Official languages and language planning. In K. Adams, & D. Brink (eds.), *Perspectives on Official English: the campaign for English as an official language of the USA* (pp. 11-24). Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter.

Said, E. (1994). *Culture and Imperialism*. London: Vintage.

Sandel, M. (1982). *Liberalism and the Limits of Justice*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Schermerhorn, R. (1970). *Comparative Ethnic Relations*. New York: Random House.

Schlesinger, A. (1991). The Disuniting of America: what we all stand to lose if multicultural education takes the wrong approach. *American Educator* 15, 14-33.

Schlesinger, A. (1992). *The Disuniting of America: reflections on a multicultural society*. New York: W.W. Norton & Co.

Secada, W. & Lightfoot, T. (1993). Symbols and the political context of bilingual education in the United States. In M. Arias & U. Casanova (eds.), *Bilingual Education: politics, practice, and research* (pp. 36-64). Chicago: The National Society for the Study of Education/University of Chicago Press.

Seton-Watson, H. (1977). *Nations and States*. London: Methuen.

Sharp, A. (1990). *Justice and the Maori: Maori claims in New Zealand political argument in the 1980s*. Auckland: Oxford University Press.

Sharp, D., Thomas, B., Price, E., Francis, G., & Davies, I. (1973). *Attitudes to Welsh and English in the Schools of Wales*. London: Macmillan.

Shell, M. (1993). Babel in America: the politics of language diversity in the United States. *Critical Inquiry* 20, 103-127.

Shils, E. (1957). Primordial, personal, sacred and civil ties. *British Journal of Sociology* 8, 130-145.

Shils, E. (1980). *Tradition*. Glencoe Ill. Free Press.

Shils, E. (1995). Nation, nationality, nationalism and civil society. *Nations and Nationalism* 1, 93-118.

Short, G., & Carrington, B. (1998). Children's constructions of their national identity: the implications for critical multiculturalism. In S. May (ed.), *Critical Multiculturalism: rethinking multicultural and antiracist education*. London: Falmer Press (in press).

Silber, L., & Little, A. (1995). *The Death of Yugoslavia*. London: Penguin/BBC Books.

Sinclair, N. (1993). *Tiger Bay is my Home*. Cardiff: Butetown History and Arts Project.

Skutnabb-Kangas, T. (1988). Multilingualism and the education of minority children. In T. Skutnabb-Kangas, & J. Cummins (eds.), *Minority Education: from shame to struggle* (pp. 9-44). Clevedon: Multilingual Matters.

Skutnabb, T. & Phillipson, R. (1995). Linguistic human rights, past and present. In T. Skutnabb-Kangas, & R. Phillipson (eds.), *Linguistic Human Rights: Overcoming linguistic discrimination* (pp. 71-110). Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter.

Smaje, C. (1997). Not just a social construct: theorising race and ethnicity. *Sociology* 31, 307-327.

Small, S. (1994). *Racialised Barriers: the Black experience in the United States and England in the 1980s*. London: Routledge.

Smith, A. (1981). *The Ethnic Revival*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Smith, A. (1983). *Theories of Nationalism* (2nd ed.). London: Harper & Row.

Smith, A. (1986). *The Ethnic Origin of Nations*. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

Smith, A. (1991). *National Identity*. London: Penguin.

Smith, A. (1994). The problem of national identity: ancient, medieval and modern? *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 17, 375-399.

Smith, A. (1995a). *Nations and Nationalism in a Global Era*. London: Polity Press.

Smith, A. (1995b). Gastronomy or geology? The role of nationalism in the construction of nations. *Nations and Nationalism* 1, 3-23.

Smith, D. (1984). *Wales! Wales?*. London: Allen & Unwin.

Smith, M. (1965). *The Plural Society of the British West Indies*. London: Sangster's.

Smolicz, J. (1979). *Culture and Education in a Plural Society*. Canberra: Curriculum Development Centre.

Smolicz, J. (1993). The monolingual myopia and minority rights: Australia's language policies from an international perspective. *Muslim Education Quarterly* 10, 44-61.

Smolicz, J. (1995). Australia's language policies and minority rights. In T. Skutnabb-Kangas, & R. Phillipson (eds.), *Linguistic Human Rights: overcoming linguistic discrimination* (pp. 235-252). Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter.

Smolicz, J., & Secombe, M. (1988). Community languages, core values and cultural maintenance: the Australian experience with special reference to Greek, Latvian and Polish groups. In M. Clyne (ed.), *Australia, Meeting Place of Languages* (pp. 11-38). Canberra: Australian National University, Pacific Linguistics.

Sollors, W. (ed.) (1989). *The Invention of Ethnicity*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Solomos, J. (1993). *Race and Racism in Contemporary Britain* (2nd ed.). London; Macmillan.

Stack, J. (1986). Ethnic mobilization in world politics: the primordial perspective. In J. Stack (ed.), *The Primordial Challenge: ethnicity in the contemporary world*. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press.

Stasiulus, D. & Yuval-Davis, N. (1995). *Unsettling Settler Societies: articulations of gender, race, ethnicity and class*. London: Sage.

Stationery Office. (1997a). *A Voice for Wales*. Norwich: Stationery Office.

Stationery Office. (1997b). *Scotland's Parliament*. Norwich: Stationery Office.

Steinberg, S. (1981). *The Ethnic Myth: race, ethnicity and class in America*. New York: Atheneum.

Stone, M. (1981). *The Education of the Black Child in Britain: the myth of multiracial education*. London: Collins Fontana.

Switzerland (1989). *Le Quadrilinguisme en Suisse: présent et futur*. Bern: Chancellerie Fédérale.

Symonds, A. (1990). Migration, communities and social change. In R. Jenkins, & A. Edwards (eds.), *One Step Forward? South and east Wales towards the year 2000* (pp. 21-32). Llandysul, Dyfed: Gomer Press.

Szasz, M. (1974). *Education and the American Indian: the road to self determination, 1928-1973*. Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press.

Tabouret-Keller, A. (1997). Language and identity. In F. Coulmas (ed.), *The Handbook of Sociolinguistics* (pp. 315-326). Oxford: Blackwell.

Tamir, Y. (1993). *Liberal Nationalism*. Princeton, NJ.: Princeton University Press.

Tarrow, N. (1992). Language, interculturalism and human rights: three European cases. *Prospects* 22, 489-509.

Tarver, H. (1994). Language and politics in the 1980s. The story of U.S. English. In F. Pincus, & H. Ehrlich (eds.), *Race and Ethnic Conflict: contending views on prejudice, discrimination and ethnoviolence* (pp. 206-218). Boulder, Col.: Westview Press.

Tate, N. (1994). Off the fence on common culture. *The Times Educational Supplement*, 29 July 1994.

Tate, N. (1997). *National identity and the school curriculum*. Centre for Policy Studies in Education, University of Leeds.

Taylor, C. (1992). *Multiculturalism and 'The Politics of Recognition'*. Princeton, NJ.: Princeton University Press.

Te Puni Kokiri (1994). *Mana Tangata. Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, 1993: background and discussion on key issues.* Wellington: Te Puni Kokiri (Ministry of Māori Development).

Thomas, A. (1997). Language policy and nationalism in Wales: a comparative analysis. *Nations and Nationalism* 3, 333-344.

Thomas, B. (1959). Wales and the Atlantic economy. *Scottish Journal of Political Economy* 6, 169-192.

Thomas, B. (1987). A cauldron of rebirth: population and the Welsh language in the nineteenth century. *The Welsh History Review* 10, 68-91.

Thomas, N. (1992). *The Welsh Extremist* (2nd ed.). Talybont: Y Lolfa.

Thomas, R.S. (1955). *Songs at the Year's Turning*. London: Rupert Hart-Davis.

Thomas, R.S. (1992). *Cymru or Wales?* Llandysul, Dyfed: Gomer Press.

Thomas, R.S. (1995). *No Truce with the Furies*. Newcastle upon Tyne: Bloodaxe Books.

Thompson, J. (1991). Editor's Introduction. In P. Bourdieu, *Language and Symbolic Power* (pp. 1-31). Cambridge: Polity Press.

Thompson, V. (1987). *The Making of the African Diaspora in the Americas, 1441-1900*. London: Longman.

Thornberry, P. (1991a). *International Law and the Rights of Minorities*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Thornberry, P. (1991b). *Minorities and Human Rights Law*. London: Minority Rights Group.

Thornton, R. (1988). Culture: a contemporary definition. In E. Boonzaier, & J. Sharp (eds.), *South African Keywords: the uses and abuses of political concepts* (pp. 17-28). Cape Town: David Philip.

Tilly, C. (ed.) (1975). *The Formation of National States in Western Europe*. Princeton, NJ.: Princeton University Press.

Tilly, C. (1984). *Big Structures, Large Processes, Huge Comparisons*. New York: Russell Sage.

Tollefson, J. (1991). *Planning Language, Planning Inequality: language policy in the community*. London: Longman.

Toynbee, A. (1953). *A Study of History* (Vols. VII-IX). London: Oxford University Press.

Trevor-Roper, H. (1983). The invention of tradition: the highland tradition of Scotland. In E. Hobsbawm, & T. Ranger (eds.), *The Invention of Tradition* (pp. 15-42). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Troyna, B. (1993). *Racism and Education*. Buckingham: Open University Press.

Truchot, C. (1990). *L'Anglais dans le monde contemporaine*. Paris: Robert.

UNESCO (1953). *The Use of Vernacular Languages in Education*. Paris: UNESCO.

Ussher, A. (1949). *The Face and Mind of Ireland*. London: Gollancz.

Valencia, R. (ed) (1997) *The Evolution of Deficit Thinking: educational thought and practice*. New York: Falmer Press.

van den Berghe, P. (1975). Ethnicity and class in highland Peru. In L Despres (ed.), *Ethnicity and Resource Competition in Plural Societies* (pp. 71-85). The Hague: Mouton.

van den Berghe, P. (1979). *The Ethnic Phenomenon*. New York: Elsevier Press.

van Dijk, T. (1993). *Elite Discourse and Racism*. London: Sage.

Van Dyke, V. (1977). The individual, the state, and ethnic communities in political theory. *World Politics* 29, 343-369.

Veltman, C. (1983). *Language Shift in the United States*. Berlin: Mouton.

Veltman, C. (1988). Modelling the language shift process of Hispanic immigrants. *International Migration Review* 22, 545-562.

Verma, G. (ed.) (1989). *Education for all: a landmark in pluralism*. Lewes: Falmer Press.

Verma, M., Corrigan, P., & Firth, S. (1998). Minority children's heritage language: planning for non-preservation? In P. Thomas (ed.), *World Minority Languages*. Cardiff: University of Wales Press (in press).

Vološinov, V. (1973). *Marxism and the Philosophy of Language*. Cambridge, Ma.: Harvard University Press (original, 1929).

Vos, L. (1993). Shifting nationalism: Belgians, Flemings and Walloons. In M. Teich & R. Porter (eds.), *The National Question in Europe in Historical Context* (pp. 128-147). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Waite, J. (1992). *Aoteareo: speaking for ourselves. A discussion on the development of a New Zealand languages policy*. Wellington: Learning Media, Ministry of Education.

Waldron, J. (1993). *Liberal Rights*. Cambridge; Cambridge University Press.

Waldron, J. (1995). Minority cultures and the cosmopolitan alternative. In W. Kymlicka (ed.), *The Rights of Minority Cultures* (pp. 93-119). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Walker, G. (1990). 'There's not a team like the Glasgow Rangers': football and religious identity in Scotland. In G. Walker, & T. Gallagher (eds.), *Sermons and Battle Hymns* (pp. 137-159) Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.

Walker, R. (1990). *Ka Whawhai Tonu Matou: struggle without end*. Auckland: Penguin.

Wallerstein, I. (1979). *The Capitalist World Economy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Wallerstein, I. (1983). *Historical Capitalism*. London: New Left Books.

Wallerstein, I. (1991). The construction of peoplehood: racism, nationalism, ethnicity. In E. Balibar & I. Wallerstein (eds.), *Race, Nation, Class: ambiguous identities* (pp. 71-85). London: Verso.

Wallman, S. (1978). The boundaries of race: processes of ethnicity in England. *Man* 13, 200-217.

Wallman, S. (1986). Ethnicity and the boundary process in context. In J. Rex, & D. Mason (eds.), *Theories of Race and Race Relations* (pp. 226-235). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Walzer, M. (1982). Pluralism in political perspective. In M. Walzer (ed.), *The Politics of Ethnicity* (pp. 1-28). Cambridge, Ma.: Harvard University Press.

Walzer, M. (1992a). *What it Means to be an American*. New York: Marsilio.

Walzer, M. (1992b). Comment. In C. Taylor, *Multiculturalism and 'The Politics of Recognition'* (pp. 100-101). Princeton, NJ.: Princeton University Press.

Warren, N., & Jahoda, M. (eds.) (1973). *Attitudes* (2nd ed.). Harmondsworth: Penguin.

Waters, M. (1990). *Ethnic Options: choosing identities in America*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Weber, E. (1976). *Peasants into Frenchmen: the modernization of rural France 1870-1914*. Stanford, Ca.: Stanford University Press.

Weber, M. (1961). *From Max Weber: essays in sociology*. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.

Weinstein, B. (1983). *The Civic Tongue: political consequences of language choices*. New York: Longman.

Welsh Joint Education Committee (1992). *Welsh for Adults: the way forward*. Cardiff: WJEC.

Welsh Language Board (1995). *Draft Guidelines as to the Form and Content of Schemes*. Cardiff: Welsh Language Board.

Welsh Office. (1993). *Welsh Social Survey*. Cardiff: Statistics Section, Welsh Office.

Welsh Office (1995). *History in the National Curriculum: Wales*. Cardiff: Welsh Office.

Wetherell, M., & Potter, J. (1992). *Mapping the Language of Racism: discourse and the legitimation of exploitation*. London: Harvester Wheatleaf.

Wildavsky, A. (1992). Finding universalistic solutions to particularistic problems: bilingualism resolved through a second language requirement for elementary schools. *Journal of Policy Analysis and Management* 11, 310-314.

Williams, Charlotte (1995). 'Race' and racism: some reflections on the Welsh context. *Contemporary Wales* 8, 113-132.

Williams, Charlotte (1997). Colour in the pictures. *Planet* 125, 25-30.

Williams, Colin (1982). Separatism and the mobilisation of Welsh national identity. In C. Williams (ed.), *National Separatism* (pp. 145-201). Cardiff: University of Wales Press.

Williams, Colin (1987). The land in linguistic consciousness: evidence from the British Isles. *Sociolinguistica* 1, 13-29.

Williams, Colin (1990). The anglicisation of Wales. In N. Coupland (ed.), *English in Wales: diversity, conflict and change* (pp. 19-47). Clevedon: Multilingual Matters.

Williams, Colin (1994). *Called Unto Liberty: on language and nationalism*. Clevedon: Multilingual Matters.

Williams, Colin (1995). Questions concerning the development of bilingual Wales. In B. M. Jones & P. Singh Ghuman (eds.), *Bilingualism, Education and Identity* (pp. 47-78). Cardiff: University of Wales Press.

Williams, Colin (1996). Ethnic identity and language issues in development. In D. Dwyer, & D. Drakakis-Smith (eds.), *Ethnicity and Development: geographical perspectives* (pp. 45-85). London: John Wiley & Sons.

Williams, Colin & Raybould, W. (1991). *Welsh Language Planning. Opportunities and constraints*. Cardiff: PDAG.

Williams, E. (1989). The dynamic of Welsh identity. In N. Evans (ed.), *National Identity in the British Isles* (pp.46-59). Harlech, Gwynedd: Coleg Harlech.

Williams, Glanmor (1979). *Religion, Language and Nationality in Wales*. Cardiff: University of Cardiff Press.

Williams, Glanmor (1987). *Recovery, Reorientation and Reformation: Wales c. 1415-1642*. Oxford: Clarendon.

Williams, Glyn (1987). Bilingualism, class dialect, and social reproduction. *International Journal of the Sociology of Language* 66, 85-98.

Williams, Glyn (1994). Discourses on 'nation' and 'race'. *Contemporary Wales* 6, 87-103.

Williams, Gwyn. A. (1982). *The Welsh in their History*. London, Croom Helm.

Williams, Gwyn. A. (1985). *When was Wales?* London: Penguin.

Williams, R. (1976). *Keywords*. London: Flamingo.

Williams, R. (1985). Wales and England. In J. Osmond (ed.), *The National Question Again: Welsh political identity in the 1980s* (pp. 18-31). Llandysul, Dyfed: Gomer Press.

Willig, A. (1985). A meta-analysis of selected studies on the effectiveness of bilingual education. *Review of Educational Research* 55, 269-317.

Willig, A. (1987). Examining bilingual education research through meta-analysis and narrative review: a response to Baker. *Review of Educational Research* 57, 363-376.

Worsley, P. (1984). *The Three Worlds: culture and world development*. London: Weidenfeld & Nicholson.

Yinger, M. (1994). *Ethnicity: source of strength? source of conflict?* New York: SUNY Press.

Young, I. (1989). Polity and group difference: a critique of the ideal of universal citizenship. *Ethics* 99, 250-274.

Young, I. (1990). *Justice and the Politics of Difference*. Princeton, NJ.: Princeton University Press.

Young, I. (1993). Together in Difference: transforming the logic of group political conflict. In J. Squires (ed.), *Principled Positions: postmodernism and the rediscovery of value* (pp. 121-150). London: Lawrence & Wishart.

Yuval-Davis, N. (1997). *Gender and the Nation*. London: Sage.

APPENDICES

APPENDIX A

Devolution for Wales

Results



Source: *The Guardian*, 20 September, 1997: 8)

APPENDIX B

Dear teacher trainee

This questionnaire aims to find out your views on Welsh language and culture, bilingualism, and bilingual education.

As a teacher trainee, currently training in Wales, your views on these issues are of particular interest and importance for future language planning in Wales.

You do **not** necessarily have to be Welsh, or a Welsh speaker, to answer this questionnaire. **All** views are welcome.

The questionnaire should take about 10 minutes to complete. Please try to answer all questions as fully as possible and return it to your tutor when finished.

All responses to this questionnaire will be treated entirely confidentially.

Many thanks for your time and help.

Stephen May

PLEASE NOTE: THERE IS A WELSH LANGUAGE VERSION OF THIS QUESTIONNAIRE AVAILABLE FOR ALL THOSE WHO WOULD PREFER IT

Please state

Age _____

Sex _____

1). What is the name of your teacher training institution?

_____

2). What level of teaching are you training for? (Please tick appropriate box)

infants ☐

primary (B.Ed) ☐

primary (PGCE) ☐

secondary* ☐ * main subject _____

other** ☐ ** please describe _____

3). What year of teacher training are you currently in?

1st ☐ 2nd ☐ 3rd ☐ 4th ☐ Other ☐

4). Which of the following descriptions best describes the language(s) used on your particular teacher training programme in college?

Welsh ☐ Welsh & English ☐ English ☐

Mainly Welsh ☐ Mainly English ☐

5). Which of the following descriptions best describes the language(s) used by you to teach on your current (or most recent) teaching practice in school?

Welsh ☐ Welsh & English ☐ English ☐

Mainly Welsh ☐ Mainly English ☐

6). Which of the following best describes your current (or most recent) teaching practice school?

Welsh-speaking primary school ☐

Bilingual (Welsh-English) primary school ☐

English-speaking primary school ☐

Welsh-speaking secondary school in Welsh-speaking area ☐

Welsh-speaking secondary school in English-speaking area ☐

Bilingual (Welsh-English) secondary school ☐

English-speaking secondary school ☐

Here are some statements about the Welsh language. Please say whether you agree or disagree with these statements. There are no right or wrong answers. Answer with ONE of the following.

SA = Strongly Agree	(circle SA)
A = Agree	(circle A)
NAND = Neither Agree Nor Disagree	(circle NAND)
D = Disagree	(circle D)
SD = Strongly Disagree	(circle SD)

7).	(5)	(4)	(3)	(2)	(1)
a. I like hearing Welsh spoken	SA	A	NAND	D	SD
b. Welsh should be taught to all pupils in Wales	SA	A	NAND	D	SD
c. It is a waste of time to keep the Welsh language alive	SA	A	NAND	D	SD
d. I like speaking Welsh	SA	A	NAND	D	SD
e. Welsh is essential to take part fully in Welsh life	SA	A	NAND	D	SD
f. There are more useful languages to learn than Welsh	SA	A	NAND	D	SD
g. Welsh is a language worth learning	SA	A	NAND	D	SD
h. Welsh is not relevant to the modern world	SA	A	NAND	D	SD
i. Pupils should not be made to learn Welsh	SA	A	NAND	D	SD
j. It is only traditionalists who want to keep the Welsh language alive	SA	A	NAND	D	SD
k. We need to preserve the Welsh language	SA	A	NAND	D	SD
l. I am likely to use Welsh in my everyday life	SA	A	NAND	D	SD
m. Learning Welsh is unnecessary because Britain is mainly English-speaking	SA	A	NAND	D	SD
n. I prefer to be taught in college in Welsh	SA	A	NAND	D	SD
o. All schools in Wales should provide the opportunity for pupils to learn in Welsh	SA	A	NAND	D	SD
p. All pupils in Wales should be taught in Welsh	SA	A	NAND	D	SD
q. The learning of Welsh should be left to individual choice	SA	A	NAND	D	SD
r. I prefer to teach in Welsh	SA	A	NAND	D	SD
s. There should be more Welsh in public life	SA	A	NAND	D	SD
t. The rights of people to use Welsh in public life must be protected	SA	A	NAND	D	SD
u. Welsh should be limited to the private domain (family, friends etc.)	SA	A	NAND	D	SD
v. It is right that some jobs are reserved for Welsh speaking people	SA	A	NAND	D	SD
w. In-migrants to Wales should learn Welsh	SA	A	NAND	D	SD
x. The Welsh language should be maintained because it is a sign of Welsh nationhood	SA	A	NAND	D	SD
y. I would prefer to marry a Welsh speaker	SA	A	NAND	D	SD
z. I would prefer my children to be Welsh speaking	SA	A	NAND	D	SD

continued overleaf

aa. The government spends too much money on promoting the Welsh language. SA A NAND D SD

bb. Legislation protecting the Welsh language is necessary, even if it limits the choices of some English speakers in Wales (e.g. their choice of education). SA A NAND D SD

How important or unimportant do you think the Welsh language is for the following activities. There are no right or wrong answers. Please tick appropriate box.

8).		Important	A Little Important	A Little Unimportant	Unimportant
a)	socialising with friends				
b)	reading				
c)	writing				
d)	having an intellectual discussion				
e)	watching TV				
f)	getting a job in Wales				
g)	being involved in Welsh cultural activities - eisteddfodau etc.				
h)	doing tertiary study				
i)	going to church/chapel				
j)	talking to peers in college				
k)	getting a job in industry/commerce/ management				
l)	living in Wales				
m)	bringing up children				
n)	talking to tutors in college				
o)	being involved in contemporary popular culture - music/media etc.				
p)	talking to other teachers in schools				
q)	getting a job in the public sector - civil service, media, teaching etc				
r)	succeeding at college				
s)	being accepted in the community				
t)	teaching in schools				

Here are some statements about the English and Welsh language. Please say whether you agree or disagree with these statements. There are no right or wrong answers. Answer with ONE of the following.

SA = Strongly Agree	(circle SA)
A = Agree	(circle A)
NAND = Neither Agree Nor Disagree	(circle NAND)
D = Disagree	(circle D)
SD = Strongly Disagree	(circle SD)

9).	(5)	(4)	(3)	(2)	(1)
a. It is important to be able to speak both English and Welsh	SA	A	NAND	D	SD
b. Knowing Welsh and English is an intellectual advantage	SA	A	NAND	D	SD
c. Children get confused when learning English and Welsh	SA	A	NAND	D	SD
d. Speaking both Welsh and English is an advantage in seeking employment	SA	A	NAND	D	SD
e. Being able to write in English and Welsh is important	SA	A	NAND	D	SD
f. All schools in Wales should teach pupils to speak in both English and Welsh	SA	A	NAND	D	SD
g. Road signs in Wales should be in English and Welsh	SA	A	NAND	D	SD
h. Speaking two languages is not difficult	SA	A	NAND	D	SD
i. Children in Wales should learn to read in both Welsh and English	SA	A	NAND	D	SD
j. People who speak Welsh and English can have a wider social circle than those who speak one language	SA	A	NAND	D	SD
k. All jobs in Wales should be advertised in both Welsh and English	SA	A	NAND	D	SD
l. Young children learn to speak Welsh and English at the same time with ease	SA	A	NAND	D	SD
m. Both English and Welsh should be important in Wales	SA	A	NAND	D	SD
n. All printed forms in Wales should be in both English and Welsh	SA	A	NAND	D	SD
o. The ability to speak and read in both English and Welsh should be a requirement for public sector jobs in Wales	SA	A	NAND	D	SD
p. All public services in Wales should be available in both Welsh and English (e.g government, media, courts etc.)	SA	A	NAND	D	SD
q. I would like to be considered as a speaker of English and Welsh	SA	A	NAND	D	SD
r. All people in Wales should speak English and Welsh	SA	A	NAND	D	SD
s. I would want my children to speak both English and Welsh	SA	A	NAND	D	SD
t. Both English and Welsh should be treated equally as the two national languages of Wales	SA	A	NAND	D	SD
u. People only need to know one language	SA	A	NAND	D	SD

Questions 10-22 are necessary for statistical purposes, could you please answer all those that apply to you. (see relevant directions)

10). What is your place of birth? (Please specify country and, if possible, county/region)

Country _____ County/Region _____

11). How long have you lived in Wales? (Please tick appropriate box)

0-1 year ☐ 1-3 years ☐ 4-6 years ☐ 7-10 years ☐ 10+ Years ☐

12). What is you religious affiliation - if any? (Please specify)

_____

13). Which of the following best describes your ethnic affiliation? (Please tick appropriate box)

Welsh ☐ English ☐ British ☐ European ☐

Irish ☐ Scottish ☐ Other* ☐ *If other, please state _____

14). Which of the following descriptions best describes your ability to speak Welsh.

No Welsh ☐ **(Go directly to question 18)**

Little Welsh ☐ **(Go to question 15)**

Much Welsh ☐ **(Go to question 15)**

Fluent Welsh ☐ **(Go to question 15)**

15). If you speak Welsh, which of the following descriptions best describes your current use of Welsh.

Rarely speak Welsh ☐ Half & Half ☐

Occasionally ☐ Most of the time ☐

16). Is Welsh your 1st or 2nd language?

1st language ☐ 2nd language ☐

(Go directly to question 19) **(Go to question 17)**

17). If you are a 2nd language learner of Welsh, where did you learn Welsh? - e.g primary school, college, ulpan etc. (Please specify)

_____ **(Go directly to question 19)**

18). If you are not currently able to speak Welsh, would you be prepared to learn it as a second language?

No ☐ Yes ☐

19). Do you understand Welsh?

No Welsh ☐ Little Welsh ☐ Much Welsh ☐ Fluent Welsh ☐

20). Are there any members of your family who speak Welsh? (This may include members of your wider family - grandparents, uncle/aunt, cousins etc.)

No ☐ Yes* ☐ *If Yes, please specify

_____

21). Apart from Welsh and/or English, do you speak any other languages fluently?

No ☐ Yes* ☐ *If Yes, please specify

_____

22). Do you wish to continue to live in Wales after completing your course?

No ☐ Yes ☐

Finally, could you answer Questions 23-28 as fully as you can.

23). In your view, what are the most important/distinctive elements of Welsh culture and society?

24). What are your views on a Welsh assembly and/or an independent Wales?

APPENDIX C

Ionawr 1996

Annwyl ddarpar-athro/athrawes

Nod yr holiadur hwn yw darganfod eich barn am y Gymraeg a'i diwylliant, dwyieithrwydd, ac addysg ddwyieithog.

Gan eich bod yn ddarpar-athro/athrawes sy'n cael ei hyfforddi yng Nghymru ar hyn o bryd, mae eich barn am y materion hyn o ddiddordeb a phwysigrwydd arbennig o ran cynllunio ieithyddol at y dyfodol yng Nghymru.

Dylai hi gymryd rhyw 10 munud i chi lenwi'r holiadur. Ceisiwch roi ateb mor llawn â phosibl i bob cwestiwn, a dychwelwch yr holiadur i'r tiwtor ar ôl i chi orffen.

Caiff pob ymateb i'r holiadur hwn ei drin fel ymateb cwbl gyfrinachol.

Diolch o galon i chi am eich amser a'ch cymorth.

Stephen May

Cyn i chi ddechrau ateb yr holiadur, a wnewch chi nodi'r wybodaeth isod

Oed _____

Rhyw _____

1). Beth yw enw eich **sefydliad** hyfforddi athrawon?

_____

2). Pa **lefel o addysgu** yr ydych yn hyfforddi ar ei chyfer? (Ticiwch y blwch priodol)

babanod ☐

cynradd (B.Add) ☐

cynradd (TAR) ☐

uwchradd* ☐ * prif bwnc _____

arall** ☐ ** disgrifiwch ef/hwy _____

3). **Ar ba flwyddyn yn eich hyfforddiant fel athro neu athrawes yr ydych chi ar hyn o bryd?**

1af ☐ Ail ☐ 3edd ☐ 4edd ☐ Arall ☐

4). **P'un o'r disgrifiadau isod sy'n disgrifio orau yr iaith/ieithoedd a ddefnyddir ar eich rhaglen hyfforddi athrawon yn y coleg?**

Cymraeg ☐ Cymraeg a Saesneg ☐ Saesneg ☐

Cymraeg yn bennaf ☐ Saesneg yn bennaf ☐

5). **P'un o'r disgrifiadau isod sy'n disgrifio orau yr iaith/ieithoedd a ddefnyddir gennych i addysgu ar eich ymarfer addysgu cyfredol (neu fwyaf diweddar) yn yr ysgol?**

Cymraeg ☐ Cymraeg a Saesneg ☐ Saesneg ☐

Cymraeg yn bennaf ☐ Saesneg yn bennaf ☐

6). **P'un o'r isod sy'n disgrifio orau eich ysgol ymarfer addysgu gyfredol (neu fwyaf diweddar)?**

Ysgol gynradd Gymraeg ei hiaith ☐

Ysgol gynradd ddwyieithog (Cymraeg-Saesneg) ☐

Ysgol gynradd Saesneg ei hiaith ☐

Ysgol uwchradd Gymraeg ei hiaith mewn ardal Gymraeg ei hiaith ☐

Ysgol uwchradd Gymraeg ei hiaith mewn ardal Saesneg ei hiaith ☐

Ysgol uwchradd ddwyieithog (Cymraeg-Saesneg) ☐

Ysgol uwchradd Saesneg ei hiaith ☐

Dyma rai datganiadau ynglŷn â'r Gymraeg. Dywedwch a ydych yn cytuno neu'n **anghytuno** â'r datganiadau hyn. **Nid oes atebion cywir nac anghywir.** Atebwch drwy roi cylch am **UN** o'r canlynol.

CG = Cytuno'n Gryf	(rhowch gylch am CG)
C = Cytuno	(rhowch gylch am C)
HGNA = Heb Gytuno Nac Anghytuno	(rhowch gylch am HGNA)
A = Anghytuno	(rhowch gylch am A)
AG = Anghytuno'n Gryf	(rhowch gylch am AG)

7).	**5)**	**4)**	**3)**	**2)**	**1)**
a. Hoffaf glywed y Gymraeg yn cael ei siarad	**CG**	**C**	**HGNA**	**A**	**AG**
b. Dylid addysgu'r Gymraeg i bob disgybl yng Nghymru	**CG**	**C**	**HGNA**	**A**	**AG**
c. Gwastraff amser yw cadw'r Gymraeg yn fyw	**CG**	**C**	**HGNA**	**A**	**AG**
d. Byddaf yn hoffi siarad Cymraeg	**CG**	**C**	**HGNA**	**A**	**AG**
e. Mae'r Gymraeg yn hanfodol er mwyn cymryd rhan yn llawn yn y bywyd Cymreig	**CG**	**C**	**HGNA**	**A**	**AG**
f. Mae ieithoedd mwy defnyddiol na'r Gymraeg i'w dysgu	**CG**	**C**	**HGNA**	**A**	**AG**
g. Mae'r Gymraeg yn iaith sy'n werth ei dysgu	**CG**	**C**	**HGNA**	**A**	**AG**
h. Nid yw'r Gymraeg yn berthnasol i'r byd modern	**CG**	**C**	**HGNA**	**A**	**AG**
i. Ni ddylid gorfodi disgyblion i ddysgu Cymraeg	**CG**	**C**	**HGNA**	**A**	**AG**
j. Dim ond y rhai sy'n glynu wrth draddodiad sydd am gadw'r Gymraeg yn fyw	**CG**	**C**	**HGNA**	**A**	**AG**
k. Mae angen i ni ddiogelu'r Gymraeg	**CG**	**C**	**HGNA**	**A**	**AG**
l. Yr wyf yn debygol o ddefnyddio'r Gymraeg yn fy mywyd bob-dydd	**CG**	**C**	**HGNA**	**A**	**AG**
m. Nid oes angen dysgu Cymraeg gan mai gwlad Saesneg ei hiaith yn bennaf yw Prydain	**CG**	**C**	**HGNA**	**A**	**AG**
n. Mae'n well gennyf gael fy nysgu drwy'r Gymraeg yn y coleg	**CG**	**C**	**HGNA**	**A**	**AG**
o. Dylai pob ysgol yng Nghymru roi cyfle i'w disgyblion ddysgu drwy'r Gymraeg	**CG**	**C**	**HGNA**	**A**	**AG**
p. Dylid addysgu pob disgybl yng Nghymru drwy'r Gymraeg	**CG**	**C**	**HGNA**	**A**	**AG**
q. Dylid gadael i'r unigolyn benderfynu a ydyw am ddysgu Cymraeg	**CG**	**C**	**HGNA**	**A**	**AG**
r. Mae'n well gennyf addysgu drwy'r Gymraeg	**CG**	**C**	**HGNA**	**A**	**AG**
s. Dylid cael rhagor o Gymraeg mewn bywyd cyhoeddus	**CG**	**C**	**HGNA**	**A**	**AG**
t. Rhaid diogelu hawl pobl i ddefnyddio'r Gymraeg mewn bywyd cyhoeddus	**CG**	**C**	**HGNA**	**A**	**AG**
u. Dylid cyfyngu'r Gymraeg i feysydd preifat (y teulu, cyfeillion etc.)	**CG**	**C**	**HGNA**	**A**	**AG**
v. Mae'n iawn i rai swyddi gael eu neilltuo ar gyfer pobl sy'n siarad Cymraeg	**CG**	**C**	**HGNA**	**A**	**AG**
w. Dylai mewnfudwyr i Gymru ddysgu Cymraeg	**CG**	**C**	**HGNA**	**A**	**AG**
x. Dylid cadw'r Gymraeg oherwydd ei bod yn arwydd o genedligrwydd y Cymry	**CG**	**C**	**HGNA**	**A**	**AG**
y. Byddai'n well gennyf briodi rhywun sy'n siarad Cymraeg	**CG**	**C**	**HGNA**	**A**	**AG**
z. Byddai'n well gennyf i'm plant fedru'r Gymraeg	**CG**	**C**	**HGNA**	**A**	**AG**

parhad trosodd

aa. Mae'r llywodraeth yn gwario gormod o arian ar hyrwyddo'r Gymraeg	**CG**	**C**	**HGNA**	**A**	**AG**
bb. Mae angen deddfwriaeth i ddiogelu'r Gymraeg, hyd yn oed os yw'n cyfyngu ar ddewisiadau rhai siaradwyr Saesneg yng Nghymru (e.e. eu dewis o addysg).	**CG**	**C**	**HGNA**	**A**	**AG**

Pa mor bwysig neu ddibwys yn eich barn chi yw'r Gymraeg ar gyfer y gweithgareddau canlynol. Nid oes atebion cywir nac anghywir. Ticiwch y blwch priodol.

8).		Pwysig	Gweddol Bwysig	Gweddol Ddibwys	Dibwys
a)	cymdeithasu â chyfeillion				
b)	darllen				
c)	ysgrifennu				
d)	cael trafodaeth ddeallusol				
e)	gwylio'r teledu				
f)	cael swydd yng Nghymru				
g)	ymwneud â gweithgareddau diwylliannol Cymraeg - eisteddfodau etc.				
h)	gwneud astudiaethau trydyddol				
i)	mynd i'r eglwys/capel				
j)	siarad â'ch cyfoedion yn y coleg				
k)	cael swydd ym myd diwydiant/masnach/ rheoli				
l)	byw yng Nghymru				
m)	magu plant				
n)	siarad â thiwtoriaid yn y coleg				
o)	ymwneud â'r diwylliant poblogaidd cyfoes - cerddoriaeth/cyfryngau etc.				
p)	siarad ag athrawon eraill yn yr ysgol				
q)	cael gwaith yn y sector cyhoeddus - y gwasanaeth sifil, y cyfryngau, addysgu etc.				
r)	llwyddo yn y coleg				
s)	cael eich derbyn yn y gymuned				
t)	addysgu mewn ysgolion				

Dyma rai datganiadau ynglŷn â'r **Gymraeg a'r Saesneg.** Dywedwch a ydych yn **cytuno** neu'n **anghytuno** â'r datganiadau hyn. **Nid oes atebion cywir nac anghywir.** Atebwch drwy roi cylch am **UN** o'r canlynol.

CG = Cytuno'n Gryf	(rhowch gylch am **CG**)
C = Cytuno	(rhowch gylch am **C**)
HGNA = Heb Gytuno Nac Anghytuno	(rhowch gylch am **HGNA**)
A = Anghytuno	(rhowch gylch am **A**)
AG = Anghytuno'n Gryf	(rhowch gylch am **AG**)

9).	5)	4)	3)	2)	1)
a. Mae'n bwysig medru'r Gymraeg a'r Saesneg	**CG**	**C**	**HGNA**	**A**	**AG**
b. Mae medru'r Gymraeg a'r Saesneg yn fantais ddeallusol	**CG**	**C**	**HGNA**	**A**	**AG**
c. Bydd plant yn dysu wrth ddysgu Cymraeg a Saesneg	**CG**	**C**	**HGNA**	**A**	**AG**
d. Mae medru'r Gymraeg a'r Saesneg yn fantais wrth chwilio am swydd	**CG**	**C**	**HGNA**	**A**	**AG**
e. Mae'n bwysig gallu ysgrifennu yn Gymraeg a Saesneg	**CG**	**C**	**HGNA**	**A**	**AG**
f. Dylai pob ysgol yng Nghymru addysgu ei disgyblion i siarad Cymraeg a Saesneg	**CG**	**C**	**HGNA**	**A**	**AG**
g. Dylai arwyddion ffyrdd yng Nghymru fod yn Gymraeg a Saesneg	**CG**	**C**	**HGNA**	**A**	**AG**
h. Nid yw'n anodd siarad dwy iaith	**CG**	**C**	**HGNA**	**A**	**AG**
i. Dylai plant yng Nghymru ddysgu darllen Cymraeg a Saesneg	**CG**	**C**	**HGNA**	**A**	**AG**
j. Gall pobl sy'n siarad Cymraeg a Saesneg fod â chylch cymdeithasol ehangach na'r rhai sy'n siarad un iaith	**CG**	**C**	**HGNA**	**A**	**AG**
k. Dylid hysbysebu pob swydd yng Nghymru yn Gymraeg a Saesneg	**CG**	**C**	**HGNA**	**A**	**AG**
l. Bydd plant ifanc yn dysgu siarad Cymraeg a Saesneg yr un pryd yn rhwydd	**CG**	**C**	**HGNA**	**A**	**AG**
m. Dylai'r Gymraeg a'r Saesneg ill dwy fod yn bwysig yng Nghymru	**CG**	**C**	**HGNA**	**A**	**AG**
n. Dylai pob ffurflen brintiedig yng Nghymru fod yn Gymraeg a Saesneg	**CG**	**C**	**HGNA**	**A**	**AG**
o. Dylai'r gallu i siarad a darllen Cymraeg a Saesneg fod yn ofynnol ar gyfer swyddi yn y sector cyhoeddus yng Nghymru	**CG**	**C**	**HGNA**	**A**	**AG**
p. Dylai pob gwasanaeth cyhoeddus yng Nghymru fod ar gael yn Gymraeg a Saesneg (e.e. y llywodraeth, y cyfryngau, y llysoedd etc.)	**CG**	**C**	**HGNA**	**A**	**AG**
q. Hoffwn i mi gael fy ystyried yn un sy'n siarad Cymraeg a Saesneg	**CG**	**C**	**HGNA**	**A**	**AG**
r. Dylai pawb yng Nghymru siarad Cymraeg a Saesneg	**CG**	**C**	**HGNA**	**A**	**AG**
s. Byddwn yn hoffi i'm plant siarad Cymraeg a Saesneg	**CG**	**C**	**HGNA**	**A**	**AG**
t. Dylai'r Gymraeg a'r Saesneg gael eu trin yn gyfartal fel dwy iaith genedlaethol Cymru	**CG**	**C**	**HGNA**	**A**	**AG**
u. Nid oes angen i bobl wybod ond un iaith	**CG**	**C**	**HGNA**	**A**	**AG**

Mae cwestiynau 10-22 yn angenrheidiol at ddibenion ystadegol. A fyddech cystal ag ateb pob un o'r rhai sy'n gymwys i chi. (gweler y cyfarwyddiadau perthnasol)

10). **Ble cawsoch chi eich geni? (Enwch y wlad ac, os oes modd, y sir/rhanbarth)**

Gwlad _____ Sir/Rhanbarth _____

11). Am faint o amser yr ydych wedi byw yng Nghymru? (Ticiwch y blwch priodol)

0-1 flwyddyn ☐ 1-3 blynedd ☐ 4-6 blynedd ☐ 7-10 mlynedd ☐ 10+ o flynyddoedd ☐

12). Beth yw eich crefydd - os oes un gennych? (Enwch hi)

_____

13). P'un o'r canlynol sy'n disgrifio orau eich tarddiad ethnig? (Ticiwch y blwch priodol)

Cymro/ Cymraes ☐ Sais/ Saesnes ☐ Prydein-iwr(aig) ☐ Ewropead ☐

Gwyddel ☐ Alban-wr(aig) ☐ Arall* ☐ *Os arall, enwch ef

_____

14). P'un o'r disgrifiadau canlynol sy'n disgrifio orau eich gallu i siarad Cymraeg.

Dim Cymraeg ☐ **(Ewch yn syth i gwestiwn 18)**

Ychydig o Gymraeg ☐ **(Ewch i gwestiwn 15)**

Eithaf tipyn o Gymraeg ☐ **(Ewch i gwestiwn 15)**

Rhugl yn y Gymraeg ☐ **(Ewch i gwestiwn 15)**

15). P'un o'r disgrifiadau canlynol sy'n disgrifio orau eich defnydd cyfredol o'r Gymraeg?

Anaml y byddaf yn siarad Cymraeg ☐ Hanner a hanner ☐

Ambell waith ☐ Y rhan fwyaf o'r amser ☐

16). Ai'r Gymraeg yw'ch iaith 1af neu'ch ail iaith?

Iaith 1af ☐ Ail iaith ☐

(Ewch yn syth i gwestiwn 19) **(Ewch i gwestiwn 17)**

17). Os ydych wedi dysgu Cymraeg fel ail iaith, ble y gwnaethoch chi ddysgu Cymraeg? e.e. ysgol gynradd, coleg, wlpan etc. (Enwch ef/hi)

_____ **(Ewch yn syth i gwestiwn 19)**

18). Os nad ydych yn medru'r Gymraeg ar hyn o bryd, a fyddech chi'n fodlon ei dysgu fel ail iaith?

Na fyddwn ☐ Byddwn ☐ Ddim yn gymwys ☐

19). A ydych yn deall Cymraeg?

Dim Cymraeg ☐ Ychydig o Gymraeg ☐ Eithaf tipyn o Gymraeg ☐ Rhugl yn y Gymraeg ☐

20). A oes unrhyw aelod o'ch teulu yn siarad Cymraeg? (Gall hyn gynnwys aelodau o'ch teulu ehangach - tad-cu/taid, mam-gu/nain, ewythr/modryb, cefndryd etc)

Nac oes ☐ Oes* ☐ *Os oes, enwch hwy

_____

21). Ar wahân i'r Gymraeg a/neu'r Saesneg, a ydych yn siarad unrhyw ieithoedd eraill yn rhugl?

Nac ydwyf ☐ Ydwyf* ☐ *Os ydych, enwch hi neu hwy

_____

22). A ydych yn dymuno parhau i fyw yng Nghymru ar ôl cwblhau eich cwrs?

Nac ydwyf ☐ Ydwyf ☐

Yn olaf, byddwch cystal â rhoi atebion mor llawn ag y gallwch i gwestiynau 23-28.

23). Yn eich barn chi, beth yw elfennau pwysicaf/mwyaf arbennig diwylliant a chymdeithas yng Nghymru?

24). Beth yw eich barn am gynulliad Cymreig a/neu Gymru annibynnol?

25). A oes angen i chi fedru'r Gymraeg i fod yn Gymro neu'n Gymraes?

26). Beth yw eich barn am fanteision a/neu anfanteision Cymru ddwyieithog? (Cymraeg a Saesneg ei hiaith)?

27). Beth yw eich barn am ofynion y Cwricwlwm Cenedlaethol i addysgu'r Gymraeg ym mhob ysgol yng Nghymru?

28). Beth yw eich barn am ymagwedd eich sefydliad hyfforddi athrawon eich hun at y Gymraeg?